Brown v. Dunn

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JENNIFER BROWN, )

Administratrix for the )

Estate of Larry Brown, )

deceased, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:21cv440-MHT

) (WO)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, Alabama )

Prison Commissioner; )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This case arises out of the tragic death of Larry

Brown. Plaintiff Jennifer Brown, on behalf of decedent

Brown’s estate, seeks to hold three prison officials

liable in their ‘individual capacities’ for decedent’s

death: Jefferson S. Dunn, then the commissioner of the

Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC); Patrice

Jones, an ADOC correctional warden; and David Lamar,

another ADOC correctional warden.1

Plaintiff asserts two counts in her amended

complaint against the officials. In Count 1, she

claims that the three officials failed to protect

decedent from a substantial risk of serious harm, in

violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as

enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. And, in Count 2,

she seeks to hold the three officials liable under

Alabama’s wrongful-death statute, again for their

failure to protect decedent. Jurisdiction is proper

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), § 1343

(civil rights), and § 1367 (supplemental).

Now pending before the court are two motions to

dismiss: one filed by former Commissioner Dunn, and

1. Plaintiff also generally seeks to hold

“unidentified and unnamed guards” liable. Third Am.

Compl. (Doc. 50) ¶ 10. These fictitious defendants

will be addressed in a separate order. Therefore, the

terms defendant and defendants, when used in the

instant order and opinion, refer to only named

defendants Dunn, Jones, and Lamar.

2

another filed by Wardens Jones and Lamar. The three

officials contend that sovereign immunity and qualified

immunity bar plaintiff’s claims. Jones and Lamar also

argue that the amended complaint should be dismissed as

an impermissible shotgun pleading. For the reasons set

forth below, defendants’ dismissal motions will be

denied as to Count 1 and granted as to Count 2.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts alleged in the amended complaint, taken

in the light most favorable to plaintiff, are as

follows.

In 2016, the United States Department of Justice

(DOJ) notified ADOC that it was investigating ADOC’s

male correctional facilities. After a three-year

investigation, DOJ issued a report on the conditions in

the male prisons in April 2019, and a_ supplemental

report in July 2020 further detailing those conditions.

The reports were specifically provided to ADOC

officials.

The 2019 and 2020 DOJ reports alleged that ADOC’s

male correctional facilities suffered from

overcrowding, staffing shortages, and rampant

inmate-on-inmate physical and sexual violence. The

reports further alleged that the available data likely

underestimate the extent of violence in ADOC

facilities, as ADOC lacks a centralized system to track

prisoner homicides across facilities and often

misclassifies prisoner homicides as deaths precipitated

by natural causes. The DOJ’s reports also represent

that there were other patterns of dangerous conditions

across Alabama prisons including: insufficient security

cameras and convex mirrors; lack of adequate

supervision; failure to screen new inmates for

contraband, including weapons, drugs, and cell phones;

failure to control the manufacture and flow of weapons;

failure to respond appropriately to reports of threats;

failure to prevent extortion among prisoners; failure

4

to classify inmates by risk level and house them

accordingly; failure to prevent uncontrolled movement

of prisoners; failure to fix broken and defective

locks; and failure to provide adequate programming.

Among the facilities investigated by DOJ was the

Bullock Correctional Facility, where decedent Brown was

incarcerated and where Jones and Lamar were wardens.

At the time of decedent’s death, Dunn was ADOC’s

highest policymaking official and had responsibility

over the day-to-day operations at all Alabama prisons,

including Bullock. In this capacity, Dunn received and

reviewed incident reports describing inmate-on-inmate

homicides.

Around the time of DOJ’s investigation, Bullock was

a medium-security facility designed to accommodate 919

inmates; had a staff vacancy rate of 60.1 %; and was

operating at an occupancy rate of 140 %. At least five

incidents of serious inmate-on-inmate violence were

reported at Bullock in the years leading up to

5

decedent’s death: a sexual and physical assault in

January 2018, a homicide in February 2018, a stabbing

in April 2018, a homicide in June 2020, and another

homicide in November 2020. In at least two of those

incidents, the victims previously reported that they

were afraid they would be attacked by other inmates.

Furthermore, due to ineffective classification and

pervasive misclassification of inmates, the prison

routinely failed to separate violent prisoners from

non-violent prisoners. Instead, officers at Bullock

routinely placed inmates with histories of violence in

“restricted housing” alongside other inmates, without

those histories, including decedent.

In January 2021, decedent started receiving death

threats from eight inmates (Charles David, Charles

Andersen, Carlos Jackson, Edward Bowman, Marcus

Washington, Marcus Jackson, “D.J.,” and “Roach”), some

or all of whom had histories of violence. Both

decedent and other inmates notified several guards of

6

concerns over decedent’s safety due to the threats from

the eight inmates named, but the guards did not take

any protective action. Three months later, in April

2021, one or more of those eight inmates physically

assaulted decedent, and he died from injuries sustained

during the attack.

II. DISCUSSION

A.Motion-to-Dismiss Standard

Defendants bring motions to dismiss under Subpart

(b) (1) of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and

under Subpart (b) (6) of that rule for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can □□ granted. In

considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts

plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, see Hishon v.

King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and construes

the complaint in plaintiff’s favor, see Duke v.

Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993).

B.Count 1: Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim

As previously explained, in Count 1 plaintiff

asserts an Eighth Amendment claim against each of the

three defendants in their individual capacities. In

response, defendants argue that the count should be

dismissed pursuant to subparts (b)(1) and (b)(6) of

Rule 12 because they are entitled to sovereign and

qualified immunities.

1.Defendants’ Sovereign Immunity Defense

The court begins with defendants’ assertion that

they are entitled to sovereign immunity under. the

Eleventh Amendment and Alabama law. In essence, they

contend that the federal claim in Count 1 is, in

actuality, an impermissible claim against the State of

Alabama itself.

“[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action

against a State in federal court,” including “when

State officials are sued for damages in their official

capacity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169

(1985). However, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not

extend to individual-capacity suits against state

officials under § 1983, see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21,

30-31 (1991); it only applies when the State is the

true party in interest, see id. The State is

considered the true party in interest only if “the

relief sought against the nominal defendant would in

fact operate against the state, especially by imposing

liability damages that must be paid out of the public

[treasury].” Jackson v. Georgia Dep’t of Transp., 16

F.3d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1994). In other words,

“Eleventh Amendment immunity applies only if the

judgment must, under all circumstances, be paid out of

state funds.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Defendants do not represent that Alabama would be

obligated to cover the costs of a judgment against them

in their individual capacities. Because plaintiff

9

seeks damages against them personally and not from the

state coffers, the Eleventh Amendment presents no bar

to relief.

Alabama state-law sovereign immunity also does not

bar plaintiff’s ability to obtain relief. As an

Alabama state court has correctly recognized, such

immunity does not apply to federal claims like the one

asserted here. See King v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc.,

919 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005).2

2. Defendants also contend that, because plaintiff

can obtain damages otherwise barred by sovereign

immunity by bringing her claim before the Alabama Board

of Adjustment, sovereign immunity should bar her from

recovering damages by suing the officials in their

individual capacity. Defendants are mistaken. For

one, this argument just begs the question of whether

defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity in the

first place, and, as already stated, they are not. See

Barefield v. Dunn, 688 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1060

(M.D. Ala. 2023) (Watkins, J.). Moreover, the

existence of an alternative state forum does not

entitle defendants to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), overruled on

other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City

of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

10

2.Defendants’ Qualified Immunity Defense

Having determined that defendants are not entitled

to sovereign immunity from the federal claim in Count

1, this court turns to whether they are entitled to

qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity “protects government officials

‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982)). Once officials establish that they were

acting within their discretionary authority, which is

uncontested here, the court engages in two distinct

inquiries to determine if qualified immunity applies:

(1) whether the plaintiff’s allegations “make out a

violation of a constitutional right,” and (2) whether

“the right at issue was clearly established at the time

of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. at 232

11

(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).

There are three ways a plaintiff may demonstrate

the law was clearly established. See Sebastian v.

Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2019). First,

the plaintiff can “show that a materially similar case

has already been decided.” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929

F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019). Second, the

plaintiff can point to broad statements of legal

principles that apply with “obvious clarity to the

circumstances.” Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1240

(11th Cir. 2021). Third, the plaintiff can prove that

the conduct was “so egregious that a constitutional

right was clearly violated, even in the total absence

of case law.” Id. Over the years, materially similar

cases and broad statements of legal principles have

created a foundation of relevant clearly established

Eighth Amendment law.

a. Plaintiff Has Asserted Clearly Established

Eighth Amendment Law in Count 1. The Constitution does

12

not permit prison officials to turn a blind eye to

violence to inmate-on-inmate violence. Rather, it

mandates that officials “protect prisoners from

violence inflicted upon them by other prisoners.”

Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298

(11th Cir. 2014). However, not “every injury suffered

by one prisoner at the hands of another ... translates

into constitutional liability for prison officials

responsible for the victim’s safety.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

Consequently, to establish that a prison official

violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against

cruel and unusual punishment, a plaintiff must prove

that the official was deliberately indifferent “to a

substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate who

suffers injury.” Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307

(11th Cir. 2016). To do so, “a plaintiff must show

‘(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the

defendants’ deliberate indifference to that risk; and

13

(3) causation.’” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227,

1233 (11th Cir. 2019). Deliberate indifference “has

both a subjective and an objective component.” Id.

