Tems v. Jefferson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

JAMES CALVIN TEMS CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-0975

SECTION P

VS.

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

ERICA JEFFERSON MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff James Calvin Tems, a prisoner at Caddo Correctional Center proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed this proceeding on approximately July 17, 2024, under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. He names Assistant District Attorney Erica Jefferson as defendant.1 For reasons that

follow, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.

Background

Plaintiff states that he was charged with possession of more than two grams of a Schedule

II narcotic on April 8, 2022. [doc. # 4, p. 1]. On February 8, 2023, he was charged with

possession of less than two grams of a Schedule II narcotic. Id. He claims that Assistant District

Attorney Erica Jefferson breached her October 16, 2023 agreement to dismiss his state criminal

charges in exchange for him acquiring a Louisiana I.D., obtaining Louisiana Medicaid, and

successfully completing thirty days of treatment at Cada Treatment Center. [doc. # 1, p. 4].

For relief, Plaintiff asks this Court to dismiss his state criminal charges and release him

from custody. [doc. #s 1, p. 4; 4, p. 3].

1 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation under

28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court.

Law and Analysis

1. Preliminary Screening

Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. As a

prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is

subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.2 See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d

578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, his

Complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)

provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is

frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or if it seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is

“based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. Courts are also afforded the

unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual

contentions are clearly baseless. Id.

A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it fails to plead

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is

facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), “‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any

facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations

of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary

program.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies

somewhere in between. Id. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Iqbal, supra. A well-pled complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of

the asserted facts is improbable and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, supra.

In making this determination, the court must assume that all of the plaintiff’s factual

allegations are true. Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). However, the

same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of

“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not

satisfy Rule 8. Id. A complaint fails to state a claim where its factual allegations do not “raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614

F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[U]nadorned, the-defendant

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.

“[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to

make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp, 632 F.3d 148, 152-53

(5th Cir. 2010). Courts are “not free to speculate that the plaintiff ‘might’ be able to state a claim

if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint.” Macias v. Raul A.

(Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).

A hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926

F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991). A district court may dismiss a prisoner’s civil rights

complaint as frivolous based upon the complaint and exhibits alone. Green v. McKaskle, 788

F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986).

“To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by

the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638

(5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent with the standard above, a

“[S]ection 1983 complaint must state specific facts, not simply legal and constitutional

conclusions.” Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990).

2. Dismissal of Charges

Although Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his request to dismiss his

charges is an implicit challenge to the very fact and duration of his physical imprisonment.3

Plaintiff may, after he exhausts his state court remedies, pursue his request for immediate release

from custody through a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 (1973) (“[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or

duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is

entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal

remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”); Stringer v. Williams, 161 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1998)

(construing a request for release from pending state criminal proceedings as a habeas petition

3 See, e.g., Sellers v. Plattsmier, 637 F. App’x 111, 112 (5th Cir. 2015) (reasoning that the

plaintiff’s request to dismiss a bill of information was an implicit request for release); Florence

v. Garcia, 713 F. App’x 306, 307 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Florence’s requests for dismissal of the

charges and for immediate release sound in habeas . . . .”); Durall v. Lafayette Police Dep't, 2011

WL 6181387, at *1 (W.D. La. Nov. 16, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL

6205542 (W.D. La. Dec. 13, 2011) (“Since dismissal of the charges would result in an immediate

or at least speedier release from custody, plaintiff must seek such relief by way of a petition for

writ of habeas corpus . . . .”).

under Section 2241). Accordingly, the Court should deny Plaintiff’s requested relief as an

improper request for habeas corpus.

The undersigned again cautions that Plaintiff must first exhaust his available state court

remedies before seeking habeas relief in this Court. See id. (observing that if “habeas corpus is

the exclusive federal remedy . . . a plaintiff cannot seek the intervention of a federal court until

he has first sought and been denied relief in the state courts, if a state remedy is available and

adequate.”).4 Plaintiff is further cautioned that the Court may abstain under Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37 (1971), or Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 225, if Plaintiff asks the Court to interfere with his

ongoing criminal prosecution.5 See Gibson v. Orleans Par. Sheriff, 2014 WL 1066987, at *1

(5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2014) (affirming abstention under Younger v. Harris, where a petitioner

sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241).

The Court should deny Plaintiff’s requested relief. As Plaintiff does not seek cognizable

relief, he does not state claims on which relief may be granted.

Recommendation

For the reasons above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff James Calvin Tems’s

claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Plaintiff’s right to pursue habeas corpus

4 See also Dickerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 225 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Despite the absence of

an exhaustion requirement in the statutory language of section 2241(c)(3), a body of case law has

developed holding that although section 2241 establishes jurisdiction in the federal courts to

consider pre-trial habeas corpus petitions, federal courts should abstain from the exercise of that

jurisdiction if the issues raised in the petition may be resolved either by trial on the merits in the

state court or by other state procedures available to the petitioner.”).

5 “Under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts should generally decline to exercise

jurisdiction when: (1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ongoing state judicial

proceeding; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim;

and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional

challenges.” Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d 874, 880 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and

quoted sources omitted).

relief after he exhausts all available state court remedies.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by

this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation

to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any objections or

response to the district judge at the time of filing.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the

proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen

(14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the

legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See

Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (Sth Cir. 1996).

In Chambers, Monroe, Louisiana, this 26" day of August, 2024.

th iy ed □

Kayla Dye-Mec€lusky

United States Magistrate Judge