The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
Wheeling
AARON JIMMIE URBAN,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 5:24-CV-153
Judge Bailey
PAT RYAN, CEO Sharpe’s Hospital,
SHEREE T. GRUBER, APRN-CNP, ACHUTA
R. AYNAMPUDI, MD, and RICK DEMPSEY,
Mental Health Ombudsman,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Background
Pending before this Court are several motions: plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for
Restraining Order [Doc. 14], filed September 6, 2024; plaintiff’s letter, which the Court
construes as a Motion to Amend Complaint [Doc. 41], filed October 15, 2024; Defendant
Pat Ryan’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 42], filed October 21, 2024; defendants Aynampudi
and Gruber’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint [Doc. 43], filed October 22, 2024;
Defendant Rick Dempsey’s Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of Answer [Doc. 47], filed October
23, 2024; and plaintiff’s Objection to Defendants Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 55], which the
Court construes as a Motion for a Hearing, filed November 4, 2024. This matter is
assigned to the Honorable John Preston Bailey, United States District Judge, and it is
referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for submission of proposed
findings and recommendation for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For
the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that the Motion for Restraining
Order be denied, the Motion to Amend Complaint be denied as moot, the Motions to
Dismiss be granted, and that plaintiff’s Motion for a Hearing be denied as moot.
II. The Complaint
Plaintiff’s Complaint raises five claims based on alleged treatment at William R.
Sharpe, Jr. Hospital (“Sharpe Hospital”). First, plaintiff claims he is subject to cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because defendant Gruber has
allowed staff to confine him and verbally and physically harass him. Second, that
defendants have unlawfully deprived him of writing materials while he attempted to file
court documents. Third, that he has been denied access to a law library. Fourth, that
defendants are retaliating against him for filing grievances. And, fifth, that defendants are
making up false allegations that he is threatening to rape female staff. For relief, plaintiff
asks the Court that he be discharged or transferred from Sharpe Hospital and awarded
damages for each day he has been at the facility.
On September 3, 2024, plaintiff filed an “amended complaint,” [Doc. 10-1], in which
he seeks to add additional claims that defendants Ryan and Dempsey conspired to
deprive him of his rights, in particular by conspiring in the handling of his filed grievances.
III. Pending Motions
The parties have filed several motions currently pending before this Court. First,
plaintiff has filed a Motion for an Emergency Restraining Order [Doc. 14]. Plaintiff alleges
that after learning of this lawsuit, defendants made comments to plaintiff that they would
ensure he would be deemed incompetent and would force medication on him; plaintiff
alleges that defendants are seeking to obstruct his ability to do legal research. Although
plaintiff does not specify what relief he seeks, construing the pro se motion liberally, it
appears plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction preventing defendants from forcing
medication on or otherwise retaliating against plaintiff.
On October 8, 2024, the defendants filed a response in opposition to the Motion.
[Doc. 38]. In their response, defendants provide some background to plaintiff’s claims.
As set forth in their response and accompanying attachments, plaintiff is a defendant in
Kanawha County Circuit Court in case number 2023-F-139, facing charges for first degree
robbery; use of a firearm, to-wit: a shotgun, in the commission of a felony; fleeing with
reckless indifference to the safety of others; child neglect creating substantial risk of
serious bodily injury or death; grand larceny; and a misdemeanor offense of prohibited
person in possession of a firearm. In the course of his criminal case in the circuit court,
plaintiff’s statements made to the court raised questions concerning his competency.
Accordingly, the circuit court entered an order directing plaintiff to undergo a
psychological evaluation to determine competency. After determining he was not
currently competent to stand trial, the court entered an order committing him to Sharpe
Hospital for competency restoration services. See [Doc. 38-7]. As summarized by
defendants, “[s]ince his admission, Plaintiff has essentially refused to participate in the
restoration treatment plan.” [Doc. 38 at 4].
Further, on September 19, 2024, after the instant case had been filed, the
Kanawha County Circuit Court held a hearing on plaintiff’s ongoing competency
restoration and determined that the involuntary administration of medication was within
plaintiff’s best interests and necessary to restore plaintiff to competency to stand trial.
See [Docs. 38 at 5, 38-12].
In their response in opposition to plaintiff’s Motion for an Emergency Restraining
Order, defendants argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s claims and
that, whilst styled as a Complaint pursuant to § 1983, plaintiff is essentially asking this
Court to act as an appellate court to review the state court’s decision. Defendants argue
that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
and that, even if this Court has jurisdiction, Younger abstention requires this Court
abstain from exercising such jurisdiction. Defendants further argue that plaintiff has failed
to meet the burden for issuance of a restraining order as set forth in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65.
On October 15, 2024, plaintiff filed a letter, which the Court construes as a Motion
to Amend. [Doc. 41]. In the Motion, plaintiff seeks only to change the case heading to
reflect that defendant “Pat Ryan” be changed to “Patrick Ryan.”
On October 21, 2024, defendant Pat Ryan filed a Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. 42]. In
a memorandum in support, Ryan raises substantially the same arguments made in the
response in opposition to plaintiff’s Motion for an Emergency Restraining Order: that this
Court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that, even if the
Court has jurisdiction, it should abstain under Younger. Further, Ryan argues that
plaintiff has failed to state a claim as he has only sued him in his official capacity and thus
his claims are not cognizable under § 1983; that plaintiff has failed to exhaust
administrative remedies; that plaintiff has failed to set forth any injury caused by denial of
access to the law library; that plaintiff has failed to set forth a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985; and that defendant Ryan is entitled to qualified immunity.
On October 22, 2024, defendants Aynampudi and Gruber also filed a Motion to
Dismiss. [Doc. 43]. In their memorandum in support, defendants adopt the jurisdictional
arguments set forth by defendant Ryan. They further ague that plaintiff has failed to
exhaust administrative remedies; that plaintiff has merely asserted legal conclusions
insufficient to state a claim under § 1983; and that plaintiff’s “amended complaint” does
not reference either of these defendants.
On October 23, 2024, defendant Dempsey also filed a Motion to Dismiss.
[Doc. 47]. Defendant Dempsey argues that the claims against him should be dismissed
pursuant to the 11th Amendment as plaintiff has only named him in his official capacity;
that plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to allege facts which would support a claim under
§ 1985; that he has failed to allege any violation of a substantive right; that he has failed
to allege any injury resulting from being denied access to the law library and courts; and
that Dempsey is entitled to qualified immunity.
On October 30, 2024, plaintiff filed an “Objection to Defendants Motion to Dismiss,”
which the undersigned interprets to be a response to all three motions to dismiss. Plaintiff
claims he has exhausted and appealed all grievances. [Doc. 53 at 1]. Plaintiff further
argues that defendants motions are attempts to make plaintiff appear guilty and that “they
are moreless (sic) admiting (sic) that they commited the acts as a duty or under color of
law.” [Id. at 3]. He asks that this Court deny the Motions until such time as defendants
provide the Court with a policy which justifies their alleged actions.
On November 4, 2023, plaintiff filed an additional “Objection to Defendants Motion
to Dismiss,” [Doc. 55], which the Court construed as a Motion for a Hearing. Plaintiff asks
for the Court to conduct an in-person hearing on this matter. Finally, the undersigned
notes that defendants Aynampudi and Gruber filed a reply on November 11, 2024, and
defendant Dempsey filed a reply on November 13, 2024.
IV. Standard of Review
A. Requests for Injunctive Relief
A preliminary injunction may be granted under the authority of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 after notice has been given to the adverse party. The Fourth Circuit
explained the different functions of temporary restraining orders and preliminary
injunctions in Hoechst Diafoil Company v. Nan Ya Plastics Corporation, 174 F.3d 411,
422 (4th Cir. 1999), as follows: “While a preliminary injunction preserves the status quo
pending a final trial on the merits, a temporary restraining order is intended to preserve
the status quo only until a preliminary injunction hearing can be held.”
