Kellett v. Livingston Parish School District

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ASHLEY KELLET CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 24-252-JWD-RLB

LIVINGSTON PARISH SCHOOL

DISTRICT, ET AL.

NOTICE

Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge’s Report has been filed with the

Clerk of the United States District Court.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen (14) days after being served

with the attached Report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of

law and recommendations therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings,

conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon

grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and

legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which have been accepted by the District Court.

ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE

WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on October 22, 2024.

S

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ASHLEY KELLET CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 24-252-JWD-RLB

LIVINGSTON PARISH SCHOOL

DISTRICT, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court are the Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Department’s Motion to Dismiss (R.

Doc. 19) and a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Louisiana Department of Children and Family

Services, the Louisiana Department of Health, and Governor Jeff Landry (collectively, the “State

Defendants”) (R. Doc. 23). The deadlines for opposing these motions has expired. LR 7(f).

Accordingly, the Motions to Dismiss are unopposed.

Also before the Court are three “ex parte” motions filed by Ashley Kellet (“Plaintiff”)

seeking injunctive relief. (R. Docs. 5, 6, 12). In the first motion, Plaintiff seeks a reversal of her

Medicaid termination (“Motion to Reverse Medicaid Termination”). (R. Doc 5). In the second

motion, Plaintiff seeks the return of her adult, disabled sons identified as MBG and CEG from

the custody of the State of Louisiana (“Motion for Custody”). (R. Doc. 6). In the third motion,

Plaintiff seeks a stay of all judicial proceedings in the State of Louisiana, as well as a temporary

restraining order against her landlord, Michelle Ruston and Ruston Properties, to prevent her

eviction (“Motion to Stay Eviction Proceedings”). (R. Doc. 12).

I. Background

Plaintiff is proceeding both pro se and in forma pauperis. (See R. Docs. 1, 8). Plaintiff

(purportedly on behalf of her minor children P.J.K.1 and P.G.K., her disabled adult sons M.B.G.

1 It appears that the Complaint contains a typo and mistakenly references B.J.K.

and C.E.G., and her adult son Joshua Germany) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and state law, naming as defendants Livingston Parish School District, the Livingston Parish

Sheriff’s Department, the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services, the Louisiana

Department of Health, and Governor Jeff Landry. (R. Doc. 1).

Attached to the Complaint are 382 pages of documents consisting of various narratives

and citations to legal authorities. (See R. Docs. 1-1, 1-2). Plaintiff also filed a “Notice of

Additional Evidence,” which appears to consist of additional typewritten allegations and an

email auto-response from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development regarding a

fair housing complaint. (See R Doc. 4).

It appears that the genesis of the instant lawsuit was a State court action brought by the

Livingston Parish School Board against Plaintiff, resulting in the issuance of a temporary

restraining order on January 27, 2020, and a preliminary injunction on April 8, 2020, prohibiting

Plaintiff from concealing electronic devices on one of her child’s clothing and personal

belongings while attending Live Oak Elementary School, as well as engaging in certain speech

with respect to the Livingston Parish School Board. See Livingston Parish School Board v.

Kellett, 368 So.3d 621, 624 (La. 1st Cir. 2023). The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal

reversed the trial court’s denial of a motion to dissolve the portion of the preliminary injunction

prohibiting Plaintiff’s speech as an impermissible prior restraint on free speech in violation of the

First Amendment. Id. at 629-30.

In the instant Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the injuries for which she is now seeking

relief began when she was sued in January of 2020 “but has continued until the present day.” (R.

Doc. 1 at 4). It appears that the minor involved in the previous state court lawsuit was P.J.K. (See

R. Doc. 1-1 at 5). Plaintiff is not, however, seeking any specific or direct relief with respect to

P.J.K or with respect to the previous lawsuit. Instead, Plaintiff appears to allege that after the

commencement of the State court action brought by the Livingston Parish School Board, the

public entities named as defendants in this action conspired to harm Plaintiff and her children.

While the exact nature of Plaintiff’s causes of action are unclear, it appears that Plaintiff

seeks relief regarding three seemingly unrelated events in her life: the termination of her

Medicaid status, the alleged unlawful removal of M.B.G. and C.E.G. from her home, and the

commencement of eviction proceedings:

Immediate injunctive relief against the state of Louisiana, including the governor

Jeff Landry, the immediate return of Ashley Kellett’s Medicaid to active status so

that she can receive care for the cancer. She is currently fighting she’s recently

had to undergo blood transfusions and needed three iron transfusions that she was

unable to receive. She’s a mass noted in her left thyroid bed, which is the site of

two forms of thyroid cancer she formally was diagnosed within 2018 she also

needs beyond surgery radiation that she is not able to receive without this.

Ironically Miss Kellett received a letter in the mail stating that her Medicaid was

until 2025 until the CMS investigation opened up, at that time the state of

Louisiana decided to terminate not only miss Kellett Medicaid, but two of her

children, Joshua Germany, and her daughter and . . . Anna Grace Germany.

[Defendants] continues to harass the Kellett family and beat on her door Daily,

she has had to withdraw her-eight year-old daughter from school due to

[Defendants] continually showing up five times the school year thus far to pull

PGK out of class question her about her sister’s medication, in addition, Kellett

believes that the state is now colluding with her landlord and is attempting to have

her evicted from her home, the state has also annihilated her entire income,

[M]atthew Kellett worked for the Waiver Program as did her son Joshua Germany

for each of her disabled children, PJK, and MBG . Both of which have been

kidnapped2 from the Kellett home currently miss Kellett has no idea where MG is

and has also requesting an emergent interdiction for not only MBG but also CEG

who is suffering irreparable psychological abuse the state now has MG dressing

up as a girl and calling himself “Chloe” please note that MG has never had any

psychological issues in his life, he does have an anoxic brain injury and does

something called confabulation, but has no noted mental health issues. please see

attached CEG is being psychologically harmed by being lied to perpetually by his

estranged grandparents continuously lied about his mother diagnosis that they

know nothing about because they have never been around. Ashley Kellett is also

requesting competent representation at the states expense that is not associated

with the state of Louisiana and anyone who may have conflict with Judge Guy

2 It appears that Plaintiff’s use of the words “kidnapped” and “abduction” to refer to the removal of her children

from her home is hyperbolic.

Bradberry who is the Uncle of Ashley Kellett, who she reported for raping her

and sexually assaulting her at the age of five years old until she was 10 years old

And 2022 is still under investigation please note the retaliation exponentially

increased after she turned down to $20,000 offer . . . and mandatory non-

disclosure and after the election was finished in 2022.

(R. Doc. 1 at 5). Throughout her Complaint and the attached documents, Plaintiff appears to

suggest that her misfortunes stem from her alleged molestation by her uncle.

Having considered the pending motions, and having conducted an independent review of

the pleadings, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint, as submitted, fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, considering the general incoherence of the allegations

and the unrelatedness of the claims brought against the three sets of government defendants. The

undersigned recommends that the district judge (1) grant the pending motions to dismiss based

on lack of service, (2) deny Plaintiff’s motions for injunctive relief, and (3) dismiss the

Complaint without prejudice to address the deficiencies raised in the instant Report and

Recommendation.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Standard for Pro Se Litigants

Pro se pleadings are to be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also SEC v. AMX, Int'l, Inc., 7

F.3d 71, 75 (5th Cir. 1993) (recognizing the established rule that this court “must construe [a pro

se plaintiff’s] allegations and briefs more permissively”). Furthermore, a court must liberally

construe a pro se complaint, taking all well-pleaded allegations as true. Johnson v. Atkins, 999

F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Nevertheless, “a pro se litigant is not exempt ... from

compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” NCO Fin. Systems, Inc. v.

Harper–Horsley, No. 07-4247, 2008 WL 2277843, at *3 (E.D. La. May 29, 2008) (quoting Birl

v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981)). As such, a pro se plaintiff's complaint “must set

forth facts giving rise to a claim on which relief may be granted.” Johnson, 999 F.2d at 100

(citation omitted).

Additionally, “[a] liberal reading of plaintiff’s pleadings is the only special treatment

afforded pro se plaintiffs by the courts.” Kiper v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., No. 14-313, 2015

WL 2451998, at *1 (M.D. La. May 21, 2015) (citing Callahan v. C.I.R., No. 99-0295, 2000 WL

1141607, at *1 (M.D. La. Apr. 10, 2000)). A “court is not required to search for or try to create

causes of actions or find material issues of fact for pro se plaintiffs.” Id. Finally, “a pro se

litigant is not entitled to greater rights than would be a litigant represented by a lawyer.” NCO

Fin. Systems, 2008 WL 2277843, at *3 (citing Birl, 660 F.2d at 593).

B. Rule 12(b)(5) Dismissal for Failure to Serve

The Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Department and the State Defendants seek dismissal of

this action pursuant for lack of proper service. (See R. Docs. 19, 23). The relief sought is

unopposed. See LR 7(f).

A Rule 12(b)(5) motion seeks dismissal for failure to effectuate service properly. “A

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) turns on the legal sufficiency of the service of

process.” Holly v. Metro. Transit Auth., 213 Fed. App’x 343, 344 (5th Cir. 2007). When a

challenge is made to the adequacy of service of process, the serving party bears the burden of

proving the validity of service or the existence of good cause for failing to effect service in a

timely manner. System Sign Supplies v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 903 F.2d 1011, 1013 (5th Cir.

1990); Aetna Business Credit, Inc. v. Universal Décor & Interior Design, Inc., 635 F.2d 434, 435

(5th Cir. 1990). The fact that the plaintiff is pro se does not excuse the failure to properly effect

service of process. System Signs Supplies, 903 F.2d at 1013; Dupre v. Touro Infirmary, 235 F.3d

1340 (5th Cir. 2000).

Rule 4(m) requires a plaintiff to “properly serve defendant[s] with a copy of the summons

and complaint within 90 days after the complaint is filed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). If a defendant is

not timely served, the court “must dismiss the action” or order that “service be made within a

specified time.” Id. However, “if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must

extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Id. Even in the absence of good cause, the

district court has discretion “to order that service be made within a specified time” as an

alternative to dismissal. Id.; see Thompson v. Brown, 91 F.3d 20, 21 (5th Cir. 1996) (“We agree

with the majority of circuits that have found that the plain language of rule 4(m) broadens a

district court’s discretion by allowing it to extend the time for service even when a plaintiff fails

to show good cause.”).

To establish good cause, a litigant must demonstrate “at least as much as would be

required to show excusable neglect.” Winters v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 776 F.2d 1304,

1306 (5th Cir. 1985). “Actions falling into the category of inadvertence, mistake or ignorance of

counsel are not excusable neglect and do not establish good cause for extending” the service

period. Traina v. United States, 911 F.2d 1155, 1157 (5th Cir. 1990). Additionally, the claimant

must make a showing of good faith and establish “‘some reasonable basis for noncompliance

within the time specified.’” Winters, 776 F.2d at 1306 (quoting 4A C. Wright & A. Miller,

Federal Practice & Procedure § 1165, at 480 (2d ed.)).

The record indicates that Plaintiff attempted service of process on each defendant by

either delivering service by certified mail or in person. (See R. Doc. 22).

Plaintiff cannot serve process on a defendant because she is a party to this action. Rule

4(c) provides that “[a]ny person who is at least 18 years old and not a party may serve a

summons and complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2). Accordingly, a “plaintiff—even one

representing himself—cannot serve a summons and complaint.” Davis v. United States Dep't of

the Treasury, No. 18-1041, 2022 WL 1311482, at *3 n.24 (M.D. La. Feb. 28, 2022), report and

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 1311474 (M.D. La. Mar. 15, 2022) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(c)(2)). This rule extends to attempted service by a plaintiff by certified mail under state law.

Shabazz v. City of Houston, 515 Fed. App’x 263 (5th Cir. 2013).

For the foregoing reasons, the claims against the Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Department

and the State Defendants are subject to dismissal, without prejudice, because service was not

made in accordance with Rule 4(c). It is appropriate, however, to provide Plaintiff an additional

30 days, pursuant to Rule 4(m), to effectuate service.3

As a final matter, Governor Landry also argues that to the extent he is named as a

defendant in his individual capacity, he was not served by domiciliary service as required by

Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article

1231. (See R. Doc. 23-1 at 3-5). Any renewed claims with respect to Governor Landry must

indicate whether he is sued solely in his official capacity. If Plaintiff is suing Governor Landry in

his individual capacity, she must demonstrate proper domiciliary service within the time allowed

by the district judge’s ruling.

3 The Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Department also seeks (1) dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(4) for insufficient

service of process (because a copy of the Complaint was not served) and (2) dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) for

lack of personal jurisdiction in light of the insufficiency of process and service of process. (See R. Doc. 19-1 at 5-7).

The Court need not reach these issues because, as explained below, Plaintiff’s claims against the Livingston Parish

Sheriff’s Department are subject to dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

C. Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal for Lack of Capacity to be Sued

The Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Office also seeks dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for

lack of capacity to be sued. (See R. Doc. 19-1 at 2-4).

When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept all well-

pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Baker v.

Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir.

1992). Nonetheless, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “To survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff names the Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Office as a defendant, although it is

unclear which of Plaintiff’s claims are specifically addressed at this defendant. At any rate, the

Court concludes that the Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Office is correct that it is not a legal entity

capable of being sued.

Rule 17(b) provides that the capacity to sue or be sued is determined by state law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 17(b). The Louisiana Supreme Court has expressly stated that a Sheriff’s Department is

not a legal entity capable of being sued:

It is well settled in the lower courts that a Sheriff’s Department is not a legal

entity capable of being sued. It is the elected Sheriff, not the “Parish Sheriff’s

Office,” that is the constitutionally designated chief law enforcement officer of

the Parish. The law of Louisiana affords no legal status to the “Parish Sheriff's

Department” so that the department can sue or be sued, such status being reserved

for the Sheriff.

Valentine v. Bonneville Ins. Co., 691 So. 2d 665, 668 (La. 1997) (internal citations removed).

Various decisions issued from this district have reached this specific conclusion with respect to

the Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Department. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ard, No. 19-66, 2020 WL

699740, at *5 (M.D. La. Feb. 11, 2020) (“[T]o the extent the Complaint alleges a claim against

the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Office, that claim is dismissed with prejudice.”); see also Abbott

v. Town of Livingston, No. 16-00188, 2016 WL 4134565, at *4 (M.D. La. July 29, 2016) (“It is

well settled under Louisiana law that a sheriff's department or office, or the parish prison, is not a

separate legal entity capable of being sued. Rather, a parish sheriff, whether in his individual or

official capacity, is the proper party defendant.”) (internal citations omitted).

For the foregoing reasons, the claims brought against the Livingston Parish Sheriff’s

Office are subject to dismissal with prejudice.

D. Frivolous Review of Plaintiff’s Complaint

1. Legal Standards

While the Court construes complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs liberally, even the most

liberally construed IFP complaint can be dismissed at any time, regardless of service or the filing

of an answer, if the court determines the case:

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Dismissal under § 1915(e) may be made before service of process.

Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986).

An IFP complaint is properly dismissed as frivolous if the plaintiff’s claims lack an

arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 24 (5th Cir. 1995). A court may

dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts are clearly baseless, a category

encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional. Denton, 504 U.S. at 33;

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; see also Ancar v. SARA Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 1992)

(“A complaint is factually frivolous if the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or wholly

incredible”). Pleaded facts which are merely improbable or strange are not frivolous. Denton,

504 U.S. at 33; Ancar, 964 F.2d at 468.

To determine whether the complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),

courts apply the same standard used for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Hart v. Harrison, 343 F.3d 762, 763-64 (5th Cir. 2003). Those standards have

been outlined above.

In most circumstances, a court should allow a plaintiff at least one chance to amend the

complaint under Rule 15(a) before dismissing the action with prejudice. See Great Plains Trust

Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) (plaintiffs generally

given one chance to amend before dismissal unless “it is clear that the defects are incurable”).

However, a court should deny leave to submit futile amendments that are “insufficient to state a

claim.” Jamieson v Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1209 (5th Cir. 1985). In other words, “the same

standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6),” and by extension §

1915(a)(2)(B)(ii), applies to futility. Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3D 863, 873 (5th

Cir. 2000).

2. Improper Representation by a Pro Se Plaintiff

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s action must be dismissed, with prejudice, to the extent

Plaintiff is seeking to represent the interests of her children. See Roush on behalf of E.R. v.

Alexander, No. 21-528, 2022 WL 846807, at *6 (M.D. La. Feb. 24, 2022), report and

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 842852 (M.D. La. Mar. 21, 2022); see also A.R. by &

through Roberts v. Kansas Sch. Bd. Ass'n, No. 21-2492, 2022 WL 103292, at *4 (D. Kan. Jan. 11,

2022) (“[T]he court finds that Plaintiff Roberts has failed to establish standing for any federal

claims on her own behalf and, because she is proceeding pro se, she cannot proceed on any

federal claims on behalf of her minor children.”).

The general rule in federal court is that while parties generally have the right to proceed

pro se under 28 U.S.C § 1654, a party cannot proceed pro se on behalf of another individual,

including a spouse or minor children. Sprague v. Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., 547 F. App’x

507, 508-09 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Johnson v. Lufkin Daily News, 48 Fed. App’x 917 (5th Cir.

2002) (citing § 1654); Morgan v. Texas, 251 Fed. App’x 894, 896 n. 2 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that

because the plaintiff was proceeding pro se, she did not have the authority to assert claims on

behalf of the minor child); Aduddle v. Body, 277 Fed. App’x 459 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that

even assuming the grandfather was the legal guardian of the grandchild, because he was not an

attorney, he did not have the authority to represent her on a pro se basis)); see also Chatman v.

Mississippi High Sch. Athletics Ass'n, 552 F. App’x 335, 337 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[W]ith limited

exceptions not applicable here, a pro se, non-lawyer parent or guardian may not represent the

interests of her minor child [in a Section 1983 action].”); JD1 by & through Raskin v. Dallas

Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 21-2429, 2021 WL 5396001, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2021) (“[T]he law

does not allow parents like Ms. Raskin to lodge claims and sue pro se on behalf of their children.

This is because individuals who do not have a law license may not represent other parties, even

minor children, on a next-friend basis.”) (citing Sprague, 547 F. App’x at 508). An exception to

this general rule applies where parents bring an appeal for supplemental security income benefits

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act where the parent has a sufficient interest in the case

and meets basic standards of competence. See Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000).

That exception is inapplicable to this case.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s action is subject to dismissal, with prejudice, to the

extent Plaintiff is seeking to represent the interests of her children without benefit of counsel.

Even if Plaintiff is provided an opportunity to amend the pleadings, she cannot proceed on behalf

of her children on any claims.

3. Shotgun Pleading & Improper Joinder of Claims

As discussed above, Plaintiff appears to seek relief regarding three unrelated events in her

life: the termination of her Medicaid status, the alleged abduction of M.B.G. and C.E.G. by the

Louisiana State Defendants, and the commencement of eviction proceedings. Plaintiff’s

disjointed allegations under various legal theories are subject to dismissal because they amount

to improper “shotgun pleading.” See O'Neal v. Universal Prot. Serv., LLC, No. 21-00737, 2022

WL 1631970, at *5 (M.D. La. May 23, 2022) (dismissing allegations based on the basis of

violations of Rules 8 and 10 in light of “shotgun pleading” where the pleading “contains

irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions, states immaterial facts not obviously

connected to any particular cause of action, copies wholesale large swaths of statutory text

without specifying which provision (if any) the Defendants are accused of violating, and

indiscriminately alleges nine claims against two separate Defendants without any indication

whether (or how) each Defendant is liable.”) (citing Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Off.,

792 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2015)).

The Federal Rules requires a Complaint to provide “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a) requires a

“showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94

(2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to meet this standard. The

Complaint as drafted “is a convoluted, nonsensical rambling, interspersed with sparse legal

gibberish” and, therefore, “fatally defective and subject to dismissal on that basis alone.” See

Truesdale v. Fla., No. 18-22286, 2018 WL 11302939, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 21, 2018), report and

recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 11302938 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2018).

Plaintiff does not clarify in the Complaint which specific Defendants are subject to which

sets of allegations. Plaintiff appears to seek relief under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution without identifying which of the specific

Defendants are accused of each alleged violation. (See R. Doc. 1 at 3-4). Plaintiff also states

without explanation that the following federal statutes and causes of actions are brought: “TITLE

42 section 1983 and 1985, The American, disability act, the IDEA, the rehabilitation act, the

privacy act, Retaliation, denial to a courtroom, physical and virtual, intentional harm to the

disabled, [c]ollusion, fraud, perjury, judicial misconduct, racketeering, [and] medical

negligence.” (R. Doc. 1 at 7).

Even if the general incoherence of the allegations and the “kitchen sink” approach to the

allegations did not subject Plaintiff’s Complaint to dismiss, the pleading is nevertheless deficient

because it improperly joins claims against various defendants that do not arise out of the same

transaction or occurrence or involve a common issue of fact or law. While misjoinder of parties

is not a ground for dismissing an action, the Court may, without motion, drop misjoined parties

from lawsuits and sever any claims against a party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. In general, a plaintiff

may join any claims it has against a defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). But Rule 20(a)(2) must

be satisfied where additional defendants are named. That rule permits joinder of multiple

defendants in a single lawsuit only when (1) the plaintiff asserts a right to relief against each

defendant relating to or “arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions

or occurrences” and (2) a “question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the

action.’” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). “In other words, ‘Rule 20 requires that all of the [plaintiff’s]

claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence and that there is a common issue of fact or

law.’” Robinson v. Stone, No. 09-0220-B, 2009 WL 790130, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2009)

(quoting Applewhite v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 67 F.3d 571, 574 n. 11 (5th Cir.1995)). “Pro se

complaints that fail to comply with the joinder requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) and 20(a)(2)

are subject to summary dismissal” with leave to amend unless amendment is futile. Robinson,

2009 WL 790130, at *4.

Here, Plaintiff has brought multiple claims against multiple defendants regarding three

unrelated events. The termination of Plaintiff’s Medicaid status, the alleged abduction of her

children, and the eviction proceedings brought against her do not arise out of the same

transaction or occurrence or involve a common issue of fact or law. “[M]ultiple claims against a

single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim

B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits. . .

.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); see Fields v. Clemons-Abdullah, No. 23-

1198, 2023 WL 7214040, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2023) (“ Naming multiple defendants

concerning unrelated events is an impermissible pleading practice.”).

Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and require

any amended pleading against multiple defendants to comply with Rule 20(a)(2).

4. The Livingston Parish School Board

The Livingston Parish School Board chose to file a responsive pleading that does not

raise the issue of improper service or otherwise seek relief under Rule 12(b)(5). Accordingly, this

defendant has waived its arguments with respect to insufficient service of process. See Fed. R.

Civ. P 12(h); Humes-Pollett v. Fam. Health Ctr. Inc., 339 F. App'x 490, 492–93 (5th Cir. 2009)

(“A defendant does indeed waive insufficient service of process as a defense to a claim for relief

by filing an answer without objecting to service of process.”).

Nevertheless, it remains unclear to the Court what claims Plaintiff is attempting to raise

against this defendant. Plaintiff does not set forth any plausible basis for recovery from the

Livingston Parish School Board with respect to the termination of her Medicaid status, the

alleged abduction of M.B.G. and C.E.G. by the Louisiana State Defendants, and the

commencement of eviction proceedings. Plaintiff does not clarify why the Livingston Parish

School Board is named as a defendant in this action, which does not appear to seek any relief

with respect to the prior State court lawsuit involving the Livingston Parish School Board.

Accordingly, it is appropriate to dismiss all claims against the Livingston Parish School Board

without prejudice to the filing of an amended pleading identifying the specific claims brought

against this defendant.

E. Plaintiff’s Motions Seeking Injunctive Relief (R. Docs. 5, 6, 12).

In light of the foregoing recommendation that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed in its

entirety, without prejudice to refile to the extent Plaintiff’s claims are not subject to dismissal

with prejudice, it is also appropriate to deny Plaintiff’s pending motions seeking injunctive relief

(R. Docs. 5, 6,12) based on the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Reverse Medicaid Termination (R. Doc. 5)

Through this motion, Plaintiff seeks an order reversing her Medicaid termination. (R.

Doc. 5). Despite filing over 300 pages of documents into the record, Plaintiff’s allegations

regarding her alleged Medicaid termination consists of just a few sentences embedded in those

documents:

The State of Louisiana terminated [Plaintiff’s] Medicaid despite [Plaintiff]

completing her application in a timely manner and receiving a letter from the

State saying that her health insurance was stable and secured until 2025 . . . .

[Plaintiff] has required a blood transfusing something she has never needed

before, she needs iron transfusions but had to cancel those appointments due to

her Medicaid being terminated unlawfully.

(R. Doc. 1-1 at 4). Similarly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reverse Medicaid Termination consists of a

single sentence: “Immediate injunctive relief for plaintiff Ashley Kellet is requested for reversal

of her Medicaid termination so she can receive life saving cancer treatment.” (R. Doc. 5)

(capitalization modified).

“Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program through which the Federal Government

provides financial assistance to States so that they may furnish medical care to needy

individuals.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396).

“Although participation in the program is voluntary, participating States must comply with

certain requirements imposed by the [Medicaid] Act and regulations promulgated by the

Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary).” Id. The Fifth Circuit has held that a

plaintiff may seek enforcement of rights under the Medicaid Act pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

without first exhausting administrative remedies. Romano v. Greenstein, 721 F.3d 373, 374 (5th

Cir. 2013) (“We conclude that § 1396a(a)(8) creates a right enforceable under § 1983, and that

exhaustion of Louisiana’s procedure for judicial review is not required before a Medicaid

claimant files suit in federal court.”).

Nevertheless, Plaintiff has failed to set forth the basis for her alleged Medicaid

termination, when such termination occurred, the specific Defendants allegedly liable for that

termination, and the specific enforceable relief sought by this Court. Even if Plaintiff can allege a

cause of action against certain Defendants named in the Complaint, it is nonetheless proper to

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for improper service and in light of the shotgun pleading and improper

joinder of claims. Accordingly, it is appropriate to deny the instant motion as moot, without

prejudice to refile if consistent with any served, amended pleading correcting the deficiencies

identified above.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Custody (R. Doc. 6)

Next, Plaintiff seeks an order providing her custody with her adult, disabled sons MBG

and CEG. (R. Doc. 6). Plaintiff asserts that these individuals were unlawfully removed from her

custody, respectively, on February 6, 2024, and December 7, 2022. Plaintiff asserts that this

removal was in “retaliation” to her allegations that her uncle, Judge Guy Bradberry, had molested

her when she was a child. It appears that Plaintiff filed another lawsuit in the U.S. Court of

Federal Claims with respect to the alleged abduction of her children, which was dismissed for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Kellett v. United States, No. 24-455, 2024 WL 1340210

(Fed. Cl. Mar. 29, 2024), reconsideration denied, 2024 WL 2844218 (Fed. Cl. June 4, 2024).

Plaintiff does not identify or address the underlying State court proceedings resulting in

the alleged “unlawful removal” of MBG and CEG from Plaintiff’s home. It appears that the

relief sought is directed at the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services, which

could assert Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the claims asserted against it in this

federal action. See Prevo v. Pennington, No. 16-0230, 2016 WL 6816254, at *4 (W.D. La. Apr.

22, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 6818524 (W.D. La. Nov. 17, 2016).

Again, even if Plaintiff can allege a cause of action against certain Defendants named in

the Complaint, it is nonetheless proper to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for improper service and in

light of the shotgun pleading and improper joinder of claims. Accordingly, it is appropriate to

deny the instant motion as moot, without prejudice to refile if consistent with any served,

amended pleading correcting the deficiencies identified above.

3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Eviction Proceedings (R. Doc. 12)

Finally, Plaintiff seeks an order staying eviction proceedings brought against her and the

issuance of a restraining order against her landlord, Michelle Ruston and Ruston Properties,4 to

prevent her eviction. (R. Doc. 12).

This motion, as well as any additional relief sought by through the Complaint with

respect to the state court eviction proceeding, fails for several reasons. Foremost, none of the

named defendants are involved in, or conducting, the eviction proceedings against Plaintiff. It

does not appear that Plaintiff has sued any defendants from which she can obtain any relief with

respect to her eviction proceedings. The Complaint only appears to mention the eviction twice in

passing. (See R. Doc. 1 at 5; R. Doc. 1-2 at 166).

