Estes v. Tabor

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

SHAUN JERMAINE ESTES PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 2:24-cv-02076-TLB-MEF

JUDGE STEPHEN TABOR,

COURT CLERK SUSIE HASSETT,

PROSECUTOR DANIEL SHUE,

ATTORNEY ROBERT GENE,

JOHN HANCOCK DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge,

referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.

The case is before the Court for preservice screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1

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Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress

from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his Complaint to initiate this action on June 13, 2024. (ECF No. 1). That

same day, the Court entered an Order provisionally filing the Complaint and directing Plaintiff to

submit a completed in forma pauperis (‘IFP”) application no later than July 5, 2024. (ECF No.

3). Plaintiff did so on June 24, 2024, was he granted IFP status on July 30, 2024. (ECF No. 6).

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Sebastian County Detention Center after a

conviction on April 23, 2021. (ECF No. 1 at 2). He identifies himself as a sovereign citizen and

1 Enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).

appears to allege that his rights as a sovereign citizen have been violated by the named Defendants.

(Id. at 6, 10). Plaintiff asserts seven claims in his Complaint.

For Claim One, Plaintiff alleges that on December 13 and 28, 2022, and again on April 8,

2024, Defendant Judge Tabor told Defendant Court Clerk Susie Hassett “to not file my pro se pre

trial paperwork.” (ECF No. 1 at 4). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hassett complied with this

directive on several occasions. (Id.). He alleges this deprived him of his fundamental rights and

resulted in him being jailed. (Id.). Plaintiff proceeds against Defendants Tabor and Hassett in

their individual and official capacities. (Id. at 5). To support his official capacity claim, Plaintiff

alleges there is a widespread practice of not providing adequate opportunity for a man to be “in

propria person” because Defendants limit access to the court and its records by denying motions

and “flat out refusing filings.” He further alleges: “This widespread practice is discrimination not

because of my race but because of my sovereignty.” (Id.).

For Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Tabor, Hassett, Prosecutor Shue, and

Hancock violated his constitutional rights from December 9, 2020,2 through March 25, 2024.

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(ECF No. 1 at 6). Plaintiff alleges that on December 9, 2020, John Hancock made a claim against

the name Shaun Jermain Estes, which he asserts is the copyrighted property of Plaintiff. Defendant

Shue then “charged the legal fiction and put a lien on its property (the living man).” (Id.).

Defendants Tabor, Shue, and Hassett then “used [Plaintiff’s] living body as well as the copyrighted

D/B/A, his LLC, and his private irrevocable trust for their personal financial gain and the financial

gain of the state of Arkansas.” (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges, “all I got was jail time, involuntary

servitude, and cruel and unusual punishment.” (Id.). Plaintiff proceeds against Defendants in their

2 The Court notes that this date, and several other dates in the Complaint fall outside the three-year

statute of limitations for § 1983 cases.

individual and official capacities. (Id. at 7). For his official capacity claim, he alleges Defendants

Tabor, Hassett, and Shue “assumed and presumed that I was a willful participant of the color of

law albeit I assured them I was not,” and though their abuse of power they manipulated the courts

record “to claim the beneficial rights from my property.” (Id.).

For Claim Three, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Tabor denied “his right to know the nature

and cause of every claim or charge brought against me and the legal intent of the person bringing

the charges.” (ECF No. 1 at 7). Plaintiff alleges he “made a special visitation to court under

threats, duress and coercion.” (Id. at 8). Judge Tabor asked him how he pleaded, and when

Plaintiff asked if he could know the nature and cause, Judge Tabor said “no.” (Id.). Plaintiff then

alleges Judge Tabor put in a plea for him. (Id.). He alleges this happened repeatedly, on December

11, 2020, on December 12, 2022, and again on April 12, 2024. (Id.). Plaintiff states, “[t]he judge

and prosecutor were operating in a jurisdiction that was known only to them.” (Id.). Plaintiff

proceeds against Defendant Tabor in his official and individual capacities, but Plaintiff fails to

provide any supporting facts for an official capacity claim in the section of the form for that

purpose. (Id.). In a later section of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Tabor is “at

war” with the Constitution and has committed treason. (Id. at 13).

For Claim Four, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Shue slandered and defamed his character

from April 2, 2024, through April 6, 2024. (ECF No. 1 at 9). Plaintiff alleges that because

Defendants Tabor, Shue, and Hassett “chose to operate in a jurisdiction that was only known to

them” he was forced to hire legal counsel. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that he first contacted Ron Fields,

but the prosecutor told Fields the Plaintiff was a sovereign citizen and that sovereign citizens were

a terrorist group who did not believe in following the law. (Id.). Defendant Shue also told Fields

that Defendant Tabor did not like Plaintiff because he filed too many motions, was argumentative,

and that I thought I knew the law. (Id.). As a result, Fields’ fee was raised from $3,500 to $7,500.

(Id.). Plaintiff then called Robert Gene3, who took $5,000, came to see him, and they “had a good

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talk.” After Gean spoke to the prosecutor, however, he became “callused, bias, prejudiced, and

partial.” (Id.). Plaintiff does not indicate the capacity in which he proceeds against Defendant

Shue for this claim.

For Claim Five, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Tabor, Shue, and Hassett discriminated

again him:

because of my religion4 and my sovereignty as well as my non-US citizen

American national decla3Fration. Because I invoked my rights as an American

National and one of the people of America . . . Defendants . . . withheld exculpatory

evidence, denied me the nature and cause of the actions, refused my filings on court

record and even prevented me from speaking on their record. I have been defamed

and slandered all because I am not a 14th Amendment creation of government.

(ECF No. 1 at 10). Plaintiff alleges this occurred from December 4, 2014, through May 23,

2024. (Id.). Plaintiff does not indicate the capacity in which he proceeds against Defendants for

this claim.

For Claim Six, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gean violated his rights on April 12, 2024,

and April 23, 2024. (Id. at 11). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Gean took his $5,000 and did not

provide a service for it as agreed upon. (Id.). Specifically, he did not file Plaintiff’s motions and

other paperwork and did not get a complete copy of a video which Plaintiff characterizes as

exculpatory evidence. (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Gean “knew that I knew nothing

about this mystery jurisdiction and still used threats duress and coercion to counsel me and forced

me to take a deal for 15 years but had me sign for 20 years.” (Id.). Finally, Plaintiff alleges

3 The correct spelling is Gean.

4 Plaintiff does not identify his religion.

Defendant Gean would not let him speak on the record and insisted that if he “said anything other

than what the judge and prosecutor told me to say that I would be additionally punished.” (Id.).

Plaintiff does not indicate the capacity in which he proceeds against Defendant Gean for this claim.

For Claim Seven, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Shue violated his rights from December 9,

2020, through March 28, 2024. (Id. at 12). Plaintiff alleges as follows:

As a pretrial detainee, as a man in propria persona I had protected rights to all

evidence of the charges against me or my copyrighted property, but I was not

afforded that right. Daniel did not inform me if the charges were against the living

man or against the legal fiction and put an attachment on what he thought was the

legal fictions property but a lien was placed on Shaun Jermaine Estes and all of its

public and private property by the living man.

Daniel Shue failed to provide nature and cause, legal intent, a true bill, Remedy,

proof of liability, a debt validation letter, exculpatory evidence or an affidavit of

probable cause (a valid charging instrument).

(Id.). Plaintiff does not indicate the capacity in which he proceeds against Defendant Shue for

this claim.

Plaintiff checked the sections on the form indicating he seeks compensatory and punitive

damages, as well as other relief. (ECF No. 1 at 13). Plaintiff states he wants every bail or bond

amount ever associated with the copyrighted name Shaun Jermaine Estes and/or CUSIP number

66FR-20-875, 20-875, 2020-026992. (Id.). He wants to immediate release of his personal and

public property. He wants every bail or bond amount he had to pay to get out of jail. (Id.). He

wants the Defendants punished “to the fullest extent of the law,” his judgment reversed, and all

charges dropped because “void judgment is no judgement at all.” (Id.).

Because Plaintiff appears to be referencing one or more state criminal cases in his § 1983

claims, and he appears to be providing case numbers in his relief request, the Court reviewed

Plaintiff’s state court record.5 In State v. Shaun Jermaine Estes, Case No. 66CR-20-875, Plaintiff

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pleaded guilty to two felony drug charges and one failure to appear for a felony charge. Defendant

Tabor was the Circuit Judge in the case. Robert Magness Gean was Plaintiff’s attorney.

