Wilkins v. Harry

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MAURICE WILKINS,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-02026

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

LAUREL HARRY, .,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Maurice Wilkins, incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon, has

filed a complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that five

defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him a

medically necessary diet to accommodate his celiac disease. The Court

will permit Wilkins to proceed against defendants Ms. Miller and Ms.

Wilson, and separately order them to respond to Wilkins’s request for

preliminary injunctive relief.

I. BACKGROUND

The complaint alleges as follows: Wilkins has celiac disease and has

required a gluten-free diet for many years. On May 20, 2024, defendant

C. Pittsinger told him that his gluten-free diet would not be “renewed” by

the dieticians, because he bought items from the commissary that

conflicted with his diet and refused to sign a DC-465-C form.

In general, the DC-465-C form requires inmates receiving a

“therapeutic diet” to agree not to take more than the prescribed amount

of food, give away the food, or receive food not prescribed by the diet,

among other rules. (Doc. 1-1 at 6). Wilkins was given a version of the

form with “added stipulations,” including that any purchase of

commissary items outside of his diet “shows [he] does not want to be on

a therapeutic diet,” and that he would be presumed to have eaten that

food. (Doc. 1-1 at 7). Wilkins refused to sign, because he wanted to be

able to purchase food for the purpose of selling or trading it. Wilkins

alleges that other inmates on therapeutic diets “buy commissary not

aligned with their diet,” and are not “harassed” or denied their prescribed

diet.

This was the latest incident in what Wilkins sees as a campaign by

various DOC employees to “persuade” him to abandon his gluten-free

diet, including “meals [contradicting] the diet,” “excessive bean meals as

a main protein,” an “extreme light breakfast [regimen],” undercooked

food, and a staff member allegedly making a reference to contaminating

his trays. Wilkins also alleges that a general “refresh” of the menu

resulted in better diets being provided to the standard prison diet, at the

expense of the gluten-free diet, which became worse.

Wilkins asserts Eighth Amendment claims, and First Amendment

retaliation claims, against five defendants: Secretary of Corrections

Laurel Harry, Craig Copper (the chief of the DOC’s Food Services

Division), Ms. Miller and Ms. Wilson (described as “State Dieticians” who

oversee nutritional standards for the DOC), and Pittsinger, the Food

Service Manager for SCI-Huntingdon. In addition to monetary relief, he

seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief directing the

defendants to restore his gluten-free diet and provide a more “efficient

calorie intake” with the “same additions” as the regular menu.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen a civil

complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity

or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a);

, 230 Fed. App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). The

Court must dismiss the complaint if it is “frivolous” or “fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The

Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions brought

and actions concerning prison conditions. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i); . § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1);

, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587–89 (W.D.

Pa. 2008) (summarizing prisoner litigation screening procedures and

standards).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a

claim under § 1915A(b)(1), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or § 1997e(c) is the same as

that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. , 481 Fed. App’x 705, 706

(3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); , 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471

(M.D. Pa. 2010); , 568 F. Supp. 2d at 588. “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a

motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded

allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff’s claims lack facial

plausibility.” , 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir.

2011) (citing , 550 U.S. 544, 555–56

(2007)). In deciding the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged

on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the

complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial

notice.” , 551 U.S. 308, 322

(2007). Although the Court must accept the fact allegations in the

complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions

and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” , 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting

, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)).

Wilkins seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983

provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or

the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must

establish that the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived

the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution.

, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). To avoid

dismissal for failure to state a claim, a civil rights complaint must state

the conduct, time, place, and persons responsible for the alleged

violations. , 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005). Further,

“[c]ivil rights claims cannot be premised on a theory of

. Rather, each named defendant must be shown . . . to have been

personally involved in the events or occurrences which underlie a claim.”

, 8 F. Supp. 3d 601, 613 (M.D. Pa. 2014)

(citation omitted). As explained by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals:

A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs . . . . [P]ersonal

involvement can be shown through allegations of

personal direction or of actual knowledge and

acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual

knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made

with appropriate particularity.

, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Eighth Amendment Claims

In general, an Eighth Amendment violation exists when a prison

official deprives an inmate of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities,” and the official is deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s

health or safety. , 974 F.3d 431,

441 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting , 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).

The Eighth Amendment requires that inmates receive a “nutritionally

adequate diet,” , 263 F. App’x 192, 198 (3d Cir. 2008),

free of food that “present[s] an immediate danger to the health and well

being of the inmates who consume it.”

, No. 3:18-CV-0209, 2023 WL 2527353, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 15,

2023) (quoting , 639 F.2d 559, 571 (10th Cir. 1980)). This

can include the elimination of allergens or foods that are dangerous to a

particular inmate. , , , 145 F. App’x 774, 776 (3d

Cir. 2005) (failure to accommodate plaintiff’s alleged lactose intolerance

and allergy to eggs).

Wilkins alleges that he was denied his therapeutic diet because of

his commissary purchases and his refusal to sign the DC-465-C form. It

is both constitutional and consistent with DOC policy1 for dieticians to

consider an inmate’s commissary purchases in determining whether that

inmate needs a special diet. , , , No. CIV.A. 06-160,

2008 WL 2693860, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2008), report and

recommendation adopted as modified, 2008 WL 2693859 (W.D. Pa. June

30, 2008); , 450 F. App’x 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2011)

1 The Court takes judicial notice of DC-ADM 610, Food Services

Procedures Manual, Section 2.D.7: “The Department Dietitian may

utilize the Meal Management System as well as review commissary

purchases to assess need for a therapeutic diet and make appropriate

recommendations regarding nutrition interventions.”

(religious diet discontinued based on commissary purchases).

At the same time, Wilkins remains entitled to a nutritionally

adequate diet. Prison officials can appropriately restrict Wilkins’s

commissary use2, but cannot knowingly deny him a nutritionally

adequate diet for “a non-medical reason.” , 182 F.3d

192, 197-99 (3d Cir. 1999). Therefore, unauthorized commissary use may

be evidence that an inmate does not need a certain diet but does not

automatically justify revocation of a therapeutic diet. , 2023

WL 2527353, at *6 (finding an issue of fact as to an inmate’s dietary needs

where the record was “unclear” if he had consumed his non-compliant

commissary purchases).

Wilkins alleges that he has had celiac disease requiring a

therapeutic diet for several years3 and the dietician defendants were

2 Wilkins has no constitutional right to purchase items from a

commissary. , No. 2:07-

CV-928, 2008 WL 2699988, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2008) (collecting cases).

3 Wilkins previously sued some of these defendants on claims that

he was not provided a nutritionally adequate diet to accommodate his

celiac disease. See Wilkins v. Wolf, No. 1:20-CV-02450 (M.D. Pa., filed

Dec. 28, 2020). The alleged deprivation post-dates the resolution of that

case, and no issue of res judicata is apparent from the complaint.

aware of those facts. His allegations support a plausible inference that

the dieticians revoked that diet merely because he was purchasing non-

compliant items from the commissary, without any genuine inquiry as to

whether the diet was medically necessary. Therefore, Wilkins may

proceed on claims against the dietician defendants based on their alleged

decision to deny him a nutritionally adequate diet. Those defendants will

also be ordered to file a separate response to Wilkins’s request for

preliminary injunctive relief, limited to the issue of whether Wilkins is

being provided a nutritionally adequate diet. These claims may not

proceed against any other defendant because Wilkins has not alleged any

other defendant’s personal involvement in this decision. , 845

F.2d at 1207.

B. Retaliation Claims

Wilkins pursues retaliation claims against the defendants,

ascribing the negative changes to his diet4 to his “prior civil suit and high

4 Many of the diet issues Wilkins ascribes to retaliation (such as the

inferior menu and the excessive use of beans) pertain to the general

gluten-free menu, and it is unclear how these broader changes would be

motivated by a desire to target him personally. The Court’s retaliation

analysis is directed to his allegation that he was targeted for changes to

his individual diet based on his prior litigation and grievances.

volumes of grievances” about his diet.

To state a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation, a

plaintiff must show that (1) he was engaged in constitutionally protected

conduct, (2) he suffered an “adverse action” by prison officials sufficient

to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First

Amendment rights, and (3) the plaintiff’s protected conduct was a

“substantial or motivating factor” in the prison officials’ decision to take

the adverse action. Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017)

(citations and quotations omitted). Typically, the plaintiff must show

“unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity

and the allegedly retaliatory action,” or “a pattern of antagonism coupled

with timing to establish a causal link.” , 834 F.3d 417,

424 (3d Cir. 2016). In some cases, causation can be established “from the

evidence gleaned from the record as a whole.” .

The first two elements are satisfied. Prison grievances are

constitutionally protected conduct, , 834 F.3d at 422, and the

denial of nutritionally adequate food is an adverse action for purposes of

a retaliation claim. , No. 23-CV-4738, 2024 WL

2331715, at *11 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2024).

Regarding causation, Wilkins alleges that other inmates who buy

non-compliant commissary items are not removed from their diets, which

supports an inference of retaliation against him personally. The timing

of the incident is potentially suggestive: Between February and April

2024, Wilkins made multiple grievances and complaints relating to his

diet. (Doc. 1-5 at 2-6, 8-9). He was then asked to sign the DC-465-C

form on May 20, 2024, to maintain a therapeutic diet that he had already

been medically qualified to receive. Making all reasonable inferences in

Wilkins’s favor, the complaint plausibly alleges that Wilkins’s protected

activity was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the dieticians’

ultimate revocation of his therapeutic diet.

As with his Eighth Amendment claims, Wilkins has not shown any

other defendant’s personal involvement in that decision, so the claim will

proceed only against the dieticians. Although Wilkins infers further

retaliation from other dietary issues, including incidents of undercooked

food and a remark about “contaminated” food, he has not pled facts

indicating that any of the defendants were personally involved in these

incidents, nor that these incidents were related to his prior litigation and

grievances. Accordingly, his retaliation claims are limited to the

dieticians’ revocation of his therapeutic diet.

IV. CONCLUSION

Wilkins is granted leave to proceed on claims under the First and

Eighth Amendments against the state dieticians, Ms. Miller and Ms.

Wilson. In addition, those defendants will be ordered to respond

separately to Wilkins’s request for preliminary injunctive relief. An

appropriate order follows.

Dated: December 12, 2024

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge