Wilson v. Arellano

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 24-cv-14061-Moore/McCabe

FARRIS E. WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

ERIK ARELLANO and

NICHOLAS ANTON,

Defendants.

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REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) (DE

4), which was referred to the undersigned by United States District Judge K. Michael Moore (DE

11). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motion be

GRANTED and that the Complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE with leave to file

an Amended Complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a pro se civil rights case against two Fort Pierce police officers, Nicholas Anton and

Erik Arellano. (DE 1-3). The Complaint alleges that these two officers approached Plaintiff on

March 4, 2024 to ask him questions concerning a nearby auto accident. (DE 1-3 at 3). Plaintiff

alleges he felt no need to respond so he walked away. (DE 1-3 at 3). At that point, the two officers

attacked Plaintiff, detained him without probable cause, and accused him of resisting arrest, even

though Plaintiff verbally told the officers he was not resisting arrest. (DE 1-3 at 3).

Plaintiff next alleges that one or more of the officers (he does not specify which)

handcuffed him, slammed him into the side of the police car, and then slammed him into the rear

seat of the police car. (DE 1-3 at 3). Someone (Plaintiff does not specify who) then slammed the

rear door of the car into him several times. (DE 1-3 at 3).

One of the officers (again Plaintiff does not specify which) asked Plaintiff whether he was

on drugs, and Plaintiff responded, “I’m tired.” (DE 1-3 at 4). One or more of the officers then

transported Plaintiff to the hospital for a medical evaluation. (DE 1-3 at 4). At the hospital, nurses

gave Plaintiff two shots (he assumes of Narcan) against his will. (DE 1-3 at 4). Plaintiff insisted,

all the while, that he was not on drugs and was merely tired. (DE 1-3 at 4).

Thereafter, the two officers filed charges against Plaintiff in bad faith. (DE 1-3 at 5).

Plaintiff does not indicate the venue or type of charges filed, nor does he indicate the current status

of those charges. Plaintiff also alleges the two officers gave perjured testimony “in depositions.”

(DE 1-3 at 6). Plaintiff does not indicate the topic or subject matter of the deposition testimony he

believes to be false, nor does he indicate why he believes the deposition testimony to be false.

Plaintiff alleges these events mentally traumatized him, and he seeks monetary and punitive

damages. (DE 1-3 at 4).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

By way of this Motion, Officer Anton1 seeks dismissal of all claims against him pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (DE 4). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, the Court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).

1 The other defendant, Officer Arellano, has not yet been served.

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Although Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief,” a mere “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Instead, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). “A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Officer Anton urges dismissal of the Complaint on multiple grounds, but the Court need

only address one, namely, that the Complaint violates the rule against shotgun pleadings. (DE 4

at 4-5). As set forth below, the Court agrees that the Complaint suffers from the problems of

shotgun pleadings, and the Court therefore recommends dismissal without prejudice.

A. Shotgun Pleadings

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires complaints to set forth “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Additionally,

Rule 10(b) requires that each claim be presented in separate, numbered paragraphs, “each limited

as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances,” and that “each claim founded on a separate

occurrence ... be stated in a separate count.” Complaints that violate Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b) are

known as “shotgun pleadings.” See Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2021)

(“A shotgun pleading is a complaint that violates either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or

Rule 10(b), or both.”). Shotgun pleadings fail to give defendants “adequate notice of the claims

against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Ctny. Sheriff’s

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Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). Shotgun pleadings commonly suffer from one or

more of the following deficiencies:

(1) they contain multiple counts, with each count adopting the allegations of all

preceding counts, thereby causing each successive count to carry all that came

before, and leaving the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint;

(2) they are replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial allegations not obviously

connected to any particular cause of action;

(3) they do not separate each cause of action into a different count; and

(4) they assert multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which

of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions.

Id.

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint

The Complaint here suffers from at least three of the above deficiencies, making it difficult

to understand the claims asserted.

1. Which Defendant Committed Which Acts?

First, the Complaint repeatedly refers to the actions of “the officer” or “the officers”

without specifying which officer committed which acts. As an example, Plaintiff alleges he was

“forcefully slammed into the steel grill of the driver side rear door,” that he was “forcefully

slammed into the back seat,” and that the rear door was “slammed” into him several times. (DE

1-3 at 3). But Plaintiff does not explain who committed these actions. Officer Anton? Officer

Arellano? Both? To survive dismissal, a plaintiff must include sufficient factual detail to give

each Defendant fair notice of the exact wrongdoing of which he is accused. Plaintiff has not met

this standard.

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2. One Clear Legal Theory Per Count

Next, the Complaint does not separate each legal cause of action into a separate count, with

one clear legal theory per count. Although the Complaint purports to bring three counts, close

inspection reveals that each count contains a hodgepodge of potential claims, causes of action,

boilerplate legal terms, and citations to miscellaneous state and federal laws. Count I cites to the

United States and Florida Constitutions, as well as Florida’s Implied Consent and Refusal Law,

Fla. Stat § 316.1932, and Florida’s punitive damages statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.72. (DE 1-3 at 5).

Count II cites to the Florida Constitution, as well as the federal criminal statute for false statements,

18 U.S.C. § 1001, and Florida’s punitive damages statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.72. (DE 1-3 at 5). Count

III again cites to the Florida Constitution, as well as several Florida statutes related to perjury, Fla.

Stat. §§ 857.02, 837.021. (DE 1-3 at 6).

The Court recognizes that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and that Court must view his

pleadings liberally. Even under the most liberal standard, however, the Court cannot decipher the

legal theory of each count. To survive dismissal, a plaintiff must separate his complaint into

separate legal counts with one cognizable legal theory per count. See Vujin v. Galbut, 836 F.

App’x 809, 817-18 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding a shotgun pleading where, inter alia, the complaint

listed numerous statutes and constitutional provisions within each count and also incorporates all

general allegations). Plaintiff has not met this standard.

From what the Court can piece together in its best reading of the Complaint, the factual

scenario described by Plaintiff could potentially form the basis of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for false arrest, excessive force, and/or malicious prosecution. To establish a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) a violation of a federal (not state) constitutional right,

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and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005).

In addition, because the Complaint describes the actions of on-duty police officers, Plaintiff

must allege facts to overcome qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity provides

“complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). “The

purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties

without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit all but the plainly

incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188,

1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). This means Plaintiff must allege facts that show not only that

the Defendant committed a constitutional violation, but that the constitutional right at issue was

“clearly established” at the time of the violation. See Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370

F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004).

The current Complaint does not attempt to allege a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor does

it allege facts sufficient to overcome the difficult hurdle of qualified immunity. As such, the

Complaint should be dismissed.

3. Clear Supporting Facts

Finally, the Complaint fails to allege clear, supporting facts logically tied to each legal

claim. Instead, the Complaint makes boilerplate conclusions, leaving many unanswered questions.

Examples include the following:

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• Count II alleges that the Defendants “filed charges” in bad faith against Plaintiff.

(DE 1-3 at 5). What charges? When and where were the charges filed? Why does

Plaintiff believe the Defendants filed the charges in bad faith? Are the charges still

pending? If the charges are no longer pending, who won?

• Count III alleges that the Defendants committed perjury in “depositions.” (DE 1-3

at 6). Why were the Defendants deposed? What did the Defendants say in these

depositions that was false? Why does Plaintiff believe the deposition testimony to

be false?

For all of the above reasons, the Court finds the Complaint should be dismissed as a

shotgun pleading. Given that Plaintiff has not had any previous opportunities to amend, he should

be given an opportunity to re-plead his claims by way of an Amended Complaint. The Amended

Complaint should comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and should avoid the problems

common to shotgun pleadings. It should specify which Defendants committed which actions, and

it should separate the causes of action into separately numbered counts with one clear legal theory

per count. See Taylor v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 20-22161-CIV, 2020 WL 3257988,

at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 16, 2020) (collecting cases on shotgun pleadings and giving instructions for

any future amended pleading). Also, any amended pleading must do more than make conclusory,

boilerplate allegations; it must allege sufficient factual matter to state a claim of relief that is

plausible on its face. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

IV. RECOMMENDATION & NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motion (DE 4)

be GRANTED. Because Plaintiff may be able to plead additional facts to cure these pleading

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deficiencies, the undersigned further RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Complaint be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE with leave to file an Amended Complaint. Pending the

District Judge’s resolution of this Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff may only file an

Amended Complaint in full compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.

IF A PARTY DOES NOT INTEND TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION, THE PARTY SHALL FILE A NOTICE TO THAT EFFECT

WITHIN FIVE (5) DAYS.

The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this

Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with United States

District Judge K. Michael Moore. Failure to file objections timely shall bar the parties from a de

novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report and Recommendation

and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions

contained in this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers at West Palm Beach in the Southern

District of Florida, this 12th day of August 2024.

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L ya fis Uf

RYONM.MCCABE

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

cc: counsel of record; Plaintiff, pro se.