Second, to the extent the state eviction proceedings are ongoing, this court cannot enjoin

such proceedings unless consistent with the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. See In re

Grand Jury Subpoena, 866 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 2017); 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (“A court of the

United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly

authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or

effectuate its judgments.”). Plaintiff has failed to set forth that any of the exceptions of the Anti-

Injunction Act applies in this case. See Vines v. Univ. of La. at Monroe, 398 F.3d 700, 704 (5th

4 This private individual and entity are not named defendants.

Cir. 2005) (“There are only three specific circumstances in which a federal court can enjoin a

state court proceeding, when it is: (1) expressly authorized by a federal statute; (2) necessary to

assert jurisdiction; or (3) necessary to protect or effectuate a prior judgment by a federal court.”).

It is, therefore, appropriate to deny injunctive relief with respect to the state court eviction

proceeding if it remains ongoing. See Delgado v. Lopez, No. 22-00187, 2023 WL 5965865, at *3

(E.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5960738 (E.D. Tex.

Sept. 13, 2023).

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking to overturn an eviction judgment, this court lacks

jurisdiction to entertain such a claim. “[F]ederal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction,

lack appellate jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final orders of state courts.” Weekly v.

Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317

(5th Cir. 1994)). Specifically, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from

“modify[ing] or revers[ing] state court judgments.” Truong v. Bank of America, N.A., 717 F.3d

377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013). This is called the Rooker-Feldman doctrine after the cases that first

recognized it: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-17 (1923), and D.C. Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is narrow and “confined to . . . cases brought by state-court

losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments . . . and inviting district court

review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544

U.S. 280, 284 (2005). In determining whether Rooker-Feldman applies, a court must carefully

evaluate what it is asked to review and reject. Truong, 717 F.3d at 382 (citing Exxon Mobil, 544

U.S. at 284). The court lacks jurisdiction only when the plaintiff “seeks relief that directly attacks

the validity of an existing state court judgment,” Weaver v. Texas Capital Bank, N.A., 660 F.3d

900, 904 (5th Cir. 2011), or the plaintiff’s federal claims “are so inextricably intertwined with a

state judgment that the federal court is in essence being called upon to review the state court

decision.” Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Guy, 682 F.3d 381, 390-91 (5th Cir. 2012). In short, to

the extent Plaintiff is seeking to directly overturn or stay a state court eviction judgment, such

relief must be denied.

As discussed above, the instant Motion to Stay Eviction Proceedings (R. Doc. 12), as

well as the underlying claims in the Complaint seeking relief with respect to the state court

eviction proceedings and/or judgment, are without merit. Accordingly, it is proper to deny this

motion and dismiss, with prejudice, all claims brought by Plaintiff with respect to the State court

eviction proceeding and/or judgment.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Department’s Motion to

Dismiss (R. Doc. 19), which is unopposed, be GRANTED, and all claims against the Livingston

Parish Sheriff’s Department be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE because that defendant lacks

capacity to be sued.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Louisiana Department of Children and

Family Services, the Louisiana Department of Health, and Governor Jeff Landry’s Motion to

Dismiss (R. Doc. 23), which is unopposed, be GRANTED, and all claims against the Louisiana

Department of Children and Family Services, the Louisiana Department of Health, and Governor

Jeff Landry be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE because they were insufficiently served

with process.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that all claims raised in Plaintiff’s Complaint (R.

Doc. 1) be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim, and that all claims with respect to State court

eviction proceedings be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Reverse Medicaid

Termination (R. Doc. 5), Motion for Custody (R. Doc. 6), and Motion to Stay Eviction

Proceedings (R. Doc. 12) be DENIED for the reasons provided above.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff be provided 30 days from the date

of the district judge’s ruling (1) to properly serve the Louisiana Department of Children and

Family Services, the Louisiana Department of Health, and Governor Jeff Landry and (2) to file

an amended pleading that corrects the deficiencies, to the extent allowed, to avoid the remaining

claims raised by the Complaint from being DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on October 22, 2024.

S

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE