MONROE v. ADAMS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DEVONTA J. MONROE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:24CV770

)

JAMIE ADAMS, et al., )

)

Defendant(s). )

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, a detainee at the Scotland County Detention Center, submitted a pro se

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and requests permission to proceed in forma pauperis

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § l915(a). Plaintiff names three police officers and an assistant district

attorney as Defendants and seeks several million dollars in damages.

Because Plaintiff is “a prisoner seek[ing] redress from a governmental entity or officer

or employee of a governmental entity,” this Court has an obligation to “review” this

Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). “On review, the court shall . . . dismiss the complaint,

or any portion of the complaint, if [it] – (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Applicable here, a plaintiff “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,”

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), when the complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are

‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility

and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). This

standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Id. In other words, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Id.1

The final ground for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) generally applies to

situations in which doctrines established by the United States Constitution or at common law

immunize governments and/or government personnel from liability for monetary damages.

See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (discussing

sovereign immunity of states and state officials under Eleventh Amendment); Pierson v. Ray,

386 U.S. 547 (1967) (describing interrelationship between 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

common-law immunity doctrines, such as judicial, legislative, and prosecutorial immunity);

1Although the Supreme Court has reiterated that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a

pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine Twombly’s requirement that a pleading

contain more than labels and conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (applying Twombly standard in dismissing pro se complaint); accord Atherton v. District of

Columbia Off. of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint . . . ‘must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ But even a pro se complainant must plead ‘factual matter’ that

permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 697, respectively)).

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cf. Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that, even where “damages are

theoretically available under [certain] statutes . . ., in some cases, immunity doctrines and

special defenses, available only to public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage

remedy”).

For the reasons that follow, some of the claims listed in the Complaint should proceed

but others should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) because they fail to state

a claim on which relief may be granted or seek monetary damages from a defendant with

immunity from such relief.

According to the Complaint and an attached Declaration from Plaintiff, Plaintiff is

African-American and, at least at the time of the events alleged in the Complaint, a gang

member. (Docket Entry 2 at 9.) On December 3, 2022, Defendants Jeffrey R. Cooke, II and

Jeremy White, two detectives with the police department in Laurinburg, North Carolina,

arrested Plaintiff for being a felon in possession of a firearm and larceny of a firearm. (Id.

at 7.) They then allegedly engaged in a videotaped interrogation of Plaintiff concerning his

crimes and the activities of other persons. (Id.) At some point, the officers allegedly became

angry because Plaintiff could not or would not answer their questions or did not provide the

answers they wanted. (Id.) They then turned off the recording, after which Defendant White

allegedly stated, “O.K. you want to play dumb huh. I got something for your gang banging

ass” and Defendant Cook allegedly stated “[w]e gonna act dumb to [sic] monkey.” (Id.)

Plaintiff was released on bond a few days later, although he was later convicted as a result

of the charges and served some amount of time in prison. (Id. at 7-8.) While he was out on

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bond, several other events allegedly occurred. First, the Declaration states that in March of

2023, Plaintiff received word that certain unidentified persons had received a copy of the

video of his interrogation in their inboxes, which caused persons in the community to say that

he was snitching and should stay away from them. (Id. at 18.) Then, a short time later,

assailants shot Plaintiff in the back stating “that’s what snitches get.” (Id.) Later, on August

14, 2023, the video was “released to the public” in a way that is not explained in the

Complaint other than by way of saying that the video was posted on multiple social media

platforms and received thousands of views. (Id. at 7.) When Plaintiff complained to the

Laurinburg police, Defendants Cooke and White allegedly told him that they were not

involved with the August release but had given the video to the local prosecutor’s office. (Id.

at 8.) Defendant White implied or stated that the district attorney’s office must have made

the August release. (Id. at 19.) He and Cooke then allegedly laughed and told Plaintiff to

move out of the area. (Id.) Plaintiff also spoke with Defendant Mitchell Johnson, who is the

Laurinburg police chief, only to be told that the background in the video was not from the

Laurinburg Police Department. (Id. at 20.) However, another officer stated to Plaintiff that

it was clear that someone had recorded the released video using the Department’s equipment

and a cellular telephone. (Id.) Plaintiff reports that, when he was in prison, he was assaulted

and threatened by other prisoners calling him a snitch and saying they had seen or heard

about the video. (Id. at 19.) The Declaration also states that people still call Plaintiff a snitch

and that unidentified persons have shot into his house where his family lives. (Id.) Based

on these alleged facts, Plaintiff named Cooke, White, and Johnson as Defendants along with

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Jamie Adams, the prosecutor who handled Plaintiff’s state criminal charges. All Defendants

are named in both their individual and official capacities.

Turning first to Defendant Johnson, the Complaint clearly states no claim for relief

against him. The Complaint theorizes that, because he is in a supervisory position and had

general access to the interrogation video, he may have been involved in the video’s releases

or may have conspired with the other Defendants to release it. However, it contains no facts

supporting that conjecture or that would allow a reasonable inference that Defendant Johnson

was involved in the releases. Nor does his position as a supervisor support a claim under

§ 1983 because theories of respondeat superior or liability predicated solely on a defendant’s

identity as a supervisor do not exist under § 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677

(2009). Defendant Johnson should be dismissed from the case entirely.

Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against the remaining Defendants should also be

dismissed. Defendant Adams is an employee of the State of North Carolina, which means

that any official capacity claims are the same as a suit against the State of North Carolina.

However, neither the State nor it agencies are “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Will

v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Further, the Eleventh Amendment

to the United States Constitution would limit any relief to a prospective injunction to remedy

an ongoing violation of federal law and Plaintiff seeks no such remedy. McBurney v.

Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2010). Therefore, the Complaint does not state a

viable claim against Defendant Adams in his official capacity.

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As for Defendants Cooke and White, they are employed by the Laurinburg Police

Department and the City of Laurinburg, not the State. The concepts just discussed do not bar

the official capacity claims against them but those claims fail for different reasons. Under

North Carolina law, a police department is merely a component part of a municipality and

not a separate entity that can sue or be sued. See Fields v. Tucker, No. 1:10CV844, 2011

WL 4345306, at *1 n. 1 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 2011) (unpublished), recommendation adopted

in relevant part, 2012 WL 174820, at *1–2 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 2012) (unpublished).

Plaintiff’s attempted official capacity claims are, therefore, claims against the City of

Laurinburg. So viewed, they fail because,

“[a] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under

§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original). “Only in cases where the

municipality causes the deprivation ‘through an official policy or custom’ will

liability attach.” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999)). “Because section 1983

was not designed to impose municipal liability under the doctrine of

respondeat superior, the ‘official policy’ requirement was ‘intended to

distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality,

and thereby to make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which

the municipality is actually responsible.’” Riddick v. School Bd. of

Portsmouth, 238 F.3d 518, 523 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pembaur v. City of

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). “To state a cause of action against a

municipality, a section 1983 plaintiff must plead (1) the existence of an official

policy or custom; (2) that the policy or custom is fairly attributable to the

municipality; and (3) that the policy or custom proximately caused the

deprivation of a constitutional right.” Pettitford v. City of Greensboro, 556

F.Supp.2d 512, 530 (M.D.N.C. 2008).

Roseboro v. Winston-Salem/Forysth County School Board of Education, No. 1:14CV455

2014 WL 5304981, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2014) (footnote omitted), recommendation

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adopted, No. 1:14CV455 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 9, 2014). Here, Plaintiff does not plead the

existence of any policy or practice fairly attributable to the Laurinburg Police Department

or the City of Laurinburg that caused or in any way related to the alleged releases of his

interrogation video by Defendants. Therefore, all of the official capacity claims should be

dismissed.

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are his individual capacity claims against Defendants

Cooke, White and Adams. As to those Defendants, Plaintiff raises multiple theories of

liability under § 1983. The first asserts that Plaintiff had a First Amendment right to answer

the questions asked by Defendants White and Cooke however he wished and to choose not

to provide them with the information they wanted. The Complaint alleges that Defendants

violated his rights by releasing the video in retaliation for his answers/failure to answer.

Although there is a right to remain silent in response to police questioning under the Fifth

Amendment of the Constitution, that right is only violated so that a § 1983 claim is supported

where any compelled statements are later used in a criminal prosecution. Burrell v. Virginia,

395 F.3d 508, 512–14 (4th Cir. 2005). On the other hand, cases do not generally support a

First Amendment right to refuse to answer questions from police. Moore v. Garnand, 83

F.4th 743, 751-52. (9th Cir. 2023) (citing cases). Claims under § 1983 based on such a

theory are subject to dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity. Id. There would likewise

be no right to lie to police and the Court is unaware of any cases entitling a person being

interrogated to be believed by police. Therefore, the Complaint does not state a viable First

Amendment claim.

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However, the Complaint also states that the release of Plaintiff’s interrogation video

violated his right to due process because the release did not occur pursuant to any established

court proceeding or order which would have allowed Plaintiff the opportunity to contest the

release. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to pursue a claim for procedural due process violations,

he has not established entitlement to any relief; however, where a plaintiff can show that a

“state actor created or increased the risk of private danger, and did so directly through

affirmative acts, not merely through inaction or omission” the plaintiff can state a due

process claim under the state-created danger doctrine. Doe v. Rosa, 795 F.3d 429, 439 (4th

Cir. 2015). Here, the Complaint claims that Defendants engaged in affirmative acts in the

form of the releases of the video of Plaintiff’s interrogation and that the releases created a

risk that he would be assaulted by third parties who considered him a snitch. It further

alleges that the danger actually resulted in multiple assaults on him, his property, and his

family. Therefore, the Complaint does successfully state a due process claim against

Defendants Cooke and White based on their alleged threats combined with the subsequent

releases of the video and against Defendant Adams based on Cooke and White’s alleged

statements or indications that Defendant Adams played some role in the second release. It

is not clear from the Complaint exactly who released the video, but it contains sufficient

factual support for the involvement of Defendants Cooke, White, and Adams given that

Plaintiff may plead theories of liability in the alternative. Plaintiff’s due process claim

should proceed against these three Defendants in their individual capacities.

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The Complaint also alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s equal protection rights.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “is essentially a direction that

all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living

Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). “To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff

must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is

similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful

discrimination. Once this showing is made, the court proceeds to determine whether the

disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level of scrutiny.” Morrison v.

Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001). Typically, equal protection claims involve

allegations that the defendants “treated [a plaintiff] differently because he is a member of a

suspect class or because he exercised a fundamental right.” Renchenski v. Williams, 622

F.3d 315, 337 (3d Cir. 2010). Suspect classes based on race, alienage, or national origin

receive strict scrutiny, while classes based on gender and illegitimacy receive lower, but still

heightened, scrutiny. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439–41. Here, the Complaint alleges

that Defendants released the video of his interrogation but did not release such videos of

other persons based on his race and his status as a gang member. Being a gang member is

not a protected class, but the Complaint alleges that Defendant Cooke, with Defendant White

present, used a racial slur to refer to Plaintiff while threatening him for not cooperating with

their questioning. These allegations suffice at this stage to state a potential claim for relief

based on an equal protection violation.

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As for Defendant Adams, the Complaint does not allege that he was present at the

time Defendant Cooke used the slur, that he ever made a similar statement himself, or that

he later became aware of it prior to the releases of the video. In fact, there are simply no

allegations whatsoever in the Complaint as to any possible racial motive for Defendant

Adams to release the video. Therefore, it does not state any equal protection claim as to

Defendant Adams.

Finally, the Complaint alleges that Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his

civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). As stated above, the Complaint does allege

that Defendants violated certain of Plaintiff’s civil rights. The alleged statements by

Defendants Cooke and White pointing to Defendant Adams having a role in at least one of

the releases of the video and the lack of any apparent motive by Defendant Adams other than

potentially helping Defendants White and Cooke retaliate against Plaintiff by placing him

in danger are sufficient at this time to allege that the three remaining Defendants conspired

to violate Plaintiff’s rights. The conspiracy claim under § 1985 can also proceed as to these

Defendants.

As for Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application, § 1915(b)(1) requires that he make

an initial payment if funds exist for such a payment. A review of his in forma pauperis

application reveals that they do not. Therefore, the Court will not order any initial partial

payment, but will instead order that his custodian withdraw payments from his prisoner trust

account if funds become available in the future.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that in forma pauperis status be granted for the sole

purpose of entering this Order and Recommendation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s trust officer shall be directed to pay to

the Clerk of this Court 20% of all deposits to his account starting with the month of

December of 2024 and thereafter each time that the amount in the account exceeds $10.00

until the $350.00 filing fee has been paid.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall send Plaintiff summonses for

Defendants Cooke, White, and Adams. Plaintiff must fill out the summonses, including

addresses suitable for service, and then return them to the Clerk. Failure to provide an

addresses wherein service may be made will result in the dismissal of the action as to any

unserved defendant after 90 days from the filing of the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States Marshal, upon return of the

properly completed summonses shall serve the Complaint on the Defendants.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Johnson, all

of the official capacity claims, the First Amendment claims, and the equal protection claim

as to Defendant Adams be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failing to state a

claim on which relief may be granted or seeking monetary damages from a defendant with

immunity from such relief, but that Plaintiff’s individual capacity due process claims and

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conspiracy claims be allowed to proceed against Defendants Cooke, White, and Adams and

that his individual capacity equal protection claims be allowed to proceed against Defendants

Cooke and White.

This, the 31st day of October, 2024.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

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