The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION
RICHARD COURVILLE DOCKET NO. 2:22-cv-06214
SECTION P
VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY
UNKNOWN OFFICERS, ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant, Officer Racca (sometimes
herein “Racca”). Doc. 18. For the reasons below, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss
be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that in October 2022 he was subjected to excessive force during a search
procedure by Town of Iowa police officer, Officer Racca. In response, Officer Racca filed the
instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing that plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Racca in his individual capacity that is plausible on
its face and that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Moreover, Officer Racca asserts that
plaintiff’s claims against him in his official capacity are not pled with sufficient factual support to
withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and, as a result, plaintiff’s complaint should be
dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. FRCP Rule 12(b)(6)
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "[t]he 'court accepts all well-pleaded
facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" In re Katrina Canal
Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas
Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). The Court may consider "the complaint,
its proper attachments, 'documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of
which a court may take judicial notice.'" Wolcott v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)). "To survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'" In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
In Twombly, the United States Supreme Court set forth the basic criteria necessary for a
complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. "While a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to
provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(2007) (internal citations and brackets omitted). A complaint is also insufficient if it merely
"tenders 'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (internal citations and brackets omitted). However, "[a] claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. In order to satisfy the
plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully." Id. "Furthermore, while the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will
not 'strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.'" Taha v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62185, 2012 WL 1576099, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 3, 2012) (quoting Southland
Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004)). On a motion to dismiss,
courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a private right of action for
redressing the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law. See Migra v.
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82 (1984); Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981). It provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using their badge of authority
to deprive individuals of federally guaranteed rights and provide relief to victims if such deterrence
fails. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).
"Section 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method
for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)
(quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)); accord Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 393-94 (1989); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985); Jackson v. City of
Atlanta, 73 F.3d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1996); Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1352 (5th Cir.
1985).
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the color of
state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986);
Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1984). A § 1983 complainant must support his
claim with specific facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on
conclusory allegations. See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995); Fee v. Herndon,
900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990); Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986); Angel
v. City of Fairfield, 793 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1986).
C. Application
a. Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff brings claims against Officer Racca in his official capacity, “while acting as a
representative of the City of Iowa Police Department.” See doc. 10, ¶ B. A suit against a
government official in his official capacity is the same as a suit against the government entity of
which he is an agent. Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F. 3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999). Thus,
to determine whether a public official is liable under § 1983 in his official capacity, the Court looks
to the jurisprudence discussing whether the municipality or local government entity is liable under
§ 1983. Id.
Municipal liability under § 1983 requires proof of three elements: (1) an official policy or
custom, of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3)
a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom. Piotrowski v.
City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 694 (1978)). A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat
superior. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). That is, “[a] municipality is
liable only for acts directly attributable to it ‘through some official action or imprimatur.’” Valle
v. City of Hous., 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d
567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)). In this regard, an official policy must either be unconstitutional or have
been adopted “with deliberate indifference to the known or obvious fact that such constitutional
violations would still result.” Johnson v. Deep E. Tex. Reg'l Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379
F.3d 293, 309 (5th Cir. 2004). “Deliberate indifference is a degree of culpability beyond mere
negligence or even gross negligence; it ‘must amount to an intentional choice, not merely an
unintentionally negligent oversight.’” James v. Harris Cty., 577 F.3d 612, 617–18 (5th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Rhyne v. Henderson Cty., 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992)). “These requirements must
not be diluted, for ‘[w]here a court fails to adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and
causation, municipal liability collapses into respondeat superior liability.’” Snyder v. Trepagnier,
142 F.3d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan
Cty., v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997)).
Again, “[a] municipality is liable under §1983 for a deprivation of rights protected by the
Constitution or federal laws that is inflicted pursuant to official policy.” Webster v. City of
Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir.), on reh'g, 739 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1984). “A plaintiff may
not infer a policy merely because harm resulted from some interaction with a governmental entity.”
Colle v. Brazos County Texas, 981 F.2d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 820-24 (1985)). Instead, the Fifth Circuit has defined “official policy” this way:
1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted
and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official to
whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or
2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which,
although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so
common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents
municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be
attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom
that body had delegated policy-making authority. Actions of officers or
employees of a municipality do not render the municipality liable under § 1983
unless they execute official policy as above defined.
