Pope v. The State of Texas

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

MATTHEW POPE, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-1225-O-BP

§

STATE OF TEXAS, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this civil rights case, the Plaintiff, Matthew Pope (“Pope”), sues the State of Texas and

the North Richland Hills Municipal Court (“the Municipal Court”) for violating his constitutional

rights. On December 11, 2023, Pope (“Pope”) filed a civil complaint accompanied by a long-form

motion/application to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF Nos. 1 and 4. Also on that same date, the

case was referred to the undersigned for judicial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and

Special Order 3. ECF No. 5. On February 15, 2024, the undersigned ordered Pope to answer a

questionnaire as part of this screening process and required him to return it by March 18, 2024.

ECF No. 8. On March 13, 2024, Pope did so. ECF No. 9. After considering the pleadings,

questionnaire response, and applicable legal authorities, and as part of the judicial screening

process under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the undersigned RECOMMENDS that United States

District Judge Reed O’Connor DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Pope’s claims against the

State of Texas and DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE his claims against the Municipal Court under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii).

I. BACKGROUND

Pope argues that officers of the North Richland Hills Police Department violated his Fourth

Amendment rights on August 12, 2023 by pulling him over without probable cause to believe that

he lacked insurance or registration for his car. ECF No. 1 at 1. He also appears to argue that this

traffic stop violated his constitutional right to travel. ECF No. 1 at 1-2. He further argues that the

officers violated his Fifth Amendment rights, presumably under the Takings Clause, by

impounding his car. Id.

As a result of the traffic stop, Pope was “charged with an expired registration, failure to

display valid insignia with a failure to maintain responsibility” and “driving while license invalid.”

ECF No. 9 at 3. He was scheduled for a jury trial on December 19, 2023. Id. at 13. Pope explains

that because he “unlawfully spent a night in the North Richland Hills Jail the Judge granted [him]

time served with a ple[a] of no contest,” which he claims he “gave under Duress because no other

form of remedy or relief was offered to [him] legally.” Id. at 3. He complains that the Municipal

Court’s presiding judge treated him poorly during his court appearance, claiming that the judge

“railroaded” him and demanded that he enter a plea, while also interrupting him numerous times.

ECF No. 1 at 2. He argues that this behavior amounts to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 18

U.S.C. § 242. ECF No. 1 at 1. Pope also claims he asked the judge and prosecutor to show him

their license to practice law via a Rule 12 challenge, but that they did not do so. ECF No. 9 at 21;

Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 12. In the interest of liberally construing his complaint, the undersigned also

interprets Pope to bring a Due Process Clause cause of action relating to his treatment during the

traffic court proceedings.

The official website of the Municipal Court reflects that Pope received citations for

“expired registration/fail to display valid insignia” (Citation B0681594-01), “fail to maintain

financial responsibility” (B0681594-02), and “driving while license invalid-DWLI” (B0681594-

03). See https://www.municipalrecordsearch.com/northrichlandhillstx/Cases last accessed on

October 21, 2024). The website also reflects that Pope pleaded “no contest” to the first citation

and “not guilty” to the second and third citations. Id. The website states that he was convicted of

each of the charges on February 28, 2024. Id. The Court takes judicial notice of the information

concerning Pope’s citations at issue under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2). Nothing suggests

Pope has attempted to appeal these convictions in state court.

Pope also provides a detailed “Declaration to Federal Court” describing numerous issues

unrelated to the August 12, 2023 traffic stop and subsequent criminal cases. ECF No. 9 at 16-23.

These issues can be grouped into four general arguments. First, he argues that the 3rd District

Court of Tarrant County and its probation officers violated his state and federal constitutional

rights during an unrelated state criminal prosecution and subsequent probation that transpired in

2019 through 2021. Id. at 16-17. Second, he discusses issues at the homeless shelter and halfway

house where he lived during that period (while on parole and before having probation revoked).

Id. at 19-20. Third, he also describes two incidents in which he claims he was “unlawfully detained

for playing electric guitar in public,” one on December 27, 2022, and another on March 13, 2024.