Subjectively, the official must be aware that his own

conduct “put the plaintiff at substantial risk of

serious harm.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1258

(11th Cir. 2024) (en banc). “Objectively, the official

must have responded to the known risk in an

unreasonable manner, in that he or she ‘knew of ways to

reduce the harm’ but knowingly or recklessly declined

to act.” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Rodriguez

v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 620

(11th Cir. 2007).

As plaintiff’s claim here relies on supervisory

liability, proving it becomes a bit more complicated.

Section 1983, which is the basis for plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim, does not make supervisors

automatically liable for their subordinates’ actions.

See Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360

14

(11th Cir. 2003). “Instead, supervisory liability

under § 1983 occurs either when the supervisor

personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional

conduct or when there is a causal connection between

the actions of a supervising official and the alleged

constitutional deprivation.” Id.

A plaintiff may establish supervisory liability for

a § 1983 Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim in

at least three ways.

First, a plaintiff may demonstrate that ”the

supervisor directed subordinates to act unlawfully or

knew that subordinates would act unlawfully and failed

to stop them from doing so.” Id. In this case,

plaintiff has not alleged that defendants directed

their subordinates to act unlawfully or failed to stop

subordinates that defendants knew would act unlawfully.

Second, a plaintiff may demonstrate that “a

‘history of widespread abuse’ put[] the responsible

supervisor on notice of the need to correct” the

15

asserted constitutional violation and that the

supervisor failed to correct said violation. Valdes v.

Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2006). Usually,

to plead an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must

establish that an official was deliberately indifferent

to a specific threat the victim faced. Yet, in some

cases officials may be liable for their deliberate

indifference to “a generalized risk of violence” or

history of widespread abuse. See Marbury, 936 F.3d at

1235.

Generally, to establish liability for

history-of-widespread-abuse claim (also known as a

generalized-risk-of-violence claim), a plaintiff must

point “to specific features of a facility or its

population” that render it particularly violent. Id.

In other words, that those particular features “present

an objectively substantial risk of serious harm.”

Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1029

(11th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Next, the plaintiff must

16

show that an official was deliberately indifferent.

See id. Then, the plaintiff must explain how that

official’s deliberate indifference to those features

caused the injury at issue. See id. Here, as

explained in more detail later, plaintiff has

adequately pled a generalized-risk-of-violence claim.

Third, a plaintiff may show “a supervisor’s custom

or policy results in deliberate indifference to

constitutional rights.” Id. In the amended complaint

here, plaintiff asserts that defendants’ customs or

policies were deliberately indifferent to decedent’s

constitutional rights. See, e.g., Third Am. Compl.

(Doc. 50) ¶¶ 95, 118. However, as plaintiff has

already adequately pled a generalized-risk-of-violence

claim, the court need not decide whether her assertions

would establish a custom or policy claim.

b. Plaintiff Has Adequately Pled in Count 1 that

Decedent’s Clearly Established Constitutional Right Was

17

Violated. Reading the amended complaint in the light

most favorable to her, the court concludes that

plaintiff has sufficiently asserted a

generalized-risk-of-violence claim.

First, plaintiff alleges that decedent Brown faced

a substantial risk of serious harm. She begins by

asserting ADOC’s male prisons had a history of

widespread abuse. As set forth in the preceding

background, she alleges that all of the facilities

suffered from: overcrowding; staffing shortages;

inadequate supervision; a failure to classify inmates

by risk level and house them accordingly; the

proliferation of contraband (including weapons, drugs,

and cell phones); insufficient security equipment; and

broken or defective locks. She asserts that, because

of these conditions, there was rampant inmate-on-inmate

physical and sexual violence across ADOC’s male

prisons. For example, in the fiscal-year prior to

decedent’s death, there were over 1,100

18

inmate-on-inmate assaults and at least 16 prisoners

were killed by other prisoners.

Plaintiff further alleges that Bullock was part of

this widespread abuse, and points to a variety of

features that rendered the facility particularly

violent. She describes how Bullock was physically

deteriorating, as it had broken and defective locks,

which allowed prisoners to often roam freely, and

insufficient or broken security cameras and convex

mirrors, which prevented guards from monitoring

prisoners. She also contends that, even if Bullock was

not deteriorating, guards would have been powerless to

stop inmate misconduct, for over half (60.1 %) of the

staff positions at Bullock were vacant, while at the

same time, it was overcrowded with inmates at an

occupancy rate of 140 %; and that lopsided ratio left

too few guards to watch over too many prisoners.

Plaintiff submits that reckless and poorly

implemented policies at Bullock exacerbated the danger.

19

Due to pervasive misclassification many inmates with

histories of serious violence were not housed

separately. And even if they had been properly

classified, it would not have made much difference, as

Bullock housed everyone in general population together

and everyone in restrictive housing together, rather

than separating “nonviolent inmates from violent

inmates.” Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1029.

