Collins v. Amjad

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

Wheeling

CLAYTON STEVEN COLLINS,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No.: 5:24-CV-105

Judge Bailey

DR. AYNE AMJAD, Medical Director

of Correctional Healthcare, DR. JAMES

BEANE, In charge of Medical Dept., St.

Marys Prison, CARLA DEEM, RN,

MELINDA GOFF, and JAMES HENSEL III,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Background

Plaintiff initiated this action on June 6, 2024, by filing a Complaint under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Plaintiff is a state inmate housed at St Marys Correctional Center in St. Marys,

West Virginia. On August 5, 2024, defendants Beane and Deem filed a Motion to Dismiss

[Doc. 20], along with a memorandum in support. On August 15, 2024, plaintiff filed a

response to the Motion, [Doc. 30]. On August 6, 2024, defendants Amjad and Hensel

also filed a Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 24], along with a memorandum in support. On

September 3, 2024, plaintiff filed a response to the Motion. [Doc. 41]. Finally, on August

28, 2024, defendant Goff filed a Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 36] and memorandum in support,

and on September 12, 2024, plaintiff filed a response. [Doc. 42]. These matters are now

fully briefed and ripe for decision. This matter is assigned to the Honorable John Preston

Bailey, United States District Judge, and it is referred to the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge for submission of proposed findings and recommendation for

disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons that follow, the

undersigned recommends that each of the three motions be granted and that this case

be dismissed.

II. The Complaint1

In his underlying Complaint, plaintiff raises five claims. First, in Claim One, plaintiff

alleges that Wexford employees acted “with complete deliberate indifference,” allowing

“people that are much further outside perimeters than what I’ve been told have been aloud

(sic) in. While much stricter rules have been used on me.” [Doc. 1 at 7]. Construing the

pro se claims liberally, and read together with the attached grievance forms, see [Doc. 1-

1], plaintiff appears to be referring to being denied being a part of a Subutex program

despite other inmates being allowed to do so. In Claim Two, plaintiff claims that he, along

with other prisoners, are told they are too far out from release to receive help. [Doc. 1 at

8]. In Claim Three, plaintiff alleges violations of the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) which he alleges occur “constantly.” [Id.]. Fourth, plaintiff

claims he is being denied medical services despite over a dozen requests and being

called for an interview several times. [Id.] Finally, in Claim Five, plaintiff alleges cruel and

unusual punishment by several defendants who he alleges have withheld medication.

[Id.]. For relief, plaintiff asks the Court to get him treatment, to force the Division of

Corrections and Rehabilitation to provide treatment to everyone who needs it, to punish

the defendants, and to reimburse him unspecified damages. [Id. at 9].

1 This section is taken from the undersigned’s July 19 Report and Recommendation,

[Doc. 15].

III. Motions to Dismiss

Defendants have filed three separate motions to dismiss. First, defendants Beane

and Deem filed a Motion to Dismiss on August 5, 2024. [Doc. 20]. In their memorandum

in support, the defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to allege the subjective

component of an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical

need. Further, in regards to defendant Deem, they argue that the grievances attached to

the Complaint show that Ms. Deem stated plaintiff was eligible to start Naltrexone, and

that mere disagreement with a course of treatment does not constitute an Eighth

Amendment claim. [Doc. 21 at 6]. In his response, plaintiff alleges that he tried

Naltrexone but suffered “horrible side effects.” [Doc. 30 at 2]. Further, he argues the

selection of inmates for the Subutex program is not fair and impartial. [Id. at 5].

Second, defendants Amjad and Hensel filed a Motion to Dismiss on August 6,

2024. These defendants argue they are entitled to immunity because plaintiff has sued

them only in their official capacities and has not made any allegations specific to them.

[Doc. 25 at 3–4]. Further, they argue that plaintiff simply disagrees with the course of

treatment selected for him and has not alleged an Eighth Amendment violation. [Id. at 9].

In the alternative, these defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. [Id. at

11–15]. In his response, plaintiff argues that defendants have a duty to protect plaintiff in

their official capacities. [Doc. 41 at 1]. He further asserts that his claim encompasses a

claim for equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. [Id. at 4].

