Barnett v. Wal-Mart Inc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

SHIRLEY BARNETT CASE NO. 3:24-CV-00863

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

WAL-MART INC., ET AL. MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on reference from the District Court, is a Motion

to Remand [doc. #10] filed by Plaintiff Shirley Barnett. The motion is opposed. [doc. #12]. For

reasons set forth below, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Remand be DENIED.

Background

Plaintiff Shirley Barnett (“Barnett”) filed a Petition against Wal-Mart, Inc. (“Walmart”) and

Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC (“Walmart Louisiana”), collectively (“Defendants”), on December 29,

2023, in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Morehouse Parish, Louisiana. (Petition for Damages

[doc. #1-2, p. 1]). Barnett seeks damages stemming from a trip-and-fall accident at a Walmart

store on January 24, 2023. Id.

According to Barnett, she was visiting Walmart on January 24, 2023, when her feet became

entangled in a rug, causing her to fall. Id. Barnett alleges that Walmart employees failed to ensure

that the rug was properly maintained. Id. at p. 2. As a result of the fall, Barnett suffered both

physical injuries and mental anguish. Id.

Defendants removed the action to this Court on June 27, 2024. (Notice of Removal [doc.

#1]). Defendants’ basis for removal is diversity jurisdiction. Id. at p. 7. Barnett is a resident and

citizen of Louisiana. Id. at p. 2. Walmart is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of

business in Arkansas. Id. Walmart Louisiana is a Delaware limited liability company whose sole

member is Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, a Delaware limited partnership. Id. Wal-Mart Stores East,

LP has two partners: (1) WSE Management, LLC, (general partner) and WSE Investment, LLC

(limited partner), both of which are Delaware limited liability companies whose sole member is

Walmart. Id.

Barnett’s Petition for Damages, consistent with Louisiana law, did not specify the monetary

value of her claims. (Petition for Damages [doc. #1-2, pp. 2-3]). Defendants assert that the face

of Barnett’s Petition did not suggest the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. (Notice of

Removal [doc. #1, p. 3]). On February 12, 2024, Defendants received Barnett’s responses to

interrogatories and requests for production of documents, which included medical records

indicating that Barnett had incurred approximately $9,000 in medical expenses. Id. at p. 4.

On June 7, 2024, Defendants took the deposition of Barnett. Id. at p. 5. During the

deposition, Barnett disclosed details about her injuries, ongoing treatment, continued pain, and her

need for additional medical procedures, including ankle surgery and treatment for her lower back.

Id. at pp. 5-6. On June 24, 2024, Defendants received the deposition transcript and additional

medical records and bills, revealing that Barnett had incurred approximately $25,000 in medical

expenses to date, with further expenses expected for her continued treatment and surgery. Id. at p.

6. Defendants contend that this information demonstrated, for the first time, that the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000 and that this case was removable. Id. at pp. 6-7.

On July 30, 2024, Barnett filed the instant Motion to Remand. [doc. #10]. Therein, she

argues that Defendants failed to timely file their Notice of Removal. Id. at p. 2. Defendants

opposed the motion on August 12, 2024. [doc. #12]. First, Defendants argue that Barnett

misunderstands the timing requirements for removal, stating that removal is permissible within

thirty-days of receiving a “paper” that makes the case’s removability facially apparent, as long as

removal occurs within one year of the filing of the state court petition. Id. at p. 6. Defendants

assert that the June 24, 2024, receipt of Barnett’s deposition transcript and updated medical records

marked their first notice of the case’s removability, making their removal timely. Id. at pp. 9-12.

Defendants also contend that Barnett’s motion is untimely. Id. at p. 8. They argue that the

deadline to file the motion was July 29, 2024, and that by filing the motion on July 30, 2024,

Barnett waived her right to challenge any procedural defects in the removal. Id. at p. 9.

Barnett did not file a reply. Accordingly, the matter is ripe.

Law & Analysis

A defendant may remove an action from state court to federal court, provided the action is

one in which the federal court may exercise original jurisdiction. Manguno v. Prudential Prop.

and Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). The removing

defendant bears the burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction and ensuring

compliance with the procedural requirements of removal. Id. Because federal courts are courts of

limited jurisdiction, a suit is presumed to lie outside this limited jurisdiction unless and until the

party invoking federal jurisdiction establishes to the contrary. Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243

F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

To determine whether jurisdiction is present, courts consider “the claims in the state court

petition as they existed at the time of removal.” Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723 (citing Cavallini v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 264 (5th Cir. 1995)). “Any ambiguities are construed

against removal because the removal statute should be strictly construed in favor of remand.” Id.