ECF No. 9 at 20-21, 22. Fourth, he argues generally that Texas has breached its contracts with him

and that he is “proposing a new contract with Texas and all the other entities I listed.” ECF No. 9

at 23.

Although several of these “incidents” mentioned in the Declaration arguably involved the

State of Texas, the Municipal Court was not a party to any of them. Pope seeks unspecified

monetary and injunctive relief and restitution from the State of Texas and the Municipal Court. To

the extent he also pursues restitution concerning the impoundment of his car, Pope asserts no facts

to show that the State of Texas or the Municipal Court was involved in the impoundment. ECF

No. 9 at 6.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Section 1915 Screening

When a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is authorized to screen

plaintiff’s case to determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant that is immune from such a claim. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Newsome v. E.E.O.C., 301 F.3d 227, 231-33 (5th Cir. 2002). A

complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2009). A complaint

lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 326-27; Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999). To state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face” with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Pursuant to this provision, the

Court may review a complaint and dismiss sua sponte those claims premised on meritless legal

theories and those that clearly lack any basis in fact. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31

(1992); Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. A finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the claims

describe “fantastic or delusional scenarios,” or “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly

incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of complaints that fail to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, courts must “take all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff ... and ask whether the pleadings contain ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Yumilicious Franchise, LLC v. Barrie, 819 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2016)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A statute of limitations may

support dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when it is evident from the plaintiff's pleadings that the

action is barred, and the pleadings fail to raise some basis for tolling or avoidance of the bar. Jones

v. ALCOA, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2003).

C. Pro Se Plaintiffs

The Court subjects the pleadings of pro se parties to less rigid analysis than those of a party

represented by counsel. “[A] pro se complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded,’ must be held to ‘less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

106 (1976) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). However, “even a liberally-

construed pro se . . . complaint must set forth facts giving rise to a claim on which relief may be

granted.” Levitt v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 847 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Bounds v.

Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825-26 (1977)). Thus, a court inquires “whether within the universe of

theoretically provable facts there exists a set which can support a cause of action under [the]

complaint, indulgently read.” Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th Cir. 1976).

There is a “well-established policy that the plaintiff be given every opportunity to state a

claim.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Hitt v. City of

Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977)). It is federal policy to decide cases on the merits

rather than technicalities, and the Fifth Circuit thus recommends that suits be dismissed without

prejudice on Rule 12 motions. Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313

F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002). As a result, courts generally allow plaintiffs at least one opportunity

to amend following a Rule 12 dismissal on the pleadings, “unless it is clear that the defects are

incurable.” Great Plains Tr. Co., 313 F.3d at 329. An incurable defect may arise when a

complaint’s facts are “not actionable as a matter of law.” Id. In such situations, amendment would

be futile, and dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp., Inc., 342

F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 2003).

Courts may also appropriately dismiss an action with prejudice if the court finds that the

plaintiff has alleged his best case. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999). If the

court “outline[s] in [its] opinion the deficiencies” of plaintiff's pleading and “plaintiff nevertheless

cannot ... amend to satisfy [the relevant pleading standard,] the court can then dismiss the

complaint with the assurance that the plaintiff has been shown all the deference he is due.” Sims

v. Tester, No. 3:00-cv-0863-D, 2001 WL 627600, at *2-*3 (N.D. Tex. 2001).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The State of Texas has immunity from Pope’s claims against it.

Under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution, states may not be sued in federal court

unless they unequivocally consent to the suit or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of

power, unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate immunity. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984). Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars Pope’s

claims against the State of Texas.

However, there are three possible exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity: (1) for

claims seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against a state official under Ex Parte Young, 209

U.S. 123 (1908); (2) a state’s waiver or consent, Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267

(1997); and (3) Congress’s abrogation of the state’s immunity through section 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment, Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001).