Finally, defendant Goff filed a Motion to Dismiss on August 28, 2024. [Doc. 36].

Similarly to defendants Beane and Deem, defendant Goff argues that plaintiff has failed

to allege that Goff had the subjective intent necessary to establish an Eighth Amendment

claim for deliberate indifference. [Doc. 37 at 4–6]. In his response, plaintiff again

reiterates that he experienced horrible side effects while taking Naltrexone and argues

that other medications have become the standard of care. [Doc. 42 at 1–2].

IV. Standard of Review

A. Section 1983 Claims

The Supreme Court has held that:

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against

“[e]very person who, under color of any statute ... of any State

... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws....” The purpose of § 1983 is to deter

state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive

individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide

relief to victims if such deterrence fails.

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,

254–257 (1978)). In Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980), the Supreme Court

succinctly stated what a plaintiff must allege to sustain a civil rights action:

By the plain terms of § 1983, two—and only two—allegations

are required in order to state a cause of action under that

statute. First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has

deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that

the person who has deprived him of that right acted under

color of state or territorial law.

Gomez, 446 U.S. at 640.

B. Motion to Dismiss

“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;

importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding facts, the merits of a claim, or the

applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th

Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

a plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th

Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “require only ‘a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair

notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

In Twombly, the United States Supreme Court noted that a complaint need not assert

“detailed factual allegations,” but must contain more than labels and conclusions” or “a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Conley, 550 U.S. at 555

(citations omitted). Thus, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Id. (citations omitted), to one that is “plausible on its face,”

[Id. at 570], rather than merely “conceivable.” Id. Therefore, in order for a complaint to

survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must “allege facts sufficient to

state all the elements of [his or] her claim.” Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324

F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th

Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). In so doing, the

complaint must meet a “plausibility” standard, instituted by the Supreme Court in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, where it held that a “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must offer more than “a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully” in order to meet the plausibility standard and survive

dismissal for failure to state a claim. Id.

VI. Analysis

A. Defendants Amjad and Hensel’s Motion to Dismiss.

Turning first to the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Amjad and Hensel, the

undersigned finds that these defendants are entitled to dismissal because plaintiff has

named them only in their official capacity. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action

against any “person who” acts under color of law. (emphasis added). Actions authorized

under § 1983 are intended to “deter state actors from using the badge of their authority

to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158,

161 (1992). Critically, complaints in § 1983 actions must allege that some person has

deprived him of a federal right. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The

Eleventh Amendment bars such suits against the State, and § 1983 does not provide an

exception. “Congress, in passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh

Amendment immunity[.]” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)

(citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)). “[N]either a State nor its officials acting

in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

Defendants Amjad and Hensel argue that they are sued only in their official

capacities. [Doc. 25 at 3]. They argue that plaintiff has made no specific allegations

against either defendant and that they have clearly been named only based upon the

positions they hold. [Id.]. Indeed, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Amjad, as Medical Director of

Correctional Healthcare, works “over top program the problem is with.” [Doc. 1 at 2].

Likewise, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Hensel is “now in charge of referrals,” presumably

meaning referrals to the program. [Id. at 3]. Although plaintiff names these defendants

at the end of several of his claims, he does not make any specific allegations against

either defendant. Thus, it appears plaintiff has named these defendants only in their

official capacity and they should thus be dismissed. Indeed, in his response to the Motion,

plaintiff doubles-down on this argument, arguing that these defendants, in their official

capacity, have a duty to protect plaintiff from self-injury. [Doc. 41 at 1], citing Lee v.

Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1121 (4th Cir. 1981). But the existence of such duty is not in

dispute here; plaintiff has named these defendants only in their official capacity and has

not alleged how they have violated this duty.

Likewise, to the extent plaintiff contends these defendants are liable by virtue of

their supervisory roles, he has not alleged the elements of supervisory liability for a § 1983

claim against either defendant. “Government officials may not be held liable for the

unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable

to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-

official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the

Constitution.” Id. “A Bivens claim is brought against the individual official for his or her

own acts, not the acts of others.” Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017).