(citing Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000)).

I. The Court Enjoys Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Walmart invoked the court’s subject matter jurisdiction via diversity, which requires

complete diversity of citizenship between plaintiff and defendants, and an amount in controversy

greater than $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The parties do not dispute that diversity of citizenship

exists. In order for there to be complete diversity, the parties must be “citizens of different States.”

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Barnett is a resident of and domiciled in Louisiana. (Notice of Removal

[doc. #1, p. 2]). Walmart is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Arkansas.

Id. Walmart Louisiana is a limited liability company. Id. Citizenship for a limited liability

company is determined by the citizenship of all of its members. MidCap Media Finance, L.L.C.

v. Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 314 (5th Cir. 2019). Walmart Louisiana’s sole member is

Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, a Delaware limited partnership. (Notice of Removal [doc. #1, p. 2]).

Wal-Mart Stores East, LP has two partners: (1) WSE Management, LLC (general partner) and

WSE Investment, LLC (limited partner), both of which are Delaware limited liability companies

whose sole member is Walmart. Id. Complete diversity of citizenship exists because the plaintiff

and defendants are not citizens of the same state.

The parties also do not contest that the amount in controversy is met. However, parties

can never consent to federal subject matter jurisdiction, and lack of such jurisdiction is a defense

which cannot be waived. Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996). The burden rests with

the removing defendant to establish by a preponderance that the amount in controversy is met.

Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723. To satisfy the preponderance standard, the removing defendant may

support federal jurisdiction “in either of two ways: (1) by demonstrating that it is facially apparent

from the petition that the claim likely exceeds $75,000 or (2) by setting forth the facts in

controversy—preferably in the removal petition, but sometimes by affidavit—that support a

finding of the requisite amount.” Grant v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 309 F.3d 864, 868 (5th

Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The test is whether it is more likely

than not that the amount of the claim will exceed $75,000. St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Greenberg,

134 F.3d 1250, 1253 n.13 (5th Cir. 1998).

Defendants assert in their Notice of Removal that on June 24, 2024, they received medical

records and bills demonstrating that Barnett had incurred approximately $25,000 in medical

expenses. [doc. #1, p. 6]. Additionally, Barnett’s deposition transcript revealed that she requires

ankle surgery to address a shifted rod or plate in her left ankle caused by her fall. [doc. #12-3, p.

6]. Courts have awarded a range of damages for ankle surgery claims. See Dennis v. The Finish

Line, Inc., 1999-1413 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/00); 781 So. 2d 12, 30 (a young woman sustained

serious injuries, including a broken ankle, after a two-car collision; the trial court awarded $75,000

in damages for the ankle injury); Johnson v. New Orleans Dep’t of Streets, 94-1542 (La. App. 4

Cir. 2/23/95), 650 So. 2d 1216, 1217 (a trial court awarded $25,000 in general damages to a

plaintiff who suffered a skinned knee and a twisted ankle after a sidewalk fall); Gardner v. Acosta

Sales, 03-573 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/12/03), 861 So. 2d 690, 691 (a guest passenger with a broken

ankle and other injuries was awarded $40,077 in medical expenses and general and special

damages). Based on these cases, Barnett could potentially be awarded medical expenses ranging

from $50,000 to $100,000. Further, Barnett testified that she will require further medical

treatments on her lower back due to the fall. (Notice of Removal [doc. #1, pp. 5-6]).

Barnett seeks damages beyond medical expenses. Her itemized damages list includes (1)

medical expenses (past, present, and future); (2) physical pain (past, present, and future); (3)

mental anguish (past, present, and future); (4) physical impairment (past, present, and future); and

(5) inconvenience (past, present, and future). (Petition for Damages [doc. #1-2, pp. 2-3]).

Louisiana juries commonly award damages for physical pain and mental anguish in slip-and-fall

cases. See Labarrera v. Boyd Gaming Corp., 2013-629 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1/30/14), 132 So. 3d 1018,

1022 (a jury awarded $30,000 for past and future physical pain and suffering and $15,000 for past

and future emotional distress to a plaintiff injured in a slip and fall); Lacy v. ABC Ins. Co., 97-1182

(La. App. 4 Cir. 4/1/98), 712 So. 2d 189, 191 (a jury awarded $50,000 for physical pain and

suffering to a plaintiff who slipped on a banana and injured her knee); Brown v. Breaux Bridge

Ventures, LLC, 2017-440 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/15/18), 239 So. 3d 319, 326 (a jury awarded $25,000

for past and future physical and mental pain and suffering and physical impairment after a plaintiff

fell in a casino parking lot and sustained multiple injuries). When taking into account the damages

Barnett seeks and the compensation commonly awarded by Louisiana juries, it is evident that the

amount in controversy is satisfied.

