Hammitt v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

Teresa H. )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 23-03069

)

Martin O’Malley )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

KAREN L. McNAUGHT, United States Magistrate Judge:

Before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on referral from the District Court, is

Plaintiff Teresa H. (“plaintiff”)’s action [1] for judicial review brought under §405(g).1

In support of the issues [8, 13], plaintiff has filed a brief and seeks remand of the

decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denying claims for benefits under the

Social Security Act (“Act”). In response [12], defendant, Martin O’Malley

(“Commissioner”) moves for affirmance of the decision and dismissal of the complaint.

For the reasons stated below, this Court hereby recommends: (1) the ALJ’s decision

be AFFIRMED; and (2) judgment be entered in favor of the Commissioner.2

I. BACKGROUND

On May 12, 2020, plaintiff filed both Title II widow disability insurance benefits

(“WIBS”) claim and Title XVI social security income (“SSI”) claims under the Act—

1 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (empowering the court “to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the

record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security,

with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.”).

2 References to the pages within the Administrative Record will be identified by R. [page number].

The Administrative Record appears at Docket Entry 7 [Doc. 7].

alleging an onset date of disability of April 13, 2020. (R. 15, 256–71). The WIBs and SSI

applications were initially denied by State Disability Determination Services (“DDS”) on

January 22, 2021, and again upon reconsideration on June 8, 2021. (R. 15, 79–141, 174–76).

Plaintiff submitted a written request for a hearing before an ALJ, which was received on

August 30, 2021. (Id.) A telephonic hearing was held on April 25, 2022, and the ALJ issued

an unfavorable decision on July 11, 2022—concluding the plaintiff was “not disabled” for

the purposes of her WIBs and SSI claims. (R. 15–34). As the ALJ outlined, the applicable

issues to address were narrow in scope:

The issue is whether the claimant is disabled under sections 223(d), 202(e),

and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. Disability is defined as the

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of

impairments that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.

Other issues are whether the claimant is the widow of the deceased worker,

has attained the age of 50, is unmarried (unless one of the exceptions in 20

CFR 404.335(e) apply), and has a disability that began before the end of the

prescribed period. The prescribed period ends with the month before the

month in which the claimant attains age 60, or, if earlier, either 7 years after

the worker’s death or 7 years after the widow was last entitled to survivor’s

benefits, whichever is later.

(R. 16). Uncontroversial in this action, the ALJ first highlights that plaintiff (an unmarried

widow of the deceased-insured worker) has attained the minimum age of 50—finding

she meets the nondisability requirements for disabled widow’s benefits set forth in

Section 202(e) of the Act. (R. 18).

Turning to the sequential analysis, at step one, the ALJ found the prescribed period

ended on December 31, 2022, and plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since April 13, 2020—the onset date of disability as alleged. (R. 18, citing 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1571; 416.971).

At step two, the ALJ determined plaintiff suffers from the following severe

impairments: (1) cerebral vascular accident; (2) congestive heart failure; (3) ischemic heart

disease; and (4) cardiomyopathy. (R. 18–22, citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c); 416.920(c); SSR

85–28).

At step three, the ALJ determined plaintiff’s impairments (whether individually

or in combination) did not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed

impairments under C.F.R. 20 Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 22–23, citing 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(d); 404.1525; 404.1526; 416.920(d); 416.925; 416.926).

Between steps three and four, the ALJ formulated the RFC of the plaintiff—

determining the plaintiff is capable of “light work” as defined under the administrative

guidance, subject to limited exceptions:

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has

the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she can frequently balance, stoop, kneel,

crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs and occasionally climb ladders,

ropes, and scaffolds. She can perform work requiring no concentrated

exposure to dusts, fumes, noxious odors, and gases.

(R. 23).

In formulating this RFC, the ALJ notes consideration of all symptoms and the

extent to which those symptoms could reasonably be accepted as consistent with

objective medical evidence and other evidence—inclusive of medical opinions and prior

administrative medical findings. (R. 23–32, citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c); 404.1529;

416.920(c); 416.929; and SSR 16-3p).

At step four, considering the above RFC formulation, age, education, and

vocational expert (“VE”) testimony as to past relevant work experience, the ALJ found

plaintiff could perform past relevant work as a Meat Products Laborer (DOT 529.687–130,

SVP 2) (R. 32–33, citing C.F.R. §§ 404.1565 and 416.965). In finding the plaintiff capable of

performing past relevant work, the ALJ’s analysis concluded—affirming the previous

DDS administrative findings of “not disabled” for the purposes of the WIBs and SSI

claims now on appeal. (R. 33, citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f); 416.920(f)). On February 21,

2023, the Appeals Counsel adopted the ALJ’s findings. (R. 1-9, citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard of Review

A claimant who is found to be “not disabled” may challenge the Commissioner’s

final decision in federal court. Judicial review of an ALJ's decision is governed by 42

U.S.C. § 405(g)—providing “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to

any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” The Court’s review

is, therefore, limited in scope—evaluating only whether the ALJ applied the correct legal

standards and whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings. Jelinek v. Astrue,

662 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2011).

Substantial evidence “means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v.

Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197,

229 (1983). The reviewing court must consider the entire administrative record, but it will

not “re-weigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute our

own judgment for that of the Commissioner.” McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 889 (7th

Cir. 2011). This Court will “conduct a critical review of the evidence” and will not let the

Commissioner’s decision stand “if it lacks evidentiary support or an adequate discussion

of the issues.” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003).

The Court will focus on whether the ALJ has articulated “an accurate and logical

bridge” from the evidence to the determination. Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176

(7th Cir. 2001). At a minimum, the ALJ must “sufficiently articulate his assessment of

the evidence to ‘assure us that the ALJ considered the important evidence ... [and to

enable] us to trace the path of the ALJ's reasoning.’” Carlson v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 180, 181

(7th Cir. 1993) (per curiam), quoting Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir.

1985) (internal quotations omitted).

This requirement is designed to allow a reviewing court to “assess the validity of

the agency’s ultimate findings and afford a claimant meaningful judicial review.” Scott v.

Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, even if reasonable minds could differ as

to whether the claimant is disabled, courts will affirm a decision if the ALJ's opinion is

adequately explained and supported by substantial evidence. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d

408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).

B. Standard of Proof

The regulations governing disability determinations under Titles II and XVI of the

Act are identical in nearly all respects. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501; 416.901

(outlining statutory scope).3 To qualify for benefits under Title II and Title XVI

applications, a claimant must be “disabled” under the Act. A person is disabled for this

purpose if “he or she has an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(1)(A).

In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the

following five-step inquiry: “(1) whether the claimant is currently employed, (2) whether

the claimant has a severe impairment, (3) whether the claimant’s impairment is one that

the Commissioner considers conclusively disabling, (4) if the claimant does not have a

conclusively disabling impairment, whether he can perform past relevant work, and (5)

whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national

economy.” Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1176 (listing requirements as set forth under C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520 and 416.920).

Although the claimant has the burden of establishing a disability at steps one

through four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show “the claimant is

capable of performing work in the national economy.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881,

885–86 (7th Cir. 2001). If the claimant is able to do other work, he is not disabled. If the

claimant is not able to do other work and meets the duration requirement, he is disabled.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 404.1560(c); 416.912; 416.960(c).

3 WIBs and SSI are codified independently, but those relevant to this case are virtually identical.

WIBs regulations are found at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900-.999 and 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1500-.1599. The parallel SSI

regulations are found at 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1400-.1499, and 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.900-.999.

III. ANALYSIS

In briefing outstanding issues on appeal, plaintiff contends the ALJ’s RFC

determination was not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 8 at 6–7). In support of

her position, plaintiff asserts the ALJ failed to properly consider all of the evidence in the

case record when formulating the RFC; notably, plaintiff suggests the ALJ failed to

adequately discuss how she weighed subjective statements as evidence in her RFC

determination. (Id. at 7–10).

In response, the Commissioner contends the plaintiff has failed to show that she

was unable to do her past relevant work and that the disability determination should be

affirmed—arguing the ALJ’s analysis reasonably relied upon substantial evidence in the

case record. (Doc. 12 at 4–11).

In reply, plaintiff reasserts her allegation that the RFC is unsupported—alleging

the medical evidence available in the record confirms she has residual weakness on her

right side and memory deficits. (Doc. 13 at 1). Further, as the past relevant work at issue

is not one-handed as defined under applicable administrative guidelines, plaintiff further

contends the ALJ erred in finding her capable of performing the past relevant role. (Id. at

1–2).

Upon review of the case record, applicable law, and arguments set forth by the

parties, this Court finds good cause to recommend affirming the ALJ’s decision. Remand

is unwarranted for those reasons set forth below.

A. The ALJ’s well-reasoned RFC formulation is grounded in substantial record

evidence

In challenging the RFC formulation in this case, the ALJ’s determination must be

“at complete odds with what an ALJ must do to support its decision with substantial

evidence, a standard that the Supreme Court has emphasized is light.” Warnell v.

O’Malley, 97 F.4th 1050, 1051 (7th Cir. 2024).

Upon review of the decision and record on appeal, the ALJ grounded the RFC

determination in substantial evidence—finding plaintiff could perform light work except

she can: frequently balance, stoop kneel, crouch crawl, and climb ramps and stairs;

occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; and perform work requiring no

concentrated exposure to dust, fumes, noxious odors and gases. (R. 23, citing §§ 404.1567(b);

416.967(b)).

In reaching this RFC formulation, the ALJ considered assessed the credibility of

the subjective statements of the plaintiff alongside several other categories of evidence—

including: (1) prior administrative medical findings; (2) medical evidence and treatment

history; and (3) daily activities. (R. 23–32, citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c); 404.1529;

416.920(c); 416.929; and SSR 16-3p) (applying requisite two-step evaluation).

i. Prior Administrative Findings

In formulating the RFC between steps three and four of the sequential analysis,

the ALJ properly considered the administrative findings of Dr. Western, Dr. Hudspeth,

and Dr. DiFonso as to functional limitations.4 For example, consistent with controlling

4 As state-agency medical consultants, these doctors are “highly qualified and experts in Social

Security disability evaluation.” 20 C.F.R. §404.1513a(b)(1); see also 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(6) (“the amount of

administrative guidance, Dr. Western found plaintiff could perform the exertional

demands of light work and could frequently climb ramps and stairs; occasionally climb

ladders; and frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. (R. 31–32, 114–16). Dr.

Western further recommended avoiding concentrated exposure to fumes, dusts, gases,

and poor ventilation. (R. 31–32, 117).

The findings of Dr. Hudspeth and Dr. DiFonso further support the reasonableness

of the ALJ’s RFC formulation—suggesting the plaintiff had only mild (not severe) mental

limitations during the purported period of disability. (R. 32, 86, 112–13). The ALJ may and

properly did consider such findings in the RFC formulation—determining that the

plaintiff had only mild mental limitations and no severe mental impairment. (R. 1821,

citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (In other words, plaintiff had no mental condition that

“significantly limit[ed]” her “ability to do basic work activities.”). Moreover, the findings

above were consistent with those made by Dr. Dow at the initial stage of review—

concluding that there was insufficient evidence in support of those mental limitations as

purported. (R. 85).

Thus, when considered alongside the totality of the record evidence, the prior

administrative findings constitute substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s RFC

formulation between steps three and four of the sequential evaluation. See Pavlicek v. Saul,

994 F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 2021) (affirming an ALJ who gave great weight to reviewing

medical assessments); Felts v. Saul, 797 F. App’x 266, 269 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding an ALJ

understanding of our disability programs and their evidentiary requirements that a medical source has” is

a factor in weighing that source’s opinion).

can rely upon state-agency psychologists in finding that mental impairments were not

severe).

ii. Medical Evidence & Treatment Plan

Despite claims by plaintiff suggesting the ALJ improperly exercised medical

judgment in this credibility determination, nothing suggests the ALJ made logical leaps

between the objective medical evidence, treatment plans as articulated in the record, and

the credibility determinations of self-reported symptoms.

In evaluating objective medical evidence and recorded treatment plans against the

credibility of other evidence (such as self-reported symptoms), the ALJ must consider the

extent to which such “symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the

objective medical evidence.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); see also C.F.R. 20 § 404.1529(c)(2)

(“Objective medical evidence . . . is a useful indicator to assist us in making reasonable

conclusions about the intensity and persistence of your symptoms and the effect those

symptoms, such as pain, may have on your ability to work.”); 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv), (v) (affording discretion to ALJ to consider claimant’s treatment as

one factor when evaluating subjective allegations); SSR 16-3p (“The intensity, persistence,

and limiting effects of many symptoms can be clinically observed and recorded in the

medical evidence. Examples such as reduced joint motion, muscle spasm, sensory deficit,

and motor disruption illustrate findings that may result from, or be associated with, the

symptom of pain.”).

Here, consistent with the foregoing administrative guidelines, the ALJ

acknowledged that plaintiff had acute heart failure followed by a stroke in April 2020,

and that treatment for those conditions required a 15-day hospitalization—occurring in

the context of methamphetamine abuse. (R. 26, 373–74). Notably, plaintiff testified that

she stopped abusing methamphetamine after experiencing those conditions; the record

also indicates further improvement with treatment following the incidence of acute heart

failure and stroke. (R. 26–30). However, the physical improvement of plaintiff is most

clearly relayed with the benefit of objective medical evidence in the record; further, as to

this medical condition and the related treatment plan, plaintiff failed to adequately show

her symptoms precluded her from work for a 12-month period, as required by the Social

Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A).

In June 2020, two months after her stroke, the record indicates plaintiff

experienced elevated blood pressure at the examination, but otherwise presented

unremarkable limitations in other physical and vascular metrics—presenting normal

hand grip strength, full range of motion, and normal cardiovascular and respiratory

observations. (R. 27–28, 1170). Although plaintiff again complained of right-hand pain

and swelling at this examination, she once more had normal observations in July 2020—

just one month later—including strong and equal hand grips. (R. 27–28, 888–89)

(“Bilateral hand grips strong and equal. Full range of motion is present; no visible

edema”).

Between June and August 2020, plaintiff routinely engaged in physical therapy to

treat some decreased strength and coordination. (R. 28, 915–82). At the conclusion of this

course of physical therapy, plaintiff reported minimal improvements in grip strength,

upper extremity strength, fine motor tasks, and functional activities; however, contrary

to her subjective reports of only marginal improvement, evidence of significant

improvement exists in the record. (R. 28, 988–89) (“Range of motion has been grossly

assessed and is within normal functional limits”). Specifically, the record indicates

plaintiff had full strength except for slightly reduced strength (4+ out of 5) in left and

right elbow extension, right shoulder internal rotation, and aspects of right wrist

movement, and somewhat reduced strength (3+ out of 5) in other aspects of right wrist

and finger movement. (R. 28, 988–89).

Further, during the October 2020 evaluation, the record suggests plaintiff has

normal gait, full range of motion, and normal muscle strength and tone, symmetrical

reflexes, normal cardiac and respiratory examinations, and no neurological deficits. (R.

29, 1159). In the next month, a physician again made those normal observations, except

that he noted some weakness in her (non-dominant) right arm. (R. 29, 1155). Further, in

January 2021, two (2) examinations of the plaintiff yielded normal gait and cardiac and

respiratory findings; specifically, one of those examinations noted: normal range of

motion, normal muscle strength and tone, and normal motor examinations in the upper

and lower extremities. (R. 29–30, 1145, 1151). A subsequent examination, conducted in

May 2021, also yielded similar findings. (R. 30, 1140).

Later that year, in August 2021, plaintiff was observed to have mild weakness in

her right arm and appeared frail, but otherwise normal. (R. 30, 1031). In January 2022,

plaintiff reported she was “back to baseline” after her stroke except that she had

weakness in her non-dominant right hand. (R. 28, 1179). However, the ALJ determined

the evidence in the record did not support her inability to even lift 10 pounds on an

occasional basis—the maximum lifting requirement of past relevant work of the plaintiff.

(R. 355). Thus, as to the significance of her purported physical impairments in support

of her claims, the ALJ adequately evaluated and articulated the record evidence in

support of the RFC as formulated.

Next, as to her alleged mental impairments, the ALJ further considered her

treatment records. (R. 20, 32). Consistent with 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv-v), the ALJ

considered the mental health treatment plan (or lack of) in the record—highlighting that

the mental health treatment did not consistent of specialized treatment of psychotherapy.

(R. 20, 32). The ALJ considered how these records indicate only that she was prescribed

medication from her primary physician. See Sienkiewicz v. Barnhart, 409 F.3d 798, 804 (7th

Cir. 2005) (affirming a finding of no disability where a claimant “never saw a mental

health care specialist about her depression.”).

The ALJ did acknowledge mental deficits of the plaintiff upon examination. (R. 19-

20, 31, 1012–13). However, despite such deficits, the ALJ also considered how plaintiff

was able to repeat sets of numbers in sequential order and count down from the number

20 in specific increments. (Id.). The ALJ also considered how plaintiff had normal speech

and eye contact, as well as fair insight and judgment. (Id.).

The ALJ ultimately found that difficulties on the mental status examination were

outliers in the totality of the record. (R. 20). Specifically, at a medical visit after the

consultative examination, plaintiff displayed unimpaired recent and remote memory. (R.