Supervisory liability under § 1983 is established when three elements are met:

(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his

subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and

unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that

the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show

“deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive

practices,”; and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between the

supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the

plaintiff.

Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). The Court further explained

that, “[t]o satisfy the requirements of the first element, a plaintiff must show the following:

(1) the supervisor’s knowledge of (2) conduct engaged in by a subordinate (3) where the

conduct poses a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to the

plaintiff.” Id. at 799 (citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984)).

“Constructive notice can be alleged in multiple ways, including the existence of

written reports of conditions at a detention facility, or a supervisor’s high level of

responsibility coupled with the violations alleged to have occurred on her or his watch.”

Jones v. Murphy, 470 F. Supp. 2d 537, 546 (D. Md. 2007). “[I]t has been established

that the plaintiff bears a heavy burden of proof which cannot be satisfied by pointing to a

single incident or isolated incidents because ‘a supervisor cannot be expected to

promulgate rules and procedures covering every conceivable occurrence within the area

of his responsibility.’” Leonard v. Starkey, No. 1:14-CV-42, 2017 WL 354851, at *8 (N.D.

W.Va. Jan. 24, 2017) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 1984)).

Turning to the second element, “[a] plaintiff may establish deliberate indifference

by demonstrating a supervisor’s ‘continued inaction in the face of documented

widespread abuses’; however, a plaintiff claiming deliberate indifference ‘assumes a

heavy burden of proof.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. “Causation is established when the

plaintiff demonstrates an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and

the harm suffered by the plaintiff.” Id.

Finally, the third element can be established “when the plaintiff demonstrates an

‘affirmative causal link’ between the supervisor's inaction and the harm suffered by the

plaintiff.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (citations omitted). “Establishing a ‘pervasive’ and

‘unreasonable’ risk of harm requires evidence that the conduct is widespread, or at least

has been used on several different occasions and that the conduct engaged in by the

subordinate poses an unreasonable risk of harm of constitutional injury.” Shaw, 13 F.3d

at 799.

Here, plaintiff has not provided allegations which would establish any of the three

elements of supervisory liability against defendants Amjad and Hensel. Accordingly, their

Motion to Dismiss should be granted.2

B. Defendants Beane and Deem’s Motion to Dismiss.

Turning next to the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Beane and Deem, the

undersigned finds that plaintiff has failed to establish deliberate indifference on the part

of either defendant. “The Eighth Amendment, which prohibits infliction of ‘cruel and

unusual punishments,’ U.S. Const. amend. VIII, applies to claims by prisoners against

corrections officials challenging conditions of confinement.” Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d

348, 355 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (May 6, 2019) (citation omitted). Deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs of a prisoner constitutes a violation of the Eighth

Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “A deliberate indifference

claim consists of two components, objective and subjective.” Jackson v. Lightsey, 775

F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014). The objective component requires that the medical

2 The undersigned notes that in his response to this Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff also

frames his claim as one brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, following a citation

from Taylor v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 2:23-CV-00475, 2024 WL 2978782

(S.D. W.Va. June 13, 2024) (Berger, J.). Regardless of how his claim is framed, plaintiff

is unable to bring these claims under § 1983 against defendants in their official capacities,

and he is unable to establish supervisory liability against these defendants.

condition be “serious”—meaning one that has been diagnosed by a physician as

mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would recognize the

need for a doctor’s attention. Id. The subjective component requires that the official

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must

both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 837 (1994).

Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to allege that either of these defendants

had subjective knowledge of plaintiff’s serious medical condition and ignored it. Plaintiff

alleges that Dr. Beane is “over medical department and personal (sic) where problem is

on going” and that Nurse Deem is the “on and off gate keeper to program.” [Doc. 1 at 2–

3]. The undersigned agrees that the Complaint does not allege the subjective intent

required to show deliberate indifference. According to the attachments to the Complaint,

see [Doc. 1-1 at 8], plaintiff’s opioid use disorder has also been treated by prison staff

with Naltrexone. In his response to the Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff alleges that he

discontinued the Naltrexone due to severe side effects.3 However, this, at most, appears

to be a disagreement between plaintiff and defendants over the proper course of

treatment. As set forth in the undersigned’s Report and Recommendation on plaintiff’s

motion for a preliminary injunction, this type of disagreement between an inmate and

medical providers about the proper course of medication is generally not enough to

