Batiste v. Lafayette Parish

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

JASON BATISTE DOCKET NO. 6:23-cv-1291

D.O.C. # 353799 SECTION P

VERSUS JUDGE DAVID C. JOSEPH

SHERIFFS OFFICE MAGISTRATE JUDGE WHITEHURST

LAFAYETET PARISH, ET AL.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the court are the original and amended civil rights complaints (docs. 1, 5) filed

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by Jason Batiste, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in

this matter. Batiste is an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections

(“LDOC”), incarcerated at the Tensas Parish Detention Center (TPDC) in Waterproof, Louisiana.

This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of this court.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on September 18, 2023, claiming to have been denied medical

care while incarcerated at the Direct Supervision Unit Community Corrections Re-Entry Program

in Lafayette Parish and later at the Tensas Parish Detention Center (TPDC), where he is currently

incarcerated. Responding to this Court’s Order to amend his complaint to cure certain deficiencies

and provide additional details regarding his claims, Batiste filed an Amended Complaint on

February 22, 2024. Doc. 5. His allegations center on the discontinuation of his mental health

medication which began after a 2022 incident. According to the Lafayette Parish Correctional

Center Corrections Division Disciplinary Report:

At approximately 1400 hours on 9/17/22, Medical Nurse M Broussard was

conducting a random locker audit on Offender Jason W. Batiste. It is noted

that Offender Batiste had a zero count on his twice daily mental health

prescription and should have a count of 36 tablets. He was previously given

a verbal warning for non-compliance of same medication by Nurse

Broussard on 8/22/22. Offender Batiste is being written up for Class II:

Violation of General Health and Safety Rules.

Doc. 1, att. 2, pp. 3-4.

Plaintiff argues that there was no “just cause for this medical decision which opposes

plaintiff’s serious need for mental health care.” Doc. 5, p. 2. He contends that Nurse Broussard,

Supervisor Hall and Sheriff Mark Garber, in his supervisory role, “harbored plaintiff to become

more ill regarding his mental health disorder(s) while being an underprivileged member of its

community, advancing him to extreme hardships.” Id.

Plaintiff was then transferred to the TPDC where he requested to speak with the mental

health nurse practitioner, “Janna,” who advised him that “their agency does not provide any care

relating to this matter.” Id. at p. 3. However, contradicting his statement that TPDC does not

provide mental health care, he goes on to assert that because Lafayette Parish failed to forward his

medical records to TPDC, they would have to be requested prior to TPDC treating him. Plaintiff

claims that this has caused him to be “overwhelmed or exhausted as it relates to this matter,” and

his mental state is “diminishing.” Id.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of $500,000.00 and that this Court order

him to be housed at Elayn Hunt. Id. at p. 5.

II. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Frivolity Review

Batiste has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter. Accordingly,

his complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides for sua sponte

dismissal of the complaint or any portion thereof if the court determines that it is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against

a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).

A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Gonzalez v. Wyatt, 157

F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1998). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted if it is clear the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would

entitle him to relief. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998). When

determining whether a complaint is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, the court must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true. Horton v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 400

(5th Cir. 1995) (frivolity); Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d at 1025 (failure to state a claim).

B. Section 1983

Federal law provides a cause of action against any person who, under the color of state law,

acts to deprive another of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws

of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to hold the defendant liable, a plaintiff must allege

facts to show (1) that a constitutional right has been violated and (2) that the conduct complained

of was committed by a person acting under color of federal law; that is, that the defendant was a

government actor. See West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2254–55 (1988).

C. Application

Plaintiff claims that he was denied medical care while incarcerated at the Direct

Supervision Unit Community Corrections Re-Entry Program in Lafayette Parish when his mental

health medication was discontinued.

The standard of conduct for providing medical care to inmates under the Eighth

Amendment was clearly established by the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97

(1976). In Estelle, the Court held that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners

constitutes the "unnecessary wanton infliction of pain," proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Id.

at 104. This is true where the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the

prisoner's needs. It is also true where the indifference is manifested by prison officials in

intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the

treatment once prescribed. Id. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or

omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference that can offend "evolving

standards of decency" in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.

"Deliberate indifference" means that a prison official is liable "only if he knows that the

inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and [he] disregards that risk by failing to take

reasonable measures to abate it." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). The Farmer

definition applies to Eighth Amendment medical claims. Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th

Cir. 1994). Thus, an inmate must satisfy two requirements to demonstrate that a prison official has

violated the Eighth Amendment. "First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, 'sufficiently

serious'; a prison official's act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized

measure of life's necessities." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quotation omitted). The plaintiff must

show that defendants "exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs." Cooper v.

Johnson, 353 F. App'x 965, 967 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991));

accord Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1999); Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d

191, 193 (5th Cir. 1993).

Further, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant possessed a culpable state of mind.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). A prison official cannot be held liable

"unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837. "Such a showing requires the

inmate to allege that prison officials 'refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally

treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton

disregard for any serious medical needs.'" Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 770 (5th Cir. 2009);

Bohannan v. Doe, 527 Fed. Appx. 283, 2013 WL 2631197, at *6 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Gobert v.

Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006)). "'Subjective recklessness,'" as used in the criminal

law, is the appropriate test for deliberate indifference." Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 291

(5th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff's burden is twofold. He must show that he had a serious medical condition and

that it was met with deliberate indifference. For purposes of the initial screening of plaintiff’s

case, the Court will presume that the documentation showing he has been on mental health

prescription medication since at least 2022, establishes that he had a serious medical need, and will

proceed to the determination as to whether the facts show that need was met with deliberate

indifference.

Plaintiff disagrees with the decision to discontinue his prescription medication; this

difference of opinion is not indicative of deliberate indifference and thus does not constitute a

constitutional violation. Even broadly construing the allegations and accepting the facts alleged

by plaintiff as true, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to establish deliberate indifference. On

the evidence presented, a considered medical decision was made to remove plaintiff from his

medication based on his undisputed belief that plaintiff was not taking the medicine as prescribed.

See doc. 1, att. 2, pp. 3-4.

Prison medical providers, in treating inmates, are generally permitted to institute and/or

discontinue methods of treatment as they deem best; however, a discontinuation or withholding of

necessary medical treatment as punishment would be improper and could constitute deliberate

indifference. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104; Estes v. Rahorst, No. 11-0023, 2013 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 139583, 2013 WL 5422874, * 5 (N. D. Tex. September 27, 2013). Here, the medical staff

deemed it best in their medical opinion, given the circumstances, to discontinue plaintiff's

medication. That act was clearly a medical decision, and not any form of punishment.

Moreover, while plaintiff stated that TPDC did not provide mental health care, his

statement was contradicted by the fact that he spoke with the mental health nurse practitioner,

“Janna,” who it appears informed him that they would request his medical records from his

previous place of incarceration. Doc. 5, p. 3.

Finally, to the extent that plaintiff is requesting an order that he be transferred to the Elayn

Hunt Correctional Center, the Court has no authority to issue such an order. Placement of state

prisoners is a matter left to the discretion of state officials. A prisoner has no constitutional right

springing from the Constitution itself or from any protected liberty or property interest arising

from state law to be housed in any particular facility or to be transferred from one prison facility

to another, even if life in one prison may be much more disagreeable than in another. Olim v.

Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1983); Tighe v. Wall, 100 F.3d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1996).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s civil rights complaint be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) as frivolous and for

otherwise failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved

by this recommendation have fourteen (14) business days from service of this report and

recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond

to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any

objections or response to the district judge at the time of filing.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed

legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within ten (10) days following

the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), shall bar an

aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted

by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See, Douglass v. United Services

Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996).

THUS DONE in Chambers on this 24" day of September, 2024.

Carol B. Whitehurst □

United States Magistrate Judge

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