Young allows only the granting of “prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing

violation of federal law” against state officers in their official capacities and does not allow

damages or other retrospective relief. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). Pope has not

named any individual defendants and has not stated any claims for specific injunctive relief. Thus,

the exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity under Ex Parte Young is unavailable to him on

all claims.

Pope neither pleaded nor directed the Court to authority showing that the State of Texas

has waived immunity or consented to suit for Texas state law claims. Indeed, Congress has not

abrogated Texas’ Eleventh Amendment immunity for breach of contract or tort claims, and Texas

has not consented to suit in federal court. See Duncan v. Univ. of Tex. Health Science Ctr. at Hous.,

469 F. App’x 364, 366 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (Texas contract and tort claims against

a state university were barred by sovereign immunity); Kitchens v. Tex. Dep’t of Human Res., 747

F.2d 985, 986 (5th Cir. 1984) (contract claims); Sherwinski v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 849, 852 (5th Cir.

1996) (tort claims); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.057 (West 2024) (explicitly

not providing for a waiver under the Texas Torts Claims Act for intentional torts). Accordingly,

the Eleventh Amendment bars any of Pope’s remaining state law claims against the State of Texas,

which Heck does not bar as explained below.

Pope neither pleaded nor directed the Court to authority showing that the State of Texas

has waived immunity or consented to suit for claims of violation of constitutional rights alleged

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. The law is clear that Texas has not waived immunity

or consented to suit under these sections. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 n.7 (1979)

(Ҥ 1983 does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the

immunity of the States[.]”); Baldwin v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 945 F. Supp.

1022, 1030 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (“Congress did not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment

immunity by enacting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985.”); Sessions v. Rusk State Hospital, 648

F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Section 1981 contains no congressional waiver of the state’s

Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). Accordingly, to the extent that the Court could liberally

construe Pope to state a claim against the State of Texas under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985,

the Eleventh Amendment bars such claims.

Because the State of Texas is immune under the Eleventh Amendment from Pope’s claims

in this case, the Court should dismiss those claims without prejudice. Warnock v. Pecos Cnty.,

Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996).

B. Heck v. Humphrey bars Pope’s Fourth Amendment, right to travel, and Due

Process claims relating to the August 12, 2023 traffic stop.

Since Pope was convicted of the traffic offenses at issue after pleading “no contest” or “not

guilty” to the citations, under the Heck doctrine he is unable to raise any civil rights violations that

call those conviction into question. Specifically, to the extent that Pope seeks to challenge the

criminal convictions against him relating to the August 12, 2023 traffic stop, the Court must

dismiss such challenge unless Pope demonstrates that the decision resulting in his confinement has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Pope’s claims about Fourth Amendment and right-

to-travel violations during the traffic stop and any Due Process claim he is bringing relating to his

treatment during traffic court proceedings under the Heck doctrine, since finding in his favor on

them would imply the invalidity of his convictions. Such a dismissal pursuant to Heck should be

with prejudice, precluding Pope from reasserting those claims unless he can demonstrate that the

Heck conditions have been satisfied. Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994); Stephenson

v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26, 27-28 (5th Cir. 1994). Further, claims barred by Heck are legally frivolous

unless the Heck conditions are met. Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1996).

C. The Court should dismiss Pope’s claims relating to the actions of the judge and

prosecutor in his court case and to their alleged violation of Rule 12 of the

Texas Rules of Judicial Administration.

The judge of the Municipal Court and the prosecutor of Pope’s case in that court are

immune from his claims. “Absolute judicial immunity extends to all judicial acts which are not

performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Kemp ex rel. Kemp v. Perkins, 423 F. App’x

409, 411 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1985)).

Similarly, prosecutorial immunity shields the unnamed prosecutor from liability for his or her

actions at Pope’s criminal trial, because “[p]rosecutors enjoy absolute immunity to initiate and

pursue criminal prosecutions.” Algoe v. State of Texas, No. 3:15-CV-1162-D (consol. with 3:15-

CV-1204-D), 2016 WL 6902154, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2016) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 430-32 (1976)), rec. adopted, 2016 WL 6893682 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2016), appeal

dismissed, No. 16-11799, 2017 WL 11776347 (5th Cir. 2017). “This immunity extends to

municipal prosecutors.” Id. (citing Melton v. Frank, 114 F.3d 1184 (5th Cir. 1997)).