The Fourth Circuit reviews “a district court’s decision to grant a preliminary
injunction under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” International Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 255–56 (4th Cir. 2018), as amended (Feb. 28, 2018).
The standard for granting injunctive relief was articulated by the United States Supreme
Court which held in Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) that:
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor,
and that an injunction is in the public interest.
As restated by the Fourth Circuit, when a plaintiff seeks the extraordinary remedy of a
preliminary injunction:
The plaintiff “need not establish a certainty of success, but must make a
clear showing that he is likely to succeed at trial.” A plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that (1) she is likely to succeed on the
merits, (2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in her favor, and (4) an
injunction is in the public interest.
Int’l Refugee, 883 F.3d at 256 (citing WV Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs.,
Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 7)). This
standard becomes even more exacting when a plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction that
mandates action, as contrasted with the typical form of a preliminary injunction that merely
preserves the status quo. See East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d
808, 828 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980))
(noting that “mandatory preliminary injunctions do not preserve the status quo and
normally should be granted only in those circumstances when the exigencies of the
situation demands such relief”).
B. Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A party may move to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The burden of proving subject matter
jurisdiction on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting federal
jurisdiction. A trial court may consider evidence by affidavit, deposition, or live testimony
without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment. Adams v. Bain, 697
F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982); Mims v. Kemp, 516 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1975). Because
the court’s very power to hear the case is at issue in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the trial court
is free to weigh the evidence to determine the existence of its jurisdiction. No presumptive
truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material
facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional
claims. See Materson v. Stokes, 166 F.R.D. 368, 371 (E.D. Va. 1996). Whenever it
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
C. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;
importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th
Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
a plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th
Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “require only ‘a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
In Twombly, the United States Supreme Court noted that a complaint need not assert
“detailed factual allegations,” but must contain more than labels and conclusions” or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Conley, 550 U.S. at 555
(citations omitted). Thus, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Id. (citations omitted), to one that is “plausible on its face,”
[Id. at 570], rather than merely “conceivable.” Id. Therefore, in order for a complaint to
survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must “allege facts sufficient to
state all the elements of [his or] her claim.” Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324
F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th
Cir. 2002); Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). In so doing, the
complaint must meet a “plausibility” standard, instituted by the Supreme Court in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, where it held that a “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must offer more than “a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully” in order to meet the plausibility standard and survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim. Id.
Finally, this Court notes that pro se allegations are held to a less stringent standard
than those drafted by lawyers and must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1347 (4th Cir. 1978).
V. Discussion
As a preliminary matter, the undersigned notes that plaintiff’s Motion to Amend
[Doc. 41] should be denied as moot. First, the undersigned notes that this Court’s Local
Rules require that “Any party filing a motion to amend a pleading that requires leave of
court to file shall attach to that motion a signed copy of the proposed amended pleading.”
LR Civ P 15.01. Second, in this instance amendment appears unnecessary. Plaintiff’s
motion seeks only to change the case heading of “Pat Ryan, CEO Sharpe’s Hospital,” to
“Patrick Ryan CEO.” At the time this Motion was filed, defendant Ryan had already
accepted service, and there appears to be no dispute that the correct defendant has been
identified and has now responded to the Complaint. Finally, as set forth below, the
undersigned recommends defendant Ryan’s Motion to Dismiss be granted. Accordingly,
this Motion [Doc. 41] should be denied as moot.
A. Insofar as plaintiff challenges the state court’s determination that he be
involuntarily committed to Sharpe Hospital, this Court lacks jurisdiction over
such a challenge.
At the heart of plaintiff’s claims, he is challenging the state court’s determination
that he be committed to Sharpe Hospital. In his relief requested, plaintiff asks this Court
to order that he be discharged or transferred from Sharpe Hospital. Defendants Ryan,
Aynampudi, and Gruber argue that plaintiff is essentially seeking for this Court to act as
an appellate court passing judgment on the circuit court’s competency rulings. The
undersigned agrees, and, as such, the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over
such claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prohibits District Courts “with the exception of
habeas corpus actions, from ‘sit[ting] in direct review of state court decisions.’” Jordahl
v. Dem. Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting D.C. Ct. of App. v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983)). “Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, a
‘party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate
review of the state judgment in a United States district court.’ . . . We regard the doctrine
as jurisdictional.” Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted). In order to grant the requested relief of discharge from Sharpe Hospital,
this Court would need to effectively conduct appellate review of issues already decided
by the Kanawha County Circuit Court. This type of review is clearly barred under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and, accordingly, such claims must be dismissed for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
B. To the extent plaintiff’s claims do not directly challenge the circuit court’s
rulings, Younger abstention applies.
Similarly, to the extent this Court has subject matter-jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
claims which do not directly seek review of issues decided by the state court, the
undersigned finds that this Court should nonetheless abstain from such matters under the
doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, the Supreme
Court stated “courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a
criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not
suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” Id. at 43–44. Under the Younger
abstention doctrine, a federal court is required to abstain from interfering in ongoing state
court proceedings, even if the federal court has jurisdiction, where the following test if
met: (1) “there are ongoing state judicial proceedings;” (2) “the proceedings implicate
important state interests;” and (3) “there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims
in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Comm’n on Human
Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm.
v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); see also Virginia Inst. Of Autism
v. Virginia Dep’t of Educ., 537 F. Supp.2d 817, 820 (E.D. Va. 2008).
Here, all three conditions have been met. First, it is clear plaintiff’s claims arise
directly as a result of the involuntary commitment that has arisen in the course of his state
criminal proceedings. Second, these proceedings implicate an important state interest in
the orderly prosecution of state citizens. Third, the Kanawha County Circuit Court can
adequately handle any constitutional claims plaintiff wishes to raise challenging his
commitment.1 Given that all three criteria exist here, abstention bars the granting of
plaintiff’s requested relief.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the defendants Motions to Dismiss
[Docs. 42, 43, & 47] be granted2.
C. The Court should deny plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Restraining Order
Because the undersigned concludes that this case should be dismissed, it follows
that the Court should not grant plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Restraining Order. Under
the Winter test, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he “is likely
to succeed on the merits.” As plaintiff clearly cannot establish this, his Motion must be
denied.
VI. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that:
1. plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Restraining Order [Doc. 14] be DENIED;
2. plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint [Doc. 41] be DENIED AS MOOT;
3. defendants Motions to Dismiss [Docs. 42, 43, & 47] be GRANTED;
4. plaintiff’s Motion for a Hearing [Doc. 55] be DENIED; and
5. this case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
1 Under the well-established principles of federalism and comity, the Younger doctrine
“also recognizes that state courts are fully competent to decide issues of federal
constitutional law.” Martin Mariettta Corp., 38 F.3d at 1396.
2 The undersigned notes that defendant Dempsey did not raise the same jurisdictional
arguments in his Motion to Dismiss. However, all defendants made these arguments in
the Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Restraining Order.
Further, this Court is always required to determine whether it has subject-matter
jurisdiction, and Younger abstention applies equally to the claims made against
defendant Dempsey.
The petitioner shall have fourteen days from the date of service of this Report and
Recommendation within which to file with the Clerk of this Court, specific written
objections, identifying the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which
objection is made, and the basis of such objection. A copy of such objections should
also be submitted to the United States District Judge. Objections shall not exceed ten
(10) typewritten pages or twenty (20) handwritten pages, including exhibits, unless
accompanied by a motion for leave to exceed the page limitations, consistent with LR PL
P 12.
Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver
of de novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the
Circuit Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).
The Clerk of the Court is further DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Report and
Recommendation to the pro se plaintiff by certified mail, return receipt requested, to his
last known address as reflected on the docket sheet.
DATED: November 19, 2024.
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/
JAMES P. MAZZONE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE