Horsey v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Parole Board

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DONNELLE HORSEY, No. 4:24-CV-00825

Petitioner, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

B. MASON,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DECEMBER 12, 2024

Petitioner Donnelle Horsey initiated this action by filing a pro se petition for

a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Horsey challenges his first denial

of parole, claiming that the Pennsylvania Parole Board’s decision violated his

constitutional rights. For the following reasons, the Court will deny Horsey’s

Section 2254 petition.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Horsey is currently serving a 25- to 50-year sentence for—among other

serious offenses—rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and statutory

sexual assault, which sentence was entered in 2001 by the Court of Common Pleas

of Philadelphia County.1 His controlling minimum and maximum incarceration

1 See Doc. 13-5 at 4; Commonwealth v. Horsey, Nos. CP-51-CR-0904281-1999, CP-51-CR-

dates are April 21, 2024, and April 21, 2049, respectively.2 Horsey was denied

parole on December 26, 2023—his first such parole hearing and denial.3

In its denial, the Parole Board provided the following reasons for its

decision:

 [Horsey’s] risk and needs assessment indicating [his] level of risk to the

community.

 Reports, evaluations and assessment/level of risk indicates [Horsey’s]

risk to the community.

 [Horsey’s] failure to demonstrate motivation for success.

 [Horsey’s] minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the

offense(s) committed.

 [Horsey’s] refusal to accept responsibility for the offense(s) committed.

 [Horsey’s] lack of remorse for the offense(s) committed.

 Other factors deemed pertinent in determining that [Horsey] should not

be paroled: repeat sexual offender.

 The nature of [Horsey’s] crime.4

The Parole Board further noted that Horsey would next be reviewed for parole “in

or after” December 2025.5

2 Doc. 13-3 at 3.

3 See Doc. 13-6.

4 Id. at 2.

5 Id. at 3.

Horsey filed the instant Section 2254 petition on May 20, 2024.6 He then

amended his petition several days later.7 Respondent was served with Horsey’s

amended petition and memorandum of law and timely filed a response.8 Horsey

eventually filed a traverse that complied with the Local Rules of Court,9 and his

Section 2254 petition is now ripe for disposition.

II. DISCUSSION

Horsey contends that the Parole Board’s denial of parole was “unfair[],

arbitrary[], capricious[], and unconstitutional[].”10 In his lengthy memorandum of

law, he appears to assert two claims: (1) the Parole Board “abused its discretion”

when it “compelled” him to admit to criminal offenses, including dismissed or

voluntarily withdrawn (“nolle prosequi”) charges, in violation of his constitutional

right against self-incrimination; and (2) the Parole Board “abused its discretion” by

giving boilerplate reasoning for its denial to disguise racial discrimination and

prejudice against sex offenders, violating Horsey’s Fourteenth Amendment

substantive due process and equal protection rights.11 Neither claim is

substantiated, and the Court will accordingly deny habeas relief.12

6 See generally Doc. 1.

7 See generally Doc. 8.

8 See Docs. 9, 13.

9 See Docs. 15, 16, 18-20.

10 Doc. 8 at 1.

11 See Doc. 8 at 1; Doc. 8-1 at 8, 9, 14.

12 Respondent alternatively contends that Horsey failed to exhaust administrative remedies, so

his petition should be dismissed. The Court, however, may forgo an exhaustion analysis and

deny a habeas petition that fails on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a

A. Claim 1 – Self-Incrimination

In his first claim, Horsey contends that the Parole Board violated his Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination as applied to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment. He maintains that the Parole Board “compelled [him] to

admit to the past crimes including unconvicted [sic] crimes during his testimony at

the parole board hearing,” thus “subjecting [him] to possible future criminal

liability in order to make parole[.]”13

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no

person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”14

The Fifth Amendment applies with equal force to prisoners already convicted and

imprisoned for an offense, prohibiting them from being compelled to bear witness

against themselves or incriminate themselves in other criminal prosecutions.15 To

establish a Fifth Amendment violation, a defendant “must demonstrate two key

elements: compulsion and use.”16

Horsey’s Fifth Amendment claim fails at both elements. First, he has not

alleged or established how he was compelled to admit to “unconvicted” criminal

behavior. Horsey simply asserts—without elaboration—that the Parole Board

writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant

to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”).

13 Doc. 8-1 at 11.

14 U.S. CONST. amend. V.

15 Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465

U.S. 420, 426 (1984)).

16 Id.

(somehow) “compelled” him to confess guilt to dismissed or voluntarily

withdrawn charges. It is possible that Horsey is claiming that he was compelled

through the threat of denial of parole. Yet to show compulsion, which is “the

linchpin” of a Fifth Amendment claim,17 a prisoner must face “the threat of

consequences so ‘grave’ as to leave him no choice at all.”18 Horsey has not made

such a showing or even proffered an allegation thereof. The mere threat of denial

of parole—to which Horsey has no right or entitlement under Pennsylvania law—

is not sufficient by itself to show compulsion for a Fifth Amendment claim.19

Horsey does not explicitly state that he was forced to choose between

admitting to conduct underlying dismissed charges or being denied parole. In fact,

the Parole Board provided multiple unrelated reasons for its denial, including

Horsey’s risk to the community, his failure to demonstrate motivation for success,

and his status of being a repeat sexual offender. Yet even if the Court assumes for

the sake of argument that Horsey was faced with this binary choice, it would not

rise to the level of compulsion required for a Fifth Amendment claim.20 Horsey’s

“sentence has not been lengthened, nor have the actual conditions of his

imprisonment been altered.”21 Simply put, Horsey’s allegations—even if

17 Id. at 210.

18 Id. at 211 (citation omitted).

19 See id. at 214-15.

20 See id.

21 Id. at 214.

construed in the most black-and-white terms and taken as true—would not

establish compulsion under the Fifth Amendment.

Second, Horsey has not established that his statements during the parole

hearing were or could be used against him. That is, Horsey has not alleged or

established the “use” element of a Fifth Amendment claim. In fact, it is unclear if

Horsey admitted to the dismissed charges or exercised his right to remain silent.

Regardless, even if Horsey is somehow arguing that an admission or refusal to

admit was used against him in the parole determination itself, that argument is a

nonstarter, as parole proceedings are not criminal prosecutions.22

B. Claim 2 – Substantive Due Process

In his second claim, Horsey contends that his substantive due process and

equal protection rights were violated by the Parole Board’s denial. He alleges that

the Parole Board used “boilerplate” reasoning to disguise “racial discrimination”

and prejudice toward sex offenders. While invoking two separate clauses of the

Fourteenth Amendment, Horsey is essentially claiming that his parole denial was

based on impermissible criteria and thus violates substantive due process.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause “contains a substantive

component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of

22 Cf. United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2013) (“A parole revocation hearing

is not a criminal prosecution.”); see Richardson v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 236 F. Supp. 3d 168,

170-71 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Parole proceedings are not criminal prosecutions.”).

the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”23 With respect to parole

determinations, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held

that a parole board’s decision can violate an inmate’s substantive due process

rights if it applies “standards that are divorced from the policy and purpose of

parole” or other “impermissible criteria.”24 Specifically, the specter of a

substantive due process violation is raised only when “a parole board considers a

factor that ‘shocks the conscience.’”25 If, however, there is “some basis” for the

parole board’s decision, and that basis is not “constitutionally impermissible” or

conscience-shocking, a substantive due process challenge will fail.26

Horsey’s substantive due process claim is meritless. His allegations that the

Parole Board’s decision was driven by invidious discrimination are entirely

speculative. His bald assertions that he “was denied parole because he is black and

not white” and because he “is a black sex offender rather than a white sex

offender”27 are conclusory and lack any supporting evidence, statistics, or

23 Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S.

113, 125 (1990)).

24 See Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 & n.2, 238, 240 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Burkett v. Love,

89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996) (“In Block, the . . . panel majority concluded that in [using

arbitrary criteria for denying parole], the [Parole Board] violated substantive due process in

grounding its action on constitutionally impermissible reasons.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

25 Holmes v. Christie, 14 F.4th 250, 267 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Newman, 617 F.3d at 782).

26 See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir. 2001).

27 Doc. 8-1 at 16; see also id. at 7, 17, 18.

comparator information.28 Moreover, the Parole Board’s decision included

numerous, constitutionally permissible reasons for its denial of parole. None of its

reasons are conscience-shocking or arbitrary.

The Court does not discount Horsey’s claims that he has made significant

progress toward rehabilitation during his incarceration.29 Such efforts are

commendable. But his disagreement with the Parole Board’s decision does not

establish a right to habeas corpus relief. “[F]ederal courts, on habeas review, are

not to ‘second-guess parole boards,’ and the requirements of substantive due

process are met if there is some basis for the challenged decision.”30 Horsey’s

conclusory, unsupported allegations of discrimination simply do not provide a

basis to “second-guess” the Parole Board.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Horsey’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court likewise declines to issue a

certificate of appealability, as Horsey has failed to make a substantial showing of

28 Horsey has proffered declarations from several inmates in support of his Section 2254 petition.

See Docs. 17-2 through 17-6. However, these declarations, which appear to be identical, do

not provide any evidence or testimony of racial discrimination or prejudice toward sex-

offenders by the Parole Board. Rather, they contain the same conclusory allegations that

appear in Horsey’s petition. See id. And while the declarants aver that they “have personal

first-hand knowledge of the Pennsylvania Parole Board denying parole to prisoners of color

and granting white prisoners parole unequally,” they do not provide any information or details

as to what this “knowledge” entails or how they know the parolees were similarly situated to

those denied parole. See id.

29 See Doc. 8-1 at 5-7.

30 Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Coady, 251 F.3d at 487).

the denial of a constitutional right,31 or that “jurists of reason would find it

debatable” whether this Court’s procedural rulings are correct.32 An appropriate

Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

31 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

32 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).