The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
FREDDIE LEE HOBSON, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § No. 3:24-cv-2356-S (BT)
§
DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT, §
§
Defendant. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se plaintiff Freddie Lee Hobson filed this civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the Dallas Police Department (DPD). The allegations in the
complaint itself are sparse and vague. Hobson alleges only that DPD did not file a
“case” in violation of his due process rights. ECF No. 3 at 1. But Hobson attached
documents to his complaint that provide additional context for his claims. He
attaches a copy of a police report from October 2019 in which he complained that
an individual, whom he had previously reported for assault, assaulted and robbed
him. ECF No. 3 at 8. He also attaches copies of two citizen complaints in which he
complained that there was no court date for “two felony cases”—including a hit and
run case from 2018—and that the perpetrator bragged about how he “beat the
case.” See ECF No. 3 at 2, 3. Thus, Hobson appears to complain that DPD did not
arrest, and that the State did not prosecute, an individual (or individuals) who
harmed him in 2018 and 2019.1 But as set forth below, this kind of claim fails for
several reasons.
The Court should dismiss this case with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted—unless
Hobson satisfactorily shows through timely objections a basis to amend the
complaint to allege a plausible claim.
Legal Standards and Analysis
Because Hobson proceeds in forma pauperis (IFP), his complaint is subject
to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that statute, a district court
may summarily dismiss a complaint filed IFP if it concludes the action is: (1)
frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted;
or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with enough
specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Id. at 555. “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint is
1 It is unclear whether the individual who injured Hobson in 2018 is the same
person who assaulted and robbed him in 2019.
frivolous when it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the
factual contentions are “clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32
(1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The latter category
encompasses allegations that describe “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional”
scenarios, or that “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible[.]” Id.
at 33 (citations omitted).
1. Hobson’s claims against DPD should be dismissed because it is a nonjural
entity.
DPD—the only defendant that Hobson sues—is a servient department that
does not enjoy its own legal existence or capacity to sue or be sued under § 1983.
Therefore, the Court should dismiss Hobson’s claims against DPD. See, e.g.,
Gooden v. Todd, 2020 WL 6586714, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2020) (DPD lacks
authority to sue or be sued); Johnson v. Dallas Police Dep’t, 2004 WL 2964968, at
*2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2004), rec. accepted 2005 WL 119467 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18,
2005) (same).
2. Even if Hobson sued a proper defendant, his claims are not cognizable.
The Court understands Hobson to allege that DPD officers did not arrest,
and that the State did not prosecute, someone who harmed him. To the extent that
Hobson demands the arrest or prosecution of the individual or individuals who
harmed him, it is well established that a victim has no standing under Article III of
the Constitution to bring suit to demand the prosecution of the perpetrator of a
crime. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see also Lefebure v.
D’Aquilla, 15 F.4th 650, 654 (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (“But longstanding Supreme
Court precedent confirms that a crime victim lacks standing to sue a prosecutor for
failing to investigate or indict her perpetrator, due to lack of causation and
redressibility.”) (citation omitted).
To the extent that Hobson alleges that some state actor failed to protect him
from violence committed by private actors, he has not alleged that he enjoys any
kind of special status or relationship that would impose such a duty on the state
actor. The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to “protect the people from the
State, not to ensure that the State protect[s] them from each other.” DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). “The Due Process
Clause, the Court explained, forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life,
liberty or property without ‘due process of law,’ but its language cannot fairly be
extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those
interests do not come to harm by other means.” Cano v. Garcia, 2021 WL 2582581,
at *5 (W.D. Tex. June 22, 2021), rec. accepted 2021 WL 8444847 (W.D. Tex. July
13, 2021), aff’d as modified 2022 WL 1548671 (5th Cir. May 16, 2022) (internal
citation marks omitted) (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195).
There are some instances where a state can create a “special relationship”
with an individual, requiring the state to protect him from harm, such as “when
the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will” or
when the State places children in foster care. Id. (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at
195); Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849,
856 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1439 (5th Cir.
1990)). But those special relationships do not exist here.
Nor can Hobson rely on the state-created danger exception to DeShaney to
state a claim. “This exception has been recognized in other jurisdictions and
focuses on the use of a state’s authority to create a dangerous environment and
deliberate indifference to the plight of the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Covington, 675 F.3d
at 865). “Yet, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly declined to recognize this exception.”
Id. (citing Keller v. Fleming, 952 F.3d 216, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2020); Est. of Lance v.
Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 982, 1001 (5th Cir. 2014); Covington, 675
F.3d at 865); see also Sterling v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, ---F. Supp. 3d---,
2024 WL 420884, at *10 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 5, 2024) (“Defendants argue that the
state-created danger theory of substantive due process liability is not legally
cognizable in the Fifth Circuit. They are correct.”) (citing Fisher v. Moore, 73 F.4th
367, 372 & n.13 (5th Cir. 2023)) (collecting cases and noting that the Fifth Circuit
has “repeatedly declined to recognize” the state-created danger theory).
Even putting all those deficiencies aside, any claim premised upon a failure
to protect or a state-created danger is untimely. The relevant statute of the forum
state furnishes the limitations period for § 1983 claims, but federal law determines
the accrual date. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). In Texas, claims under
§ 1983 are governed by Texas’s two-year personal-injury limitations statute. TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a); King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803
F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2015). Under Fifth Circuit law, “the [limitations] period
begins to run ‘the moment the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an
injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured.’” See
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Russell
v. Bd. of Trustees, 968 F.2d 489, 493 (5th Cir. 1992)). Here, Hobson knew about
his injury, at the latest, in November 2021 when he complained that the individual
or individuals who harmed him had not been prosecuted. See ECF No. 3 at 2
(citizen complaint to DPD in which Hobson complained that he needed justice and
that the perpetrator of a crime against Hobson was bragging about “beat[ing] the
case”). But Hobson did not file this suit until September 18, 2024. Accordingly, his
claims are time-barred.
In sum, Hobson’s case should be dismissed. He only sued DPD, a nonjural
entity. But even if had sued a defendant with a jural existence, he would lack
standing to force the State to prosecute the individual or individuals who harmed
him, and any claims premised upon a failure to protect or the state-created danger
theory of substantive due process are not cognizable and are time-barred.
Leave to Amend
The ability to file objections to this recommendation (further explained
below) allows Hobson an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified above and
show the Court that this case should not be dismissed at this time and that the
Court should instead grant leave to amend. See Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16
F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“A court should freely give leave to
amend when justice so requires, but a movant must give the court at least some
notice of what his or her amendments would be and how those amendments would
cure the initial complaint’s defects. If the plaintiff does not provide a copy of the
amended complaint nor explain how the defects could be cured, a district court
may deny leave.”) (citations omitted)). But if Hobson fails to show through timely
objections that leave to amend should be granted, the Court should dismiss his
claims with prejudice.
Recommendation
Unless Plaintiff Freddie Lee Hobson satisfactorily shows through timely
objections a basis to amend the complaint to allege a plausible claim, the Court
should dismiss his complaint with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
SO RECOMMENDED.
September 24, 2024.
REBECCA RU{HERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services
Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).