Hightower v. Grant Co. State Ploice

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

ELKINS

RICHARD K. HIGHTOWER,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 2:24-CV-28

(JUDGE KLEEH)

GRANT COUNTY STATE PLOICE [sic],

JOSHA [sic] ORANDOFF, JOHN G. OURS,

and JAMES CURRIE,

Defendants.1

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, AFTER INITIAL

SCREENING, RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 1] BE DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

On October 21, 2024, pro se Plaintiff Richard K. Hightower (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint

against the above-captioned Defendants. [ECF No. 1]. Having screened Plaintiff's Complaint in

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the undersigned now RECOMMENDS

that the Complaint [ECF No. 1] should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to

state a claim on which relief may be granted.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In his pro se Complaint, Plaintiff lodges scant factual allegations, such that Defendants’

supposed actions or omissions are explained in the briefest fashion. The factual allegations are set

forth in a single, brief handwritten paragraph that reads only: “working [sic] on false statemen [sic]

in my case. they [sic] even gave the one that I was accused of messing with a stuffed animeal [sic]

for her to lie because they didn’t like me”. There is nothing else in the Complaint or in any other

1 The names of the party-defendants in the case caption here are taken from the pro se Complaint lodged

herein. The undersigned is aware that names of the party-defendants in the case caption may appear to be

incomplete and/or misspelled. The undersigned notes this only to the extent it reflects the shortcomings of

the pro se Complaint.

materials which Plaintiff submitted by which Plaintiff offers any further factual allegations –

except that on the civil cover sheet [ECF No. 1-1], in the section for Plaintiff to provide a brief

description of the cause of action, he states “false arrest working on false statements.” Nowhere

does Plaintiff straightforwardly explain any cause of action he wishes to pursue, and he cites no

legal authority in support of any cause of action. On the civil cover sheet, Plaintiff did check boxes

in the “Nature of Suit” section for “False Claims Act” and “Other Civil Rights.” But nowhere in

his filings does Plaintiff give any further supporting factual allegations or citations to legal

authority to explain how he wishes to purse relief under the False Claims Act or via some civil

rights claim.

Additionally, in conjunction with his other filings, Plaintiff filed a pro se Motion for Leave

to Proceed in forma pauperis including an Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees

and Affidavit. [ECF No. 2].

On October 22, 2024, this Court, by the Honorable Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief United States

District Judge, entered an Order of Referral [ECF No. 4], referring this matter to the undersigned

United States Magistrate Judge in order “to conduct a scheduling conference and issue a

scheduling order, for written orders or reports and recommendations, as the case may be, regarding

any motions filed, and to dispose of any other matters that may arise.”

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), where a plaintiff is seeking to proceed without the

prepayment of fees and costs, the court is obliged to screen the case to determine if the complaint

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

This screening is generally conducted prior to ruling upon the Motion for Leave to Proceed

in forma pauperis and Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs and before

service of process. See Portee v. United States Dep't of Agric., No. 2:15-CV-13928, 2016 WL

4962727, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. July 14, 2016) (Tinsley, J.), report and recommendation adopted, No.

2:15-CV-13928, 2016 WL 4942023 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 15, 2016) (Johnston, J.). The purpose of

this statute is “to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless

lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit and

because of the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 11.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). “To this end, the statute accords

judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,

but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss

those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. See also Nasim v. Warden,

Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th Cir. 1995) (initial screenings required

because § 1915 removed the “economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or

repetitive lawsuits.”) (internal citations omitted); Whitehead v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No.

1:08CV792, 2009 WL 1565639, at *4 (E.D. Va. May 28, 2009), aff'd in part sub nom. Whitehead

v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 366 F. App'x 457 (4th Cir. 2010) (upholding dismissal). Thus, while

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) speaks specifically to review as to pro se litigants who are prisoners,

the Court may conduct such a screening regardless of whether a pro se litigant is a prisoner.

Relatedly, the undersigned of course is mindful of Plaintiff’s pro se status in this context.

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must liberally construe the pleadings. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978). A pro

se complaint is subject to dismissal, however, if the Court cannot reasonably read the pleadings to

state a valid claim on which a plaintiff could prevail. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th

Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the plaintiff’s legal arguments for him, nor should it “conjure

up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th

Cir. 1985).

III. ANALYSIS OF COMPLAINT

The Complaint [ECF No. 1] provides no factual allegations as a basis for the Plaintiff’s

claims which would allow this Court to grant relief. Nor does Plaintiff set forth in the Complaint

any necessary legal grounds entitling him to any relief.

As noted above, Plaintiff’s factual allegations are very limited. The brief statement he

provides does not explain in any detail which Defendant acted in which alleged manner, and it

does not explain in any concrete fashion how Plaintiff was harmed or damaged. Plaintiff seems to

take issue with Defendants’ alleged conduct in a “case,” but he does not explain which case he

refers to, what the nature of it is, or even where it is or was pending. And without any context or

explanation, Plaintiff attributes some statement to someone (it is not clear exactly who) about a

stuffed animal. This statement allegedly was deployed to induce “her” to lie, but there is no

explanation about who “her” is, what the nature of the supposed lie was, or about how Plaintiff

was harmed or damaged as a result.

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not generally require that claims be

pled with great detail. To this end:

A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the

court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief; and

(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or

different types of relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

Nonetheless, even though Rule 8 does not require great particularity, claims must be pled

with sufficient detail such that a defendant has fair notice of the basis of a plaintiff’s claim. Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). More specifically:

It is established that a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. We have recognized that

facial plausibility is established once . . . the complaint’s factual allegations produce

an inference . . . strong enough to nudge the plaintiff’s claims across the line from

conceivable to plausible. In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, we assume as

true all its well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff. Thus, to satisfy the plausibility standard, a plaintiff is not required to plead

factual allegations in great detail, but the allegations must contain sufficient factual

heft to allow a court, drawing on judicial experience and common sense, to infer

more than the mere possibility of that which is alleged.

Nanni v. Aberdeen Marketplace, Inc., 878 F.3d 447, 452 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). As a corollary, of course, legal claims asserted must have a basis in both fact

and law. As a neighboring District Court once helpfully summarized:

[A] district court “is not obliged to ferret through a [c]omplaint, searching for viable

claims.” Wynn–Bey v. Talley, No. RWT-12-3121, 2012 WL 5986967, at *2 (D.

Md. Nov. 28, 2012). On the contrary, courts have “unhesitatingly dismissed actions

where the complaint:

 consisted of “a labyrinthian prolixity of unrelated and vituperative

charges that def(y) comprehension,” Prezzi v. Schelter, 469 F.2d

691, 692 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 935, 93 S.Ct. 1911,

36 L.Ed.2d 396 (1973);

 was “confusing, ambiguous, redundant, vague and, in some

respects, unintelligible,” Wallach v. City of Pagedale, Missouri, 359

F.2d 57, 58 (8th Cir. 1966);

 was “so verbose, confused and redundant that its true substance, if

any, is well disguised,” Corcoran v. Yorty, 347 F.2d 222, 223 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 966, 86 S.Ct. 458, 15 L.Ed.2d 370

(1965);

 contained “a completely unintelligible statement of argumentative

fact,” Koll v. Wayzata State Bank, 397 F.2d 124, 125 (8th Cir.

1968), with “little more than demands, charges, and conclusions,”

Burton v. Peartree, 326 F.Supp. 755, 758 (E.D. Pa. 1971);

 represented “circuitous diatribes far removed from the heart of the

claim,” Prezzi v. Berzak, 57 F.R.D. 149, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); or

 set forth “a meandering, disorganized, prolix narrative,” Karlinsky

v. New York Racing Association, Inc., 310 F.Supp. 937, 939

(S.D.N.Y. 1970).

Jianqing Wu v. TrustPoint Int'l, No. CV PWG-15-1924, 2015 WL 13091378, at *1

(D. Md. Oct. 5, 2015) (formatting altered) (quoting Brown, 75 F.R.D. at 499

(dismissing complaint that was “a confused and rambling narrative of charges and

conclusions concerning numerous persons, organizations and agencies” and that

“contain[ed] an untidy assortment of claims that [were] neither plainly nor

concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp

harangues and personal comments”)).

Plumhoff v. Cent. Mortg. Co., 286 F. Supp. 3d 699, 702 (D. Md. 2017).

In the instant matter, the factual allegations and legal bases for any possible theory of relief

are similarly incoherent. The Court cannot discern how the brief factual statement is tied to any

conceivable cause of action. As noted above, the only discernable citations to legal authority are

the checked boxes on the civil cover sheet. The precise constitutional provision, statute, regulation,

policy, or other authority on which Plaintiff relies is a total mystery. As such, the legal claims –

and the bases to support the claims – are not discernible. For that reason alone, the Complaint

utterly fails under Rule 8.

As such, the undersigned FINDS that Plaintiff sets forth no cognizable claims, and as such,

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Because of the lack of any factual allegations of acts, omissions, or wrongdoing by

Defendants giving rise to cognizable legal claims, the undersigned FINDS that the Complaint fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. After performing an initial screening pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the undersigned concludes and RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s

motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2] be DENIED.

V. RECOMMENDATION

For the abovementioned reasons, the undersigned FINDS that the Complaint [ECF No. 1]

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully

RECOMMENDS Plaintiff's Complaint, filed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 1], should be

DISMISSED in its entirety WITHOUT PREJUDICE after review and screening pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Further, the undersigned RECOMMNEDS that Plaintiff’s

corresponding motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2] be DENIED.

Any party shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation to file with the Clerk of the Court specific written objections identifying the

portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made, and the basis for

such objection. A copy of such objections should also be submitted to the presiding United States

District Judge. Objections shall not exceed ten (10) typewritten pages or twenty (20) handwritten

pages, including exhibits, unless accompanied by a motion for leave to exceed the page limitations,

consistent with LR PL P 12.

Failure to timely file written objections to the Report and Recommendation as set

forth above shall constitute a waiver of de novo review by the District Court and a waiver of

appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir.

1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985);

United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Report and

Recommendation to counsel of record as provided in the Administrative Procedures for Electronic

Case Filing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, and to

the pro se Plaintiff by certified mail, return receipt requested.

DATED: October 23, 2024.

\ . A 2

MICHAEL JO

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE