Raymond Douglas Hardy v. Singleton

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

RAYMOND DOUGLAS HARDY PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 1:24-cv-01062-SOH-BAB

JUDGE SPENCER SINGLETON;

CARLA GIBSON; and

PUBLIC DEFENDER ANDREW BEST DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Raymond Douglas Hardy filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff

proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. The case was directly assigned to the undersigned

Magistrate Judge. However, because not all parties to the action have consented to the

jurisdiction of the undersigned, and this document will be dispositive of Plaintiff’s claims, this

document will be filed as a Report and Recommendation and the case will automatically be

reassigned to Chief United States District Judge Susan O. Hickey. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and General Order 2024-02.

The case is before the Court for preservice screening under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(a). Pursuant to § 1915A(a), the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which

a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental

entity.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on September 16, 2024. (ECF No. 1). The Court

1

provisionally filed Plaintiff’s Complaint and ordered him to submit a completed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) Application. (ECF No. 3). Plaintiff filed his IFP Application on September 27, 2024,

(ECF No. 5). Plaintiff was granted IFP status on October 15, 2024. (ECF No. 6).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff names Judge Spencer G. Singleton, Prosecuting Attorney Carla

R. Gibson, and Public Defender Andrew Best as Defendants. (ECF No. 1, pp. 2-3). Plaintiff

claims all three Defendants are illegally holding him incarcerated. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff also

claims Defendant Gibson is violating his due process rights by “obstruction of the law and holding

me.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff argues his “60th day” is being miscalculated. Id. Plaintiff also claims

Defendant Gibson falsified his documents and criminal charges. Id. Finally, Plaintiff claims

Defendant Best provided insufficient counsel as his public defender. Id. at 8.

Plaintiff alleges his claims against Defendants in both their individual and official

capacities. Id. at 8. Plaintiff seeks both punitive and compensatory damages and injunctive

relief. Id. at 9.

II. APPLICABLE STANDARD

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court must dismiss a

complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be

false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather

than to vindicate a cognizable right. In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer

v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987). A claim fails to state a claim upon which

2

relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that the Defendants acted

under color of state law, and that the actor violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the

Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009

(8th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, the deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not

suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under Section 1983. Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). Lastly, Defendants

must have been personally involved and caused the violation alleged. “Liability under section

1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights. To establish

personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [Plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal

involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights.” Clemmons

v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128,

1132 (8th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff’s claims shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears

beyond a doubt the Plaintiff’s complaint can prove no set of facts to support the plaintiff’s

purported cause of action. See Schaller Tel. Co. v. Golden Sky Sys., Inc., 298 F.3d 736, 740 (8th

Cir. 2001).

“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we

hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). However, even a pro se Plaintiff must allege specific

facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).

3

III. DISCUSSION

First, the Court notes Plaintiff is challenging his imprisonment in his Complaint. Plaintiff

may not use Section 1983 as a substitute for habeas relief, instead, he must pursue such claims

through the proper avenue of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018,

1023 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Section 2254 is the only means by which ‘a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court’ may raise challenges to the validity of his conviction or sentence or

to the execution of his sentence.”) (quoting Crouch v. Norris, 251 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2001)).

Furthermore, even if Plaintiff stated cognizable Section 1983 claims in his Complaint, the

Defendants named are improper defendants under Section 1983.

First, Judge Singleton enjoys complete judicial immunity. “Few doctrines were more

solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges for liability for damages for acts

committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967)

(explaining the common law principle of judicial immunity was not abolished by Section 1983).

The Supreme Court “has pronounced and followed this doctrine of the common law for more than

a century.” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199 (1985). Judicial immunity is only overcome

in two narrow situations: (1) if the challenged act is non-judicial; and (2) if the action, although

judicial in nature, was taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502

U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Schottel v. Young, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 2012). Moreover, “[a] judge

will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously,

or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in

the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (citations

omitted).

4

Plaintiff did not allege Judge Singleton acted outside his jurisdiction. His only complaint

is that Judge Singleton will not release him from jail based on an improper calculation of his days

served. Clearly, determinations of release of a defendant in case pending before him, fall within

Judge Singleton’s normal judicial activity. See Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1091

(explaining that judicial immunity applies if the act complained of is one normally performed by

a judge and if the complaining party is dealing with the judge in his judicial capacity).

Next, Defendant Gibson, as prosecutor, also is immune from suit in her role as prosecutor

for Union County, Arkansas. The Supreme Court established the absolute immunity of a

prosecutor from a civil suit for damages under Section 1983 “in initiating a prosecution and in

presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). This immunity

extends to all acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”

Id. at 430. Furthermore, immunity is not defeated by “[a]llegations of unethical conduct and

improper motive in the performance of prosecutorial functions.” Sample v. City of Woodbury,

836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2016). “[A] prosecutor is immune from suit even if he knowingly

presented false, misleading, or perjured testimony . . . or withheld or suppressed exculpatory

evidence.” Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1089 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal citations

omitted).

Finally, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Best, as a public defender, also fail as a matter

of law. “The conduct of counsel, either retained or appointed, in representing clients, does not

constitute action under color of state law for purposes of a Section 1983 violation.” Bilal v.

Kaplan, 904 F.2d 14, 15 (8th Cir. 1990). See also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)

(holding “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s

traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding”).

5

Furthermore, all official capacity claims asserted by Plaintiff against all Defendants must

fail as a matter of law. Under Section 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his personal

capacity, or in his official capacity, or claims may be stated against a defendant in both his personal

and his official capacities. The type of conduct that is actionable and the type of defense available

depend on whether the claim is asserted against a defendant in his official or individual capacity.

See Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). “Claims

against individuals in their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the entity for which

they work; they require proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff’s rights,

and the only type of immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself.” Id. Personal

capacity claims “are those which allege personal liability for individual actions by officials in the

course of their duties; these claims do not require proof of any policy and qualified immunity may

be raised as a defense” to these individual capacity claims. Id. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, Plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law, and that the actor

violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,

48 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.1999).

Plaintiff did not allege any policy, procedure, or custom of Union County caused any of

his complaints. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state any official capacity claims against any

Defendant.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is recommended Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) be dismissed

without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.

6

Referral Status: Referral in this case should be terminated.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file

timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties

are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by

the district court.

DATED this 7th day of November 2024.

/s/ Barry A. Bryant

HON. BARRY A. BRYANT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

7