Additionally, Pope refers to the Rule 12 of the Texas Rules of Judicial Administration

when explaining that he asked the presiding judge and the prosecutor to show him their law

licenses. ECF No. 9 at 21. However, “[a] request to inspect or copy a judicial record must be in

writing,” and Pope has not pleaded facts suggesting that he made this request in writing. Tex. R.

Jud. Admin. 12.6(a). Accordingly, Pope fails to state a claim against the Municipal Court, its

presiding judge, and assigned prosecutor.

D. Pope is not the proper party to bring charges under 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 18

U.S.C. § 242.

Pope appears to argue that the Municipal Court violated federal criminal statutes 18 U.S.C.

§ 241 and 18 U.S.C. § 242 because it has a “duty to prevent negligence” and engaged in

“deprivation of rights under color of law.” ECF No. 1 at 1. However, private citizens generally

have “no standing to institute a federal criminal prosecution and no power to enforce a criminal

statute.” Gill v. Texas, 153 F. App’x 261, 262 (5th Cir. 2005). Therefore, because only the

government, not Pope, can prosecute a defendant under these statutes, the Court should dismiss

claims against the Municipal Court for violations of federal criminal law.

E. The Court should dismiss Pope’s claims without leave to amend.

The decision to allow amendment of the pleadings is within the sound discretion of the

district court. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir.1994). In determining

whether to allow an amendment of the pleadings, the Court considers the following: undue delay

in the proceedings, undue prejudice to the opposing parties, timeliness of the amendment, and

futility of the amendment. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Chitimacha Tribe of

La. v. Harry L. Laws Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1163 (5th Cir.1982). However, “[a]t some point, a

court must decide that a plaintiff has had fair opportunity to make his case; if, after that time, a

cause of action has not been established, the court should finally dismiss the suit.” Jacquez v.

Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1986); Schiller, 342 F.3d at 563. Pope has pleaded his

best case after filing an Original Complaint and responding to the Court’s Questionnaire. Immunity

bars his claims for the most part, and amendment or revision of the pleadings will not change that

fact. The undersigned concludes that allowing Pope another opportunity to amend his lengthy

pleadings would be an inefficient use of the Court's resources, would cause unnecessary delay, and

would be futile.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court should dismiss Pope’s claims arising from his August 12, 2023 traffic stop

because they fail to state a claim and seek relief from defendants who are immune from the claims.

28 U.S.C. § 1915. The State of Texas is immune from suit in this Court under the Eleventh

Amendment, and Pope has not alleged facts to show that any exceptions to that immunity apply.

Likewise, the Heck doctrine bars claims against the Municipal Court because those claims call into

question Pope’s criminal convictions under the citations at issue that are subject to the Heck

doctrine. Further, liberally construing Pope’s claims as they relate to the Municipal Court’s judge

and prosecutor, absolute judicial immunity bars Pope’s claims against the judge, and prosecutorial

immunity bars his claims against the prosecutor. He has no claim against the judge or prosecutor

under Rule 12.6(a) of the Texas Rules of Judicial Administration, and he is not a proper party to

assert violations of 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 18 U.S.C. § 242.

Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Judge O’Connor DISMISS

WITHOUT PREJUDICE Pope’s claims against the State of Texas and DISMISS WITH

PREJUDICE his claims against the North Richland Hills Municipal Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). To the extent that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) bars Pope’s

claims against the Municipal Court, Judge O’Connor should dismiss the claims with prejudice,

subject to Pope’s right to reassert them later if the conditions under Heck are met.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties

in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions,

and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with

a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). In order to be specific, an

objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state

the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions,

and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific.

Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual

findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district

court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,

1417 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en banc), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).

It is so ORDERED on October 21, 2024.

Thad ie. en

Hal R. Ray, Jr.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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