In summation, the Court concludes that the value of the relief sought by Barnett is well in

excess of the jurisdictional threshold for the exercise of diversity jurisdiction. The undersigned

finds that Defendants have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in

controversy exceeded $75,000 at the time of removal.

Accordingly, the Court finds that complete diversity of citizenship exists between the

parties and that the amount in controversy is met. Thus, the Court enjoys subject matter

jurisdiction in this case.

II. Timeliness of Remand

Barnett’s sole argument in her Motion to Remand is that Walmart was untimely in filing its

“Motion to Removal.” (M/Remand [doc. #10, p. 2]). “A motion to remand the case on the basis

of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the

filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a).” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “This 30-day limit

does not apply, however, to jurisdictional defects . . .” Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 69

(1996). The purpose of the thirty-day requirement is to ensure that procedural defects are raised

promptly, thereby reducing burdens on the parties and the courts. F.D.I.C. v. Loyd, 955 F.2d 316,

322 (5th Cir. 1992).

As noted above, Barnett did move to remand this case. However, her motion relied solely

on the ground that the notice of removal was not timely filed.

The Notice of Removal was filed on June 27, 2024. To preserve her right to object to

procedural defects in removal, Barnett was required to file her motion to remand within thirty days.

To determine the deadline for filing a motion to remand, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6

provides the method for computing time. Rule 6 states that the day of the event triggering the time

period—in this case, June 27—is not counted. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(A). The counting begins on

the following day, June 28. Rule 6 further provides that when a period is stated in days, “count

every day, including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.” FED. R. CIV. P.

6(a)(1)(B). Based on this computation, the thirtieth day fell on Saturday, July 27, 2024.

When, as here, the final day of a period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the

period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. FED. R.

CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C). Here, the next day that was not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday was

Monday, July 29, 2024. Therefore, Barnett was required to file her motion to remand by July 29,

2024. However, she filed the motion on July 30, 2024, one day late. As a result, Barnett waived

her right to object to any procedural defects in the removal.

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Remand be DENIED.

III. Timeliness of Removal

The undersigned finds that Barnett waived her right to challenge the timeliness of removal,

as it constitutes a removal defect. However, even assuming arguendo that Barnett timely filed her

motion to remand, Defendants’ removal was timely in this case.

Under the removal statute, a defendant must file a notice of removal: 1) within thirty days

after the defendant receives, through service or otherwise, a copy of the initial pleading setting

forth the claim for relief, or the summons, whichever period is shorter; or 2) if the case “stated by

the initial pleading is not removable,” within thirty days after defendant’s receipt, “through service

or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may

first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)

& (3).1

To trigger § 1446(b)’s first thirty-day removal period, the initial pleading must

“affirmatively reveal[] on its face that the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the minimum

jurisdictional amount of the federal court.” Chapman v. Powermatic, Inc., 969 F.2d 160, 163 (5th

Cir. 1992); Mumfrey v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 719 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2013). If a plaintiff wants

1 Other than dividing the thirty-day removal periods into separately numbered paragraphs, the

remaining changes brought by the Judicial and Venue Clarification Act (“JVCA”) do not

undermine the Fifth Circuit decisions regarding the thirty-day removal periods. See discussion,

infra.

the thirty-day period to run from the defendant’s receipt of the initial pleading, a plaintiff should

place in that pleading “a specific allegation that damages are in excess of the federal jurisdictional

amount.” Chapman, 969 F.2d at 163. 2

Barnett contends that Walmart should have removed the case within thirty days of her

initial pleading. (M/Remand [doc. #10. p. 2]). However, Barnett’s Petition does not satisfy

Chapman’s bright-line rule because it lacks a specific allegation that damages exceed the federal

jurisdictional threshold. Thus, the initial thirty-day removal window was not triggered.

The Fifth Circuit endeavored to establish another “bright-line” rule for purposes of §

1446(b)’s second thirty-day removal period. Bosky v. Kroger Texas, LP, 288 F.3d 208, 211 (5th

Cir. 2002). The court explained that

the information supporting removal in a copy of an amended pleading, motion,

order or other paper must be “unequivocally clear and certain” to start the time limit

running for a notice of removal under the second paragraph of section 1446(b).3

This clearer threshold promotes judicial economy. It should reduce “protective”

removals by defendants faced with an equivocal record. It should also discourage

removals before their factual basis can be proven by a preponderance of the

evidence through a simple and short statement of the facts. In short, a bright-line

rule should create a fairer environment for plaintiffs and defendants.

Id.

2 As the Fifth Circuit explained,

[t]he Chapman court had several practical ramifications in mind when it

announced this standard. By rejecting a so-called due-diligence standard, it

sought to promote efficiency by preventing courts from expending copious time

determining what a defendant should have known or have been able to ascertain

at the time of the initial pleading. Moreover, the Chapman court wanted to avoid

encouraging defendants to remove cases prematurely for fear of accidentally

letting the thirty-day window to federal court close when it is unclear that the

initial pleading satisfies the amount in controversy.

Mumfrey, 719 F.3d at 399 (internal citations omitted).

3 Now § 1446(b)(3).

This begs the question what must be included in an “other paper” to make it “unequivocally

clear and certain” that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold?

Despite some confusion,4 Bosky provided the lower courts with some guidance. The court

cited Fifth Circuit cases, such as S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., and Wilson v. Belin, that it

deemed consistent with its “unequivocally clear and certain” standard. Bosky, 288 F.3d at 212

(citing S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 491-92 (5th Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Belin, 20

F.3d 644, 651 n.8 (5th Cir. 1994)). In both S.W.S. Erectors and Wilson, the removals were

premised upon written evidence obtained from plaintiffs which acknowledged specific damage

figures that exceeded the federal jurisdictional minimum. Id.

In addition, Bosky relied on the different meanings attributable to “setting forth” and

“ascertained” – the two terms used to describe the information needed to trigger the first and

second thirty-day removal windows – to infer that the requisite trigger for the second removal

period necessarily is stiffer than Chapman’s bright-line rule for the initial removal period. Bosky,

288 F.3d at 211.

While it is difficult to conceive of a more demanding requirement than that set forth in

Chapman, i.e., a specific allegation that damages exceed the federal jurisdictional minimum, one

must recall that Bosky was decided under the mistaken premise that Chapman’s bright-line rule

had been degraded by subsequent amount-in-dispute cases, which, as it turns out, are inapposite.

See Mumfrey, 719 F.3d at 400. Consequently, Bosky should be read as imposing a trigger for the

second removal period that is at least as strict as that set forth in Chapman.5

4 See Mumfrey, 719 F.3d at 400.

5 An unintended consequence of Bosky is that a defendant may be able to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the requisite jurisdictional

minimum, even though the pleadings and “other papers” do not suffice to trigger the § 1446(b)

Consistent with this interpretation, the “other paper[s]” that the Bosky defendants relied on

to support removal were documents that revealed actual medical expenses in excess of $75,000.

Bosky v. Kroger, Appellee Brief, 2001 WL 34127780. Even more telling is that more than thirty

days before removal, the defendants obtained discovery from the plaintiff stating that the plaintiff

would “not seek more than $500,000.00 for all of her damages and may seek less than this amount

. . . ” plus a written statement that the plaintiff’s medical damages were around $50,000. Id. By

finding removal timely, Bosky effectively held that the foregoing evidence was insufficient to

commence the thirty-day removal period. Rather, the thirty-day removal clock was not triggered

until defendant obtained written proof of actual damages that exceeded the jurisdictional

minimum.

Defendants assert that Barnett’s initial responses to interrogatories and requests for

production of documents in February 2024 indicated only approximately $9,207 in medical

expenses. (Opp. to M/Remand [doc. #12, p. 7]). Barnett herself acknowledged in her motion that

no statement from those responses suggested damages exceeding $75,000. (M/Remand [doc. #10,

p. 1]). Defendants contend that they could not ascertain the case’s removability until June 24,

2024, when they received Barnett’s deposition transcript and additional medical records. (Opp. to

M/Remand [doc. #12, p. 8]). The Fifth Circuit has confirmed that a deposition transcript qualifies

as an “other paper” for removal purposes. Morgan v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 879 F.3d 602, 607-

608 (5th Cir. 2018).

The deposition transcript indicates that Barnett intends to undergo ankle surgery. See

removal window(s). See Mumfrey, 719 F.3d at 400, n.13; Biggs v. Cajun Operating Co., No. 3:10-

CV-01847, 2011 WL 196096, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2011) (noting the incongruity between the

standard to satisfy amount in controversy and the standard to trigger mandatory removal).

(Deposition Transcript [doc. #12-3]). The medical receipts and records received on June 24, 2024,

along with the deposition transcript, revealed that Barnett had already incurred $25,000 in medical

expenses and would face additional costs for ankle surgery and further treatment for her lower

back. (Notice of Removal [doc. #1, pp. 5-6]). However, the undersigned finds that the deposition

transcript, medical records, and receipt do not unequivocally establish that the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000.

Defendants rely on several cases to argue that the “other papers” made it unequivocally

clear that the second thirty-day removal period was triggered. (Opp. to M/Remand [doc. #12, pp.

16-17]). However, these cases are distinguishable from the matter at hand. In Chambers v. Bielss,

the court found that the plaintiff’s first amended petition expressly claimed damages exceeding

$75,000, allowing the defendant to ascertain removability. No. CIV.A.3:08CV372KC, 2008 WL

5683483, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2008). Similarly, in Hinojosa v. Chowning, a settlement demand

letter triggered the second removal period because the plaintiff explicitly demanded one million in

damages. No. CIV.A. L-10-79, 2010 WL 4065487, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2010). By contrast,

the present case does not include a clear statement indicating that Barnett’s claims exceed $75,000;

the specific damages alleged amount to no more than $25,000. Furthermore, Defendants cited

Jones v. Chavez where the court held that the one-year removal deadline did not apply because the

plaintiff engaged in forum manipulation. No. CIV.A. 11-2039, 2012 WL 441251, at *2-3 (E.D.

La. Feb. 10, 2012). Here, however, neither the one-year limitation nor forum manipulation is at

issue.

Although the medical records and receipts show that Barnett has incurred $25,000 in

medical expenses, this amount falls short of exceeding $75,000. In time limit dispute cases,

Mumfrey explicitly rejected the principle from Bosky that “‘specific damage estimates that are less

than the minimum jurisdictional amount, when combined with other unspecified damage claims,

can provide sufficient notice that an action is removable . . .’” Mumfrey, 719 F.3d at 400 (quoting

Bosky, 288 F.3d at 210). Here, the specific damage estimate is $25,000, which is below the

minimum jurisdictional amount. Defendants cannot combine this figure with speculative costs for

Barnett’s potential ankle surgery or potential damages for mental anguish or inconvenience. The

Fifth Circuit created this bright-line rule to avoid Defendants from having to make such

assumptions and from having to combine unspecified, speculative damage claims. Therefore, the

Court finds that the deposition transcript and medical records were not unequivocally clear and

certain to trigger the second thirty-day removal period.

However, the “unequivocally clear and certain” standard is applied when a court is

determining whether a defendant has timely removed, not whether removal was permissive. Stated

differently, the § 1446(b)(3) thirty-day clock acts as a ceiling or limit on removal, not as a

jurisdictional floor. If, before the thirty-day clock starts, a defendant can demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional threshold is met, he or she may remove

without being required to “unlock” the thirty-day window by presenting “unequivocally clear and

certain” evidence. See Mumfrey, 719 F.3d at 400, n.13 (even if defendant could have removed the

suit, the allegations did not start the clock such that defendant was required to remove).

As outlined above, Defendants have established by a preponderance of the evidence that

the amount in controversy is met. Additionally, the Court has determined that complete diversity

of citizenship exists. Therefore, although the second thirty-day removal period was not triggered,

Defendants were permitted to remove the case by establishing that subject matter jurisdiction

exists.

Accordingly, even if Barnett had timely filed her motion to remand, Defendants properly

and timely removed this case, and thus, it would be recommended that the Motion to Remand be

DENIED on that basis.

Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Remand [doc. #10] filed by Plaintiff Shirley

Barnett be DENIED.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties have

fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file specific, written

objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party’s objections within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. A courtesy copy of any objection or

response or request for extension of time shall be furnished to the District Judge at the time of

filing. Timely objections will be considered by the District Judge before he makes a final ruling.

A PARTY’S FAILURE TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THIS

REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF ITS SERVICE SHALL

BAR AN AGGRIEVED PARTY, EXCEPT ON GROUNDS OF PLAIN ERROR, FROM

ATTACKING ON APPEAL THE UNOBJECTED-TO PROPOSED FACTUAL FINDINGS

AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS ACCEPTED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE.

In Chambers, at Monroe, Louisiana, on this 25" day of November, 2024.

fi MeCles _

KAYLA 'LUSKY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

15