Sandoval v. Lumpkin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT September 12, 2024

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

VICTORIA DIVISION

JESSE MANUEL SANDOVAL, JR., §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:24-CV-00024

§

BOBBY LUMPKIN, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Jesse Manuel Sandoval, Jr. is a Texas inmate appearing pro se and in forma

pauperis in this prisoner civil rights action. (D.E. 1). Plaintiff’s case is subject to screening

pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C.

§§1915(e)(2), 1915A. For purposes of screening, Plaintiff has stated the following claims

against Director Bobby Lumpkin, the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice (TDCJ), in his official capacity for injunctive relief: (1) a First Amendment claim

under § 1983; and (2) a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended

that these claims be RETAINED. The undersigned will order service on Defendant

Lumpkin.

The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against

Director Lumpkin in his official capacity for monetary damages be DISMISSED without

prejudice as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

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I. JURISDICTION

The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case

has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management and making

recommendations on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS1

Plaintiffs’ claims and allegations in this action arise in connection with his current

assignment to the Stevenson Unit in Cuero, Texas. Plaintiff practices Native American

religious customs, beliefs, and traditions. Through the ancestry of both his biological

parents, Plaintiff is a descendent of the Lipan Apache Tribe. Plaintiff has practiced his

Native American Religious beliefs for years and his religion preference is referenced in

Plaintiff’s TDCJ records. Plaintiff’s religious beliefs require him to grow his hair long

and in two braids as an expression of his Native American faith. TDCJ officials have

denied Plaintiff’s requests to wear his hair in two long braids in accordance with the TDCJ

grooming policy. Plaintiff has been ordered to comply with the TDCJ’s grooming

standard and he is subject to being disciplined if he refuses to comply. Plaintiff alleges

he is a good inmate who follows the rules and that it has been over two years since he has

had even a minor TDCJ disciplinary infraction.

Plaintiff has sought an exception to policy through the TDCJ Religious Practices

1Plaintiff testified at an evidentiary hearing before the undersigned on September 11, 2024. Spears v. McCotter, 766

F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). The evidentiary hearing is “in the nature of a motion for more definite statement.” Id.

Plaintiff’s allegation are summarized from both his written complaint and his Spears hearing testimony.

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Committee and by filing formal TDCJ grievances. Plaintiff has been denied the right to

grow his hair long by TDCJ officials since at least May 2022, which is now over two

years. Various officials have told Plaintiff that if he wants to wear his hair in two long

braids, he has to file a lawsuit. Plaintiff filed this action on August 5, 2024, naming TDCJ

Director Bobby Lumpkin in his official capacity. Plaintiff alleges TDCJ policies and

practices conflict with his right to practice his Native American faith in violation of the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc,

et seq., and the First Amendment. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and monetary relief.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court shall evaluate the

complaint and dismiss it without service of process, if the Court finds the complaint

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (providing that a court shall review an in forma pauperis

complaint as soon as practicable and dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune

defendant). A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory, “such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal

interest which clearly does not exist.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998).

A claim has no arguable basis in fact if “after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to

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present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.” Talib v.

Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir.1998).

“In analyzing the complaint, [the Court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as true,

viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d

322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999). “The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but

whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. Thus, the Court should not

dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts

or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”

Id. (citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. RLUIPA and First Amendment Claims

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall

make no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise

thereof. U.S. Const., amend. I. The United States Supreme Court has held prisoners retain

their First Amendment rights, including the right to free exercise of religion. O’Lone v.

Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). An inmate retains only those First

Amendment rights which “are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the

legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.

817, 822 (1974). Thus, a prisoner’s right to practice his religion may be limited where the

prison officials establish there is a legitimate penological objective. Id.; Cruz v. Beto, 405

U.S. 319, 322, n. 2 (1972) (per curiam); Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 25 (5th Cir. 1995).

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“[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is

valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” O’Lone, 482 U.S. at

349 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).

In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court set forth four factors a court should consider

in determining whether a reasonable relationship exists between a regulation and the

governmental interest: (1) whether the regulation has a logical connection to the legitimate

government interests invoked to justify it; (2) whether there are alternative means of

exercising the rights that remain open to the inmates; (3) the impact that accommodation

of the asserted constitutional right will have on other inmates, guards and prison resources;

and (4) the presence or absence of ready alternatives that fully accommodate the prisoner’s

rights at de minimus cost to valid penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90; see also

Chriceol v. Phillips, 169 F.3d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1999).

RLUPIA “poses a far greater challenge than does Turner to prison regulations that

impinge on inmates’ free exercise of religion.” Freeman v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice,

369 F.3d 854, 858 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004). Congress has also mandated that courts construe

the RLUPIA “in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise,” to the maximum extent

permitted by law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. RLUIPA § 3 addresses restrictions on the religious

exercise of institutionalized persons. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, § 3. This section provides

that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise” of an

institutionalized person unless the government demonstrates that the burden “is in

furtherance of a compelling government interest” and “is the least restrictive means of

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furthering” that interest. RLUPIA does not provide a cause of action for individual

capacity claims. Jones v. Alfred, 353 F. App’x 949, 951 (5th Cir. 2009).

The Supreme Court held an Arkansas policy preventing a Muslim prisoner from

growing a half-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs violated RLUIPA. Holt

v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2105). Relying on Holt, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

remanded a RLUIPA claim brought by a Native American inmate with regard to the

TDCJ’s kouplock-grooming policy. Davis v. Davis, 826 F.3d 258, 267-72 (5th Cir. 2016).

Plaintiff alleges he is a Lipan Apache and he practices his Native American faith.

Part of his religious practice is wearing his hair long in two braids. Wearing two braids is

significant and important to his faith because wearing two braids is how Plaintiff connects

to his spiritual world and is part of the way he worships. While TDCJ policy allows

Plaintiff to wear his hair in a single long braid, a single braid is inadequate because

Plaintiff’s faith requires him to have two braids to connect to his spiritual world. Plaintiff

has tried to comply with TDCJ policy to obtain an exception to policy, but his requests

have either been denied or delayed for over two years. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the

applicable TDCJ grooming policy and the application of the policy to him places a

substantial burden on his ability to practice his religion. Whether TDCJ officials have a

sufficient penological interest to justify the one braid grooming policy is yet to be

determined and will likely be the subject of this litigation. Nevertheless, for purpose of

screening, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff has stated a nonfrivolous, plausible claim

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under RLUIPA and the First Amendment through section 1983 for injunctive relief against

Director Lumpkin in his official capacity.

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity and Official Capacity Claim.

Plaintiff has also named Director Lumpkin in his official capacity. A suit against a

state officer in his or her official capacity is effectively a suit against that state official’s

office. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The Eleventh

Amendment, however, bars claims for money damages against a state or state agency. See

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Aguilar v. Texas Dep’t of

Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). As such, an action for monetary

damages against a state official in his or her official capacity is one against the state itself

and is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166

(1985). The Fifth Circuit has extended the Eleventh Amendment immunity specifically to

TDCJ-CID officers and officials acting in their official capacities. See Oliver v. Scott, 276

F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002) (Eleventh Amendment bars prisoner’s suit for money

damages against prison officials in their official capacities).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Director Lumpkin in his official capacity for

monetary damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, it is respectfully

recommended that Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against Director Lumpkin in his

official capacity be dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

V. RECOMMENDATION

For purposes of § 1915A, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff has stated

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sufficient facts that, if true, state First Amendment and RLUIPA claims against TDCJ

Director Bobby Lumpkin in his official capacity for injunctive relief only. Accordingly,

it is respectfully recommended that these claims be retained. It 1s further recommended

that Plaintiffs claims against Director Lumpkin in his official capacity for monetary

damages be DISMISSED without prejudice.”

Respectfully submitted on September 12, 2024.

C Jason 6 Libby Z

United States Magistrate Judge

*Claims implicating the Eleventh Amendment are subject to dismissal without prejudice because

the Eleventh Amendment deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. See Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc.

v. Phillips, 24 FAth 442, 450 (Sth Cir. 2022) (observing that “the Eleventh Amendment generally deprives federal

courts of jurisdiction” over certain suits); United States v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285 n.9 (Sth Cir.

1999) (“While the Supreme Court has left this question open, [the Fifth Circuit] has repeatedly referred to the Eleventh

Amendment’s restriction in terms of subject matter jurisdiction.”)

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NOTICE TO PARTIES

The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to

each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of

the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the

United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and

recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN

(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of

plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal

conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d

1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

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