3 The undersigned acknowledges that the allegations made in plaintiff’s response are not

in the Complaint and thus not part of his claim. However, in the interests of construing

the pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally and in adjudicating the claims on the merits, the

undersigned has considered the included allegations for purposes of this Report and

Recommendation.

establish deliberate indifference. Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014)

(deliberate indifference claim based on a diagnosis of arrhythmia rather than a more

serious condition and the resulting modification of prescriptions was essentially “a

‘[d]isagreement[ ] between an inmate and a physician over the inmate’s proper medical

care,’ and we consistently have found such disagreements to fall short of showing

deliberate indifference.”); Dao v. Harold, No. 7:22-CV-00554, 2023 WL 3304534 (W.D.

Va. May 8, 2023) (Urbanski, J.) (dismissal on initial review of deliberate indifference claim

related to doctor’s decision to terminate inmate’s Suboxone treatment because plaintiff

had not alleged subjective component); see also Hymer v. Kross, No. CV 3:22-1531,

2022 WL 17978265, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2022) (dismissing deliberate indifference

claim based on inmate’s removal from Suboxone program); Guillen v. ICE Health Serv.

Corps, No. C22-5894-DGE-MLP, 2023 WL 2529459, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 1, 2023),

report and recommendation adopted, No. C22-5894-DGE, 2023 WL 2527149 (W.D.

Wash. Mar. 15, 2023) (inmate’s disagreement with decision to terminate Suboxone

treatment was not deliberate indifference). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that

plaintiff has failed to meet the subjective prong of deliberate indifference against

defendants Dr. Beane and Nurse Deem.

Further, to the extent plaintiff seeks to bring a claim against Nurse Deem for

violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), the

act does not provide a private cause of action and plaintiff is thus unable to enforce such

right under § 1983. See Payne v. Taslimi, 998 F.3d 648, 660 (4th Cir. 2021) (“HIPAA

does not expressly allow for a private cause of action but delegates enforcement authority

to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, reflecting Congress's

intent to forgo creating a private remedy.”).

C. Defendant Goff’s Motion to Dismiss.

Finally, the undersigned finds that defendant Goff’s Motion to Dismiss should be

granted for the same reasons as Nurse Deem’s. Goff argues that plaintiff has failed to

make any specific allegations which would establish the subjective component of a

deliberate indifference claim. Similar to Nurse Deem, plaintiff alleges that defendant Goff

is the “on and off again gate keeper to program, sometimes superviser (sic).” [Doc. 1 at

3]. Plaintiff does not allege any facts which would establish the subjective component of

deliberate indifference as to defendant Goff. Further, to the extent plaintiff alleges she is

liable in a supervisory capacity, these claims fail for the same reasons as above—plaintiff

is unable to establish any of the three prongs necessary to establish supervisory liability.

Likewise, for the same reasons as above, plaintiff is unable to bring a separate HIPAA

claim against defendant Goff.

VII. Recommendation

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the pending

Motions to Dismiss [Docs. 20, 24, & 36] be GRANTED and that this case be DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this

Recommendation, any party may file with the Clerk of this Court, specific written

objections, identifying the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which

objection is made, and the basis of such objection. A copy of such objections should

also be submitted to the United States District Judge. Objections shall not exceed ten

(10) typewritten pages or twenty (20) handwritten pages, including exhibits, unless

accompanied by a motion for leave to exceed the page limitations, consistent with LR PL

P 12.

Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver

of de novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the

Circuit Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United

States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).

This Report and Recommendation completes the referral from the district court.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate the Magistrate Judge’s association with this case.

The Clerk of the Court is further DIRECTED to provide copies of this Report and

Recommendation to all counsel of record herein.

DATED: September 20, 2024.

á ]tÅxá cA `tééÉÇx

/

JAMES P. MAZZONE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE