Smith v. Davenport

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KECITE RENEE SMITH CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-2149

JACQUELEN DAVENPORT, ET AL. SECTION “G”(4)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct a hearing,

including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary, and to submit proposed findings and

recommendations for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), § 1915e(2), and

§ 1915A, and as applicable, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) and(2). Upon review of the record, the Court

has determined that this matter can be disposed of without an evidentiary hearing.

I. Complaint (ECF No. 4)

Plaintiff Kecite Renee Smith (“Smith”) is a pretrial detainee housed in the St. Tammany

Parish Jail (“STPJ”) in Covington, Louisiana. ECF No. 4, ¶III(a), at 4. Smith filed this pro se and

in forma pauperis suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants inmate Jacquelen

Davenport and STPJ Correctional Officers Fonitno and Burgess. Id. at 1; id., ¶III(B) and (D), at

5. She also lists as defendants all STPJ correctional officers in D building, the STPJ medical staff

and nurses, and all inmates in “dormitory 300 in building D, pod 1.” Id. at 1; id., ¶III(C), (E), and

(F), at 5.

Under a broad reading of the Complaint, Smith alleges that she is being harassed by inmate

Davenport and a number of guards and inmates at the direction of Davenport. ECF No. 4, ¶IV, at

5-6. Smith claims that Davenport is a trustee inmate who serves the meals in her dormitory and

has influence over everyone in the dorm. Id. She claims that she is not supposed to be in contact

with Davenport because Davenport filed a PREA complaint against her. Id. However, because

Davenport is a trustee, she is constantly in the dormitory serving food trays and telling other

inmates about Smith. Id.

Smith claims that Davenport encourages other unidentified inmates, and now some

unidentified guards, to kill Smith upon her release from jail. ECF No. 4 at 6-8, 9-10. Smith further

alleges that Davenport “hotshot”1 Smith in jail by telling unidentified inmates and guards that

Smith filed a lawsuit against Davenport and certain correctional officers who favor Davenport and

allow her to fraternize in the hallways while she passes out meals. Id. Smith claims that these

officers, who are not identified, allowed Davenport to lie about an alleged rape on the PREA

complaint. Id. She further claims that this harassment by Davenport has caused her to be

“mentally disturbed.” Id. at 7. Smith also claims that she has not seen a psychiatrist, which has

caused her trauma and to fear for her life. Id. at 8.

Smith also claims that on August 19, 2024, Davenport served plaintiff her lunch but played

with the food on her tray before giving it to Officer Burgess to hand out to plaintiff. ECF No. 4 at

11. Smith claims that the tray had trash on it and the food was mixed up. Id. Smith alleges that

she placed the tray back on the trap door and said she did not want it. Id. She further claims she

was the only one in the dorm who received a messed up tray. Id. Another inmate walked up to

receive her lunch and Officer Burgess told her not to take Smith’s tray because something was

wrong with it. Id. Officer Burgess and Davenport gave other inmates different trays and left

Smith’s tray on the trap and did not move it. Id. at 12. Smith also complains that at another time,

1 Smith does not define this term.

2

Officer Burgess would not allow her to have toenail clippers while other inmates were allowed to

have hair clippers that same day.

Smith also claims that on August 20 or 21, 2024, Officer Fonitno allowed an inmate to

receive a tray meant for another inmate. ECF No. 4 at 12-13. However, on one date, when an

inmate gave her tray to Smith, Officer Fonitno took the tray away from Smith as harassment and

to show favoritism just so plaintiff would not have it. Id. Smith claims Officer Fonitno harassed

and threatened her again on August 22, 2024. Id. She also alleges, without any context, that Nurse

CeCe showed favoritism through the door trap during medical call on August 26, 2024. Id. at 14.

As relief, Smith seeks compensation for her “mentally challenge” and torture by inmates

and correctional officers. ECF No. 4, ¶V, at 15. She also seeks compensation for pain and

suffering because Davenport still has contact with her despite the PREA complaint and because

she is mentally disturbed since they are plotting against her life. Id. She also seeks compensation

for mental and physical abuse and for defamation of character. Id. Smith also requests that the

PREA charges against her be dropped. Id.

