Walker v. Vandigo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

TYRONE ANTWAN WALKER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-773-MMH-LLL

J. VANDIGO, et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________________

ORDER

Plaintiff Tyrone Antwan Walker, an inmate of the Florida penal system,

initiated this action on July 29, 2024, by filing a pro se Complaint for Violation

of Civil Rights (Complaint; Doc. 1) with attachments (Docs. 1-1 through 1-3).

In the Complaint, he names the following Defendants: (1) Sergeant J. Vandigo,

(2) Officer N. Wright, (3) Lieutenant Tyler Watson, (4) LPN Lucinda O’Connor,

and (5) Sergeant Sean Bailey. See Complaint at 3–5. Walker raises two claims

for relief: an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant O’Connor and an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim

against Defendants Vandigo, Wright, Watson, and Bailey. See id. at 6.

Walker’s claims arise from a July 2022 incident in which another inmate

stabbed him. See id. at 12–13. Walker requests declaratory and injunctive

relief, as well as monetary damages. See id. at 17.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss

this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.1 See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable

merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A

complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should

only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,

or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims

‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district

judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears

that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the

1 Walker proceeds as a pauper. See Order (Doc. 5).

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PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517

F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted);

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)

(citations omitted). Moreover, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in

a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show “an affirmative causal connection

between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional

deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation

omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)).

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entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262–

63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not

necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the

. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not

required to include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

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masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and

quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of

the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]”

which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a federal constitutional

deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of

action against the defendant.

In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Walker’s pro se

allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And,

while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings

drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum

v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not

give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air

Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc.

v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted),

overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must

provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that

inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must

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‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

526–27 (1984)). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must

satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s

conduct. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834).

As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison

officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display

‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla.

Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). For decades, the Eleventh Circuit has

described a “more than mere negligence” or “more than gross negligence

standard” in determining whether an official acted with deliberate indifference

to that serious medical need. See Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d

1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020) (“To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff

must demonstrate that the prison officials (1) had subjective knowledge of a

risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and (3) acted with more than

gross negligence.”) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Wade v. McDade,

106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024). Recently, however, the Eleventh Circuit

determined that those standards conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision

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in Farmer and clarified that courts in this circuit should apply the “subjective

recklessness” standard as used in criminal law. See Wade, 106 F.4th at 1253.

Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed that to establish liability on

an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must show:

First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered

a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently

serious.’” [Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834].

Second, . . . that the defendant acted with

“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,”

id. at 839, and to do so he must show that the

defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his

own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm

to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if

the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to

inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable

under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if

he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844–45.

Id. at 1262 (enumeration and emphasis omitted).3

“As applied in the prison context, the deliberate-indifference standard

sets an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285. Indeed, the law is

well settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of

corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

330–31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in

3 The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan wrote a concurrence to

the majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior Eleventh Circuit

deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they should continue

to be cited as binding precedent.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).

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Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or

substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”). The

Eleventh Circuit has also noted that “[n]othing in our case law would derive a

constitutional deprivation from a prison physician’s failure to subordinate his

own professional judgment to that of another doctor; to the contrary, it is well

established that ‘a simple difference in medical opinion’ does not constitute

deliberate indifference.” Bismark v. Fisher, 213 F. App’x 892, 897 (11th Cir.

2007)4 (quoting Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033). Similarly, “the question of whether

governmental actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or

forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and

therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth

Amendment.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation

omitted).

Here, Walker brings an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim

against Defendant O’Connor. See Complaint at 6. As to the specific facts

underlying his claim, Walker alleges that after another inmate “stabb[ed]”

him, he was transported to medical where Defendant O’Connor cleaned his

4 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022);

see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

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wounds. See id. at 13. According to Walker, when he moaned because of the

pain, Defendant O’Connor responded, “it’s not that bad” and “this [is] what

prisoners get.” Id. Walker contends that Defendant O’Connor refused to

bandage his wounds because they would “heal faster.” Id. He asserts that he

did not sustain “deep stab wounds,” only “deep cuts (because for some reason

the knife . . . didn’t go all the way through).” Id. at 14.

The Court finds that Walker fails to allege facts permitting the

reasonable inference that Defendant O’Connor was deliberately indifferent to

his serious medical needs. Indeed, Defendant O’Connor provided medical care

to Walker by cleaning his wounds and applying bacitracin. See Complaint at

13; see also Doc. 1-1 at 10. Notably, although Defendant O’Connor did not

bandage Walker’s wounds, he does not allege that they became infected.

Walker merely disagrees with the type of treatment provided by Defendant

O’Connor. Such disagreement, however, does not rise to the level of an Eighth

Amendment violation. See Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545 (“[T]he question of whether

governmental actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or

forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and

therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth

Amendment.” (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107)); Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774

F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Although [the inmate] may have desired

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different modes of treatment, the care the jail provided did not amount to

deliberate indifference.”). To the extent Walker complains about Defendant

O’Connor’s remarks while she cleaned his wounds, the statements, at most,

demonstrate a poor “bedside manner” and do not support “an inference of

deliberate indifference.” Bismark, 213 F. App’x at 897. Therefore, the claim

against Defendant O’Connor is due to be dismissed.

In addition to filing his Complaint, Walker has filed a proposed order,

entitled Order to Show Cause for a Preliminary Injunction [and] a Temporary

Restraining Order (Doc. 1-3), and a Declaration (Doc. 1-2) by which he

apparently attempts to seek preliminary injunctive relief. In doing so, Walker

alleges that he fears retaliation from officers. See generally Doc. 1-2. He also

asserts that “[u]pon information and belief,” the inmate who stabbed him is

housed in “the dormitory next to the dormitory [he is] housed in,” and he fears

for his life. Id. at 1–2.

Upon review of Walker’s Request for Injunctive Relief, the Court finds

that he is not entitled to a temporary restraining order or a preliminary

injunction. First, he has not complied with the requirements of Rule 65,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Local Rule 6.02. He did not file a separate

motion, and he did not provide the Court with a brief or legal memorandum

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supporting his motion. Regardless, the Court is of the opinion that preliminary

injunctive relief is not warranted.

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary

remedy never awarded as of right,” id.[5] at 1077

(internal quotation marks omitted), and the party

seeking that remedy must satisfy a four-part test, Otto

v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 860 (11th Cir.

2020). First, it must prove that “it has a substantial

likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). Second, it must prove that

it will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction

issues. Id. Third, it must prove that the injury that

threatens it “outweighs whatever damage the

proposed injunction may cause the opposing party.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, it must

prove that “the injunction would not be adverse to the

public interest” if issued. Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd. v. State Surgeon Gen., Fla. Dep’t of

Health, 50 F.4th 1126, 1134–35 (11th Cir. 2022); Keister v. Bell, 879 F.3d 1282,

1287–88 (11th Cir. 2018). The movant must clearly establish the burden of

persuasion as to the four requisites. See McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147

F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998). Walker has failed to carry his burden. As

such, his request is due to be denied.

5 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. On Point Cap. Partners LLC, 17 F.4th 1066 (11th Cir.

2021).

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Therefore, it is now ORDERED:

1. Walker’s request for injunctive relief (Docs. 1-2, 1-3) is DENIED.

2. The claim against Defendant O’Connor is DISMISSED without

prejudice. The Clerk shall terminate O’Connor as a Defendant in this case.

3. Walker’s claims against Defendants Vandigo, Wright, Watson, and

Bailey will proceed. A separate Order will enter regarding service of process on

the remaining Defendants.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 16th day of

December, 2024.

United States District Judge

Jax-9 11/22

C: Tyrone Antwan Walker, #B04225

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