20, 1151). For example, plaintiff was observed to answer questions appropriately at

several medical visits. (R. 20, 889, 895, 1164, 1170). Further, several mental status

examinations were observed as completely normal. (R. 20, 889, 896, 1139, 1145, 1151, 1155,

1164, 1170).

In challenging the ALJ’s reliance upon such findings, plaintiff contends the ALJ

neglected to adequately consider the December 2021 medical record listing

“Forgetfulness” as one of the thirty-seven (37) items under “Patient Active Problem List”

was evidence of a significant mental limitation. (Doc. 8 at 8, citing R. 1050). Upon review,

however, it appears that problem list appears to have included information from prior

medical visits—documenting issues that were not necessarily still present.

For example, the December 2021 medical record did not list any observations of

mental deficits, forgetfulness or otherwise. (R. 1051–52). The assessment section of that

medical record similarly includes no mental concerns. (R. 1053). Similarly, the record

notes “Methamphetamine abuse” on the same list; yet, in the same record (in a different

section) also notes that “[n]o recent meth use” was reported. (R. 1049, 1051). Thus, to

presume this record was not a reflection of the full scope of the prior treatment would

incorrect and inconsistent within itself.

Plaintiff also argues, unpersuasively, that the ALJ erred by not finding significant

mental limitations when plaintiff missed her first appointment with a consultative

examiner. (Doc. 8 at 8, citing R. 94–95). However, the ALJ determination of a missed

medical appointment as insufficient to support a finding of mental limitations is

reasonable, especially in light of the numerous medical appointments that she did attend.

(R. 888-1184). Similarly, although an agency employee at SSA noted the plaintiff

struggled to remember dates and information without assistance of her daughter, this

evidence does not itself indicate the ALJ’s finding was unreasonable or patently wrong.

(Doc. 8 at 8, citing R. 282, 1029). Plaintiff has not established how forgetting details on

some occasions warrants a finding of significant limitations such that would preclude her

from returning to her past relevant work as a Meat Products Laborer.

The ALJ cited medical assessments and objective evidence of improvement in

support of the finding that plaintiff could return to her past relevant light exertional

work, involving simple duties. Nothing in the record suggests the ALJ’s findings were

unreasonable as to the purported mental impairments of the plaintiff. Plaintiff did not

provide sufficient evidence or argument to conclude the ALJ’s RFC formulation or

disability determination was unreasonable.

In summary, not only was the medical evidence and treatment plan adequately

summarized, evaluated, and considered, but the ALJ’s articulation of persuasive

rationale as to each of the pieces of relevant evidence in the record also support the RFC

as formulated. Evidenced in the analysis above, the record does not suggest the ALJ’s

credibility assessment as to the medical evidence was “patently wrong”—suggesting

deference to the ALJ’s findings is warranted.

Moreover, even if reasonable minds could disagree on whether the plaintiff was

disabled in consideration of the foregoing medical and treatment plan evidence, this

Court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. Burmester v. Berryhill,

920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019); see also Bakke v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 2023)

(“This explicit weighing is precisely within the purview of the ALJ—and it is not [the

Court’s] place to reweigh evidence, even where reasonable minds might disagree about

the outcome.”). This Court will not engage in reweighing evidence as a means to supplant

ALJ’s discretion with its own. To do so would be improper. Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893,

900 (7th Cir. 2021)(holding a reviewing court “will not reweigh the evidence, resolve

debatable evidentiary conflicts, determine credibility, or substitute [its] judgment for the

ALJ’s determination so long as substantial evidence supports it.”).

Thus, the ALJ reasonably considered the objective medical evidence and treatment

plan available in the record when formulating the RFC—affording the ALJ to consider

such evidence against the totality of the longitudinal case record inclusive of the

subjective reports of the plaintiff.

iii. Daily Activities & Other Factors

Plaintiff also attacks the ALJ’s description of her daily activities. (Doc. 8 at 7–8).

For example, the ALJ noted plaintiff could prepare meals. (Id., citing R. 21). In response

to this reliance, plaintiff contends she is unable to cook and, instead, only admitted she is

capable of making sandwiches and preparing TV dinners. (Doc. 8, citing R. 298). This

suggestion, however, appears adequately rebutted because the testimony also suggests

she was capable of preparing meals on a stovetop; specifically, hamburgers and similar

meals. (R. 58). This provides the ALJ with enough reasonable ground to find plaintiff

capable of preparing meals, even if such meals are basic or rudimentary. Further, the ALJ

also found evidence exists in the record from mental status examinations that suggest

plaintiff can manage her own funds and handle her medical care. (R. 21, 889, 896, 1139,

1145, 1151, 1164, 1170).

Despite such consideration of these daily activities, the decision in no way equates

such activities with the ability to maintain full employment. Cynthia A. v. Berryhill, No.

4:17-4319, 2019 WL 7421964 at *6 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2019) (finding no error where ALJ

considered activities of daily living, but did not equate those activities with her ability to

maintain employment). Instead, the ALJ’s consideration of daily activities was one factor

in consideration of the totality of the evidence. See Burmester, 920 F.3d at 510; Alvarado v.

Colvin, 836 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding “it is entirely permissible [for an ALJ] to

examine all of the evidence, including a claimant’s daily activities, to assess whether

testimony about the effects of his impairments was credible or exaggerated”) (citation

and internal quotation omitted).

Finally, consistent with the ALJ’s consideration of previous categories of evidence

in the record, challenging the ALJ’s RFC assessment is tantamount to a request of this

Court to improperly reweigh or reconsider evidence. Once more, this Court refuses to do

so and it will not supplant the findings of the ALJ with its own RFC assessment.

McKinzey, 641 F.3d at 889.

B. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff was capable

of performing past relevant work

As an initial matter, step four of the sequential analysis, plaintiff has the burden of

showing she is unable to perform her past relevant work as she actually performed it. See

Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n. 5 (placing burden upon plaintiff to show inability of returning

to past relevant work during the period of alleged disability, as was actually performed

prior to the period of disability); Wilder, 22 F.4th at 651 (“The burden of proof is on the

plaintiff at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step

five”).

Here, the ALJ considered the requirements of Meat Products Laborer as it was

actually performed by plaintiff—relying upon her own submissions and testimony given

to the agency. (R. 33, 355). Specifically, plaintiff indicated this job involved cutting and

pulling entrails out of meat, and that her role did not involve supervising the work of

others. (R. 335). The record poses the limitations implicated in this role, or that (while

there was standing involved) the maximum amount of weight lifted was 10 pounds with

frequently lifting of less than 10 pounds. (R. 335). It was not purported that this job, as

plaintiff performed it, involved climbing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, or crawling. (R.

335).

Plaintiff relies upon a DOT summary of the role, as well as the meat laborer online

job posting advertised from her former employer indicating greater physical

requirements. (Doc. 8 at 8–9). However, a claimant is not disabled if she can do her past

relevant work as she actually performed it, even if she is unable to do that job as it is

typically performed. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)(2) (a claimant is not disabled if the

claimant can do her past relevant work “either as the claimant actually performed it or as

generally performed in the national economy”) (emphasis added). It is irrelevant whether

plaintiff was unable to perform the meat laborer job as it was typically performed, how it

was described by DOT, or how it was previously advertised by her prior employer.

It is, therefore, reasonable that—with the benefit the record evidence and the

testimony provided from the impartial VE—the ALJ would make this finding on this past

relevant role as it was actually—not typically—performed.

Moreover, identical to the RFC formulation as outlined previously, it is not this

Court’s place to second-guess the ALJ’s determination by reweighing the persuasiveness

of the evidence in the record. Gedatus, 994 F.3d at 900 (holding a reviewing court “will

not reweigh the evidence, resolve debatable evidentiary conflicts, determine credibility,

or substitute [its] judgment for the ALJ’s determination so long as substantial evidence

supports it.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon review of the filings and applicable law, this Court finds the ALJ applied

correct legal standards and supported her decision with substantial evidence in the

longitudinal case record.

As to the RFC formulation between steps three and four of the sequential

evaluation, the ALJ adequately and articulately considered prior administrative findings,

medical evidence, and subjective statements by the plaintiff. Further, at step four of the

analysis, the ALJ reasonably determined the plaintiff could perform her past relevant

role—as it was actually performed— during the period of alleged disability. The ALJ

grounded this finding in substantial evidence, relying primarily on reliable testimony

proffered by the impartial VE at the hearing.

In assessment of the decision and longitudinal case record at each of the sequential

stages of evaluation, it is evident to this Court that the ALJ built a “logical bridge”

between the available evidence and ultimate disability determination.

For these reasons, this Court hereby recommends: (1) the ALJ’s decision be

AFFIRMED; and (2) judgment be entered in favor of the Commissioner.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED.

ENTER: November 4, 2024

/s/ Karen L. McNaught

KAREN L. McNAUGHT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE