Williams v. Voorhies

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALVIN WILLIAMS (#480922) CIVIL ACTION NO.

VERSUS 21-636-JWD-SDJ

DAVID VOORHIES, ET AL.

NOTICE

Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge’s Report has been filed with the

Clerk of the U. S. District Court.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have 14 days after being served with the

attached report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

recommendations set forth therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings,

conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon

grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and

legal conclusions accepted by the District Court.

ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE

WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on November 19, 2024.

S

SCOTT D. JOHNSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALVIN WILLIAMS (#480922) CIVIL ACTION NO.

VERSUS 21-636-JWD-SDJ

DAVID VOORHIES, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants David Voorhies

and Omar Walker.1 The Motion is opposed.2 For the following reasons, it is recommended that

the Motion for Summary Judgment be granted in part and denied in part, dismissing Plaintiff’s

claims for excessive force against Omar Walker, failure to intervene against David Voorhies, the

claims for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, any claims arising from the hot

shower, and the claims for injunctive relief; that the Court decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s potential state law claims; and that this case be referred back to the

Magistrate Judge to appoint counsel for Plaintiff.

I. Background

Plaintiff Alvin Williams, who is representing himself and is confined at the Louisiana

State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana, instituted this action against Defendants pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights arising from an incident

occurring on April 28, 2021, when Walker allegedly used excessive amounts of chemical agent

on Williams, and Voorhies pushed Williams into a wall causing his lip to bleed and exerted force

that caused a stress fracture in Plaintiff’s right hand.3 This Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s

1 R. Doc. 63.

2 R. Doc. 67.

3 R. Docs. 1 & 4.

claims for monetary relief against Defendants in their official capacities.4 Plaintiff seeks

monetary and injunctive relief.5

II. Law & Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine disputed issue as to any

material fact, such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.6 A party

moving for summary judgment must explain the basis for the motion and identify those portions

of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, that show there is no genuine issue of material fact.7 If the moving party

carries its burden of proof under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the opposing party must

direct the court’s attention to specific evidence in the record which demonstrates that the non-

moving party can satisfy a reasonable jury that it is entitled to a verdict in its favor.8 Summary

judgment must be entered against a party who fails to make an adequate showing to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial.9 In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court must review the facts

and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and may not evaluate the

credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve material factual disputes.10

4 R. Docs. 17 & 19.

5 R. Doc. 4, p. 5.

6 Fed. Rule Civ. P. 56. See also, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

7 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.

8 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

9 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.

10 International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991).

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants have asserted they are entitled to qualified immunity for the claims of

excessive force and failure to intervene.11 The qualified immunity defense employs a two-step

process, which asks whether the defendant’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights

and whether the rights allegedly violated were clearly established at the time of the violation;

courts have discretion to determine which of the two prongs to address first.12 The assertion of

the qualified immunity defense alters the summary judgment burden of proof.13 Once a

defendant pleads qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who “must rebut the

defense by establishing that the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established

law and that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the reasonableness of the official’s

conduct.”14 “The plaintiff bears the burden of negating the defense and cannot rest on conclusory

allegations and assertions but must demonstrate genuine issues of material fact regarding the

reasonableness of the officer’s conduct.”15

i. Excessive Force

Force is considered excessive and violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States

Constitution if it is applied maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm

rather than in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.16 The Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, however, necessarily excludes from

11 See R. Doc.63-1.

12 Huff v. Crites, 473 F. App’x. 398 (5th Cir. 2012); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (concluding that

the rigid protocol mandated in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) – that called for consideration of the two-

ponged analysis in a particular order – should not be “regarded as an inflexible requirement”).

13 Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005).

14 Gates v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, 537 F.3d 404, 419 (5th Cir. 2008), (citing

Michalik, 422 F.3d at 262).

15 Michalik, 422 F.3d at 262.

16 Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010), (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)).

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that such force is not of a

sort “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”17 Factors to be considered in determining

whether an alleged use of force has been excessive include the extent of injury sustained, if any;

the need for the application of force; the relationship between the need for force and the amount

of force utilized; the threat reasonably perceived by prison officials; and any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response.18

1. Omar Walker

The competent summary judgment evidence presented by Williams in his verified

complaint19 indicates that Walker entered Plaintiff’s tier on April 28, 2021, and Williams

requested “Mental Health,” but the request was denied.20 Williams stated he complied with all

orders and again requested mental health, but his request was again denied.21 Williams continued

to comply with all orders, which included an order to go to the bars to be restrained, but once he

was restrained, Walker tried unsuccessfully to spray Williams with chemical agent. Williams

inquired into why he was being sprayed, but Walker cut Williams off by successfully spraying

him with chemical agent.22 Based upon Plaintiff’s version of events, there was no need for the

use of force because he was complying with all orders.

However, the evidence presented by Defendants is wholly opposite from Plaintiff’s

version of facts given in the verified complaint. Defendants contend Walker was not at all present

on Plaintiff’s tier when the incidents occurred and that Walker did not use chemical agent or any

17 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10.

18 Id., 503 U.S. at 7.

19 R. Doc. 1, p. 8 (Williams certifies “under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct).

20 R. Doc. 1, p. 2.

21 R. Doc. 1, p. 2.

22 R. Doc. 1, pp. 2-3.

force on Williams.23 The Defendants, however, admit that Voorhies used chemical agent on

Williams, but Williams is adamant that it was Walker, not Voorhies, who used the chemical

agent. Though the foregoing appears to create a genuine issue of material fact, Plaintiff’s

responses, or lack thereof, to Defendants’ requests for admissions, when taken into consideration

with other undisputed facts, prove dispositive on the issue of whether Walker used excessive

force against him.

Rule 36 governs requests for admissions, and a matter admitted under Rule 36 “is

conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or

amended.”24 Courts have long recognized that summary judgment is proper where a party fails to

respond to Rule 36 admissions requests on material facts.25 Rule 56(c) specifies that “admissions

on file” can be an appropriate basis for granting summary judgment. A party who makes an

admission, whether express or by default, is bound by that admission for summary judgment

purposes—not even contrary evidence can overcome an admission at the summary judgment

stage.26 Rule 36(b) has been applied equally and consistently to represented and pro se parties

alike.27

23 R. Doc. 63-1, p. 3.

24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b).

25 E.g., Hulsey v. State of Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991).

26 In re Carney, 258 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2001).

27 See Poon-Atkins v. Sappington, No. 21-60467, 2022 WL 102042, at *1–2 (5th Cir. Jan. 10, 2022), cert. denied,

143 S. Ct. 93, 214 L. Ed. 2d 18 (2022), reh’g denied, 143 S. Ct. 515, 214 L. Ed. 2d 294 (2022) (affirming district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants that relied on Rule 36(b) and held that pro se plaintiff’s

lack of responses to admissions rendered those facts admitted, and those admissions could serve as the basis for

granting summary judgment). See also Hill v. Breazeale, 197 F. App'x 331, 337 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The requests for

admissions that [the pro se plaintiff] failed to timely respond to concerned essential issues of his claim. These

deemed admissions conclusively establish that the defendants engaged in no [wrongdoing].”); Birl v. Estelle, 660

F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). (noting that a pro se party “acquires no greater rights than a litigant

represented by lawyer,” and instead “acquiesces in and subjects [her]self to the established rules of practice and

procedure”). Though Williams argues he sent objections to the interrogatories and requests for admissions and stated

he would resend them (R. Doc. 69), there are still no responses to the requests for admission in the record. The Court

notes that the Plaintiff’s responses to interrogatories were received. R. Doc. 40. Plaintiff noted on his responses “I

request admissions from all interrogatory questions,” but it is unclear what is meant by this, and this statement does

Williams failed to respond to Defendants’ requests for admissions. Under Rule 36(b),

this results in the admission that Williams failed to comply with orders to remove plastic from

around his waist.28 A failure to comply with orders indicates a “need” for the use of force. The

evidence also indicates that the only “injuries” sustained as a result of the use of chemical spray

included temporary blindness, a burning sensation, and pain.29 The chemical log books further

demonstrate that the force used, which included one burst of chemical agent, was less than 50

grams of the chemical.30 This Court, along with other courts, has found the use of this amount of

chemical agent to not be constitutionally relevant.31 Though there is no information regarding the

threat perceived by officials and efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response, the

Court finds that the undisputed evidence regarding Plaintiff’s refusal to follow orders, the

minimal amount of force used, and the minimal injury sustained is sufficient to conclude that

excessive force was not used by Walker. Because the factors weigh against a finding of excessive

force, Plaintiff’s claim against Walker for excessive force arising from use of the chemical agent

should be dismissed.

2. David Voorhies

Based upon the competent evidence presented by Plaintiff in the form of his verified

complaint, Voorhies pushed Williams against the wall while he was restrained with sufficient

not constitute a response to the request for admissions. R. Doc. 40, p. 2. So, unfortunately, at this time, Plaintiff is

“stuck” with his admissions.

28 R. Doc. 24. The Court also notes that Plaintiff’s verified complaint indicates that he still had plastic around his

waist after he was sprayed with chemical agent. R. Doc. 1, p. 3 (“I can hear Cpt. Voorhies saying ‘come on’ yanking

and trying to untie the rest of the material that was wrapped around my abdomen.”).

29 R. Doc. 1, pp. 3-4.

30 R. Doc. 25-3, p. 2.

31 See Hamilton v. Orr, 2023 WL 2878820 (M.D. La. March 22, 2023) (44 grams of chemical agent not

unconstitutionally excessive) (citing Robinson v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 2012 WL 851042, at *7

(D.S.C. March 13, 2012) (31 grams of chemical agent not unconstitutionally excessive); and Scott v. Crosby, 2021

WL 3472800, at *5 (N.D. Fl. July 28, 2021) (69.5 gram use of pepper spray shows an absence of sadistic or

malicious intent and is not excessive).

force to cause his lip to bleed and proceeded to press on Plaintiff’s hands, causing him

excruciating pain and a stress fracture in his right hand.32 Though Defendants contend that

Williams has admitted his right hand was not injured in the incident with Voorhies but was

instead injured in a fight days later, this is a misrepresentation of the admission relied upon.

Williams only “admitted,” by his failure to respond to the requests for admission, that he was “in

a fight on May 3, 2021 and injured [his] right hand.”33 The other evidence presented by

Defendants to support the notion that Voorhies did not use excessive force against Williams in

the stairwell relies entirely on the lack of reported injury to Plaintiff’s right wrist/hand on April

28, 2021, but this entirely fails to address the evidence presented by Williams that he was shoved

into the wall with sufficient force to cause his lip to bleed.34 The alleged lack of injury to the

wrist/hand also does not take into consideration the other factors to be considered in an excessive

force analysis, though Defendants have couched the lack of documented injury on April 28, 2021

as disproving all other factors.

The evidence noted above, presented by Plaintiff’s verified complaint, indicates that

Williams was complying with orders; there was no need for force because he was restrained and

posing no threat; there was no efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response; and the

force used was severe enough and applied for a long enough time for Williams to feel something

“crack” in his hand and to cause his lip to bleed.35 The minimal injury caused by Voorhies on

April 28, 2021, is only one factor to consider in the excessive force analysis. All other factors, as

noted above, weigh against finding that excessive force was not used. Further, the fact that

Williams injured his hand on May 3, 2021, in a fight does not mean the hand was not also

32 R. Doc. 1, pp. 3-4.

33 R. Doc. 24, p. 3.

34 Defendants otherwise focus on the use of chemical agent by Voorhies against Williams. R. Doc. 63-1.

35 R. Doc. 1, p. 3.

injured on April 28, 2021, by Voorhies, so this admission does not prove dispositive, and

Defendants entirely failed to address Plaintiff’s bleeding lip. There is a genuine dispute of

material fact regarding whether force was applied by Voorhies maliciously, and when prison

officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of

decency are always violated.36 It was also clearly established at the time of the violation that

using force against a shackled, subdued inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.37 Accordingly,

summary judgment on this claim is inappropriate.

ii. Failure to Intervene

Under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a defendant security

officer may be found responsible for a failure to intervene and take reasonable measures to

protect an inmate from another officer’s use of excessive force under a theory of bystander

liability. An officer may be liable under § 1983 under a theory of bystander liability where the

officer (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional rights (2) has a

reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.38

The first allegation of failure to intervene is for Voorhies’s failure to intervene to stop

Walker’s use of chemical agent. However, as noted above, the Court has determined that Walker

did not use excessive force. “To succeed on a claim of a failure to intervene and prevent the use

of excessive force against a plaintiff, it is axiomatic that there must be an underlying excessive

36 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). That is not to say that every malevolent touch by a prison guard

gives rise to a federal action. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.

37 See Cowart v. Erwin, 837 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 2016) (“courts have frequently found constitutional violations in

cases where a restrained of subdued person is subjected to the use of force” and declining to find qualified immunity

where officer punched a restrained inmate) (internal citations omitted).

38 See Whitley v. Hale, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1995)).

force violation of the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights.”39 Because Walker did not use

excessive force against Williams, Voorhies cannot be liable for failure to intervene.

The second allegation of failure to intervene is against Walker and relates to Voorhies’s

use of force against Williams. Competent summary judgment evidence, in the form of Plaintiff’s

verified complaint, indicates that Walker, Voorhies, and Williams were in a stairwell when

Voorhies pressed Williams against the wall, and Walker was close enough to tell Williams to

“shut the f**k up.”40 The only evidence Defendants have presented to contradict this and the

only argument made is that Walker was not present at all. Under Plaintiff’s version of facts,

Walker should have known Voorhies was violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by pressing

him against a wall while restrained. Based upon Plaintiff’s version of events, Walker also had

time to intervene, as he was able to tell Williams “shut the f**k up” and was in the stairwell with

Voorhies and Williams. This creates a genuine issue of material fact, rendering disposal of this

claim on summary judgment inappropriate.

E. Williams Claim Regarding the Hot Shower is Subject to Dismissal

Plaintiff’s claim regarding the hot shower is, in essence, a conditions of confinement

claim. In evaluating a conditions of confinement claim, it is appropriate to apply the deliberate

indifference standard articulated in Estelle v. Gamble.41 “To establish deliberate indifference…,

the prisoner must show that the defendants (1) were aware of facts from which an inference of an

excessive risk to the prisoner’s health or safety could be drawn and (2) that they actually drew an

inference that such potential for harm existed.42 The Eighth Amendment “does not mandate

39 Stewart v. Mathews, No.19-00120-, 2021 WL 3519725, at *6 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 10, 2021) (citing Davis v. Cannon,

91 Fed. Appx. 327, 329 (5th Cir. 2004)).

40 R. Doc. 1, p. 6.

41 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).

42 Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998).

comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones.”43 At a minimum, prison officials

“must provide humane conditions of confinement” and “ensure that inmates receive adequate

food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.”44 They cannot deprive prisoners of the “basic elements

of hygiene” or the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”45 Prison conditions cannot

inflict “wanton and unnecessary” pain.46

Though Plaintiff alleged the officers placed him in a shower that was known to be very

hot, Defendants have produced competent summary judgment evidence that the officers have no

control over the water temperature in the shower.47 Further, Williams claim regarding the hot

shower is lacking sufficient detail for this claim to proceed. Though the shower water may have

been uncomfortable, Williams does not provide information indicating the hot water posed an

excessive risk to his health or safety or any indication that he was injured by the hot water.48

F. Williams has not Stated a Claim for Deliberate Indifference to a Serious

Medical Need

To the extent Williams sought to bring a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need, it is subject to dismissal.49 A claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs requires an inmate plaintiff to demonstrate that appropriate medical care has been denied

43 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

44 Id.

45 Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 352-53 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted).

46 Id. at 351.

47 R. Doc. 63-4, p. 2.

48 See Tilmon v. Chairman of Union Parish Detention Center Commission, No. 21-4037, 2022 WL 21842397, at *9

(W.D. La. Mar. 29, 2022) (dismissing as frivolous plaintiff’s claim that he was scalded by shower water because he

did not detail the severity of his injury, did not explain if he could easily sidestep the shower steam, and other

factors).

49 It is unclear if Williams intended to bring this claim, but to ensure all claims have been examined, the Court

examined this potential claim. Further, though Defendants did not argue for its dismissal, after giving notice and an

opportunity to respond, the Court may grant the motion on grounds not raised by a party. Washington v. Copiah

County Board of Supervisors, 740 Fed.Appx. 424, 426 (5th Cir. 2018). This report and recommendation provides

notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond. Treadway v. Wilkinson, 2008 WL 4224817, n. 3 (W.D. La. June 10,

2008). See also Spann v. Woods, 66 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 1995) (unpubl.) (district court sua sponte dismissed claims

under 12(b)(6) although the defendants never filed a motion to dismiss, nor did they plead failure to state a claim in

their answer). Additionally, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A.

and that the denial has constituted “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”50

“[S]ubjective recklessness as used in the criminal law” is the appropriate definition of “deliberate

indifference” under the Eighth Amendment.51 Farmer lays out both an objective prong and a

subjective prong.52 The objective prong requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that “the deprivation

alleged [was], objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’”53 Second, under Farmer’s “subjective” prong,

plaintiffs must show that prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”54 The

deliberate indifference standard sets a very high bar: the plaintiff must be able to establish that

the defendants “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him

incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for

any serious medical needs.”55 Further, a mere delay in providing medical treatment does not

amount to a constitutional violation without both deliberate indifference and a resulting

substantial harm.56

Though Williams alleges that he requested to see “mental health,” the facts of the

complaint, as amended, do not indicate that Williams was suicidal, a threat to himself or others,

or had any observable need for mental health counseling. Rather, it appears Williams sought to

see mental health because two officers were approaching his cell causing him to “fear[] for [his]

life” because he was high. Plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate that he had a serious

medical need to be addressed, much less one that Defendants would have been aware of; thus, he

has not stated a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Further, Williams

50 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1237 (5th Cir.1985).

51 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839–30 (1994).

52 Id. at 837.

53 Id. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).

54 Id.

55 Domino v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir.2001), (quoting Johnson v. Treen, 759

F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985).

56 Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993).

does not indicate that any harm resulted from the denial of mental health treatment.57 Thus, this

claim is subject to dismissal.

G. Plaintiff’s Requests for Injunctive Relief are Subject to Dismissal

Plaintiff’s request that Defendants be fired is not cognizable.58 In addition to that request

not being cognizable, both that request and the request that this Court act to enjoin future acts of

excessive force are not viable because Walker and Voorhies no longer work at LSP, rendering the

requests for injunctive relief moot.59 Accordingly, the claims for injunctive relief are subject to

dismissal.

H. Exercise of Supplemental Jurisdiction Should be Declined

To the extent that Williams seeks to have the Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over potential state law claims, a district court may decline the exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction if a plaintiff’s state law claims raise novel or complex issues of state law, if the

claims substantially predominate over the claims over which the district court has original

jurisdiction, if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction,

or for other compelling reasons. In the instant case, because the only remaining claim is for

failure to protect under the Eighth Amendment, it is appropriate to decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law claim because any potential state law claim

based upon these facts would require a wholly different analysis than the federal claims.

57 Burnette v. Bureau of Prisons, 277 Fed.Appx. 329, 332 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that the plaintiff did not identify

any harm that resulted from the denial or delay of psychological treatment rendering dismissal as frivolous proper).

58 See Ware v. Tanner, No. 12-2250, 2013 WL 5589506 at *10 (E.D. La. Oct. 10, 2013) (noting that it would be

against precedent and the public’s interest, if not an abuse of judicial resources, to entertain a request that prison

officials be fired for their conduct); Krist v. Smith, 439 F.2d 146 (5th Cir.1971); Haggerty v. Wainwright, 427 F.2d

1137 (5th Cir.1970).

59 See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir.

2001) (noting that plaintiff’s transfer to a different prison facility rendered his claims for declaratory and injunctive

relief moot); Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that an inmate’s

transfer from county jail to state prison rendered moot his claims for injunctive relief).

I. Appointment of Counsel

Williams has moved for appointment of counsel multiple times in this case,60 but because

at the time those motions were filed, Williams’s case was not headed for trial, his requests were

denied. If this Recommendation is adopted, Plaintiff’s case will be ripe for trial, so it is

recommended that the case be referred back to the undersigned for appointment of counsel.

60 See, e.g., R. Docs. 16, 21, 28, & 37.

RECOMMENDATION

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants

be DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART, that Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force

against Omar Walker, the related claim of failure to intervene against David Voorhies, any claims

arising from the hot shower, all claims for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, and

the claims for injunctive relief be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; the Court decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over potential state law claims, and that this case be referred

back to the Magistrate Judge for appointment of counsel.61

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on November 19, 2024.

S

SCOTT D. JOHNSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

61 If the Recommendation is adopted, the only claims remaining will be Plaintiff’s claim against Voorhies in his

individual capacity for excessive force arising from the incident in the stairwell on April 28, 2021, and the related

claim against Walker in his individual capacity for failure to intervene.