Wood v. Independent School District No. 5 of Tulsa County, Oklahoma

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

ANGELA WOOD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) Case No. 24-CV-00098-CDL

)

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL, )

DISTRICT NO. 5 OF )

TULSA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11).

Defendant seeks dismissal of the Plaintiff’s claims of employment discrimination in

violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended by the ADA

Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), and for retaliation in

violation of the ADA, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

By consent of the parties, the undersigned has the authority to conduct

all proceedings and order the entry of a final judgment in this action in accordance with 28

U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.

I. Background

Pursuant to the standards governing a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the

following allegations are accepted as true as set forth in the Complaint (Doc. 2).

Plaintiff began working for the Defendant, Jenks Public Schools (the “School

District”) in 2005 as a middle school classroom teacher, teaching a variety of science and

social studies courses over the years. She performed the duties of her job satisfactorily and,

beginning in 2011, Plaintiff was given an extra duty assignment, including additional

compensation, as eighth-grade Team Leader. Plaintiff also obtained the extra-duty position

of Key Club Team Leader beginning in 2018. In late 2017, Plaintiff developed an infection

that resulted in significant hearing loss. Plaintiff developed compensatory strategies, such

as lip-reading, in order to continue teaching, but the hearing loss affected her ability to

communicate with students in the classroom.

In the summer of 2020, amid the Covid-19 national emergency, Defendant

announced that instruction in the 2020-2021 school year would take place in multiple

modes, including in-person classes, all-virtual instruction, and a hybrid model combining

virtual and in-person school. Plaintiff alleges that, beginning in mid-2020, she repeatedly

requested various forms of accommodation for her hearing impairment. First, in July 2020,

she asked to be assigned to a full-time virtual teaching position. Defendant denied that

request because there was no such vacancy at the time for which Plaintiff was qualified.

Later the same month, Plaintiff requested accommodations in the form of a hearing

aid device and the installation of plexiglass panels in her classroom. Defendant granted her

request as to the hearing aid and helped Plaintiff obtain a device in September 2020.

Defendant allegedly approved the request for plexiglass panels, but the principal and

assistant principal of the middle school allegedly prevented the panels from being installed.

Plaintiff ultimately abandoned her efforts to obtain the plexiglass panels because of the

principal’s “evident upset and hostility about the matter.” Id. at ¶ 33.

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Between April 2021 and May 2022, she continued to inquire about positions and

applied for several vacancies within the school district that would accommodate her

hearing loss. During an evaluation conference with her assistant principal on April 17,

2022, Plaintiff renewed her request to be assigned to a virtual teaching position, or

alternatively to be assigned to a half-day teaching position, to accommodate her hearing

impairment. However, Plaintiff alleges that her requests were ignored, and she was not

invited to interview for open positions for which she was qualified.

In December 2021, Plaintiff received “unjustifiable” criticism after a teacher

observation by her assistant principal. Id. at ¶ 40. On May 9, 2022, Plaintiff sent an email

to the district superintendent and head of human resources complaining about the inaction

on her accommodation requests and complaining that she had been subjected to retaliation.

In June 2022, Plaintiff’s middle-school principal replaced Plaintiff as the eighth-grade

Team Leader for the upcoming school year, but after Plaintiff complained, Principal Brown

reinstated her to the Team Leader position. Plaintiff alleges that she experienced emotional

upset, worry, and anguish as a result of the principal’s actions and that she began

considering retirement “as a possible response.” Id. at ¶ 59.

In September 2022, Plaintiff experienced two separate injuries while at work, but

Defendant unreasonably denied her requests to leave school to receive treatment. On

October 11, 2022, Principal Brown “unjustifiably” removed Plaintiff from the Team Leader

role, causing Plaintiff lost pay and humiliation. Id. at ¶ 62. The next day, Plaintiff requested

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a meeting with school district personnel “to confer about her employment concerns.” Id. at

¶ 63.

On October 13, 2022, Plaintiff met with school district personnel regarding

“Plaintiff’s continuing need for a job accommodation due to her hearing impairment and

the related ongoing hostile and retaliatory conduct of Principal Brown” and about the

possibility of transferring Plaintiff to a different position within the district. Id. ¶ 64. In a

follow-up meeting on October 17, 2022, Principal Brown “was angry and verbally attacked

Plaintiff,” complaining that she was “unprofessional, problematic, and all she did was send

long emails complaining to School District leaders about [Principal Brown].” Id. at ¶ 66

(alterations and quotation marks omitted). Although upset after Principal Brown’s

criticism, Plaintiff again explained “why her hearing loss necessitated a job

accommodation” and about her more recent struggles with anxiety and depression. Id. at ¶

67. The School District requested medical documentation from Plaintiff but did not follow

up with Plaintiff about her job accommodation request. Id. at ¶ 68.

On February 22, 2023, Plaintiff sent an email to the director of human resources for

the School District, discussing her previous communications with the School District and

stating, “I do not know what options I have with [the School District]. But if you have any

suggestions or insight, please let me know.” Id. at ¶ 71. By March 22, 2023, Plaintiff had

not received a response or heard from Defendant regarding her accommodation requests.

Plaintiff submitted a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC) but was advised that the EEOC “could not immediately intervene.” Id. at ¶ 73-74.

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Plaintiff submitted her resignation paperwork in March 2023, and Plaintiff left her

employment with Defendant after the school year ended.

Plaintiff executed and filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination form on June 30,

2023, alleging disability-based discrimination and retaliation. The EEOC issued a Notice

of Right to Sue dated December 12, 2023, and Plaintiff filed the Complaint (Doc. 2) on

March 6, 2024.

II. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

A pleading must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In considering a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon

which relief may be granted. A complaint must provide “more than labels and conclusions,

and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It must contain enough “facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face,” and the factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citations omitted).

At this stage, the court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint

as true and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to claimant.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Alvarado v. KOB–TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.

2007); Moffett v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 291 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 2002).

However, a court need not accept as true those allegations that are conclusory in

nature. Erikson v. Pawnee County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1154–55 (10th

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Cir. 2001). “[C]onclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient

to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Cory v. Allstate Ins., 583 F.3d 1240, 1244

(10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (10th Cir. 1991)).

III. Discussion

Defendant argues that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

because Plaintiff’s ADA claims are untimely. Alternatively, Defendant contends the

Complaint fails to state a claim under the ADA. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court

finds that both arguments lack merit and that Plaintiff has stated sufficient facts in the

Complaint to plausibly support her claims of disability-based discrimination and

retaliation.

The ADA prohibits covered employers from discriminating “against a qualified

individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,

advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other

terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The term

“disability” is broadly construed and includes “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A),

12102(4)(A). A “qualified individual” is one who, “with or without reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such

individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). There are three distinct types of ADA

discrimination claims: “(1) disparate treatment; (2) failure to accommodate; and (3)

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disparate impact.” Dansie v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 42 F.4th 1184, 1193 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2022)

(internal citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s ADA claims are based on an alleged failure to accommodate her

disability and on Defendant’s alleged retaliation for seeking accommodations.

“Discrimination” under the ADA may include an employer’s failure to “mak[e] reasonable

accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified

individual with a disability . . . unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the

accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of [the

employer].” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

The ADA is enforced according to the procedural requirements set forth under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House,

Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 285 (2002). Under the applicable procedures, administrative exhaustion

requires that a charge of discrimination be filed with a state agency within 300 days “after

the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). This

period applies to both failure-to-accommodate and retaliation claims. See Stratton v.

Sutherland Global Servs., Inc., 2020 WL 620662, at *3 & n.4 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 2020)

(unpublished).1

1 Under 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A), “[u]npublished decisions are not precedential, but may

be cited for their persuasive value.”

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It is uncontested that the Plaintiff perfected her charge of discrimination with the

EEOC, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation, no later than June 30, 2023.2 By

perfecting her charge on that date, the 300-day period relevant to her filing runs from

September 3, 2022, to June 30, 2023. Thus, the question is whether the Complaint alleges

facts plausibly showing that an unreasonable failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s hearing-

related impairment, and any alleged retaliation in violation of the ADA, occurred on or

after September 3, 2022.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s discrimination claim is untimely because as

alleged in the Complaint, “Plaintiff’s requests for accommodation for her employment

were well outside the 300-day period of time.” (Doc. 11 at 4-5). Defendant incorrectly

suggests that the time for filing a charge of discrimination began when Plaintiff requested

accommodations for her hearing impairment. See id. But that misconstrues the statute; an

employee’s request for accommodation is not an “unlawful employment practice”

prohibited by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Rather, the Tenth Circuit has held that

“it is knowledge of the adverse employment decision itself that triggers the running of the

2 Plaintiff notes authority providing that the “filing” of a charge with the EEOC may

begin with other submissions to the EEOC before a formal charge is executed. (Doc. 14 at

12 n.7). The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff began the process of filing her complaint

earlier in 2022. Because the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims are timely, for the reasons

discussed herein, the issue of whether Plaintiff may be considered to have “filed” a charge

earlier than June 30, 2023 is not before the Court at this time.

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statute of limitations.” Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003)

(citation omitted).

Defendant argues that the facts alleged in the Complaint are untimely because the

alleged conduct does not establish a continuing violation. “[U]nder proper circumstances,

a plaintiff may recover for discriminatory acts that occurred prior to the statutory

limitations period if they are ‘part of a continuing policy or practice that includes the act or

acts within the statutory period.’” Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1183 (citation omitted)). However,

it is not necessary to decide at this stage whether the continuing violation doctrine applies,

because “[e]ach discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging

that act.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002); see Davidson,

337 F.3d at 1184.

Based on the facts alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that she

requested accommodations for her disability that were unreasonably denied between

September 2022 and June 2023. Notwithstanding background allegations occurring before

the 300-day look-back period, the Complaint alleges that the Plaintiff engaged in

discussions and/or email communication with School District personnel on October 13,

2022, October 17, 2022, and February 22, 2023, related to her requests for hearing

impairment-related job accommodation. (Doc. 2 at ¶¶ 63-64, 67, 71). Plaintiff alleges that

the School District took no specific action in response to requests for accommodation she

made on those dates. Id. ¶¶ 69, 72, 77.

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Thus, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Complaint alleges facts

constituting an unlawful practice under the ADA that occurred within the 300-day period.

Specifically, the Complaint alleges facts plausibly establishing that Defendant failed to

“mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an

otherwise qualified individual with a disability,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A). So long as

one or more such decisions falls within the 300-day period, it is immaterial whether the

complaint alleges prior instances of discrimination. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113 (“Nor

does [Title VII] bar an employee from using . . . prior acts as background evidence in

support of a timely claim.”); see also Watts v. Okla. Dep't of Mental Health & Substance

Abuse Servs., No. CIV-19-1072-D, 2020 WL 2562811, at *2 (W.D. Okla. May 20, 2020)

(unpublished) (addressing claims under Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act) (“Further, the

only consequence of an untimely filing in relation to earlier acts of discrimination would

be to limit the time period of recoverable damages, if liability is otherwise established.”).

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of ADA-prohibited

discrimination. Such a claimant must allege that “(1) [she] is disabled as defined under

ADA; (2) [she] is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation by [the defendant,]

to perform the essential functions of the job; and (3) [she] was discriminated against

because of [her] disability.” Hester v. Osage Landfill, Inc., No. 23-CV-00341-GKF-MTS,

2024 WL 101854, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 9, 2024) (unpublished) (citations omitted); see

Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173, 1175 (10th Cir. 1997).

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As to the first element, to show an actual disability under § 12102(1)(A), a plaintiff

must “(1) have a recognized impairment, (2) identify one or more appropriate major life

activities, and (3) show the impairment substantially limits one or more of those activities.”

Callahan v. Commc’n Graphics, 2015 WL 5156888, *5 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 2, 2015)

(unpublished) (quoting Felkins v. City of Lakewood, 774 F.3d 647, 650 (10th Cir. 2014)).

“The first two requirements are questions of law, while the third is a question of fact. Id.

(citing Sanchez v. Vilsack, 695 F.3d 1174, 1179 (10th Cir. 2012)). In the Complaint, Plaintiff

alleges that she is deaf in her left ear and has moderate to severe hearing loss in her right

ear. (Doc. 2, ¶¶ 16, 70). She alleges that her hearing loss has adversely affected her ability

to communicate and interact with students in the classroom. Id. ¶ 17. Hearing is recognized

as a major life activity, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), and Defendant concedes that hearing loss

“could qualify as an impairment under the ADA.” (Doc. 11 at 7). Defendant asserts that

Plaintiff has failed to provide “any individual assessment of how her hearing impairs her.”

Id. However, Defendant points to no authority that an ADA discrimination claimant must

do so at the pleading stage.

The Court thus concludes the Complaint plausibly alleges that Plaintiff has a

disability. Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff satisfied the second element by alleging

that she is a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA. (Doc. 11 at 7; see also

Doc. 2 ¶ 81). Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to allege that she was subject to an

adverse employment action, because the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff resigned from her

position. However, “an adverse employment action is not a requisite element of an ADA

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failure-to-accommodate claim.” Exby-Stolley v. Board of Cnty. Comm’rs, 979 F.3d 784,

788 (10th Cir. 2020). Rather, “the third element of this general test—that the individual

was “discriminated against because of her disability”—is satisfied in a failure-to-

accommodate claim as soon as the employer, with adequate notice of the disabled

employee's request for some accommodation, fails to provide a reasonable

accommodation.” Id. at 795 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Here, the Complaint

plainly alleges that Defendant received notice of Plaintiff’s hearing impairment and failed

to provide her with a reasonable job accommodation (see Doc. 2 ¶¶ 2, 82-84), and further

alleged that Defendant failed to engage Plaintiff in the reasonable accommodation process.

Id. ¶ 84. The Complaint thus adequately states a claim for ADA discrimination.

Defendant argues that the Complaint fails to state a plausible claim of ADA

retaliation. The ADA prohibits discrimination against any person for opposing “any act or

practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under

[the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under the

ADA, Plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity under the applicable

statute; (2) a reasonable employee would have found Defendant’s conduct materially

adverse; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the materially

adverse action. Blakely v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 256 F. Supp. 3d 1169, 1174 (D. Kan. 2017).

At the pleading stage, “Plaintiff is not required to set forth a prima facie case for each

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element,” but the Complaint must “set forth plausible claims.” Khalik v. United Air Lines,

671 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2012); see Blakely, 256 F. Supp. at 1174 (D. Kan. 2017).

“Requests for reasonable accommodation are protected activities.” Blakely, 256 F.

Supp. at 1174 (D. Kan. 2017). Thus, Plaintiff has established the first element. Defendant

argues that Plaintiff suffered no material adverse action because she resigned her position.

However, Plaintiff alleges that, on or about October 11, 2022, she was unjustifiably

removed from being her Team Lead, a position she had held for over a decade, and as a

result she lost pay and suffered humiliation. (See Doc. 2 ¶ 62). As such, Plaintiff alleges

Defendant took an action that a reasonable worker could find materially adverse. See

Burlington N. and Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted) (holding employer’s action is materially adverse if it “might have

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination”).

Defendant argues that the Complaint fails to plausibly show a causal connection

between Plaintiff’s requests for accommodation and any adverse action, noting that

Plaintiff allegedly began requesting hearing-related accommodations several years before

the end of her employment with Defendant. Less than one week after Plaintiff was removed

from the Team Lead position, during an October 17th, 2022 meeting with School District

personnel to discuss Plaintiff’s accommodation requests, Principal Brown allegedly

berated the Plaintiff, accusing her of “‘send[ing] [the district] long emails’” complaining

about him.” (Doc. 2 at ¶ 66). Principal Brown then allegedly stated the Plaintiff did not

deserve to be the Team Lead. Id. The alleged purpose of the October 17th meeting was to

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address Plaintiff’s request for a job accommodation. See id. at 64-66. Thus, the

Complaint alleges facts, including temporal proximity and the context of Principal Brown’s

alleged outburst, plausibly connecting the adverse employment action with Plaintiff’s

requests for accommodation. See Proctor v. United Parcel Serv., 502 F.3d 1200, 1213 &

n.6 (10th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that “protected conduct closely followed by adverse

action” may constitute “evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory

motive” under the ADA). Accordingly, the Complaint plausibly alleges that, because of her

request for accommodations, the Plaintiff was subjected to retaliation.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the above analysis, the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is denied. The Court

will enter a scheduling order separately.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of December, 2024.

Christine D. Little ==

United States Magistrate Judge

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