Williams v. Gulick

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

HARMON WILLIAMS . PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:20-cv-04079-SOH-BAB

DETECTIVE REYN BROWN;

OFFICER DANIEL OLLER;

and STEPHEN GULICK DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is Defendant Reyn Brown’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.

78). Plaintiff has responded. (ECF No. 93). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

and (3)(2011), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District Judge, referred the

instant motion to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Arkansas Division of Corrections – Tucker Unit in

Tucker, Arkansas. His claims in this lawsuit stem from alleged civil rights violations which

occurred during his arrest in Hempstead County by officers from the Hope Police Department and

Hempstead Count Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on September 15, 2020,

(ECF No. 1), and then an Amended Complaint on October 5, 2020, (ECF No. 9).

Plaintiff alleged two claims in his Amended Complaint, but the second claim and some

Defendants were initially dismissed at screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b). (ECF No. 13). This leaves Plaintiff’s Claim One against Separate Defendants

Sergeant Daniel Oller, Hope Police Department; Special Agent Reyn Brown, Hempstead County

Sheriff’s Office; and Stephen Gulick, Parole Officer.1 Separate Defendants Oller and Gulick have

0F

filed separate motions for summary judgment. The Court previously issued a Report and

Recommendation on Defendant Oller’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 95). The Court

will address Defendant Gulick’s Motion for Summary Judgment by separate report and

recommendation.

Plaintiff alleges, in his Claim One that Separate Defendant Brown violated his

constitutional rights on October 15, 2019 when he accompanied Separate Defendant Oller to

Plaintiff’s place of work, unlawfully detained, searched, and arrested him, and then falsely

imprisoned him. Specifically, Plaintiff claims:

On Oct. 15, 2019, approx.. 8:40 am I Harmon Williams, was called into the office at my

job by Terry Crabtree and Daniel Hampton, due to another employee Hunter Britten, told

them that he had knocked some dust down on me and officer Stephen [G]ulick order to

come harass me on my job; which led Det. Reyn Brown and Officer Daniel Oller to violate

my 4th, 5th, 8th and 14th Amendments. 1) They first detain me off false accusations claiming

they received a call stating I was selling drugs from the Feed Mill. 2) They arrest me off a

false investigation, no probable cause was establish nor was there any proof to support their

allegations. 3) They false imprison me with off of false reports and falsified documents.

After . . . making it to the Hempstead County Jail, where we met up with my parole officer

Stephen Eulick, who informed me that Det. Reyn Brown, claimed to have retrieved “meth”

from me that I’ve never seen nor had. Stephen [G]ulick, never attain a “White Warrant”

from the state to hold me in jail. I later found out (6) days by another parolee who return

from a parole hearing; that goes by the name Lemon Scott, informed me that I had been

deferral by the state and my parole officer Stephen [G]ulick, withheld the information

causing me to lose my job at the Feed Mill after causing me to miss over (3) consecutive

days over regulation abusing this public trust.2

1F

1 Plaintiff’s Claim One against all remaining Separate Defendants was also administratively stayed

pursuant to the Younger doctrine until Plaintiff’s criminal charges in Arkansas State Court were

resolved. (ECF No. 13, pp. 3-4). Plaintiff moved to reopen the instant civil case after the State

of Arkansas dismissed the charges against him without a finding of guilt. (ECF No. 14, p. 2). This

case was reopened on September 22, 2021 once Plaintiff’s criminal case was resolved. (ECF No.

16).

2 There are additional facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Claim One, but they relate solely to Plaintiff’s

claims against the Separate Defendants who were dismissed at screening. (ECF No. 9, p. 8; ECF

No. 13). Accordingly, the Court finds them irrelevant to Separate Defendant Brown’s Motion for

Summary Judgment.

(ECF No. 9, p. 8) (errors in original).

Plaintiff sues Separate Defendant Brown in both his individual and official capacities.

(ECF No. 9, p. 5). Plaintiff requests both compensatory and punitive damages for relief. Id. at 14.

Separate Defendant Brown filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on December 4, 2023

along with a Brief in Support and Statement of Undisputed Facts. (ECF Nos. 78, 79,, 81). In his

Motion, Separate Defendant Brown argues: (1) his stop of Plaintiff on October 15, 2019 was

supported by reasonable suspicion and lawful; (2) his search of Plaintiff on October 15, 2019 was

supported by Plaintiff’s search waiver and lawful under the Fourth Amendment, (ECF No. 79, p.

3); (3) his arrest of Plaintiff on October 15, 2019 was supported by probable cause and lawful

under the Fourth Amendment, (ECF No. 79, p. 4); (4) Plaintiff’s unlawful imprisonment claim

fails as a matter of law because there was probable cause to arrest him, (ECF No. 79, p. 4 ); (5)

Plaintiff’s Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims are misplaced and should be dismissed, (ECF No.

79, p. 5); (6) Separate Defendant Brown is entitled to qualified immunity, (ECF No. 79, p. 5 ); and

(7) Plaintiff’s official capacity claim fails as a matter of law, (ECF No. 79, p. 6 ).

Separate Defendant Brown did not submit any independent statements of fact or evidence

in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment. Instead, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 10(c), Defendant Brown incorporates all arguments made and evidence presented by

Separate Defendants Oller and Gulick in their Motions for Summary Judgment, Briefs in Support,

and Statements of Undisputed Facts. (ECF No. 79, p. 2; ECF No. 81). Accordingly, the Court

utilizes the evidence presented by those Separate Defendants herein.

On October 15, 2019, Plaintiff was on parole from the Arkansas Division of Corrections

with a signed warrantless search waiver on file. Plaintiff was under active supervision with his

parole officer, Separate Defendant Gulick. (ECF Nos. 71-1, p. 2). The warrantless search waiver,

signed by Plaintiff, from the Arkansas Department of Corrections reads:

As a condition of my supervised parole or probation, I agree to allow any Arkansas

Community Correction officer, or any certified law enforcement officer, to conduct a

warrantless search of my person, place of residence, or motor vehicle at any time, day or

night, whenever requested by the Arkansas Community Correction officer, or certified law

enforcement officer.

I understand that a warrantless search based on this waiver must be conducted in a

reasonable manner but does not need to be based on a clearly expressed suspicion that I am

committing or I have committed a criminal offense.

Arkansas law code annotated § 16-93-106 requires this waiver to be signed by a person

who is placed on supervised probation or is released on parole under this section as a

condition of his or her supervised parole or probation.

(ECF No. 71-1, p. 9).

On October 15, 2019 Separate Defendant Gulick received a call from an anonymous

individual who stated he worked with Plaintiff at the Tyson Feed Mill in Hempstead County,

Arkansas. (ECF No. 75, p. 1). In the call, the informant informed Separate Defendant Gulick that

Plaintiff was selling drugs and had drugs in his possession at the Feed Mill while on duty as an

employee. Id. After receiving this call, Separate Defendant Gulick notified Separate Defendant

Brown of all the information given by the informant. Id.

Separate Defendants Oller and Brown were both members of the Eighth North Drug Task

Force (“DTF”) which is comprised of employees from Hope Police Department, Hempstead

County Sheriff’s Office, Nevada County Sheriff’s Office, and Prescott Police Department. (ECF

No. 71-1, p. 24). Separate Defendant Oller was aware that Plaintiff had a warrantless search waiver

on file as part of his parole. Id. at 25. Separate Defendant Brown was also aware of Plaintiff’s

status as a parolee and his warrantless search waiver prior to engaging with Plaintiff at the Feed

Mill. (ECF No. 71-1, p. 33).

Once Defendants Oller and Brown arrived at the Feed Mill they contacted Plaintiff while

he worked. Separate Defendant Oller took a piece of work equipment from Plaintiff and asked

Plaintiff if he had anything illegal on his person. Plaintiff responded he did not. Plaintiff then put

his arms out in front of his body and told the officers to “hold on.” Separate Defendants Brown

and Oller then grabbed Plaintiff’s wrists to gain control over Plaintiff for safety. Separate

Defendant Brown then explained to Plaintiff he would perform a parole search pursuant to

Plaintiff’s warrantless search waiver. Separate Defendant Brown also informed Plaintiff he was

being detained and placed Plaintiff in handcuffs. (ECF No. 71-1, p. 25).

Separate Defendant Brown then searched Plaintiff’s pockets and handed the contents to

Separate Defendant Oller. Separate Defendant Oller determined that a white powdery substance

in a plastic bag from Plaintiff’s pockets was methamphetamine. Id. at 26. Separate Defendant

Brown then placed Plaintiff under arrest and escorted Plaintiff to his patrol vehicle while Separate

Defendant Oller collected Plaintiff’s belongings from the Feed Mill. Id. The video footage of

Plaintiff’s search and arrest, from Separate Defendant Brown’s body camera, is consistent with

Separate Defendant Oller’s rendition of the facts. (ECF No. 71-1, p. 33).

The bag of white powder pulled out of Plaintiff’s pocket by Separate Defendant Brown

was tested by the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory and determined to be 0.9340 grams of

methamphetamine. (ECF No. 71-1, p. 32). Plaintiff was booked into the Hempstead County

Detention Center (“HCDC”) for possession of a controlled substance on October 15, 2019. (ECF

No. 71-1, p. 34). Plaintiff was provided a First Judicial Appearance on October 16, 2019 in front

of the Judge Wright, Circuit Judge of Hempstead County. Judge Wright denied bond at that

hearing. (ECF No. 75-3). However, Judge Wright released Plaintiff on October 23, 2019 on his

own recognizance. (ECF No. 71-1). Plaintiff’s charge of possession related to this arrest was later

dismissed based on a negotiated plea of guilty to other subsequent charges. (ECF No. 71-1, pp.

36-41).

In response to Defendant Brown’s Motion, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Plaintiff

Statement of Disputed Facts.” (ECF No. 93). This document is properly sworn and subscribed

and consist of twenty-seven (27) numbered paragraphs. Id. These numbered paragraphs do not

correspond to Separate Defendant Oller’s or Defendant Gulick’s Statement of Undisputed Fact

paragraphs, and these paragraphs do not dispute the facts alleged by any of the Defendants.

Instead, the Response includes legal arguments. Id.

Plaintiff argues Separate Defendant Brown lacked “probable cause” to search him at his

workplace on October 15, 2019 because his search was based only on hearsay and his search

waiver on file. (ECF No. 93, p. 1). Plaintiff also argues searches are not constitutional under a

parolee search waiver when they are conducted for the purposes of law enforcement instead of

parole supervision. (ECF No. 93, pp. 1-2). According to Plaintiff, no warrant process was ever

started because Separate Defendant Brown acted only on his belief that a parole agreement justified

his warrantless search. (ECF No. 93, pp. 2-3).

Plaintiff then argues Separate Defendant Brown did not present any evidence that his

informant was reliable or that he had detailed information that he knew to be more than rumor or

suspicion. According to Plaintiff the information known to Separate Defendant Brown was

insufficient to establish probable cause for the search. (ECF No. 93, p. 2). Plaintiff argues an

uncorroborated telephone call from an anonymous informant, standing alone, is insufficient to

establish probable cause to arrest him. Id. Finally, Plaintiff argues Separate Defendant Brown did

not obtain any surveillance footage once he arrived at the Feed Mill to corroborate the informant’s

tip. (ECF No. 93, p. 2).

Furthermore, Plaintiff argues police officers are distinguished from parole officers and

cannot initiate searches of parolees unless the circumstances warrant the search of any other

citizen. (ECF No. 93, p. 2). Moreover, according to Plaintiff, the search conducted on him was a

“‘ fishing expedition’ that was arbitrary and capricious” using the “parole officer ‘as a cat’s paw’”.

(ECF No. 93, p. 3). Plaintiff argues his consent waiver is only valid if there were reasonable

grounds to investigate whether he violated the terms of his parole, and the search was conducted

by his parole officer. (ECF No. 93, p. 3). Specifically, Plaintiff argues:

A parole search can not be a mere subterfuge enabling the police to avoid having to obtain

a search warrant often times characterized as using parole officers as stalking horse for the

police. We do not consider it a strained interpretation of the waiver to extend it to arrests,

even though an arrest is a more intrusive invasion of Fourth Amendment Rights than a

detention.

(ECF No. 93, p. 3). While Plaintiff does not attribute any of his legal conclusions listed above to

specific legal precedent, he does provide two case which he argues generally support his position:

(1) “Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266;” and (2) “People v. Sanders, (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 318, 2

Cal. Rpte 3d 630.” (ECF No. 93, p. 4).

Plaintiff goes on to argue there was no information in Separate Defendant Brown’s incident

report evidencing the time he received the anonymous phone call, the time he spent talking to

Separate Defendant Gulick, the time it took to contact Separate Defendant Oller and brief him on

the situation, or the time between the anonymous tip and Separate Defendant Brown arriving at

the feed mill. (ECF No. 93, p. 4). Plaintiff does not explain how the timing relates to the

reasonable reliance of the information. Furthermore, Plaintiff argues there is nothing in the record

that justifies Separate Defendant Brown’s investigatory “Terry’s stop” of Plaintiff at the Feed Mill.

Id.

Finally, Plaintiff argues:

Parole Search condition is irrelevant to the determination of lawfulness of the detention

and pat search. The constitutionality of the search involving a parolee must be judged by

the facts known to the searching officer, officer’s subsequent discovery of a search

condition cannot be used to justify an otherwise illegal search.

(ECF No. 93, p. 5).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record "shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). "Once

a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the

non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine

issue of material fact exists.” Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.

1999).

The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607. "A case founded

on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment." Id. at 610.

“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the

record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts

for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380

(2007).

Under § 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his personal capacity, or in his official

capacity, or claims may be stated against a defendant in both his personal and his official

capacities. The type of conduct that is actionable and the type of defense available depend on

whether the claim is asserted against a defendant in his official or individual capacity. See Gorman

v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). “Claims against

individuals in their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the entity for which they

work; they require proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff’s rights, and the

only type of immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself.” Id. Personal capacity claims

“are those which allege personal liability for individual actions by officials in the course of their

duties; these claims do not require proof of any policy and qualified immunity may be raised as a

defense” to these individual capacity claims. Id. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff

must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law, and that the actor violated a right,

privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);

Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.1999).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges his search, arrest, and imprisonment on October 15, 2019, violated his

constitutional rights. (ECF No. 9). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint can also be read to include a

claim for an unlawful stop or detention—a Terry stop. Id. Separate Defendant Brown argues all

of Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law because his stop, search, arrest, and imprisonment were

all lawful. Additionally, Separate Defendant Brown argues even if the stop, search, arrest, and

imprisonment violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, he is entitled to qualified immunity from

such claims.

Qualified immunity “shields [a] government official from liability in a section 1983 action

unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2009). Qualified

immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “At summary judgment, qualified immunity shields

a law enforcement officer from liability in a § 1983 action unless: (1) the facts viewed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right;

and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation.” Watson v. Boyd, 2 F.4th

1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 2021) (internal citation and quotations omitted). As Plaintiff did not dispute

any of the summary judgment evidence presented by Separate Defendants here, the Court will first

determine whether any of Plaintiff’s claims, considering the undisputed facts, rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. See Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.35 637, 642 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining the

court may start with either prong of the qualified immunity test and may end the analysis if either

is not met).

A. Terry Stop

Plaintiff argues Separate Defendant Brown did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity at the Feed Mill to justify coming to the Feed Mill and detaining him. (ECF No. 93).

Separate Defendant Brown argues he had reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff based on the

information he received from Separate Defendant Gulick. (ECF No. 79, p. 3).

A police officer can stop and briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes if the officer

has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity “may be a foot.” This is known as a “Terry stop.”

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). To determine whether Defendant had reasonable suspicion

to conduct a Terry stop, the Court looks at the information Separate Defendant Brown possessed

at the time. Terry 392 U.S. at 21-22 (1968). The Court views Separate Defendant Brown's

“observations as a whole, rather than as discrete and disconnected occurrences.” Waters v.

Madson, 921 F.3d 725, 736 (8th Cir. 2019). The “determination of reasonable suspicion must be

based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” Illinois v. Wardlow,

528 U.S.119, 125 (2000).. If a Defendant “lacked reasonable suspicion and thus conducted an

unlawful Terry stop, he may nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity if he had arguable

reasonable suspicion—that is, if a reasonable officer in the same position could have believed he

had reasonable suspicion.” Waters, 921 F.3d at 736.

Just as explained in the Court’s Report and Recommendation on Separate Defendant

Oller’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Separate Defendant Brown is entitled to rely upon the

information provided to him by Separate Defendant Gulick. See Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958,

965 (8th Cir. 2005) (officers may reasonably rely on information provided by other law

enforcement individuals). The record is clear that Separate Defendant Gulick called Separate

Defendant Brown and provided him with all the information given by Plaintiff’s co-worker. While

Plaintiff argues the anonymity of the informant should lend to the assumption the information is

unreliable, the Court is unconvinced. This informant did not provide their name but did provide

their status as Plaintiff’s co-worker. This status lends credibility to their knowledge of Plaintiff’s

activities while working at the Feed Mill. It is also undisputed that Separate Defendant Brown

knew of Plaintiff’s status as a parolee with a warrantless search waiver on file. (ECF No. 71-1, p.

25). Finally, Defendant Brown was a member of an area wide drug task force.

Therefore, if reasonable suspicion was required to stop and investigate Plaintiff at his

workplace for drug related activity, such requirement was satisfied. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1 (1968). See also United States v. Mosley, 878 F.3d 246, 252-53 (8th Cir. 2017) (reasonable

suspicion may be based on information provided by third parties so long as it bears some indicia

of reliability); United States v. Maltais, 403 F.3d 550, 554 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding the basis for

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to warrant a Terry stop is determined in light of the

totality of the circumstances known to the officer).3

2F

The Court finds no material issues of fact exist as to Plaintiff’s stop claim and such claim

fails as a matter of law. As the claim did not state a constitutional violation, the Court need not

address the second prong of qualified immunity to determine if the law was clearly established at

the time of the alleged violation.

B. Search

Plaintiff next argues Separate Defendant Brown violated his Fourth Amendment rights by

searching him without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Separate Defendant Brown argues

his search of Plaintiff did not violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights because Plaintiff signed

the warrantless search waiver. The Court agrees Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights were not

violated by Separate Defendant Brown’s search of Plaintiff’s person on October 15, 2019 at the

Feed Mill.

The Fourth Amendment provides for “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend IV.

To assert a violation of the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff must possess a legitimate expectation to

privacy. United States v. Green, 275 F.3d 694, 698 (8th Cir. 2001). “To establish a legitimate

expectation of privacy, [Plaintiff] must demonstrate: (1) a subjective expectation of privacy; and

(2) that this expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable.”

3 The Court notes it makes no findings or recommendation on whether a warrantless search

waiver negates the need for reasonable suspicion to stop Plaintiff, but simply finds the summary

judgment record here supports a finding of reasonable suspicion.

United States v. Muhammad, 58 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1995). Parolees such as Plaintiff, however,

have significantly curtailed expectations of privacy.

The State of Arkansas requires parolees to sign warrantless search waivers. Specifically,

the statute provides as follows:

(a)(1) A person who is placed on supervised probation or is released on parole under this

chapter is required to agree to a waiver as a condition of his or her supervised probation or

parole that allows any certified law enforcement officer or Division of Community

Correction officer to conduct a warrantless search of his or her person, place of residence,

or motor vehicle at any time, day or night, whenever requested by the certified law

enforcement officer or division officer.

(2) A warrantless search that is based on a waiver required by this section shall be

conducted in a reasonable manner but does not need to be based on an articulable suspicion

that the person is committing or has committed a criminal offence.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-106(a)(1)-(2).

The Arkansas Court of Appeals previously held the statute to be constitutional under both

the Arkansas and United States Constitutions. See Clingmon v. State, 620 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Ark.

App. 2021) (explaining the statutory language is clear that reasonable suspicion is not required and

upholding a suspicionless search of a parolee's home). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court

has upheld a similar statute authorizing a suspicionless search of a parolee’s person. In Samson v.

California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), the California statute at issue required parolees to “‘agree in

writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer ..., with or

without a search warrant and with or without cause.’” Id. at 846. The Supreme Court concluded

a condition of release could “so diminish or eliminate a released prisoner's reasonable expectation

of privacy that a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer would not offend the Fourth

Amendment.” Id at 847. Regarding the expectation of privacy, the Court noted that parole was

“an established variation on imprisonment” on which the statute imposed a clearly stated

warrantless search condition. Id. at 852. Therefore, the Court “conclude[d] that petitioner did not

have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate.” Id. at 852. The Court

further observed that the State “has an ‘overwhelming interest’ in supervising parolees because

‘parolees ... are more likely to commit future criminal offenses.’ ” Id. at 853 (quoting Pennsylvania

Bd. of Probation and Parole, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998)). The Court held “the Fourth Amendment

does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.” Id. at 857.

Here, Plaintiff does not dispute he executed a valid warrantless search waiver as a condition

of his parole pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-106(a)(1)-(2). Such signed waiver is part of the

summary judgment record and quoted above. (ECF No. 71-1, p. 9). Furthermore, Plaintiff does

not dispute his warrantless search waiver mirrors the language held constitutional in Clingmon by

the Arkansas Court of Appeals, and by the United States Supreme Court in Samson. Accordingly,

the Court finds no reasonable suspicion was required to conduct the search of Plaintiff’s person at

the Feed Mill on October 15, 2019. Just as in Clingmon and Samson, Plaintiff agreed in his waiver

to be searched at any time by any law enforcement officer without reasonable suspicion. (ECF

No. 71-1, p. 9). Lastly, as explained in Samson, Plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy

in his person while on parole and subject to the warrantless search waiver. See Samson, 547 U.S.

at 852.

Plaintiff did not offer any facts to distinguish his circumstances from either Clingmon or

Samson. Instead, Plaintiff cites to Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) and People v. Sanders, 31

Cal. 4th 318 (Cal. 2003) in support of his contentions that Separate Defendant Brown could not

stop him and search him pursuant to his warrantless search waiver for any other purpose than a

suspected parole violation. He further asserts Separate Defendant Brown needed probable cause

or reasonable suspicion to stop him at his work to investigate and conduct the search. However,

Florida v. J.L does not involve a parolee or a warrantless search waiver. Florida, 529 U.S. at 268.

Instead, it involves only the question of whether an anonymous tip that an unknown individual

standing at a bus stop possessed a handgun created sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop and

search said individual. Id. That set of facts is distinguishable from the facts here. First, and most

notably, Plaintiff was known to Separate Defendant Brown as a parolee with an existing

warrantless search waiver. (ECF No. 71-1, p. 25). Additionally, while the record is unclear as to

the name of the informant it is undisputed that it was a current co-worker of Plaintiff—someone

who would have reliable knowledge of Plaintiff’s activities while working at the Feed Mill where

he was searched.

Furthermore, while the second case cited by Plaintiff, does address the issue of warrantless

searches of parolees, the case was decided by the Supreme Court of California. See People v.

Sanders, 31 Cal. 4th 318 (Cal. 2003). Such decisions are not binding on this Court and are

unpersuasive when there exists binding precedent with similar fact patterns such as Clingmon and

Samson. Accordingly, the Court will not rely on People v. Sanders herein.

The Court notes Plaintiff also argues his waiver only authorized a warrantless search by

his parole officer for parole violations. However, the waiver on its face authorizes any law

enforcement officer to search Plaintiff without a warrant at any time, and as explained above, this

language has been deemed constitutional by the Arkansas Court of Appeals and the United States

Supreme Court.

Finally, Plaintiff argued Separate Defendant Brown cannot use the contraband found

during the search to justify the search. The Court agrees. However, Separate Defendant Brown

did not need to rely upon the contraband found during the search to validate the search. It is

undisputed on the record; Separate Defendant Brown based his search of Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s

existing search waiver which the Court finds valid herein.

Accordingly, the Court finds no material issues of fact exist as to Plaintiff’s search claim

and such claim fails as a matter of law. As the claim did not state a constitutional violation, the

Court need not address the second prong of qualified immunity to determine if the law was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation.

C. Arrest

Plaintiff also claims his arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights because Separate

Defendant Brown had no probable cause to arrest him. Separate Defendant Brown argues the

methamphetamines found on Plaintiff’s person along with the informant information received

were sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest Plaintiff on October 15, 2019. The Court

agrees.

“Under the Fourth Amendment, a person has a right to be secure in his person and warrants

may not issue but upon probable cause.” Ross v. City of Jackson, Mo., 897 F.3d 916, 920 (8th Cir.

2018). “It is well established that a warrantless arrest without probable cause violates an

individual’s constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Joseph v. Allen,

712 F.3d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, a

false arrest claim under Section 1983 “fails as a matter of law where the officer had probable cause

to make the arrest.” Kurtz v. City of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 2001).

“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in

particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). The Eighth Circuit has provided a fluid definition to

provide some guidance in evaluating the existence of probable cause. Specifically, the Eighth

Circuit has stated that “[p]robable cause exists when “the totality of the circumstances at the time

of the arrest ‘[is] sufficient to lead a reasonable officer to believe that the defendant has committed

or is committing an offense.” Borgman v, Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 523 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting

Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2010)). “The substance of all the

definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Baribeau v. City of

Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 474 (8th Cir. 2010).

“We must give law enforcement officers ‘substantial latitude in interpreting and drawing

inferences from factual circumstances,’ ... but such latitude is not without limits.” Kuehl v. Burtis,

173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Washington, 109 F.3d 459, 465 (8th

Cir. 1997)). First, evidence tending to “negate the possibility that a suspect committed a crime is

relevant” to whether probable cause exists. Id. “In this sense, the Fourth Amendment requires

that we analyze the weight of all the evidence—not merely the sufficiency of the incriminating

evidence.” Id. Second, “law enforcement officers have a duty to conduct a reasonably thorough

investigation prior to arresting a suspect, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances and so

long as law enforcement would not be unduly hampered if the agents wait to obtain more facts

before seeking arrest.” Id. (internal punctuation marks and citations omitted).

An officer is entitled to “qualified immunity for a warrantless arrest if the arrest was

supported by at least ‘arguable probable cause.’” Jospeh, 712 F.3d at 1226. “Arguable probable

cause exists even where an officer mistakenly arrests a suspect believing it is based on probable

cause if the mistake is objectively reasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The existence of probable cause is a question of law. Id. at 1227.

It is undisputed that during the search of Plaintiff a white substance in a clear plastic bag

was found in Plaintiff’s pocket. This discovery is captured on the body camera footage on the

record.4 (ECF No. 71-1, p. 25). It is also undisputed that Separate Defendant Oller through his

3F

experience and education as a drug task force officer concluded that substance to be

methamphetamine—an illegal controlled substance—and so informed Separate Defendant Brown.

(ECF No. 71-1, 26). Also on the body camera footage, Plaintiff admitted to using

methamphetamines but denied selling methamphetamines.5 (ECF No. 71-1, p. 33). Under

4F

Arkansas law, it is unlawful to possess the controlled substance of methamphetamine pursuant to

Arkansas Code Annotated Section 5-64-419(b)(1)(A). Based on the totality of these undisputed

circumstances, the Court finds Separate Defendant Brown had probable cause to believe Plaintiff

committed a crime under such Arkansas state law and did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights

with his arrest. See Borgman v, Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 523 (8th Cir. 2011).

Accordingly, the Court finds no material issues of fact exist as to Plaintiff’s arrest claim

and such claim fails as a matter of law. As the claim did not state a constitutional violation, the

Court need not address the second prong of qualified immunity to determine if the law was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation.

4 The Court notes Plaintiff does allege in his Complaint that he did not possess methamphetamines.

(ECF No. 9, p. 6). However, Plaintiff did not dispute the body camera footage showing Separate

Defendant Brown pulling the clear bag of white substance from his pocket, (ECF No. 71-1, p. 25),

the Arkansas Crime Lab Report determining the white substance was methamphetamine, (ECF

No. 71-1, p. 32), or his deposition testimony where he admitted he possessed the

methamphetamines, (ECF No. 71-1, p. 7); nor did he reassert his initial allegation that he did not

possess the methamphetamines in his Response, (ECF No. 93). Accordingly, the Court need not

consider Plaintiff’s original allegation that he did not possess the methamphetamine at the time of

his arrest. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (explaining, at summary judgment, a

court should not adopt the version of events presented by the nonmoving party when that version

is blatantly contradicted by video footage on the record).

5 Specifically, Separate Defendant Oller asked Plaintiff where his pipe was. Plaintiff responded

he did not have a pipe. Separate Defendant Oller asked Plaintiff how he was smoking the “meth”

without a pipe. Plaintiff responded he used “the paper.” Separate Defendant Oller then asked if

he was snorting it. Plaintiff responded explaining he snorted and smoked the meth. (ECF No. 71-

1, p. 33, time stamp 00:20).

D. Imprisonment

Next, Plaintiff claims Separate Defendant Brown falsely imprisoned him. Separate

Defendant Brown argues because he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff his imprisonment was

valid.

The Court finds Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim is simply an extension of his false

arrest claim. Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support a due process claim, but instead goes on

to argue that he should not have been imprisoned because Separate Defendant Brown did not have

reasonable suspicion to search him or probable cause to arrest him. (ECF Nos. 9; 93). As the

Court has previously found Plaintiff’s claims for illegal search and arrest fail as a matter of law so

should his false imprisonment claim.

Furthermore, false imprisonment claims are state law claims and not actionable under

Section 1983. King v. Beavers, 148 F.3d 1031, 1034 (8th Cir. 1998) (“False imprisonment is a

state law tort claim. It is not coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment, which ‘protects only

against deprivations of liberty accomplished ‘without due process of law.’” (quoting Baker v.

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979))). As the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal

claims, it will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any pendant state claims raised by

Plaintiff. See Franklin v. Zain, 152 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 1998) (explaining a federal court may

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a pendent state claim if it has dismissed all

claims over which it had original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).).

E. Official Capacity

Since Plaintiff has failed to state any individual claim against Separate Defendant Brown,

he cannot maintain an official capacity claim against Hempstead County, Separate Defendant

Brown’s employer. See Morris v. Cradduck, 954 F.3d 1055, 1060 (8th Cir. 2020) Sanders v. City

of Minneapolis, Minn., 474 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475

U.S. 796, 799 (1986)). Furthermore, “[c]laims against individuals in their official capacities are

equivalent to claims against the entity for which they work; they require proof that a policy or

custom of the entity violated the plaintiff’s rights, and the only type of immunity available is one

belonging to the entity itself.” Id. Plaintiff did not cite or claim any policies or procedures of

Hempstead County that violated his constitutional rights.6

5F

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I recommend Separate Defendant Brown’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 78) be GRANTED and all claims asserted against Separate Defendant Brown

be DISMISSED with prejudice.

Referral Status: This case should remain referred at this time.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 11th day of October 2024.

Barry A. Bryant

/s/

HON. BARRY A. BRYANT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

6 The Court notes Plaintiff listed the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in his Amended

Complaint, however, the facts he alleged against Separate Defendant Brown only stated a Fourth

Amendment claim. Accordingly, the Court need not address any additional amendments herein.