II. Standards for Frivolousness Review

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), the Court is

required to sua sponte dismiss cases filed by prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis upon a

determination that they are frivolous. The Court has broad discretion in determining the frivolous

nature of the complaint. See Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318, 325 (5th Cir. 1986), modified on other

grounds, Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 1993). However, the Court may not sua sponte

dismiss an action merely because of questionable legal theories or unlikely factual allegations in

the Complaint.

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Under this statute, a claim is frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir.

1998). “A [claim] lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal

theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not

exist.” Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d

882, 889 (5th Cir. 1998)). It lacks an arguable factual basis only if the facts alleged are “clearly

baseless,” a category encompassing fanciful, fantastic, and delusional allegations. Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28). Thus, the Court must

determine whether plaintiff’s claims are based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or clearly

baseless factual allegations. Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994); Jackson v.

Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1995); Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir. 1992).

III. Discussion

A. Improper Defendants

Among the named defendants, Smith included inmate Davenport, all STPJ correctional

officers assigned to her dormitory, the STPJ medical staff and nurses, and all inmates in her

dormitory. ECF No. 4 at 1. For the reasons that follow, these are not proper defendants under §

1983.

1. Inmate Davenport and Other Inmates

Smith asserts a number of grievances against Jacquelen Davenport, who is a trustee inmate

at STPJ. A plaintiff seeking to recover damages under § 1983 must establish that a defendant has

acted under color of state law in violating his rights. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,

156 (1978). The federal courts, however, have consistently held that an inmate, even a trustee

inmate, is not a state actor or a person acting under the color of state law for purposes of stating a

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claim under § 1983. See Batiste v. Gusman, No. 13-96, 2013 WL 6095833, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov.

20, 2013); Bland v. Terrebonne Par. Crim. Just. Complex, No. 09-4407, 2009 WL 3486449, at *3

(E.D. La. Oct. 23, 2009). Davenport, as an inmate, is a private person not a state actor.

A plaintiff can establish that a defendant acted under color of state law if the defendant

exercised power “‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer

is clothed with the authority of state law.’” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988); accord Johnson

ex rel. Wilson v. Dowd, 305 F. App’x 221, 223-24 (5th Cir. 2008); Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp.,

402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005). A private person may only be considered a state actor if the

plaintiff establishes that their actions are attributable to the State in this way. See Priester v.

Lowndes Cnty., 354 F.3d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 2004) (actions may be attributable to the state if the

private citizen is a willful participant in joint activity with a State or its agents). Otherwise, “the

under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no

matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50

(1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Smith has presented no facts to establish that Davenport’s alleged actions are attributable

to the State or that she acted jointly with any state official to violate a constitutionally protected

right.2 Her conclusory suggestion that Davenport has some influence over the correctional officers

is insufficient to establish the necessary level of joint activity or attribution to the State, much less

2 For the reasons discussed later in this Report, Smith has not stated a non-frivolous claim that any

constitutional right was violated by the state actor defendants.

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that any action by Davenport or the correctional officers amounted to a constitutional violation.3

Without such a showing, Davenport is not a state actor or proper defendant for purposes of § 1983.

The same would be true to the extent the court considers Smith’s broad assertions made

against “every” inmate in her dormitory. ECF No. 4 at 1. Not only are these individuals

unidentified, no specific constitutional claims have been asserted against any other specific inmate

and Smith has offered nothing to suggest that any inmate’s action were attributable to the State.

Because Smith fails to allege facts establishing that Davenport (or any other inmate) is a

state actor, her § 1983 claims against Davenport have no basis in federal law and are therefore

frivolous. Smith’s claims against Davenport should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and

§ 1915A as frivolous and for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

2. All Correctional Officers and All Medical Staff and Nurses

Smith also references as defendants all of the correctional staff in her dormitory and the

medical staff and nurses as defendants. ECF No. 4 at 1. These broad groups of people are not

properly named defendants. Instead, a § 1983 action must be filed against an actual identified

person who violated a constitutional right, not a department or general staff group at the jail. See,

e.g., Allen v. Gusman, No. 05-1633, 2006 WL 286007, at *3 n.8 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2006) (“Medical

Staff” is not a juridical entity capable of being sued; the specific medical personnel must be

3 Smith’s conclusory claims do not allege a conspiracy claim under § 1983. To do so, a plaintiff must show

(1) “an actual violation of [Section] 1983” and (2) “an agreement by the defendants to commit an illegal act.” Leggett

v. Williams, 277 F. App’x 498, 501 (5th Cir. 2008). Without an underlying § 1983 claim, no actionable conspiracy

claim exists. Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 341-42 (5th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Castellano v.

Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003). In addition, “[m]ere conclusory allegations of conspiracy cannot, absent

reference to material facts, state a substantial claim of federal conspiracy.” Id. (citing Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688,

690 (5th Cir. 1986)). In pleading specific facts of conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege the operative facts of the alleged

conspiracy. Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (5th Cir. 1987). Even under a broad reading of her

complaint, Smith has not met her burden of pleading a non-conclusory, non-frivolous conspiracy claim or a claim

sufficient to attribute Davenport’s actions to the State.

6

named); Carter v. Strain, No. 09-3401, 2009 WL 2390808, at *3 (E.D. La. July 31, 2009) (citing

August v. Gusman, No. 06-3962, 2008 WL 466202, at *7 (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 2008); Staritz v.

Valdez, No. 06-CV-1926, 2007 WL 1498285, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2007); and Banks v. United

States, No. 05-6853, 2007 WL 1030326, at *11 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2007)). Smith has failed to

name as a defendant any medical personnel or any correctional officers other than Fonitno and

Burgess who would be responsible for any constitutional violation.4

Accordingly, Smith’s broad claim against the medical staff and all correctional officers

should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e as frivolous

and for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.5

B. Claims Against Officers Burgess and Fonitno

Smith alleges that Officers Burgess and Fonitno show favoritism to inmate Davenport and

often harass and disparage Smith because of it, causing Smith mental anguish and emotional

4 The Court recognizes that Smith included one sentence in her complaint indicating that during meal pass-

outs on August 26, 2024, “Nurse CeCe (Michelle Coyner) was showing favoritism thru trap door for med call . . .”

Smith did not name this person as a defendant. Smith also provides no factual description of any event that could

possibly present a question of a constitutional magnitude. She does not explain what favoritism means or what act

somehow demonstrated favoritism to someone else over plaintiff that deprived her of a protected right. As noted

above, Smith cannot recover for any emotional upset caused by her being disfavored by prison personnel without

more. Thus, under the broadest possible reading of the complaint, Smith has failed to state a non-frivolous claim

against “Nurse CeCe (Michelle Coyner)” even if she had been named as a defendant.

5 As discussed in this Report, Smith has failed to identify a constitutional violation occurring at the jail. For

this reason, it is unnecessary to afford Smith an inherently futile opportunity to file an amended complaint to name

these officers and medical staff. See, e.g., Smith v. Terrebonne Par. Crim. Just. Complex, No. 14-2207, 2014 WL

5780696, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 4, 2014) (“[T]he Court need not give plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint

to name a proper defendant, because it is clear that his underlying claim is frivolous and/or fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted . . .”); see also Martzen v. McLane, 764 F. App’x 402, 403 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that a

plaintiff need not be given an opportunity to amend if he has “already alleged his best case and . . . any further

amendment would not have stated a valid § 1983 claim”).

7

upset.6 ECF No. 4 at 6-8. Smith’s claims fail to state non-frivolous claim of a constitutional

violation.7

1. Verbal Abuse and Harassment

Plaintiff complains that Officers Burgess and Fonitno at differing times used verbally

abusive and harassing words and actions. ECF No. 4 at 6-8. She also complains that Officer

Burgess denied her request for toenail clippers when other inmates got hair clippers that same day.

Smith’s claims do not invoke the Constitution.

It is well settled that crude, unprofessional, or harassing remarks, even verbal threats by

prison staff to an inmate, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Field v. Corr. Corp.,

364 F. App’x 927, 930 (5th Cir. 2010); Orange v. Ellis, 348 F. App’x 69, 72 (5th Cir. 2009)

(“[C]laims of verbal harassment do not reveal a constitutional violation. Mere words are not

sufficient to support a Section 1983 claim.”); Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730, 734 (5th Cir.

2002) (holding that “claims of verbal abuse are not actionable” constitutional claims); Robertson

v. Plano City of Texas, 70 F.3d 21, 24 (5th Cir. 1995) (same) Bender v. Brumley, 1 F.3d 271, 274

n.4 (5th Cir. 1993) (same). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has consistently rejected retaliation and

harassment claims based solely on a prison’s guards use of threatening or derogatory language.

Gibson v. Jean-Baptiste, 802 F. App’x 858, 859-60 (5th Cir. 2020).

6 Smith mentions physical abuse in her request for relief but otherwise fails to indicate any physical contact

or altercation with either Burgess or Smith.

7 Regardless of whether an inmate is a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner, the standard of liability is the

same for episodic acts or omissions of jail officials of the type alleged in this case. Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston,

185 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1999); Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 104 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996); Hare v. City of Corinth,

Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996). The duty under both the 8th and 14th Amendments is for the prison officials

“to provide both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates with basic human needs, including medical care and

protection from harm, during their confinement” and liability for failure to do so only attaches when “the official had

subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to a pretrial detainee but responded with deliberate

indifference to that risk.” Id. at 650. Smith’s complaint fails to state a non-frivolous claim against either officer under

these standards applicable to the episodic events about which she complains. See Olabisiomotosho, 185 F.3d at 526.

8

When addressing similar claims in Field, the Fifth Circuit found that the inmate failed to

present a nonfrivolous claim for review when he alleged he was housed with an inmate who

verbally and physically threatened him and claimed that he was verbally and mentally abused by

the staff and other inmates. 364 F. App’x at 930. The same is true here in Smith’s case. Smith

has not stated sufficient facts to support a plausible claim of a constitutional violation. Simply put,

Smith’s “[c]laims of hurt feelings, humiliation, and other heartfelt, yet objectively trivial

indignities, are not of Constitutional moment . . .” Jackson v. Liberty Cnty., 860 F. Supp. 360, 363

(E.D. Tex. Jul. 26, 1994).

As for the alleged toenail clipper incident, Smith alleges no facts that show the denial of

toenail clippers was inhumane or that Officer Burgess was aware of or caused Smith to be in any

substantial risk of serious harm. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (prison and jail

officials must provide humane conditions of confinement guided by “contemporary standards of

decency.”); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (a prisoner must allege facts showing

she is “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm”). Smith’s claim

does not state a constitutional violation.

Furthermore, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), “[n]o federal civil action may be brought by a

prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury

suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” Smith essentially alleges

that on a number of occasions she endured emotional trauma as a result of inmate Davenport and

Davenport’s influencing of other inmates and guards to threaten and verbally mistreat Smith during

meal deliveries. ECF No. 4 at 6-8. Neither the alleged verbal abuse by guards nor an occasional

missed meal, as discussed in the next section, alleges a physical injury to Smith that is sufficient

to overcome the § 1997e(e) bar to recovery for emotional injury.

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For these reasons, Smith’s allegations fails to state a non-frivolous claim. Smith’s claims

should be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e) and § 1915A as frivolous and otherwise for failure to

state a claim for which relief can be granted.

2. Missed Meals

Smith claims that on one occasion the food tray served to her by Davenport and Officer

Burgess was in disarray and had trash on it, and that when she returned it she was not given a

replacement. ECF No. 4 at 11-12. She also claims that on another occasion, Officer Fonitno took

away a tray that had been given to her by another inmate which apparently left her without a meal.

Id. While not ideal, neither incident violated the constitution.

The deprivation of food to an inmate, whether pretrial or convicted, can constitute cruel

and unusual punishment only if it stands as the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.” See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). The denial of food may establish a constitutional violation depending on

the amount and duration of the alleged deprivation. Talib, 138 F.3d at 211 (expressing doubt that

a prisoner who missed 50 meals in five months, or one out of every nine meals, and lost 15 pounds

established a constitutional violation). The Fifth Circuit has held that only a “continuous and

substantial denial of food” will suffice. Id. at 214 n.3.

Smith’s claims, accepted as true, demonstrate the denial of food in this case consists of at

most two meals over the course of several days, and does not rise to the level of a cognizable

constitutional injury simply because the plaintiff is a prisoner. Coleman v. Platt, 558 F. App'x

493, 494 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (denial of eight

meals over a seven month period during which the plaintiff experienced only hunger pangs but no

other discomfort or injury did not rise to level of a serious deprivation) and Palmer v. Johnson,

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193 F.3d 346, 352 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also Shelby v. Dupree, 574 F. App'x 397, 399 (5th Cir.

2014) (inmate missing three meals per week for six weeks was not sufficiently severe in amount

or duration to deprive him of minimal civilized measure of life's necessities). Plaintiff alleges no

more than frustration with the distribution of food by Davenport and Officers she does not trust.

This is not enough to reach a constitutional level, even if Smith was without food on two occasions.

See Id., at 399 (citing Talib, 138 F.3d at 214 n.3); see also Berry, 192 F.3d at 506-08.

For these reasons, Smith’s allegations that she was denied proper meals on two occasions

fail to state a non-frivolous claim. Smith’s claims should be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e) and

§ 1915A as frivolous and otherwise for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

C. State Law Defamation Claim

Although she provided no specific derogations, Smith seeks relief for defamation. ECF

No. 4, ¶V, at 15. Defamation claims do not involve the deprivation of any right, privilege, or

immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Mowbray v. Cameron

Cnty., 274 F.3d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 2001) (allegations of slander by a former prisoner, resulting in

public humiliation, scorn, and ridicule, do not state a claim under § 1983); Cook v. Houston Post,

616 F.2d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 1980); Castillo v. Bowles, 687 F. Supp. 277, 282 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 8,

1988) (dismissing inmate’s defamation claim against jail guards because, even if his allegations

were true, plaintiff only alleged harm to his reputation, a claim not protected by the Constitution).

Further, the Fifth Circuit has held that a plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that “slanderous

statements resulted in lost friendships, lost livelihood, lost time, and physical injuries are

insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Gill v. State of Tex., 153 F. App'x 261, 263

(5th Cir. 2005) (citing Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 307 (5th Cir. 1989)). Thus, Smith’s

11

defamation claim is not sufficient to state a § 1983 claim. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Gibson v.

Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 219-20 (5th Cir. 2019).

To the extent Smith intended to assert this claim under state law, the claim would involve

purely state law questions that are best and ordinarily left to the state courts to decide. For the

reasons reported above, Smith’s § 1983 claims should be dismissed. This leaves no basis for

federal subject matter jurisdiction derived from the Complaint. Therefore, the Court has discretion

either to decline or exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). Considering the provisions of § 1367(c) and balancing the relevant factors of judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity,8 the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction and

dismiss without prejudice Smith’s state law defamation claim.

RECOMMENDATION

It is therefore RECOMMENDED that plaintiff Kecite Renee Smith’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claims against defendants Jacquelen Davenport, Officer Fonitno, Officer Burgess, all correctional

officers in D building, the STPJ medical staff and nurses, and all inmates in dormitory 300 in

building D, pod 1, be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and

§ 1915A, and as applicable 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, as frivolous and otherwise for failure to state a

claim for which relief can be granted.

It is further RECOMMENDED that the Court decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction and DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Smith’s state law defamation claim.

8 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1988); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.

715, 726 (1966); Heggemeier v. Caldwell Cnty., Tex., 826 F.3d 861, 872-73 (5th Cir. 2016); Enochs v. Lampasas

Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 158-59 (5th Cir. 2011); Brookshire Bros. Holding v. Dayco Prod., Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th

Cir. 2009); Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 227 (5th Cir. 1999).

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A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and

recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days

after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from

attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by

the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will

result from a failure to object. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (Sth Cir.

1996).

New Orleans, Louisiana, this _day of November, 2024.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRA DGE

Douglass referenced the previously applicable ten-day period for the filing of objections. Effective

December 1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) was amended extend the period to fourteen days.