In her amended complaint, plaintiff explains how

the asserted facility deterioration, staffing

shortages, overpopulation, inadequate treatment, and

reckless policies at Bullock rendered it especially

dangerous. Guards failed to screen new inmates for

contraband, and as a result the facility was flooded

with, weapons, drugs, and cell phones. Those weapons

and drugs not imported would be manufactured at Bullock

by prisoners inadequately supervised by short-staffed

guards equipped with insufficient security cameras and

convex mirrors. Guards then failed to control the flow

20

of those weapons, drugs, and cell phones, which readily

made their way through doors secured with broken and

defective locks, and into the hands of other prisoners.

The amended complaint represents that the

conditions at Bullock did not just create a substantial

risk of serious harm, they actually caused serious

harm. Inmates used cell phones to extort other inmates

and their families. Sexual and physical violence was

commonplace, often involving the use of prevalent

weapons. The complaint also provides two examples of

homicides that occurred in the ten months leading to

decedent’s death. Moreover, plaintiff contends that

the actual number of homicides during that time may be

much higher, as Bullock routinely misclassifies

prisoner deaths. This misclassification problem is in

turn made worse by ADOC’s lack of a centralized

classification system for reporting prisoner deaths.

For example, it is alleged that one of the two

previously referenced homicides was unreported.

21

According to the amended complaint, the many

alleged incidents of inmate-on-inmate violence that did

not result in death, also faced reporting problems. As

previously explained, in the fiscal-year prior to

decedent Brown’s death, there were over 1,100

inmate-on-inmate assaults in ADOC male prisons. What

proportion of those assaults occurred at Bullock, the

month-to-month breakdown of those assaults, and whether

there are many other unreported assaults is unclear, in

part, because of ADOC’s own actions. In particular,

ADOC curbed public reporting of serious

inmate-on-inmate violence in the months after DOJ

issued its first report. Moreover, ADOC does not have

a grievance system to report when guards improperly

respond to incidents or threats of inmate-on-inmate

violence, which also makes proper reporting difficult.

Plaintiff asserts that staff at Bullock would fail

to respond to these dangers. For example, she alleges

that a few years before decedents’ death, a third

22

prisoner was killed at Bullock, who just one day prior

“expressed concern for his safety to prison officials.”

Third Am. Compl. (Doc. 50) ¶54. She also represents

that staff at Bullock did not intervene at a different

time when they were told a prisoner was “‘kidnapped’ by

other prisoners and forcibly held ... for multiple days

while [the] prisoner-captors extorted the

hostage-prisoner’s family and friends.” Id. ¶¶56-57.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

repeatedly found that features, like those plaintiff

asserts occurred at Bullock, pose a substantial risk of

serious harm. In Marsh v. Butler County, Alabama, the

appellate court found that a jail that was overcrowded,

failed to segregate violent inmates from non-violent

inmates, failed to control the flow of weapons, and had

inadequate supervision and defective locks, all posed

an “objectively substantial risk of serious harm.” 268

F.3d at 1029. The appellate court concluded the same

in Hale v. Tallapoosa County, for a jail that was

23

overcrowded, failed to classify and separate violent

inmates, and inadequately supervised inmates. See 50

F.3d 1579, 1583 (11th Cir. 1995). And more recently,

in Dickinson v. Cochran, the Eleventh Circuit concluded

that a facility that “routinely housed dangerous

inmates in crowded conditions with non-violent inmates,

allowed the introduction of contraband by improperly

searching inmates, and inadequately supervised inmates”

posed a substantial risk of serious harm. 833 F. App’x

268, 272 (11th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).3

Second, plaintiff has adequately pled that

defendants were deliberately indifferent to this

substantial risk of serious harm. Defendants were

subjectively aware that their conduct posed a

substantial risk of serious harm to decedent Brown.

According to the amended complaint, defendants were

3. While as an unpublished case Dickinson cannot be

relied upon to define clearly established law,” J W by

& through Tammy Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ.,

904 F.3d 1248, 1260 (11th Cir. 2018), it is still

persuasive for demonstrating how a court might apply

law already clearly established.

24

notified of the history of widespread abuse at Bullock

by the DOJ reports, both of which were sent to the

officials. See Dickinson, 833 F. App’x at 270-73

(involving notice through a letter sent by DOJ); Marsh,

268 F.3d at 1029 (involving notice given, in part,

through reports on jail conditions and lawsuits). The

DOJ reports provided illustrative (but not exhaustive)

examples of inmate-on-inmate violence and inmate access

to contraband at Bullock. The reports also detailed

patterns of facility deterioration, staffing issues,

overcrowding, violence, and dangerous policies, across

all the prisons investigated. As Bullock was one of

the prisons investigated and discussed by the DOJ, the

report provided notice of the conditions at Bullock.

See Dickinson, 833 F. App’x at 270-73.

Plaintiff has demonstrated that defendants’

responses were objectively unreasonable, as they

knowingly or recklessly failed to remedy the conditions

at Bullock. The amended complaint asserts that Dunn,

25

as ADOC’s highest policymaking official, and Jones and

Lamar, as wardens at Bullock, were responsible for the

conditions. Yet, according to the complaint, in the

two years following DOJ’s first report until decedent

was killed, defendants knew about the widespread abuse

at Bullock and failed to correct it.

Plaintiff contends that defendants failed to take

any action in response, and she offered many possible

actions they could have taken to remedy the conditions

at Bullock. For example, changing the classification

and housing policies; remedying the staffing shortages

and overcrowding; fixing the broken, defective, or

inadequate locks, mirrors, and cameras; and

establishing a grievance system to report when guards

improperly respond to incidents or threats of

inmate-on-inmate. Plaintiff’s assertions, taken as

true and in the light most favorable to her, would

reflect that defendants were deliberately indifferent.

See, e.g., Hale, 50 F.3d at 1584-85 (finding sheriff’s

26

“failure to take meaningful action” to address

overcrowding, inadequate supervision by guards, and

violence among constituted deliberate indifference);

id. at 1583-84 (stating sheriff’s failure to pursue

reasonable measures such as “classifying and

segregating the inmates based on their likelihood for

violence” was deliberately indifferent).

Finally, plaintiff has shown how defendants’

deliberate indifference to the specific features at

Bullock caused the decedent’s death. Plaintiff asserts

that decedent Brown was yet another victim of

widespread abuse at Bullock. Decedent was housed at

Bullock in restrictive housing. Plaintiff submits that

pursuant to the previously discussed policies, rather

than being housed separately, eight inmates with

histories of violence were housed alongside decedent.

In January 2021, those eight individuals threatened to

kill decedent. Fearful for his life, decedent told the

guards at Bullock about the death threats, and in doing

27

so he named the eight individuals responsible. The

under-staffed and under-equipped guards did nothing in

response. According to the amended complaint, for the

next three months, decedent (and later other concerned

inmates as well) continued to seek help from the guards

at Bullock. The complaint states that help never came,

and, as a result, in April 2021, decedent was attacked

by the eight inmates. He died the following month from

injuries caused by the attack.

Plaintiff alleges that, because of Bullock’s

improper classification policies, the eight inmates who

threatened and attacked decedent, were not properly

separated, and thus put in a position where they could

attack decedent Brown. Inadequate staffing,

overcrowding, defective locks, and insufficient or

broken security cameras and convex mirrors made it

particularly easy for those inmates to harm decedent,

as guards were ill equipped to respond to any threats.

And defendants’ failure to implement a centralized

28

grievance system for improper responses to threats of

violence made it harder to report the guards’ failure

to respond to the threats against decedent.

Nevertheless, defendants make several arguments for

why plaintiff’s allegations do not amount to a

violation of clearly established law. Defendants begin

by contending that plaintiff has not pointed to any

specific features of Bullock that render it

particularly violent. Defendants argue that plaintiff

has made only “allegations of generalized violence

spread out across all of ADOC’s major male facilities

over a number of years.” Jones and Lamar Br. Supp.

Mot. Dismiss (Doc. 54), at 8 (emphasis omitted).

While defendants are correct that plaintiff makes

generalized allegations of violence across ADOC

facilities, they misunderstand the function of those

allegations. Plaintiff’s systemic allegations are

circumstantial background evidence of defendants’

deliberate indifference to the conditions at Bullock.

29

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 843 n.8. Moreover, as

Bullock is one of the prisons that DOJ investigated and

discussed as part of the patterns outlined in its

report, these assertions, taken in the light most

favorable to plaintiff, are assertions of the

conditions at Bullock. Furthermore, and contrary to

defendants’ contention, in addition to her systemic

allegations plaintiff made specific allegations about

the conditions at Bullock and the circumstances of

decedent Brown’s death.

Next, to argue that they did not violate clearly

established law, defendants point to several Eleventh

Circuit cases involving inmate-on-inmate violence,

where the plaintiff did not meet the

generalized-risk-of-violence standard. Defendants

chiefly rely on Marbury v. Warden, which involved a

plaintiff who repeatedly asked to be transferred

because he feared for his safety. See 936 F.3d at

1231. In his letters to the warden seeking a transfer,

30

plaintiff mentioned witnessing 15 stabbings in his cell

block. See id. at 1231-32. After two months of being

repeatedly denied a transfer, plaintiff was stabbed by

another inmate. Id. Plaintiff sued the warden,

asserting the warden had been put on notice of a

history of widespread abuse (the 15 stabbings) and that

the warden’s deliberate indifference to those stabbings

caused plaintiff to be stabbed. See id. at 1234-35.

The Eleventh Circuit stated that the 15 stabbings,

standing alone, were not sufficient to demonstrate the

prison was one “where violence and terror reign.” Id.

at 1234. Defendants in this case correspondingly argue

that because plaintiff gives only a few examples of

violence at Bullock, she has not demonstrated that the

facility was one where violence and terror reign.

Defendants misunderstand Marbury. Marbury does not

establish that to prove a generalized-risk-of-violence

claim, violence must be so commonplace that violence

and terror reign. Rather, Marbury’s

31

violence-and-terror standard only “applies where a

plaintiff alleges only a generalized risk and points to

no ‘specific features of a facility or its population

rendering it particularly violent.’” Dickinson, 833 F.

App’x at 275 (discussing Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1235).

Marbury merely suggests that evidence of a reign of

violence and terror would be one way to establish

deliberate indifference; it is does not say it is the

only way. When a plaintiff points to “specific

features of [a facility] that render it particularly

violent,” id., and thus “has alleged more than a

generalized risk of violence,” id., the plaintiff does

not need to prove a reign of terror and violence. See

id.; see also Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1034 (finding that

because of the dangerous conditions at the facility,

defendant was deliberately indifferent even though “no

serious injury was alleged to have [previously]

occurred”). In such cases, the specific features help

explain how a defendant’s deliberate indifference

32

caused the injury.

Furthermore, defendants argue that other inmates,

not defendants, proximately caused decedent death.

Under Alabama law--which defines proximate cause in

this case--the touchstone of proximate cause is whether

the injury was a foreseeable consequence of defendants’

actions. See Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1389

(11th Cir. 1982); see also Alabama Power Co. v. Taylor,

306 So. 2d 236, 249 (Ala. 1975). But, contrary to

defendants’ assertion proximate cause does not require

a defendant’s conduct to be the “sole cause” of

plaintiff’s injury, see Bennett, 689 F.2d at 1389. At

bottom, what matters is foreseeability, not

exclusivity.

Here, showing that defendants caused decedent’s

death requires plaintiff to prove two layers of

causation: (1) that the prison conditions caused

decedent’s death and (2) that defendants caused those

prison conditions. See id. at 1384-85. By meeting the

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standard for a supervisory-liability Eighth Amendment

claim, plaintiff has established proximate causation on

both layers. See LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526,

1538-39 (11th Cir. 1993). In essence, finding that the

conditions at Bullock violated the Eighth Amendment and

that decedent was subject to those conditions,

“presupposes the distinct likelihood” of decedent’s

injury. Id. at 1538. And demonstrating the causal

link required for supervisory liability establishes

that defendants proximately caused the conditions. See

id.

Moreover, Jones and Lamar--but not Dunn--submit

that previous caselaw is inapposite because it involves

county jails rather than prisons. They contend that

prisons are different from jails because prisons often

house more dangerous individuals. Yet, whether a

facility is labeled a prison or jail is not

determinative of the risk posed by population housed

within. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 n.28-29

34

(1979). A prison can be filled with tax offenders,

while the jail next door is housing recently convicted

mass murderers awaiting transfer to a maximum-security

prison. Consequently, the focus is properly on whether

the conditions at a specific facility meet the

requirements imposed by the Eighth Amendment, not

whether a facility is of a certain type. See Marbury,

936 F.3d at 1235. Compare LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1536-37

(finding that the conditions at a prison violated the

Eighth Amendment), with Hale, 50 F.3d at 1584-85

(relying on LaMarca to find that the conditions at a

jail violated the Eighth Amendment).

Jones and Lamar also contend that previous cases

(Marsh, Hale, and Dickinson) are distinguishable

because they involved a “total failure to classify and

segregate violent and non-violent detainees,” rather

than an ineffective classification scheme or routine

misclassification. Jones and Lamar Br. Supp. Mot.

Dismiss (Doc. 54), at 10 n.4 (emphasis in original).

35

This argument misunderstands the proper inquiry under

the Eighth Amendment. The inquiry is not whether a

classification scheme existed or not, but whether a

particular classification scheme posed a substantial

risk of serious harm to which defendants were

deliberately indifferent. See Dickinson, 833 F. App’x

at 269 (finding deliberate indifference when certain

violent inmates were misclassified). And as already

discussed, plaintiff has adequately pled such.

Dunn--but not Jones and Lamar--makes one final

argument. Dunn argues that plaintiff has not cited to

any case that proves a “statewide commissioner

individually violates the Constitution every time any

inmate in any correctional facility in the state

assaults another inmate.” Dunn Reply Br. (Doc. 63), at

5. But plaintiff is not asserting that a statewide

commissioner is automatically liable for every act of

inmate-on-inmate violence; rather, she is asserting

that when a statewide commissioner’s conduct violates

36

clearly established Eighth Amendment standards and

satisfies the high bar for § 1983 #£=supervisory

liability, that commissioner is not entitled _ to

qualified immunity. See generally Williams v. Bennett,

689 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1982) (while the law before

the court was somewhat different, this 1982 case

provides a helpful discussion of when corrections

officials at the highest level can be held liable in

the individual capacities on an Eighth Amendment

generalized-risk-of-violence claim).

Ultimately, when viewed in the light most favorable

to her, plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to

establish that defendants violated decedent’s clearly

established Eighth Amendment right.

C.Count 2: Plaintiff’s Wrongful-Death Claim

The court now turns to Count 2, in which plaintiff

claims that defendants violated Alabama’s

wrongful-death statute. Under the

37

traditional-common-law rule, an injured party’s

personal tort claims abate upon their death. See

Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589 (1978). In

other words, there is no survivorship under the

traditional-common-law rule. See id. Unsatisfied with

that harsh rule, Alabama passed a wrongful-death

statute, which permits survivorship when a decedent’s

death is caused by “the wrongful act, omission, or

negligence of any person, persons, or corporation,”

Ala. Code § 6-5-410(a). See Simmons v. Pulmosan Safety

Equip. Corp., Inc., 471 F. Supp. 999, 1001

(S.D. Ala. 1979) (Thomas., J.). Here, plaintiff

contends that defendants’ Eighth Amendment violation

was a wrongful act or omission that caused decedent’s

death. While plaintiff asserts Count 2 as a separate

count from Count 1, Count 2 is redundant, for it just

reasserts the claim in Count 1.

To understand why Count 2 is redundant, it helps to

provide some explanation as to why plaintiff may assert

38

Count 1, her § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim. The

Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[b]y its terms, 42

U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide for the survival of

civil rights actions.” Est. of Gilliam ex rel. Waldroup

v. City of Prattville, 639 F.3d 1041, 1045

(11th Cir. 2011). “Due to this ‘deficiency’ in the

statute, the survivorship of civil rights actions is

governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).” Id. Section 1988(a),

“generally directs that, where federal law is

‘deficient,’ the state law of the forum applies,” so

long as said law is not inconsistent with federal law.

Id.

Generally, “the applicable Alabama survivorship law

is Ala. Code § 6-5-462,” which requires that a

decedent’s unfiled tort claims abate upon their death.

Id. at 1046 (cleaned up). If this survivorship statute

were to apply, then decedent Brown’s Eighth Amendment

claim would not survive his death. See id.

However, “when a constitutional violation actually

39

causes the injured party’s death, a § 1983 claim can be

asserted through the Alabama wrongful-death statute,

Ala. Code § 6-5-410.” Id. at 1047 (cleaned up). To

permit otherwise would allow a state actor to “escape

§ 1983 liability by killing off the victim,” thereby

undermining the “deterrent purposes of the statute.”

Id. at 1048 n.10.

Here, as already discussed, defendants’

constitutional violation allegedly proximately caused

decedent’s death; therefore plaintiff may use Alabama’s

wrongful-death statute to resolve the deficiency and

resurrect decedent’s § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim.

See id. at 1047-48, 1047 n.9. In essence, she can

claim that defendants’ Eighth Amendment violation

(Count 1), also violates the wrongful-death statute

(Count 2), which contains a survivorship provision

incorporated through § 1988(a), allowing plaintiff to

assert decedent’s § 1983 claim (Count 1). As

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is based on a violation of the

40

wrongful-death statute, Count 2 is just repeating the

claim in Count 1.‘ Accordingly, Count 2 will be

dismissed, albeit without prejudice, as redundant.

D.Jones and Lamar’s Shotgun-Pleading Assertion

Jones and Lamar--but not Dunn--contend that the

complaint should be dismissed because it iS an

impermissible “shotgun pleading,” in violation of

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) (2) and 10(b). A

complaint is a “shotgun pleading” when it presents

claims in a manner where a defendant cannot “discern

what [the plaintiff] is claiming and frame a responsive

pleading.” T.D.S. Ince. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760

F.2d 1520, 1544 n.14 (11th Cir. 1985). At bottom, the

complaint “must give the defendants adequate notice of

the claims against them and the grounds upon which each

4. Defendants also argue Count 2 is barred by § 14

immunity and state-agent immunity, but as this section

explains, Count 2 just repeats Count 1. And for the

reasons already explained, § 14 immunity and

state-agent immunity do not apply to Count 1.

Al

claim rests.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s

Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015).

The Eleventh Circuit has identified, at least, four

categories of shotgun pleadings: first, “a complaint

containing multiple counts where each count adopts the

allegations of all preceding counts, causing each

successive count to carry all that came before and the

last count to be a combination of the entire

complaint,” id. at 1321; second, “a

complaint ... replete with conclusory, vague, and

immaterial facts not obviously connected to any

particular cause of action,” id. at 1322; third, a

complaint that fails to separate “each cause of action

or claim for relief” into a different count, id. at

1323; and, fourth, a complaint that asserts “multiple

claims against multiple defendants without specifying

which of the defendants are responsible for which acts

or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is

brought against,” id. Wardens Jones and Lamar assert

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that plaintiff’s complaint falls into the first,

second, and fourth categories.5

Jones and Lamar begin by contending that the

complaint falls into the first category of shotgun

pleading because “each of the two counts rely on

exactly the same allegations.” Jones and Lamar Br.

Supp. Mot. Dismiss (Doc. 54), at 4. This argument

misunderstands the first category, which is not just

about repeating the same allegations; rather, it is

about situations where both the general factual

allegations and irrelevant allegations of each of the

preceding counts are incorporated. See Weiland, 792

5. Jones and Lamar are inconsistent as to which

category or categories of shotgun pleading the

complaint falls into. They initially assert that only

one category applies, then they assert three apply, and

finally (in their reply brief) they assert--without

explanation--that all four apply. See Jones and Lamar

Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (Doc. 54), at 3 n.2; id. at 3-4;

Jones and Lamar Reply Br. (Doc. 64), at 2. As arguments

are made only with respect to the first, second, and

fourth categories, the court will discuss only whether

those categories are met. Regardless, the complaint

does not fall into the third category of shotgun

pleading.

43

F.3d at 1324. In essence, the first category is

attempting to address an issue where defendants would

have “difficulty knowing what they were alleged to have

done and why they were liable for doing it” because by

incorporating all the preceding allegations plaintiff

would also incorporate irrelevant or immaterial

allegations. Id. Such a concern is inapplicable to the

present case, because, as previously discussed, the

reason plaintiff repeats the allegations is that she is

repeating the same claim in two separate counts. Thus,

while Count 2 is due to be dismissed as redundant, this

complaint is not the type meant to be covered by the

first category of shotgun pleading as the assertions

made are relevant to both counts.

As stated, Jones and Lamar further contend that the

complaint fits into the second category of shotgun

pleading. As previously stated, this category involves

“a complaint ... replete with conclusory, vague, and

immaterial facts not obviously connected to any

44

particular cause of action.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at

1322. The wardens argue that many of the complaint’s

assertions are either vague and conclusory or not

specific to the Bullock facility or decedent’s death.

On the contrary, as explained above, the facts asserted

in the complaint are concrete, detailed, and material

to plaintiff’s claims. While the complaint begins by

outlining a history of alleged defects across all of

ADOC’s male prisons (which of course includes Bullock),

it then goes on to discuss the specific conditions at

Bullock, and the circumstances of decedent’s death.

And, as already explained, both the systemic

allegations and the allegations specific to Bullock and

decedent Brown’s death help explain why defendants were

deliberately indifferent. Both are necessary to

explain Dunn’s alleged liability for decedent’s death

at Bullock, and the systemic allegations are needed as

background to the Bullock allegations to explain the

wardens’ alleged liability.

45

Finally, as stated, Jones and Lamar assert that

plaintiff’s complaint belongs in the fourth category.

This category refers to complaints that assert

“multiple claims against multiple defendants without

specifying” who did what or who each claim is brought

against. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. Jones and Lamar

contend that, after page 3, the complaint does not

distinguish between the defendants, and instead only

refers to Dunn, Jones, and Lamar as “Defendants” or

names all three “in trio.” Jones and Lamar Br. Supp.

Mot. Dismiss (Doc. 54), at 4. This argument

misconstrues the fourth category, which refers to cases

where no specific defendants are named, not where all

the defendants are explicitly named and, as explained

above, the all allegations go to all defendants. At

bottom, this contention is a factual dispute dressed up

as a procedural one. In essence, Jones and Lamar are

arguing that all three defendants did not have the same

knowledge or take the same actions. But that goes to

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the complaint’s substance, not its form.

Comprehension, not perfection, is the standard of

the pleading rules. And, in this case, plaintiff’s

complaint is sufficiently comprehensible so as not to

be a shotgun pleading.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to

dismiss will be denied as to Count 1 and granted as to

Count 2. The court emphasizes that it has relied on

only allegations in the third amended complaint.

Whether the evidence actually supports those

allegations is not before the court at this time.

Moreover, because discovery has not yet begun, whether

the evidence supports the conclusion that defendants

were deliberately indifferent is also not before the

court at this time.

***

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

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(1) Defendant Jefferson Dunn’s motion to dismiss

(Doc. 51) and defendants Patrice Jones and David

Lamar’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 53) are denied as to

Count 1.

(2) Said motions are granted as to Count 2, and

said count is dismissed without prejudice.

DONE, this the 19th day of December, 2024.

/s/ Myron H. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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