Documents in the case indicate Gean is a private attorney. The prosecuting attorney is Houston

Race Garner, a deputy prosecuting attorney. John Dale Hancock, Jr. was subpoenaed as a witness

for the State in the case. A docket notation indicates Plaintiff wanted to represent himself on

March 27, 2024. On April 12, 2024, Judge Tabor held a hearing on motions and filings submitted

by the Defendant, Mr. Estes. An Order was entered that no pleadings would be accepted from

Defendant unless submitted by his attorney, Robert Gean. Attorney Gean filed a Motion to

Withdraw on May 9, 2024, but he appeared with Plaintiff for his guilty plea on May 23, 2024.

Plaintiff pleaded guilty to all three charges. The case was closed on May 28, 2024. Defendant

Shue’s role in the case is unclear from the case docket, other than being the Prosecuting Attorney

for Sebastian County, Twelfth Judicial District, and, therefore, Defendant Garner’s supervisor.

The Court could find no case with the number 026992.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under § 1915A, the Court is obliged to screen the case prior to service of process being

issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are

frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or

5 Available at Search ARCourts, https://caseinfonew.arcourts.gov/opad/case/66FCR-20-875 (Last

accessed Sept. 26, 2024).

it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to

vindicate a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987); In re

Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we

hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is

discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe

the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal

framework.” Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). However, the complaint must still allege

specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Heck Doctrine

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Heck doctrine. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994), the Supreme Court held that a claim for damages for “allegedly unconstitutional conviction

or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid” is not cognizable until “the conviction or sentence has been

reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a

writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. 486-87. The Supreme Court noted that if a successful

claim would not demonstrate the invalidity of an outstanding criminal judgment, it should be

allowed to proceed.

Here, Plaintiff’s claims arise from what he describes as unconstitutional actions by

Defendants in State v. Shaun Jermaine Estes, Case No. 66CR-20-875. Plaintiff pleaded guilty to

felony charges in that case and was convicted and sentenced. He does not allege that his conviction

has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal writ of habeas

corpus. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are Heck-barred.

B. Judge Tabor

Judge Stephen Tabor is a Circuit Judge in Division 1 of the Twelfth Judicial District of

Arkansas. As such, he is immune from suit. “Few doctrines were more solidly established at

common law than the immunity of judges for liability for damages for acts committed within their

judicial jurisdiction.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). The Supreme Court “has

pronounced and followed this doctrine of the common law for more than a century.” Cleavinger

v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199 (1985) (citation omitted). Judicial immunity is only overcome in two

narrow situations: (1) if the challenged act is non-judicial; and (2) if the action, although judicial

in nature, was taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11

(1991). Moreover, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in

error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability

only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

356-57 (1978) (citations omitted); see also Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1134, 1240-42 (11th Cir. 2000)

(judicial immunity applies to Bivens actions); Schwartz v. Weinstein, 459 F.2d 882, 883 (8th Cir.

1972) (judicial immunity applies to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1985); Nolan v. Campbell, 369 F.

Supp. 1032 (E.D. Mo. 1974) (judicial immunity applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§

1983 & 1981). Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Tabor are for actions taken in his judicial

capacity. He is, therefore, immune from suit.

C. Court Clerk Susie Hassett

Court Clerk Hassett is likewise immune from suit. The doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity

extends judicial immunity “to officials other than judges ... because their judgments are

functionally comparable to those of judges – that is, because they, too ‘exercise a discretionary

judgment’ as part of their function.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993).

“For court clerks, absolute immunity has been extended to acts that are discretionary, taken at the

direction of a judge, or taken according to court rules.” Hamilton v. City of Hayti, Mo., 948 F.3d

921, 928 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Antoine, 508 U.S. at 436); Boyer v. Cnty. of Washington, 971 F.2d

100, 102 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Court clerks have quasi-judicial immunity for damages for civil rights

violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process, unless the clerks

acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”) (cleaned up). The “filing of complaints and other

documents is an integral part of the judicial process.” Smith v. Erickson, 884 F.2d 1108, 1111 (8th

Cir. 1989); see also Davis v. McAteer, 431 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1970) (immunity extends to the

loss of files). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Hassett are for actions taken in her

role as Court Clerk at the direction of Judge Tabor. She is, therefore, immune from suit.

D. Prosecutor Daniel Shue

Plaintiff’s claims against Prosecutor Shue must be dismissed because prosecutors are

immune from suit. The United States Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431

(1976), established the absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a civil suit for damages under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.” Id. at 427. This

immunity extends to all acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal

process.” Id. at 430; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (Prosecutor acting as

an advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution is entitled to absolute immunity).

Here, Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant Shue spoke with both private attorneys he

contacted for his case, telling both attorneys that Plaintiff was a sovereign citizen and, therefore, a

terrorist who did not believe in following the law. He also alleges that Shue told them Judge Tabor

did not like Plaintiff because he filed too many motions, was argumentative, and thought he knew

the law. Plaintiff alleges that after these conversations with Shue, the private defense attorneys in

question either raised their rate to represent him or were not as congenial in their interactions with

him. Plaintiff clearly identifies himself as a sovereign citizen in his Complaint. Finally, the Court

infers that Defendant Shue was involved in the State v. Shaun Jermaine Estes, Case No. 66CR-20-

875, as the supervisor of deputy prosecuting attorney Houston Race Garner.

It is indisputable that a prosecutor speaking with a defense attorney concerning a criminal

case they are both involved with is an act intimately associated with the judicial phase of the

criminal process. Indeed, it is unclear how criminal cases could proceed or how defense attorneys

could adequately represent their clients if the attorneys involved on each side were not permitted

to communicate with each other.6 As to the content of that speech, Plaintiff clearly identifies

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himself as a sovereign citizen. The sovereign citizen movement is widely known and categorized

as an extremist group.7 Finally, Plaintiff’s approach to litigation can be seen by reviewing the

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6 For example, “contemporary criminal justice guidelines and standards have at their ‘core,’” the

duty for defense counsel to pursue plea negotiations with the prosecutor.” These standards include

those from the American Bar Association and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association's

Performance Guidelines. Todd A. Berger, After Frye and Lafler: The Constitutional Right to

Defense Counsel Who Plea Bargains, 38 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 121, 140 (2014).

7 See, e.g. The Anti-Defamation League, https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/sovereign-

citizen-movement-united-states (last visited Sept. 26, 2024); Southern Poverty Law Center,

https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/sovereign-citizens-movement

(last visited Sept. 26, 2024).

docket report in State v. Shaun Jermaine Estes, Case No. 66CR-20-875. Thus, Defendant Shue is

immune from suit as a prosecutor.

E. Attorney Robert Gean

Plaintiff identifies Defendant Gean as his privately retained defense attorney. A privately

retained defense attorney is not a state actor and is, therefore, not a proper party under § 1983. See

Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324 (1981) (neither public defenders nor privately retained

defense counsel act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as

counsel to a defendant in criminal proceedings.); DuBose v. Kelly, 187 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999)

(private attorneys do not act under color of state law and are not subject to suit under § 1983).

Therefore, Robert Gean, Plaintiff’s privately retained defense attorney, is not subject to suit under

§ 1983.

F. John Hancock

Defendant Hancock’s only role in this case appears to have been as a witness called by the

State in State v. Shaun Jermaine Estes, Case No. 66CR-20-875. As a private party, he is not

subject to suit under § 1983. “[A] private party’s mere invocation of state legal procedures does

not constitute state action.” Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir.

2001) (store employee, who was not employed by the police department, was not a state actor

when employee reported suspected shoplifting and detained the shoplifter until police arrived)

(citations omitted); see also Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 1975) (“The mere fact

that the individual defendants were complainants and witnesses in an action which itself was

prosecuted under color of law does not make their complaining or testifying other than what it

was, i.e., the action of private persons not acting under color of law.”).

G. Defamation and Slander

Plaintiff’s claims that he has been defamed and slandered by many of the Defendants is

subject to dismissal. Slander, defamation, and humiliation do not state a constitutional violation.

“[D]efamation, per se, is not actionable under section 1983.” Underwood v. Pritchard, 638 F.2d

60, 62 (8th Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court has held that a person’s interest in his reputation is not

considered liberty or property protected by the due process clause. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,

711-12 (1976). In other words, the “Supreme Court has made clear that federal courts are not to

view defamatory acts as constitutional violations.” Boyanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit,

215 F.3d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 2000).

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is recommended that: (1) the case be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (2) Plaintiff/Petitioner

is warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g) and thus, the Clerk is directed to place a § 1915(g) strike flag on the case for future judicial

consideration; and (3) the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from

this dismissal would not be taken in good faith.

Referral Status: This case should not remain referred as all matters have been

recommended for dismissal in this Report and Recommendation.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 30th day of September 2024.

/s/

HON. MARK E. FORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE