The opinion
FOR THUEN MITIEDDD LSTEA DTIESTS RDIICSTT ROIFC TPE CNONUSRYTL VANIA
SHATASIA C. BUCKNER, : CIVIL NO. 3:24-CV-00659
:
Plaintiff, : (Magistrate Judge Schwab)
:
v. :
:
COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction.
Plaintiff Shatasia C. Buckner (“Buckner”) claims that some of the defendants
removed her children from her custody and other defendants wrongfully arrested her
while enforcing custody orders. After reviewing her initial complaint, we concluded
that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and granted Buckner
an opportunity to amend her complaint. Buckner did so—twice. After reviewing her
second amended complaint, we conclude it also fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Accordingly, we recommend that the Court dismiss Buckner’s
second amended complaint and close the case.
II. Background.
Buckner commenced this action pro se by filing a form complaint and a request
to proceed in forma pauperis on March 12, 2024. Docs. 1, 2. Buckner initiated this
case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(“Southern District of New York”). See id. On April 8, 2024, the Southern District of
New York found that it was the wrong venue for this case and transferred it to our
court. Doc. 3. We then ordered Buckner to file a proper application to proceed in
forma pauperis in our court or to tender payment. Doc. 5. When Buckner failed to
file such application, we ordered Buckner to show cause why this action should not
be dismissed. Doc. 6. Buckner did not do so, but she filed a proper application for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which we granted. Docs. 7, 8.
We reviewed Buckner’s complaint and found that it failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. Doc. 9. We granted Buckner leave to file an amended
complaint. Id. On August 20, 2024, Buckner filed her first amended complaint. Doc.
10. And on September 4, 2024, Buckner filed her second amended complaint. Doc.
11. We deemed the second amended complaint properly filed such that we consider
the second amended complaint to be the operative complaint. Doc. 12. Accordingly,
the following facts are taken from the second amended complaint.1
Buckner has children with Russell King (“King”). See doc. 11 at 3. According
to Buckner, King is the non-custodial parent. Id. Regardless, on February 6, 2023,
1 In addition to the form complaint, the second amended complaint also
includes a number of attachments including New York and Pennsylvania court
documents, snippets of online news articles and emails, screenshots of text messages
and internet searches, medical records relating to Buckner and her children, financial
documents, and paperwork from the New York Housing Authority. See docs. 11-1–
11-6.
King and Chanel Buckner (“Chanel”) “removed [Buckner’s] children[,]” “actively
withholding [her] children in Pennsylvania[.]” Id. Buckner explains that Chanel and
King acted with “intent to obstruct [Buckner’s] custodial rights.” Id. Chanel achieved
this end by “obtain[ing] a fraudulent custody order.” Id. According to Buckner, the
Luzerne County Family Court “failed to dismiss orders filed by Chanel . . . on
grounds of lack of service.” Id.
While enforcing these orders, the Ashley Borough Police Department
“wrongfully arrested” Buckner. Id. Buckner adds, “I was subjected to physical and
verbal assault on 10/28/23 resulting from the kidnapping.” Id. But she does not
explain who assault her, how the assault resulted from the kidnapping, or what the
assault entailed. See id.
As for relief, Buckner requests we “vacate orders and dismissal of case by
Defendant Chanel Buckner on 4/13/23 in special relief order ushered in by Luzerne
County Family Court[.]” Id. at 4. She also seeks $18,200,000 in “punitive,
psychological and general damages[.]” Id.
Buckner names five defendants: (1) the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
(“Commonwealth”); (2) “the City of Luzerne County”; (3) the Ashley Borough
Police Department (“Police Department”); (4) Chanel; and (5) King. Buckner does
not clearly state the legal basis for her claims. See generally id. But Buckner does list
the following in the section of the form complaint designated for “Relief”: “contempt
of Chanel . . . , and Defendant Ashley PD inflicting permanent damage, emotional
distress, trauma, psychological abuse, financial loss, loss in quality of life, gross
negligence,[ ]false arrest reckless discretion, harassment,[ ]retaliation operational
neglect recklessly failing to verify validity of any orders, reckless discretion and
disregard, parental,[ ]civil,[ ]human,[ ]constitutional rights[.]” Id. (commas in
original). After liberally construing the second amended complaint, we conclude that
Buckner is bringing claims for false arrest and excessive force pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
III. Standard of Review.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court shall dismiss a complaint brought in
forma pauperis if it determines that the complaint “fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). This statutory text mirrors the
language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which provides that a complaint should be
dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
When determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be
granted, “[w]e must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe
the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether
[the] plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the
complaint.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F. 3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). In making that
determination, we “consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint,
matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the
[plaintiff’s] claims are based upon these documents.” Id. at 230.
“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a
‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The
statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of the nature of
the plaintiff’s claim and of the grounds upon which the claim rests. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but
more is required than “labels,” “conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). “In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s
entitlement to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).
“A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.” Id.
In considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the court “‘must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’” Krieger v. Bank
of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776
F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). But a court “need not credit a complaint’s bald
assertions or legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902,
906 (3d Cir. 1997). A court also need not “assume that a
. . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526
(1983).
Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more
than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations
sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails
a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff
must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify
allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are
not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.”
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and
citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and “‘however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in
their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
245 (3d Cir. 2013).
IV. Discussion.
The second amended complaint is confusing. Even after construing it liberally,
it is unclear exactly what Buckner alleges each defendant did or failed to do. It thus
appears that Buckner has failed to provide the defendants with fair notice of the
grounds upon which her claims against them rest. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Moreover,
Buckner brings her claims pursuant to § 1983, but the defendants are not proper
defendants against whom § 1983 claims can be brought.
A. The Commonwealth.
The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to the Commonwealth. The
Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. Amend. XI. Although its text appears to restrict only the Article III
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, the Eleventh Amendment has been
interpreted “‘to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . .
which it confirms.’” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)
(quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)). That
presupposition is that each state is a sovereign entity in our federal system and it is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty that a sovereign is not amenable to suit unless it
consents. Id.
There are two circumstances when the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit
against a state or state agency. First, a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment
immunity by consenting to suit. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). Second, Congress may
abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity when it unequivocally intends to
do so and when it acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. Geness v.
Admin. Off. of Pennsylvania Cts., 974 F.3d 263, 269–70 (3d Cir. 2020).
Neither of these circumstances are present here. The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 42 Pa. Stat. and
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8521(b) (“Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guaranteed
by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”); Downey v.
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Pennsylvania has
not waived its sovereign immunity defense in federal court.”). And Buckner has not
cited to any statute that waives the Commonwealth’s Eleventh Amendment immunity
in the circumstances of this case. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). We thus
conclude that the Commonwealth is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from
Buckner’s § 1983 claims against it.
B. The Police Department and the “City of Luzerne County.”
Buckner’s § 1983 claims against the Ashley Borough Police Department fail to
state a claim as well. Courts have concluded that—although local governments are
subject to suit under § 1983—a police department, as a sub-unit of the local
government, is merely a vehicle through which the municipality fulfills its policing
functions. See e.g., Johnson v. City of Erie, Pa., 834 F. Supp. 873, 878–79 (W.D. Pa.
1993); see also Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Thus,
they have held that while a municipality may be liable under § 1983, a police
department, as a mere sub-unit of the municipality, may not. Id. The proper
defendant, then is the Ashley Borough municipality.
“[A] § 1983 claim against a municipality may proceed in two ways.” Forrest v.
Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019). One way for a plaintiff to present a claim
against a municipality is to allege “that an unconstitutional policy or custom of the
municipality led to his or her injuries.” Id. Another way for a plaintiff to present a
claim against a municipality is to allege that her injuries “were caused by a failure or
inadequacy by the municipality that ‘reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.’” Id.
(quoting Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019)).
Buckner has made no allegation that a custom or policy of Ashley Borough led
to her false arrest or any of the other actions allegedly taken by the Police
Department. Accordingly, even if we were to substitute the municipality as the
proper defendant, Buckner fails to state a claim against the municipality as well. We
thus conclude that Buckner has failed to state a claim against the Ashley Borough
Police Department, and we will not substitute the municipality.
As to the defendant the “City of Luzerne County,” it is entirely unclear whether
Buckner means to bring claims against Luzerne Borough or Luzerne County. See doc.
11. Buckner is also unclear what she alleges the “City of Luzerne County” did. Id.
Regardless, it is clear that she does not allege a custom or policy of this municipal
defendant. Accordingly, we also conclude that Buckner has failed to state a claim
against either Luzerne County or Luzerne Borough.
C. Chanel and King.
The second amended complaint also fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted against Chanel and King because Buckner has not alleged facts to show
that they were acting under color of state law. “Action under color of state law
‘requires that one liable under § 1983 have exercised power possessed by virtue of
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of state law.’” Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dept., 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir.1998)). The Supreme Court
has established several approaches to the question of when a private person acts
under color of state law. Crissman v. Dover Downs Entertainment, Inc., 289 F.3d
231, 239 (3d Cir. 2002). And the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has “outlined three broad tests generated by Supreme Court jurisprudence to
determine whether state action exists: (1) ‘whether the private entity has exercised
powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state’; (2) ‘whether the
private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials’; and (3)
whether ‘the [s]tate has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged
activity.’” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Mark v. Borough
of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)). “The inquiry is fact-specific,”
Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995), and “state action
may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the
challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself.’” Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assoc.,
531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 351 (1974)).
“[T]he relevant question is not whether the private actor and the state have a
close relationship generally, but whether there is ‘such a close nexus between the
State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated
as that of the State itself.’” Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 870 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir.
2017) (emphasis in original) (quoting Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir.
2005)). “In other words, the government must be ‘responsible for the specific
conduct of which the plaintiff complains.’” Id. (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1004 (1982)). “Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or
acquiescence of the State is not state action.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526
U.S. 40, 52 (1999).
An otherwise private actor also may act under color of state law when engaged
in a conspiracy with a state official including a state judge. Dennis v. Sparks, 449
U.S. 24, 29 (1980) (“Private parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in
connection with such conduct are thus acting under color of state law within the
meaning of § 1983 . . . .”). “The essence of a conspiracy is an agreement.” United
States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1989). “To demonstrate the existence of a
conspiracy under § 1983 [or Bivens], ‘a plaintiff must show that two or more
conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him or her of a constitutional right
under color of law.’” LeBlanc v. Stedman, 483 F. App’x 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2012)
(quoting Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila., 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir.1993),
abrogated on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of
Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003)). “It is not enough that the end result of the
parties’ independent conduct caused the plaintiff harm or even that the alleged
perpetrators of the harm acted in conscious parallelism.” Perez v. Gamez, 1:13-CV-
1552, 2013 WL 6073877, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2013). Rather, the plaintiff must
show that the defendants acted in concert with the specific intent to violate the
plaintiff’s rights. Davis v. Fox, 3:12-CV-1660, 2013 WL 5656125, at * 5 (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 15, 2013).
Here, Buckner does not allege facts that raise a reasonable inference that King
or Chanel acted under color of state law. Nor does she allege facts from which the
Court could reasonably infer a conspiracy between Chanel and King and any state
actors. And “merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a
lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.”
Dennis, 449 U.S. at 28. We thus conclude that Buckner cannot show that Chanel or
King were acting under color of state. As such, she fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
D. Supplemental Jurisdiction.
Again, we must note that Buckner’s second amended complaint is confusing.
Accordingly, we are not entirely clear whether she intends to bring state law claims in
addition to the above-addressed federal claims. Insofar as Buckner does bring state
law claims, however, such claims would fall within the Court’s supplemental
jurisdiction.2 Whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within the discretion
of the court. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that district courts may decline to
2 It is also unclear from the complaint whether Buckner intends to invoke
diversity jurisdiction in addition to the federal-question jurisdiction we exercise over
the § 1983 claims. See doc. 11. Regardless of her intent, Buckner does not allege
facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that there is complete diversity of
citizenship—namely, she fails to allege the citizenship of any of the defendants. See
doc. 11. We thus conclude that we do not have diversity jurisdiction over Buckner’s
state law claims, and we will have jurisdiction over those claims only if we have
supplemental jurisdiction over them.
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim if the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. When deciding whether
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, “a federal court should consider and weigh in
each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity.” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522
U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cahill, 484 U.S. 343, 350
(1988)). The Third Circuit has held that “where the claim over which the district
court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline
to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing
so.” Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Borough of West
Miflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995)).
There is nothing unique about this case such that considerations of judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness provide an affirmative justification for
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Buckner’s state law claims, if she intends to
bring any. Accordingly, we recommend that the Court decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims.
V. Leave to Amend.
Before dismissing a complaint under a screening provision, the Court must
grant the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d
Cir. 2002). “Under Rule 15(a), futility of amendment is a sufficient basis to deny
leave to amend.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d
159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010). “Futility ‘means that the complaint, as amended, would fail
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.’” Id. (quoting In re Merck & Co.
Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 493 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 2007)). Thus, in
determining whether an amendment would be futile, we apply the same standard as
we apply in determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Id. “In other words, ‘[t]he District
Court determines futility by taking all pleaded allegations as true and viewing them in
a light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Winer Family Trust v. Queen,
503 F.3d 319, 330–31 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Here, we conclude that it would be futile for Buckner to file a third amended
complaint. In fact, we previously concluded it would be futile for Buckner to file an
amended complaint as to the Commonwealth due to its entitlement to Eleventh
Amendment immunity, and we did not grant Buckner leave to file an amended
complaint against it. Moreover, on her third attempt Buckner has again failed to state
a claim against any of the defendants. We thus conclude it would be futile to grant
Buckner further leave to amend.
VI. Recommendation.
Based on the foregoing, we recommend that the Court dismiss Buckner’s
second amended complaint without granting her leave to amend.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file
with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the
proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is
made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set
forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however,
need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where
required by law, and may consider the record developed before the
magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of
that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.
Submitted this 17th day of September 2024.
S/Susan E. Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
United States Magistrate Judge