The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
JENNIFER SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 6:24-cv-457-PGB-RMN
FLORIDA AGRICULTURAL &
MECHANICAL UNIVERSITY
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Jennifer Smith’s
(“Plaintiff”) Renewed Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 133 (the “Renewed
Motion”)). Defendant Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University (“FAMU”)
Board of Trustees (“Defendant”) has filed a response in opposition (Doc. 136 (the
“Response”)). Upon careful consideration, the Renewed Motion is due to be
granted.
I. BACKGROUND1
This case arises out of Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant engaged in
gender discrimination in compensating Plaintiff—who was a tenured law professor
1 The Court provides an abbreviated synopsis of both the Plaintiff’s allegations and the lengthy
procedural history involved in Plaintiff’s requests to amend the operative Amended Complaint
(Doc. 1-1 (“FAC”)). Despite Plaintiff’s representations to the contrary in the Renewed Motion,
the Court strives to act with efficiency in resolving the issues before it. (See Doc. 133).
Moreover, the Court’s involvement in trying to advance this matter is unrivaled among the
cases on this Court’s docket. Yet Plaintiff appears to persist in the faulty belief that, on any
at FAMU—in violation of the Equal Protection Act (“EPA”). (See Doc. 1-1). Plaintiff
additionally claims that Defendant wrongfully terminated Plaintiff after learning
she had sued Defendant under the EPA. (See id.).
On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff moved for the Court’s leave to file a second
amended complaint (Doc. 72 (the “Amended Motion to Amend”)). Plaintiff
attached the proposed second amended complaint (Doc. 72-1 through Doc. 72-16
(the “proposed SAC”)) to the Amended Motion to Amend for the Court’s
consideration. (Id.). On July 3, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file the
proposed SAC.2 (Doc. 80). However, on July 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a second
amended complaint that differed in significant respects from the proposed SAC.
(See Doc. 81). The next day, Plaintiff filed a “corrected” second amended
complaint, which also differed significantly from the proposed SAC. (See Doc. 84
(the “altered SAC”); see also Doc. 84-1 through Doc. 84-21 (exhibits to the altered
SAC)).
Ultimately, upon Defendant’s request, the Court struck both versions of the
second amended complaint that were filed by Plaintiff, finding they had been filed
without the Court’s leave. (Doc. 132 (the “Order Striking the SACs”)). However,
the Court gave Plaintiff the option of (1) filing the proposed SAC; or (2) filing a
renewed motion seeking leave to file the altered SAC. (Id.). Plaintiff has chosen the
2 The Court notes that the Amended Motion to Amend was filed after the deadline for amending
the pleadings as set forth in the Case Management and Scheduling Order (“CMSO”). (Doc.
45, p. 1; Doc. 72). However, Plaintiff had timely filed the first version of this motion and the
Amended Motion to Amend was filed as a result of a Court Order. (Docs. 54, 65, 71).
Accordingly, the Court treated the Amended Motion to Amend as a timely request to amend
latter course, and in the Renewed Motion, seeks leave to file the altered SAC as the
operative complaint in this case. (Doc. 133).3 The Renewed Motion was filed nearly
two (2) months after the expiration of the deadline for amending the pleadings as
set forth in the CMSO. (Doc. 45, p. 1; Doc. 72; Doc. 133).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When a motion for leave to amend the pleadings is filed after the deadline
established by the Court in the CMSO, the movant must first show good cause for
the belated request under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4). Romero v.
Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Sosa v. Airprint
Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1998)). “To establish good cause, the
[movant] must have been diligent.” See id. at 1319; see also Oravec v. Sunny Isles
Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted)
(noting the good cause standard “precludes modification [of the CMSO] unless the
schedule cannot be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.”).
3 Because Plaintiff never filed the proposed SAC after the Court granted her Amended Motion
to Amend, it never became the operative pleading in this case. (Docs. 81, 84, 132).
Nevertheless, in the instant Order, the Court addresses only the additional, untimely
amendments that Plaintiff made to the proposed SAC, resulting in the altered SAC. There are
a myriad of reasons for this choice, including: (1) the Court has already approved of Plaintiff
filing the proposed SAC by Court Order; (2) the Court considered that the request to make the
amendments contained within the proposed SAC were timely made; (3) in the Order Striking
the SACs, the Court did not offer Plaintiff the option of filing the proposed SAC as the operative
pleading before moving to amend to file the altered SAC; (4) neither of the parties appear to
anticipate a return to the FAC in their briefing on Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion; and (5) for the
sake of simplicity, given the complex procedural history of Plaintiff’s attempts to amend in
this case. In any event, under the circumstances, the Court finds good cause for allowing
Plaintiff to file the altered SAC in its entirety. (Docs. 80, 132; see Docs. 133, 136); FED. R. CIV.
Once the movant has established good cause, the Court must consider if the
amendment is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Romero, 552 F.3d
at 1318–19 (citing Sosa, 133 F.3d at 1418). Under Rule 15, the Court shall “freely”
grant leave to the parties to amend their pleadings “when justice so requires.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). “This standard of liberality is mandated absent any apparent
reason to the contrary.” Gropp v. United Airlines, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 941, 945 (M.D.
Fla. 1994); see Laurie v. Ala. Ct. of Crim. Appeals, 256 F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir.
2001). In fact, to deny a motion to amend the complaint, there must be a
substantial reason “such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of
the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, [or] futility of amendment.” E.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962); Laurie, 256 F.3d at 1274.
III. DISCUSSION
Through the Renewed Motion, Plaintiff seeks to add a new party Defendant,
Sarah Reiner (“Ms. Reiner”), to the case.4 (See Doc. 133-1). She also seeks to add
substantial detail regarding Plaintiff’s alleged encounter with a disruptive student
4 The proposed SAC had added as party Defendants two attorneys and their law firm (the
“Defendant law firm”) (collectively, the “law firm Defendants”), asserting their alleged
involvement in Plaintiff’s wrongful termination. (Doc. 72-1, ¶¶ 12–15, 190–205). Therein,
Plaintiff included two (2) counts against the law firm Defendants: one (1) for conspiracy to
interfere with civil rights and another for failure to prevent conspiracy (the “conspiracy
counts”). (Id. ¶¶ 190–205). In the altered SAC, Plaintiff maintains her conspiracy counts
against the law firm Defendants. (See Doc. 133-1, ¶¶ 191–209). However, Plaintiff newly
alleges that Ms. Reiner, who is a partner of the Defendant law firm, is also liable under the
conspiracy counts. (See id., ¶¶ 14, 16, 191–209).
(the “student encounter”) and Defendant’s investigation regarding the student
encounter, which lie at the heart of Plaintiff’s claims in this case.5 (See e.g., id. ¶¶
43, 45, 50–52, 55, 74). Further, the parties seemingly agree that the changes made
in the altered SAC cure deficiencies within the proposed SAC. (Doc. 112, pp. 7–8;
Doc. 114, pp. 3–4).
In the Renewed Motion, Plaintiff raises a host of arguments in support of
good cause for the untimely request to amend. (See Doc. 133). Of those arguments,
one is worthy of discussion.6 (See id. at p. 9). Plaintiff represents that, after she
filed her Amended Motion to Amend with the attached proposed SAC:
Plaintiff became aware of new facts and a new party with
involvement in the allegations of the [altered] SAC. New
documents and information had also been unearthed from
Plaintiff and Defendant FAMU’s interactions in discovery in
her case, the proceedings in another case against FAMU
brought by another law professor, and Plaintiff’s own
investigation of the foregoing.
(Id. (citation omitted)). Defendant advances two (2) primary arguments in
response. (See Doc. 136). First, Defendant argues that, in her Renewed Motion,
Plaintiff fails to expressly seek a modification of the CMSO’s deadlines for
amending the pleadings. (Id. at p. 4). Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has
5 Plaintiff alleges that the student encounter led to an investigation that Defendant later used
as a pretext for terminating her employment. (E.g., Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 36–77).
6 Much of Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion is dedicated to venting disagreement with the Court’s
Order Striking the SACs, which has no bearing on the Renewed Motion, and indeed, would
not be appropriate even in the context of a request for reconsideration of that Order. (See Doc.
133, pp. 10–11; 14–16); Madura v. BAC Home Loans Servicing L.P., No. 8:11-cv-2511, 2013
WL 4055851, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2013) (citation omitted) (explaining that it is wholly
inappropriate in a motion for reconsideration to “vent dissatisfaction with the Court’s
reasoning.”).
not met the good cause standard because she has not been diligent. (Id. at p. 5). To
this point, Defendant contends that “failure to comply with a Court’s Orders
demonstrates a lack of diligence in itself.” (Id.).
After careful consideration, the Court finds good cause to permit Plaintiff to
file the requested amendment despite the expiration of the deadline for doing so.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4). First, Plaintiff represents that she requests to amend
her allegations based upon relevant information she recently obtained through her
discovery efforts and her personal investigation in this case. (Doc. 133, p. 9).
Essentially, Plaintiff argues that she obtained the information underlying her
requested amendment through her diligence. (See id.). Defendant fails to
meaningfully challenge this point. (See Doc. 136). For example, Defendant does
not argue that Plaintiff has long known about the information underlying the
requested amendment or, conversely, that Plaintiff should have discovered this
information sooner. (See id.). Instead, Defendant appears to advance a good cause
standard that could never be met. (See id. at p. 5). The good cause standard that
requires an evaluation of a plaintiff’s diligence only applies to amendments
requested after the deadline for amending has expired. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4).
Yet, Defendant urges that a plaintiff who fails to meet that deadline is de facto not
diligent. (See Doc. 136, p. 5).
However, as Defendant notes in its Response, “[d]iligence means that a
party has worked earnestly, steadily, energetically and conscientiously to
accomplish their goal.” (Id. at p. 6 (quoting Freedman v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., No.
6:15-cv-1657-Orl-41TBS, 2016 WL 3196464, at *6 (M.D. Fla. June 9, 2016)). The
filings in this case suggest that Plaintiff has been vigorous in her pursuit of
discovery. (See, e.g., Doc. 88 (Plaintiff’s motion to pierce attorney-client privilege);
Doc. 89 (Plaintiff’s motion to pierce FERPA confidentiality); Doc. 99 (Plaintiff’s
motion to take additional depositions and serve additional interrogatories); Doc.
109 (Plaintiff’s motion to compel responses to discovery)). This suggests Plaintiff’s
diligence and supports the notion that there is good cause to extend the CMSO’s
deadline for amending the pleadings. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4); Romero, 552
F.3d at 1318–19.
Further, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff has not requested an extension
of the CMSO’s deadline for amending the pleadings also fails. (Doc. 136, p. 4). First,
the Renewed Motion does reference that Plaintiff seeks such an extension, albeit
in a cursory manner. (See Doc. 133, pp. 11, 13, 17). More importantly, Plaintiff
correctly cites to the good cause standard, which applies to untimely requests to
amend the pleadings. (Id. at. pp. 2, 8). Thus, as a result of the foregoing, the Court
finds good cause to extend the deadline for amending the pleadings. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 16(b)(4); Romero, 552 F.3d at 1318–19.
The Court additionally finds that Plaintiff’s amendment should be permitted
under Rule 15’s liberal pleading standard. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). Simply put,
there is no apparent, substantial reason why the amendment should be forbidden.
See Gropp, 847 F. Supp. at 945; Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; Laurie, 256 F.3d at 1274.
Indeed, Defendant does not raise any arguments to the contrary, and instead relies
entirely on its argument that Plaintiff has not established good cause. (See Doc.
136, p. 6). As a result, Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion will be granted.7
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 133) is
GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff shall file her second amended complaint on or before August
20, 2024. Plaintiff is instructed to file the exact version of the second
amended complaint that was attached to the Renewed Motion to
Amend Complaint along with the exact same exhibits. (Doc. 133; Doc.
133-1 through Doc. 133-22).
DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on August 16, 2024.
7 Plaintiff gratuitously asserts in the Renewed Motion that she has “cautioned the Court to avoid
delays” and that granting her pending motion for preliminary injunction “is an obvious and
straightforward decision, but we have not even been able to reach that.” (Doc. 133, p. 16, 16
n.6; see Doc. 86). Before concluding, the Court briefly addresses these remarks. A motion for
preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy” that requires the Court to
carefully analyze a plaintiff’s claims to determine whether the plaintiff has clearly established
a likelihood of success on the merits. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000)
(per curiam) (quoting McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998));
Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1246–47 (11th
Cir. 2002). The Court found it improvident to address Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
injunction—despite Plaintiff labelling it as time-sensitive—until it is clear which of the five (5)
versions of the allegations that Plaintiff has submitted in this case would ultimately be the
operative pleading. (See Docs. 1-1, 65-1, 72-1, 81, 84; see also Doc. 86). Thus, any perceived
delay in the Court ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction is directly
attributable to Plaintiff’s choices about how to proceed in this matter. (See, e.g., Docs. 37, 54,
65, 71, 72, 80, 81, 82, 84, 86, 132, 133). The Court notes that, following Plaintiff’s filing of her
amended pleadings pursuant to the instant Order, her motion for preliminary injunction will
be ruled upon in due course, with the proviso that the Court has other important matters
Gree
PAUL G.
UNITED STATESM@ISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties