The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
KELLYANN McKENZIE,
Plaintiff,
1:24-CV-6812 (LTS)
-against-
TRANSFER ORDER
CRAIG BROWN,
Defendant.
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Kellyann McKenzie, of Huntington, Massachusetts, brings this pro se action
under the court’s diversity jurisdiction, seeking damages. She sues Craig Brown, whom she
describes as the father of her child,1 and whom, she alleges, resides in Brooklyn, Kings County,
New York. For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action, under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a),
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
DISCUSSION
The applicable venue provision for Plaintiff’s claims is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b),
which provides that, unless otherwise provided by law, a federal civil action must be brought in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents
of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if
there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in
this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s
personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
1 Pursuant to Rule 5.2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, court submissions that
refer to a minor child may only do so by using the child’s names initials, and to a person’s date of
birth by using the person’s birth year. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(2), (3). In her complaint, Plaintiff
reveals the full name and complete date of birth of her minor child. Thus, in an abundance of
caution, the Court has directed the Clerk of Court to limit electronic access to the complaint to a
“case participant-only” basis.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the judicial district where
the person is domiciled, and any other “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued,” if a
defendant, resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect
to the civil action in question. § 1391(c)(1), (2).
Plaintiff alleges that Brown resides in Brooklyn, Kings County, New York (ECF 1, at 4-
5), which lies within the Eastern District of New York,2 see 28 U.S.C. § 112(c). Thus, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, not this court, is a proper venue for
this action under Section 1391(b)(1). In addition, because Plaintiff alleges that the events that are
the bases for her claims occurred in St. Albans, Queens County, New York (ECF 1, at 5), which
also lies within the Eastern District of New York, see § 112(c), the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York is also a proper venue for this action under Section
1391(b)(2). As Plaintiff does not allege that any of the events that are the bases for her claims
occurred within this judicial district, this court is not a proper venue for this action under Section
1391(b)(2).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), if a plaintiff files a case in the wrong venue, the Court “shall
dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which
it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The defendant resides in the Eastern District of
New York and the alleged events that are the bases for Plaintiff’s claims also occurred within that
judicial district. Accordingly, venue lies in the United States District Court for the Eastern
2 The judicial district for this court, the Southern District of New York, is comprised of
the following New York State counties: (1) New York (New York City Borough of
Manhattan);(2) Bronx (New York City Borough of the Bronx); (3) Westchester; (4) Dutchess;
(5) Rockland; (6) Orange; (7) Putnam; and (8) Sullivan. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(b).
District of New York, see § 1391(b)(1), (2), and, in the interest of justice, this Court transfers this
action to that court, see § 1406(a).
CONCLUSION
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to transfer this action to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Whether Plaintiff should be
permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the
transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this court. This order closes this action in this
court.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order
would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for the
purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 12, 2024
New York, New York
/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
Chief United States District Judge