Webster, 735 F.2d at 841.
Regarding practices and customs, “[a] pattern is tantamount to official policy when it is ‘so
common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.’”
Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 850 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Webster, 735 F.2d at
841). “Where prior incidents are used to prove a pattern, they ‘must have occurred for so long or
so frequently that the course of conduct warrants the attribution to the governing body of
knowledge that the objectionable conduct is the expected, accepted practice of city employees.’”
Id. (quoting Webster, 735 F.2d at 842). “It is thus clear that a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘a pattern
of abuses that transcends the error made in a single case.’” Id. at 850–51 (quoting Piotrowski, 237
F.3d at 582 (citations omitted)) “A pattern requires similarity and specificity; ‘[p]rior indications
cannot simply be for any and all “bad” or unwise acts, but rather must point to the specific violation
in question.’” Id. at 851 (quoting Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406
F.3d 375, 383 (5th Cir. 2005)). “A pattern also requires ‘sufficiently numerous prior incidents,’
as opposed to ‘isolated instances.’” Id. (quoting McConney v. City of Hous., 863 F.2d 1180, 1184
(5th Cir. 1989)).
Officer Racca argues that plaintiff’s complaint, and the amendments thereto, are devoid of
any facts which would demonstrate liability of Officer Racca in his official capacity under § 1983.
More specifically, Officer Racca argues in his Motion to Dismiss that plaintiff’s complaint is
completely void of any reference to any official policy or custom that was a moving force for the
alleged constitutional violation, and thus fails those prongs with respect to the claims against him
in his official capacity. Plaintiff does not rebut this argument in his Opposition to the instant
Motion to Dismiss.
The Court concurs with Officer Racca’s assertion that the instant complaint does not cite,
reference, or mention any written policy or practice which could be used to impute liability to him.
Instead, plaintiff’s complaint cited only the single instance of his own arrest as proof that Officer
Racca should be liable under § 1983, which solitary occurrence the Fifth Circuit has already held
is not enough to satisfy his burden at the pleading stage (see discussion, supra). Additionally, the
instant complaint does not show any policy was promulgated or ratified by any policymaker of the
municipality. Further to this point, the Fifth Circuit has held that “a city cannot be liable for an
unwritten custom unless ‘actual or constructive knowledge of such custom’ is attributable to a city
policy maker.” Pena v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 623 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Hicks-
Fields v. Harris Cnty., Texas, 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017)). Plaintiff’s complaint makes no
such allegations. As such, plaintiff’s claims against Officer Racca in his official capacity should
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
b. Individual Capacity Claims
In addition to suing Officer Racca in his official capacity, Plaintiff is also suing him
“personally.” Officer Racca contends that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a § 1983
claim against him in his individual capacity that is plausible on its face and that he is entitled to
qualified immunity.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) a court may dismiss an action barred by
qualified immunity. See Bustillos v. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 226 F. Supp. 3d 778, 793 (W.D.
Tex. 2016) (Martinez, J.) (dismissing a plaintiff's claim based on qualified immunity). Qualified
immunity shields government officials from civil liability for claims under federal law unless their
conduct "violates a clearly established constitutional right." Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d
621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003). Qualified immunity balances "the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Because qualified immunity shields "all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law," the Fifth Circuit considers qualified
immunity the norm and admonishes courts to deny a defendant immunity only in rare
circumstances. Romero v. City of Grapevine, 888 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts use a two-prong analysis to determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified
immunity. Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 2019 WL 3928715, at *5 (5th Cir. 2019), as revised
(Aug. 21, 2019). A plaintiff must show (1) the official violated a constitutional right; and (2) the
constitutional right was "clearly established" at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct.
Reed v. Taylor, 923 F.3d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 2019). The Supreme Court held in Pearson that "the
judges of the district courts . . . should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding
which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first." 555 U.S. at
236. Although qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, the plaintiff bears the burden to rebut
the defense and assert facts to satisfy both prongs of the analysis. Brumfield, 551 F.3d at 326. If a
plaintiff fails to establish either prong, the public official is immune from suit. Zarnow v. City of
Wichita Falls, 500 F.3d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 2007).
A heightened pleading requirement is imposed on a civil rights plaintiff suing a state actor
in his individual capacity. Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1479 (5th Cir. 1985). To satisfy the
heightened pleading requirement and maintain a § 1983 action against an official who raises a
qualified immunity defense, a complaint must allege with particularity all material facts
establishing a plaintiff's right of recovery, including "detailed facts supporting the contention that
[a] plea of immunity cannot be sustained." Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence
and Coordination Unit, 954 F.2d 1054, 1055 (5th Cir. 1992). Mere conclusory allegations are
insufficient to meet this heightened pleading requirement. Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1479.
"[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the
course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under
the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989). "[P]laintiff must allege: (1) an injury that (2) resulted directly and only from the use of
force that was excessive to the need, and (3) the use of force was objectively unreasonable" to
plead an excessive force claim under § 1983. Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2008).
To determine whether Officer Racca’s actions were objectively reasonable, the analysis is
an "objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed" that
he was violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights "under the circumstances of the complained of
action." Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). "The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. "To gauge the objective reasonableness of the force used by the law
enforcement officer, the Court must balance the amount of force used against the need for force."
Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 399 (5th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that Officer Racca “trip whip slammed” him to the ground, because he
“moved funny” while complying with a verbal order to retrieve property from his back pocket.
Doc. 4, p. 3. As a result, he contends that he suffered numerous injuries to the face, eye socket,
left shoulder, hip, knee and neck. Id. He allegedly continues to suffer today with numbness,
tingling, shooting pain and loss of strength in his fingers. Id. The Court finds that Plaintiff has
satisfied the first step of the qualified immunity analysis; he has alleged facts that, if proven,
constitute a violation of his clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive
force. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394.
The law was clearly established at the time of Plaintiff's arrest that "the right to make an
arrest necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof
to effect it." Bush, 513 F.3d at 502 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, during the arrest,
"the permissible degree of force depends on the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
posed a threat to the officer's safety, and whether the suspect was resisting arrest or attempting to
flee." Id. According to Plaintiff's version of the events, he was not resisting or failing to cooperate
with Officer Racca and the body camera footage will establish that the use of force was
unnecessary in the situation. Doc. 31, p. 1.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does concede, however, that he was charged with
resisting a police officer1. Doc. 10, p. 5. Whether Plaintiff was resisting arrest is a critical factor
in determining the reasonableness of Office Racca’s conduct. If Plaintiff was actively resisting
arrest, the force necessary to apprehend him naturally escalates. However, this degree of escalation
is relative to the need for force in the situation. See Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613,
619 (5th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, "[e]xcessive force claims are necessarily fact-intensive; whether
the force used is excessive or unreasonable depends on the facts and circumstances of each
particular case." Darden v. City of Fort Worth, Texas, 880 F.3d 722, 728 (5th Cir. 2018); see also
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
This is not an obvious case in which the entitlement to qualified immunity can be
determined without further development of the facts. See Hatcher v. Bement, No. 3:14-CV-432-
1 At the time of the filing, the charges were still pending.
M-BN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44074, 2015 WL 1511106, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2015). For the
Court to determine the reasonableness of Officer Racca’s actions, the Court must determine if
Officer Racca’s actions were reasonable in light of the circumstances, and "whether it would have
been clear to a reasonable officer in the [defendant's] position that [his or her] conduct was
unlawful in the situation [he or she] confronted." Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 758 (2014). When
significant fact questions remain as to both the plaintiff's and the defendant's knowledge, actions,
and omissions, more discovery is required. See Webb v. Livingston, No. 6:13cv711, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 34081, 2014 WL 1049983, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Mar.14, 2014). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
claims against Officer Racca in his individual capacity should survive the Motion to Dismiss.
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss (doc. 18)
be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, the District Court should GRANT the
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Racca in his official capacity and DENY the
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Racca in his individual capacity.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C) and Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 72(b), parties
aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and
recommendation to file specific, written objections with the clerk of court. A party may respond
to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual finding and/or the proposed
legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days
following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b),
shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal
conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglas
y. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5™ Cir. 1996).
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in chambers this 11th day of September, 2024.
a P. LEBLANC
UNITED S ES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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