Ratley v. Inch

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MICHAEL STEVEN RATLEY,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 3:21-cv-598-MMH-LLL

RICKY D. DIXON, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Michael Steven Ratley, an inmate in the custody of the Florida

Department of Corrections (FDOC), initiated this action on June 14, 2021, by

filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1). He filed an Amended Complaint

(AC; Doc. 28) with exhibits (Doc. 28-1) on October 12, 2021.1 In the AC, Ratley

asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These Defendants remain: (1)

FDOC Secretary Ricky D. Dixon;2 (2) FDOC Regional Director Palmer; (3)

Hamilton Correctional Institution’s (Hamilton C.I.) Warden Glenn Young; (4)

1 For purposes of reference to pleadings and exhibits, the Court will cite the

document page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic docketing system.

2 Ratley originally named Mark Inch in his official capacity as Secretary of the

FDOC, a position he no longer holds. As such, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

25(d)(1), the Court substituted Ricky D. Dixon, the current Secretary of the FDOC,

as the proper party Defendant. See Order (Doc. 64 at 34 n.12).

Hamilton C.I.’s Assistant Warden Gerald Stewart; and (5) Sergeant E.

Burkett. Ratley alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights

when Defendant Burkett assaulted him and Defendants Dixon, Palmer,

Stewart, and Young failed to remedy the mistreatment related to the assault

and resolve Ratley’s inadequate medical care.

Ratley also originally named as Defendants the following medical

personnel who interacted with, and medically treated, him following the

assault: Dr. Leslie Colombani, M.D., Hamilton C.I. Chief Health Officer; Nurse

Ira Lee; Dr. Richard Laubaugh, M.D., orthopedic surgeon at Taylor

Correctional Institution (Taylor C.I.); and Dr. Jason Brenes-Catinchi, M.D.,

Central Florida Reception Center (CFRC) Medical Director (collectively

“Medical Defendants”). See AC. The Medical Defendants moved for summary

judgment (Doc. 113); and on September 28, 2023, the Court granted their

motion, finding the record evidence failed to create a genuine issue of material

fact on the claim that any Medical Defendant acted with deliberate indifference

to Ratley’s serious medical needs following Burkett’s alleged assault (Doc. 145).

Now before the Court is Defendants Dixon, Palmer, Stewart, and

Young’s3 (collectively “FDOC Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment

(Motion; Doc. 127), with exhibits (Docs. 128-1 through 128-7). The Court

3 Defendant Burkett has not moved for summary judgment or filed any other

dispositive motion in this case.

advised Ratley of the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, notified

him that the granting of a motion for summary judgment would represent a

final adjudication of this case which may foreclose subsequent litigation on the

matter, and permitted him to respond to the Motion. See Order (Doc. 5);

Summary Judgment Notice (Doc. 114). Ratley filed a response in opposition to

the Motion, see “Plaintiff[’]s Declaration in Opposition to Defendants Dixon,

Palmer, Stewart and Young’s Motion for Summary Judgment” (Response; Doc.

150), with exhibits (Docs. 150-1 through 150-21); a brief in support of his

Response, see “Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Declaration and Oppos[]ition to

Defendant[]s Dixon, Palmer, Stewart and Young’s Request for Summary

Judgment” (Response Brief; Doc. 151); and a statement of disputed facts, see

“Plaintiff’s Statement of Disputed Factual Issues” (Doc. 152). FDOC

Defendants filed a Reply (Reply; Doc. 168). FDOC Defendants’ Motion is ripe

for review.

II. Ratley’s Allegations4

Because Ratley’s claims against Defendants Dixon, Palmer, Young,

Stewart, and Burkett are the only issues before the Court, in this Order, in

4 For the purposes of resolving Defendants’ Motion, the Court views all

disputed facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to

Ratley. However, the Court notes that these facts may differ from those that

ultimately can be proved at trial. See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir.

2002).

summarizing Ratley’s claims, the Court focuses on the allegations involving

those Defendants.

In the AC, Ratley alleges that on September 12, 2019, while housed at

Hamilton C.I., Defendant Burkett demanded that Ratley give him free items

from the canteen where Ratley worked. AC at 13. When Ratley refused,

Burkett made several threatening comments to Ratley, warning Ratley that

he would get him removed from his canteen position and telling Ratley that

his “days are numbered.” Id. According to Ratley, around 7:30 a.m. on

September 16, 2019, while Ratley was taking the trash out, two inmates hit

him in the back of the head, knocking him unconscious. Id. He asserts that

when he woke up, he was inside his assigned canteen and Burkett was

“stomp[ing]” and “kicking” him. Id. During Burkett’s assault, Ratley noticed

that his canteen had been destroyed. Id. Burkett told Ratley, “clean up your

store and act like nothing happened . . . .” Id. at 13-14. Ratley alleges that

Burkett then allowed the two inmates who initially hit Ratley to take two

canteen bags worth of inventory from the store before leaving. Id. at 14. Ratley

asserts he then cleaned up the mess and continued his workday “even though

[he] was in an extreme amount of pain due to being in fear of [his] life.” Id.

According to Ratley, the next day, Ms. Phillips, the inmate canteen

servicer, arrived with the weekly delivery and advised Ratley that if he did not

replace the canteen’s missing products, she would issue a disciplinary report

for the shortage. Id. Ratley alleges that officials then charged him with

“Bartering with Other Inmates,” because one of the two inmates who attacked

him and stole from the canteen used a third inmate’s ID card to take the items.

Id. at 15-16.

On September 18, 2019, Ratley met with Ms. Troy, a library supervisor,

about changing jobs and showed her his injured arm, “which was extremely

swollen and bruised from [his] right shoulder down to [his] fingers.” Id. at 14-

15. Ratley maintains Troy immediately sent him to medical where Nurse Lee

ordered x-rays, issued medical passes, provided ibuprofen, and told him that

his bicep appeared torn. Id. at 15. Thereafter, according to Ratley, every day

between September 20 and 24, 2019, he asked to see medical due to his arm

injury and the extreme pain he was experiencing. Id. at 16-17. During that

timeframe, Lee authorized a Solu-Medrol (a steroid shot for pain and swelling),

ibuprofen, and Tylenol. Id. at 8, 16. Ratley also contacted his sister, Brandy

Parrish, about his extreme pain and Parrish called medical to request a welfare

check. Id. at 16. After the phone call, medical saw Ratley on September 22 and

23, 2019, and provided him Tylenol, ibuprofen, and a right-arm sling. Id. at 16-

17; Doc. 28-1 at 4.

Medical took an x-ray of Ratley’s right shoulder on September 25, 2019,

which showed “markedly comminuted fracture displacement of the

humeral/head with markedly displaced greater tuberosity with oblique

fracture through the proximal humerus.” AC at 17. Ratley then signed a

consultation form for a transfer to Reception and Medical Center (RMC) for an

orthopedic consult. Id. at 17-18. Ratley contends he later attempted to declare

two other medical emergencies, but both times medical responded that nothing

more could be done until the orthopedic consult and advised him to stop

complaining to his family as Parrish and his mother, Cindy Ratley, were

calling the facility to report the injury each day. Id. at 18.

Officials transported Ratley to RMC on September 27, 2019, where

orthopedic surgeons Drs. Winters and Ryan examined him. Id. After two

additional x-rays, the doctors told Ratley he needed emergency surgery to

repair the right shoulder. Id. The surgery had to be rescheduled because “the

proper surgical parts were not on site,” prompting Ratley to submit a grievance

to the Secretary on September 29, 2019. Id. at 18-19; Doc. 28-1 at 4-5

(complaining in a grievance to the FDOC Secretary about a 13-day delay and

that the surgeon did not have “enough parts” to complete the surgery, so the

FDOC returned him to Hamilton C.I.’s general population). When Parrish later

visited Ratley, he updated her about his situation, causing Parrish to then file

two complaints on the FDOC website about the attack and Ratley’s lack of

adequate medical care following the attack. AC at 19-20. The FDOC then

responded to only one of the complaints, advising Parrish that her complaint

about Burkett’s attack would be forwarded to the Office of the Inspector

General (OIG). Id. at 20.

Ratley continued to seek medical care for his arm injury and saw medical

on September 30, 2019. Id. at 20-21. During that exam, Ratley asked medical

if he could remove his shirt, so they could see the extent of his injury (which

included a more recent injury caused by his cellmate stepping on Ratley’s

broken arm). Id. Dr. Colombani then ordered shots for Ratley’s pain and

bruising and upgraded his surgery request from urgent to emergent. Id. at 21.

Dr. Colombani, however, denied Ratley’s requests to be “placed in the

infirmary due to not being able to protect [himself] f[ro]m harm.” Id. at 20.

According to Ratley, that same day he filed another formal grievance with the

Secretary about the lack of adequate medical care. Id. at 21.

Ratley maintains that on October 1, 2019, at the request of Defendant

Stewart, Lieutenant Harrell advised Ratley that even though officials knew

that Burkett had attacked him and broken his arm, Ratley would remain at

Hamilton C.I. and would not be placed in protective custody despite Ratley’s

“fear of retaliation” from Burkett. Id. at 9, 21. On October 2, 3, and 8, 2019,

Parrish and the OIG exchanged emails about the assault investigation. Id. at

22. During that time, medical advised Parrish that Ratley’s surgery was

approved. Id. On October 11, 2019, Parrish emailed Defendant Palmer and the

FDOC Central Office about the inadequate medical treatment and “lack of

transparency regarding the investigation.” Id. Ratley’s mother also contacted

classification officer Ms. Hunter and Captain James to confirm they knew

about Burkett’s assault and Ratley’s lack of medical care. Id.

According to Ratley, between October 15 and 19, 2019, he proceeded to

file several grievances with the Warden of Hamilton C.I. and the Secretary

about his need for medical care and Burkett’s assault. Id. at 23; see also Doc.

28-1 at 2, 9, 11, 14. Ratley explains these grievances were either denied or

returned for non-compliance. AC at 23. Medical examined him during a sick-

call on October 16, 2019, and prescribed Tylenol after documenting that Ratley

had an elevated pulse and high blood pressure due to “the extreme pain.” Id.

Parrish spoke with Ms. Gaylord, an employee of the OIG, on October 21, 2019,

who advised that Ratley’s emergency surgery was approved but also had no

update on the assault investigation. Id.

On October 23, 2019, officials transferred Ratley to CFRC in preparation

for surgery at the Orlando Outpatient Surgical center and gave him medication

to lower his heartrate. Id. at 24. But once he arrived at the hospital, medical

staff had to reschedule the procedure because the elevators were broken. Id.

Officials returned Ratley to CFRC where he remained housed until his surgery.

Id. Ratley ultimately received right-shoulder open reduction internal fixation

(ORIF) surgery on November 4, 2019, during which doctors realigned his

socket and implanted a metal plate and screws into his arm and shoulder. Id.

at 25. The FDOC later returned him to CFRC, where he had a follow-up

appointment with medical on November 12, 2019, and was provided ibuprofen

and Tylenol. Id.

Officials transferred Ratley to RMC on November 14, 2019. Id. The next

day, Drs. Winters and Ryan removed Ratley’s stitches and advised that he

would begin physical therapy soon. Id. at 26. That same month, Ratley sent

grievances and requests to the OIG asking about its investigation. Id. Ratley

alleges that in December 2019, he, Cindy Ratley, and Parrish proceeded to

submit formal grievances to the Secretary about Burkett’s assault and lack of

pain medication following surgery. Id.; see Doc. 28-1 at 19, 23, 29.

Officials transferred Ratley back to Hamilton C.I. on December 13, 2019,

and placed him in confinement pending the OIG’s investigation. AC at 27.

Ratley alleges, however, that Burkett and one of the two inmates who

assaulted him were assigned to the same confinement unit. Id. That month,

Parrish filed another complaint with the OIG and contacted the Regional

Director’s Office; and Ratley filed an emergency grievance with the Central

Office about being housed at Hamilton C.I. with Burkett and a formal

grievance with the Warden about the lack of medical care following his surgery.

Id. Ratley asserts he also advised two prison officials, Major Carter and

Sergeant Bowers, that he feared Burkett and needed protection, but they

explained “protection couldn’t be requested from an FD[O]C officer.” Id. at 27-

28. According to Ratley, on December 24, 2019, Burkett came to Ratley’s cell

door and confronted him several times about the grievances and complaints he

submitted about his assault. Id. at 28. He alleges Burkett made hostile

comments, threatening retaliation and physical harm if Ratley did not drop

the OIG investigation. Id. Ratley then wrote to the OIG, asking that the

camera footage of Burkett making threats at his cell door be saved. Id. at 29.

But on December 27, 2019, Major Carter and Ms. Hamlin recommended that

Ratley be transferred “due to all of the allegations of assault and [his] arm and

shoulder being broke,” but explained he had a “Region 2 hold” and could not

transfer to Suwannee or Columbia because family members worked at those

facilities. Id.

On January 2, 2020, Ratley began right-shoulder physical therapy. Id.

at 29. A few days later, Ratley advised his physical therapist that he was

experiencing pain in his left shoulder too. Id. In March, April, and June 2020,

Ratley saw a primary care physician, an orthopedic surgeon, and a nurse about

his left shoulder pain. Id. at 30. He received injections for the pain and swelling

and an x-ray of his left shoulder showed an “impacted anterior glenohumeral

joint dislocation.” Id. An orthopedic surgeon conducted a left shoulder ORIF

surgery on June 5, 2020. Id. At his June 19, 2020 follow-up, the orthopedic

surgeon referred Ratley to another surgeon for a “double reversal total

shoulder replacement due to Hill-Sachs Impaction Fracture.” Id.

Ratley asserts he continued to have left and right shoulder pain from

June through December 2020. Id. at 30-33. On December 28, 2020, an

orthopedic surgeon performed a “double reversal total shoulder replacement

of” Ratley’s left shoulder. AC at 30-33. Thereafter, in February 2021, Ratley

submitted several sick-call requests and a grievance with CFRC’s Warden

about his need for post-surgery medical care. Doc. 28-1 at 54-66; AC at 32-33.

He continued to submit sick-call requests and grievances about his right

shoulder pain in March, May, June, July, and August 2021. AC at 34-35. And

at some point, officials transferred him to Taylor C.I. where he submitted a

grievance to Taylor C.I.’s Assistant Warden on July 16, 2021. Doc. 28-1 at 70.

Ratley maintains that he suffered unnecessary delays related to the provision

of medical care.

Based on these facts, Ratley alleges Defendants Dixon, in his official and

individual capacities as the Secretary of the FDOC;5 Palmer, in his individual

and official capacities as FDOC’s Regional Director of Region II; Young, in his

individual and official capacities as Hamilton C.I.’s Warden; and Stewart, in

his individual and official capacities as Hamilton C.I.’s Assistant Warden,

5 Although Ratley only checked “official capacity” under Defendant Dixon on

the Amended Complaint form, he alleges personal involvement by the Secretary and

he seeks monetary damages, thus suggesting his intention that Dixon be sued in his

individual capacity as well. Additionally, FDOC Defendants raise qualified immunity

as an affirmative defense, see Motion at 19, which is only applicable to individual

capacity suits. Thus, the Court construes Ratley’s claims as being against all

Defendants in their individual and official capacities.

violated his Eighth Amendment rights before and after Burkett’s September

16, 2019 assault, as well as during the Medical Defendants’ subsequent

inadequate medical care. Id. at 4. He asserts that after Burkett’s physical

attack, FDOC Defendants failed to “remov[e] [him] from harm and [ ] correct[]

the medical concern, which was so blatantly obvious [and] within the scope and

requirement of their employment . . . .” Id. at 9. He asserts he notified Dixon,

Palmer, Young, and Stewart about his need for protection from Burkett and

medical care via the “grievance procedure, word of mouth, and family through

the online complaint forum and telephone . . . .” Id. Ratley also alleges “the

abuse by staff and the unlawful medical treatment [were] well known at the

time” and “[t]he practice of inmate abuse was so blatant and wide-spread that

it was common practice to allow the same officer[s] who blatantly abused

inmates to remain on the compound and continue the violations.” Id. at 8-9. As

relief, he seeks monetary damages and asks that the Court direct the FDOC to

train its staff and provide proper medical care.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), “[t]he

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The record to be considered on a

motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations

(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).6 An

issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ.,

93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g

Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support

of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for

summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381

6 Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and

deciding summary-judgment motions.” Rule 56 advisory committee’s note 2010

Amends.

The standard for granting summary judgment remains

unchanged. The language of subdivision (a) continues to

require that there be no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. The amendments will not affect continuing

development of the decisional law construing and applying

these phrases.

Id. “[A]lthough the interpretations in the advisory committee[’s] notes are not

binding, they are highly persuasive.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 F. App’x 874, 879 n.3

(11th Cir. 2013). Thus, case law construing the former Rule 56 standard of review

remains viable.

In citing to Campbell, the Court notes that it does not rely on unpublished

opinions as binding precedent; however, they may be cited in this Order when the

Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th

1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2

(“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited

as persuasive authority.”).

F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no

genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats &

Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “When a moving party has

discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the

pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d

590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court “must

view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party

opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th

Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38

F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)). “Summary judgment is improper, however,

if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th

Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

IV. Summary of Parties’ Arguments

In their Motion, the FDOC Defendants argue they are entitled to

summary judgment because they cannot be held vicariously liable under a

theory of respondeat superior. See generally Motion. They assert there is no

record evidence showing they failed to protect Ratley before or after Burkett’s

assault; and there is no evidence showing that they denied Ratley medical

treatment following the assault. See generally Motion. They also argue they

are entitled to qualified immunity.7 See id. at 19-21. In response, Ratley argues

the FDOC Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment because: each

Defendant had personal knowledge that “inmates were being repeatedly

assaulted by staff and not being adequately treated for their medical issues”;

they knew about Burkett’s assault and that Ratley did not receive proper

medical care for his serious injuries afterward; and their implementation of an

unofficial policy or practice of allowing FDOC staff to use malicious force on

inmates and inadequately treat subsequent injuries forecloses an entitlement

to qualified immunity. See generally Response Brief.

7 Because the Court finds the FDOC Defendants did not commit any

constitutional violations, the Court need not address the qualified immunity

argument. Further, the Court need not address Ratley’s official capacity claims.

V. Evidence

During Ratley’s deposition, he testified that on September 12, 2019,

former FDOC correctional officer Ethan Burkett came to his canteen and

demanded that Ratley give him and two other inmates items without payment.

Doc. 128-1 at 10, 13. When Ratley said no, Burkett threatened that he would

“replace” Ratley with an inmate who would provide him with free items. Id. at

14. Ratley stated that on that day, Burkett “never physically touched [him] or

anything of that nature.” Id. at 15. Instead, according to Ratley, Burkett

finished his shift and three days later, on September 16, 2019, when Ratley

was taking out the trash, two unknown inmates hit him on the back of the

head. Id. at 11. Ratley testified he blacked out and when he woke up, the two

inmates and Burkett had dragged him into his assigned canteen and Burkett

was “stomping down on [his] right shoulder.” Id. at 12, 15. He explained that

when Burkett was done kicking him, he told Ratley to clean up the store and

continue his day as if nothing happened and allowed the other two inmates to

steal items from the canteen. Id. at 15. Ratley then cleaned up and “ran [his]

canteen for that day.” Id. at 16.

Ratley testified that during the days that followed, he interacted with

multiple people but told no one about Burkett’s attack. Id. at 15-18. He

explained he spoke with his canteen operator on September 17; he met with

the library supervisor and medical on September 18; he attended a disciplinary

hearing on September 19; he saw medical again on September 20, 22, 24, and

25; and on September 27, Drs. Winters and Ryan examined and x-rayed his

right shoulder at RMC. Id. at 15-29. But Ratley admitted he told no one about

Burkett’s attack during any of those interactions. Id. at 15-29. On September

19, 2019, Ratley also emailed his sister, Brandy Parrish, but did not mention

Burkett’s attack and instead stated he “fell in [his] store . . . and [his] right

arm is a swollen and purple mass from [his] elbow to [his] shoulder.” Doc. 128-

5.

According to Ratley, the first time he told anyone about Burkett’s attack

was on September 28, 2019, when he told his sister Parrish during their face-

to-face visitation. Doc. 128-1 at 18, 29. He stated that at that time, he informed

Parrish “of the entire situation and exactly what happened and [his] reasons

for not saying what happened over e-mail.” Id. at 29-30. Parrish immediately

attempted to talk to the officer present during the visitation, but the officer

told her “she would have to report it to the proper authorities.” Id. at 30. Ratley

stated that Parrish then filed two complaints on the FDOC website on

September 29. Id. Ratley testified that two days later, on October 1, Lieutenant

Harrell met with him in response to Parrish’s complaint about staff abuse, took

a photo of Ratley, and asked Ratley to write a statement about the incident.

Id. at 31. Ratley explained that during that meeting, he asked Harrell if he

could be placed in protective custody away from Burkett, but Harrell denied

the request, saying he “cannot ask for protection from an FD[O]C staff

member.” Id. at 33. According to Ratley, he asked to be placed in protective

custody because during the assault, Burkett “made it clear that [Ratley] would

not continue to live on the compound with him if [Ratley] told on him for” the

attack. Id. Ratley acknowledged, however, that following the attack, he did not

see Burkett again until after he returned to Hamilton C.I. following his first

shoulder surgery. Id. at 33-34.

Ratley testified that on October 2, 3, and 8, Parrish exchanged emails

with the OIG and the OIG informed her that the department was reviewing

her complaint about the assault. Id. at 34-35. According to Ratley, on October

11, Parrish emailed Defendant Palmer’s FDOC email “directly” and asked

about the assault investigation and Ratley’s need for medical care. Id. at 35-

37. Ratley testified that Parrish obtained Palmer’s direct FDOC email address

because it is available online, but he did not know if Palmer personally

responded to her email. Id. at 35-37. Ratley also stated that on October 11, his

mother, Cindy Ratley, called his classification officer and Captain James to tell

them about the assault. Id. at 37.

Ratley testified that on October 15, he began filing a series of informal

and formal grievances about his need for medical care for the injuries he

suffered during Burkett’s assault. Id. at 38-42. On October 19, Ratley filed a

grievance about Burkett’s assault, and C. Neel responded to the grievance,

explaining “the subject of [his] grievance was previously referred to the [OIG]

. . . [a]nd since that process was initiated prior to receipt of the grievance, this

office cannot do anything.” Id. at 43-44.

On October 23, 2019, officials transferred Ratley to CFRC for right-

shoulder surgery. Id. at 45-46. He remained at CFRC until he received his first

surgery, and officials then transferred him to RMC on November 14, 2019, for

follow-up care. Id. at 48-49. Ratley submitted an informal grievance to the OIG

about its investigation into Burkett’s assault; and the OIG responded that the

assault was no longer an active OIG investigation and that it forwarded the

complaint (MINS-954546) to Hamilton C.I. officials. Id. at 49-50. A review of

the MINS Incident Report – 954546 shows that on September 18, 2019, Ratley

declared a medical emergency because of swelling in his right shoulder and

during his evaluation, he advised medical that he slipped and fell causing the

injury to his arm. Doc. 128-7 at 1. The MINS Report adds that Brandy Parrish

later emailed Colonel Brannen and alleged that Burkett verbally threatened

Ratley and that is the reason other inmates injured Ratley. Id. Ratley then

submitted a witness statement stating Burkett conspired to have “him beat

up,” and then he attacked him on September 16. Id. at 2.

Ratley testified that on December 2, he filed a formal grievance with the

Secretary; and on December 13, A. Keaton responded saying the grievance was

being returned without action because he could not “appeal a decision that’s

already rendered by the Office of the Secretary.” Doc. 128-1 at 50. He also

stated that his mother and Parrish submitted complaints about the assault via

the FDOC website on December 5 and 12. Id. at 51.

On December 13, 2019, officials transferred Ratley back to Hamilton C.I.

and placed him in confinement “due to the investigation.” Id. at 51-52. On

December 15, Ratley saw Burkett for the first time since the September 16

assault and learned Burkett was assigned to monitor the confinement unit in

which Ratley was housed. Id. at 52-53. The next day, December 16, Ratley filed

an emergency grievance with the Secretary’s Office, asking for “an emergency

transfer.” Id. at 54. In the grievance, he advised officials that he felt his “life

was in danger” because he was transferred back to the facility where Burkett

attacked him and was confined in the unit to which Burkett was assigned. Id.

at 53-54. Ratley testified that A. Johns responded, advising Ratley that his

grievance was not accepted “as a grievance of an emergency nature, and that,

once again, it was previously referred to the [OIG] and it’s their responsibility

to determine what’s going to happen.” Id. at 54.

Ratley testified that on December 20, Sergeant Bowers pulled Ratley

from his cell and asked about his return to Hamilton C.I. and his protective

custody status. Id. at 56. Ratley advised Bowers that he was in protective

custody because of “the investigation” and explained he “was in fear of [his] life

from Sergeant Burkett.” Id. Bowers responded to Ratley that he could not

“request a keep-away from [an FDOC] staff member.” Id. at 56. On December

21, Ratley’s mother filed another complaint with the OIG about being returned

to Hamilton C.I. and placed in Burkett’s confinement unit. Id. at 57. Two days

later, on December 23, officials escorted Ratley to Major Carter’s office where

Carter advised Ratley he had been placed in confinement because “upon

intake, classification thought [he] was in fear of an inmate[,] not a staff

member.” Id. Ratley explained he advised Carter that he feared no other

inmates, but rather he feared Burkett. Id. Carter told Ratley that while he

could not request protection from a staff member, officials would review his

custody status and determine if Ratley should be transferred to another

facility. Id. at 58.

According to Ratley, on December 24, Burkett came to his cell several

times and threatened retaliation if Ratley did not drop the investigation. Id. at

59. Thereafter, on December 27, ICP advised Ratley that they had

recommended him for a transfer, and “sometime [during] the first week of

January” 2020, officials transferred Ratley to another facility. Id. at 60-62.

According to Ratley, after his January 2020 transfer, he has not returned to

Hamilton C.I. Id. at 71.

Ratley testified that he named FDOC Defendants (the Secretary,

Warden, Assistant Warden, and Regional Director) because it “was common

knowledge” that “Burkett beats inmates.” Id. at 71-72. Ratley stated FDOC

Defendants “would have to know” because the Florida Department of Law

Enforcement (FDLE) previously investigated Burkett for another inmate

assault, which resulted in other correctional officers being arrested and

criminally charged. Id. at 73. While Ratley could not provide details of other

inmate assaults involving Burkett, he stated he knew about Burkett’s prior

attacks through “inmate speak.” Id. When asked why he named the Secretary

as a Defendant, Ratley stated he sued him because he is the head of the FDOC.

Id. at 74. Ratley admitted he neither had information indicating that the

Secretary was personally involved in the events underlying this case, nor that

he or his family members spoke to the Secretary personally about the events.

Id.

In his deposition, however, Ratley testified that his sister and mother

spoke with the Regional Director, the Warden, and the Assistant Warden and

informed them about Burkett’s September 16, 2019 assault and asked why

officials continued to house him at Hamilton C.I. while Burkett was there. Id.

Ratley also stated that the Warden and Assistant Warden learned of the

situation because his family called Hamilton C.I. multiple times; Lieutenant

Harrell advised Ratley he planned to turn over relevant documents to

Hamilton C.I.’s Warden and Assistant Warden following their October 1, 2019

interaction; and Major Carter obtained documents from the Assistant

Warden’s Office for their December 23 meeting about being transferred. Id. at

74-76. He also testified that his sister emailed Defendant Palmer several

times, but he was unaware of whether Palmer ever responded to her emails.

Id. at 75-76. Ratley acknowledged that following his transfer back to Hamilton

C.I. after his surgery, he personally never spoke to the Warden or Assistant

Warden, only his family members did. Id. at 77-78.

Defendant Palmer submitted a declaration, in which he states in

pertinent part:

My duties, as Regional Director in Region II are to

provide supervisory oversight for the region . . . .

Because we receive so much communication daily, I

have a team of staff who assist me with delegation of

duties, especially as it relates to tasking out

correspondence and tracking responses. . . .

It is common practice to ask that the administration

at the location of custody to have the inmate evaluated

by medical if the inmate was alleging denied access to

care.

Our records were searched to obtain any information

we had related to this case. The records reveal that my

secretary received and handled a call from the sister

of Plaintiff, Brandy Parrish. She then emailed the

Warden’s Office at Hamilton CI and instructed them

to give her a call at once . . . to address her concerns

and then inform her of the outcome.

Doc. 128-2. The FDOC Defendants also submitted a copy of a December 23,

2019 email Defendant Palmer’s Executive Secretary sent to Defendant Young,

stating that Parrish had called Palmer’s office and asking that Defendant

Young call Parrish to address her concerns. Doc. 128-6.

Defendant Young submitted a declaration that states the following in

relevant part:

As [former] Warden [at Hamilton C.I.], I was

responsible for day-to-day administration and

operations of the Correctional facility. Those duties

included the oversight of employees, and correctional

officers. I would respond to grievances from inmates.

. . . .

I did not have any direct contact with the Plaintiff

Michael Steven Ratley . . . regarding the allegations of

his complaint.

I was not in a position to deny Plaintiff medical care,

such requests for medical care would have been [to]

nurses or corrections officers in the wing.

In regard to the receipt of telephonic calls, as Warden,

I had an assistant that fielded such calls for me.

Doc. 128-3.

Defendant Stewart submitted a declaration stating the following:

As an Assistant Warden [at Hamilton C.I.,] I was

responsible for day-to-day operations, the oversight of

employees, and correctional officers. I would respond

to grievances from inmates.

I had a colonel who worked under me, as well as two

or three Majors, who assisted me with resolving

grievances and other inmate issues.

I did not have any direct contact with Inmate Ratley

regarding the allegations of his complaint.

I was not in a position to deny Inmate Ratley medical

care, such requests for medical care would have been

[to] nurses or corrections officers in the wing.

Doc. 128-4.

VI. Law and Conclusions

Ratley seeks relief against the FDOC Defendants based on a theory of

supervisory liability because as “management of the institution,” the FDOC

Defendants had the means, responsibility, and authority to properly resolve

the issues. Response Brief at 9. The FDOC Defendants argue that Ratley failed

to submit evidence of their personal involvement sufficient to support his

claims against them.

The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[i]t is well established in this Circuit

that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional

acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious

liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in

part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). To

establish individual liability for supervisory conduct, a plaintiff must show

“that the supervisor either directly participated in the unconstitutional

conduct or that a causal connection exists between the supervisor’s actions and

the alleged constitutional violation.” Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034,

1047–48 (11th Cir. 2014).

A plaintiff may show the requisite causal connection in one of three ways:

(1) “when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on

notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he [or she] fails to do

so”; (2) “when a supervisor’s custom or policy . . . result[s] in deliberate

indifference to constitutional rights”; or (3) “when facts support an inference

that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that

the subordinate would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.”

Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360. Also,

[T]o prove that a policy or its absence caused a

constitutional harm, a plaintiff must point to multiple

incidents, or multiple reports of prior misconduct by a

particular employee. And allegations of a single

incident of unconstitutional conduct cannot state a

claim for supervisory liability, even when the conduct

involves several subordinates.

Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations and

citations omitted).

A. Failure to Protect

The FDOC Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on

Ratley’s failure to protect claims against them because he fails to establish that

they violated his constitutional rights. Motion at 15-19. According to the FDOC

Defendants, Ratley fails to point to any evidence showing they knew Burkett

posed an excessive risk to Ratley’s health or safety before the incident or had

the ability to remedy the situation beforehand. Id. They acknowledge that

Ratley’s family members contacted FDOC officials after the attack, but

Ratley’s original story was that his injuries resulted from a fall; and his

subsequent decision to alter his story and report Burkett’s actions could not

place FDOC Defendants on notice. Id. They also contend that while Ratley filed

grievances about the assault and his desire that officials offer him protection

from Burkett following the assault, none of the FDOC Defendants personally

responded to those grievances. Id.

Ratley contends the FDOC Defendants “had personal knowledge that

Defendant Burkett had previously had allegations of inmate abuse, which were

reported and [yet] continued to allow Defendant Burkett around the inmate

population with the personal knowledge that the inmate population was at a

greater risk of harm due to the actions of [D]efendant Burkett.” Doc. 150 at 8.

He also asserts he filed several grievances with the Warden and the Secretary

personally informing them of Burkett’s September 16, 2019 assault, and

Parrish personally emailed Defendant Palmer about “the ongoing situation.”

Id. at 4-6. Ratley also alleges Parrish and his mother Cindy Ratley “notified

via email, grievance, phone, online complaint or letter at a minimum (33)

Thirty-three FD[O]C . . . employees of the assault,” including Palmer, Stewart,

and Young, about Ratley being housed in the same confinement wing that

Burkett was assigned to monitor, and about Ratley’s desire for protection from

Burkett. Id. at 7. Thus, Ratley maintains that a genuine dispute of material

fact exists as to the FDOC Defendants’ knowledge of the risk of harm

Defendant Burkett posed to Ratley prior to and after the September 16, 2019

assault and that they failed to alleviate those risks. See Doc. 152.

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 832 (1994), but this does not make them “guarantor[s] of [prisoners’]

safety,” Purcell ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313,

1321 (11th Cir. 2005). As such, prison officials are not constitutionally liable

for every inmate attack. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. Instead, it is “[a] prison

official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an

inmate [that] violates the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 828 (citations omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit has explained the requirement of deliberate indifference

to a substantial risk of serious harm as follows:

To succeed on a failure-to-protect claim, a

plaintiff must satisfy three elements. First, the

plaintiff must show that [he] was “incarcerated under

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Second, the plaintiff must

show that the “prison official [had] a sufficiently

culpable state of mind,” amounting to “deliberate

indifference.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Third, and finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate

causation—that the constitutional violation caused

[his] injuries. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748

F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014).

Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1357–58 (11th Cir. 2021) (citations modified).

Recently, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that in accordance with Farmer,

courts in this circuit should apply the “subjective recklessness” standard as

used in criminal law when determining liability on an Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference claim. See Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1253 (11th

Cir. 2024) (en banc). To satisfy this standard, the plaintiff must show:

First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered

a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently

serious.’” [Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834].

Second, . . . that the defendant acted with

“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,”

id. at 839, and to do so he must show that the

defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his

own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm

to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if

the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to

inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable

under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if

he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844–45.

Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (enumeration and emphasis omitted).8

Under this standard, “liability requires consciousness of a risk.” Farmer,

511 U.S. at 840. The defendant prison official “must both be aware of facts from

8 The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan wrote a concurrence to

the majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior Eleventh Circuit

deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they should continue

to be cited as binding precedent.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. As such, a prisoner-

plaintiff must point to evidence showing “the defendant prison official actually

knew of a substantial risk of serious harm, not just that he should have

known.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1257 (emphasis in original). A prison official

cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for not appreciating that a

prisoner faced a substantial risk of serious harm, even if “the risk was obvious

and a reasonable prison official would have noticed it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842

(“[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have

perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot . . . be

condemned as the infliction of punishment.”).

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must point to

evidence permitting the reasonable inference that the defendant was

deliberately indifferent to conditions that were “sufficiently serious.” See

Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2004). Conditions of

confinement are “sufficiently serious” only if they are so extreme that they

expose the prisoner to “an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future

health or safety.” Id. at 1289 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Showing a

substantial risk of serious harm requires the prisoner to provide evidence that

there was a ‘strong likelihood’ of his injury occurring.” Visage v. Woodall, 798

F. App’x 406, 408 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295,

1301 (11th Cir. 2015)). A court’s consideration of whether there was a strong

likelihood, as opposed to a “mere possibility,” of an injury occurring cannot be

based on “hindsight bias.” Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1301. Moreover, isolated

incidents do not satisfy the “substantial risk” standard articulated in Farmer.

See, e.g., Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1320 (“[O]ccasional, isolated attacks by one

prisoner on another may not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, [but]

confinement in a prison where violence and terror reign is actionable.”); see

also Lakin v. Barnhart, 758 F.3d 66, 70–72 (1st Cir. 2014) (Souter, J., sitting

by designation) (explaining that the risk must be “substantial,” not isolated or

infrequent, and affirming summary judgment in defendants’ favor where

plaintiff’s evidence did not reach the “substantial” threshold required by

Farmer as “not every risk carries an inherent threat at a substantial level”).

As such, a prisoner cannot survive summary judgment based solely on evidence

of past isolated incidents or his own injury. Visage, 798 F. App’x at 408. Rather,

the prisoner must demonstrate that the complained-of condition—most

commonly inmate-on-inmate violence—resulted in so many incidents or

injuries that such incidents or injuries were “the norm or something close to

it.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Purcell,

400 F.3d at 1322)).

Here, Ratley’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim is seemingly

based on two theories: (1) the FDOC Defendants failed to protect him from

Burkett’s September 16, 2019 assault; and (2) the FDOC Defendants acted

deliberately indifferent and failed to protect him from another potential

assault when, after the September 16, 2019 assault, they ignored his requests

for protection and continued to house him at Hamilton C.I.

As to both theories, the FDOC Defendants assert they were unaware of

any underlying facts suggesting Burkett posed a substantial danger to Ratley.

While the evidence shows that four days before the attack, Burkett made

threatening comments to Ratley, Ratley does not allege, and no evidence

shows, that Ratley advised any FDOC Defendant or any other official about

Burkett’s September 12, 2019 comments. Indeed, Ratley does not allege, and

no evidence shows, that Ratley advised any FDOC Defendant or any other

official that he feared Burkett prior to the September 16 attack. Ratley argues

that the FDOC Defendants knew that Burkett posed a substantial risk to him

prior to the September 16 attack because Burkett had a history of attacking

inmates and that the FDOC had an unofficial policy or practice of allowing

FDOC staff to use malicious force on inmates. But the only record evidence

supporting that notion is Ratley’s generalized testimony that Burkett’s abusive

history was “common knowledge” and that he learned about Burkett’s history

though “inmate speak.” Doc. 128-1 at 72-73. But the record here contains

evidence about only one incident (Burkett’s September 16, 2019 assault), and

that evidence alone does not constitute evidence of widespread abuse such that

a jury could find that the FDOC Defendants were put on notice of an increased

risk of harm to Ratley. Nor does it support a finding that the FDOC Defendants

had an unofficial policy resulting in a constitutional violation.

Notably, Ratley’s own allegations and testimony show that before the

attack, even he was unaware that Burkett posed a substantial risk of harm to

him. Ratley testified that while Burkett made verbal threats on September 12,

2019, Burkett did not physically touch Ratley on that day. Indeed, three days

then went by without Ratley seeing Burkett. It was on September 16, 2019,

while Ratley was unaware and simply taking out the morning trash, that two

unknown inmates hit Ratley from behind and dragged him inside his canteen

where Burkett began kicking him.

The evidence further shows that following the attack, Ratley waited

twelve days to tell anyone about Burkett’s September 16 assault despite

having several opportunities to advise family members and officials. Indeed,

the September 19, 2019 email Ratley sent to Parrish states he injured himself

after falling in his canteen. See Doc. 128-5. And Ratley admits that despite

seeing various officials and medical personnel between September 17 and 27,

he told no one about Burkett’s attack.

The record shows that on September 28, 2019, Ratley mentioned

Burkett’s attack for the first time during his visitation with Parrish.

Thereafter, Ratley spoke with Lieutenant Harrell; Parrish emailed Palmer’s

direct FDOC email address; and Ratley submitted a grievance about Burkett.

But Ratley acknowledged that he did not know if Palmer responded to

Parrish’s email, and Ratley testified that C. Neel responded to his grievance.

Ratley was then transferred to CFRC for surgery on October 23, 2019. The

undisputed evidence shows that between the September 16 attack and the

October 23 transfer, Ratley did not see or interact with Burkett. Thus, there is

no direct or anecdotal evidence from which to infer that the FDOC Defendants

were aware of information that Burkett posed a risk to Ratley during that

timeframe.

As to Ratley’s return to Hamilton C.I., the record shows that Ratley was

returned to Hamilton C.I. on December 13, 2019. He saw Burkett for the first

time since the assault on December 15, 2019. Ratley and his family then

notified officials about Ratley’s need for protection. Ratley also filed an

emergency grievance, to which A. Johns responded, and Sergeant Bowers met

with Ratley and learned of his desire for protective custody. On December 23,

2019, Parrish called Palmer’s office and Palmer’s Executive Secretary emailed

Defendant Young about Parrish’s complaints and asked Young to contact

Parrish and notify the Secretary’s Office immediately afterward. See Doc. 128-

5. That same day, Major Carter met with Ratley and, according to Ratley’s own

testimony, explained that officials believed Ratley was placed in confinement

upon his return to Hamilton C.I. because he feared another inmate. When

Ratley explained that it was Burkett he was in fear of, Carter advised that

officials would review his custody status, and they ultimately transferred

Ratley to another facility about a week later. Thus, there is no evidence from

which to infer that upon learning of the potential risk Ratley’s December 13,

2019 transfer back to Hamilton C.I. posed, the FDOC Defendants disregarded

that known risk by failing to respond to it in a reasonable manner. While it

was unfortunate that upon his return to Hamilton C.I. officials housed Ratley

in the same wing as Burkett, once officials learned of the true alleged threat to

Ratley, they took reasonable actions to remedy the situation and transferred

Ratley to another facility within days. As such, the record evidence fails to

support a finding that the FDOC Defendants either directly participated in

any unconstitutional conduct, or that they were causally connected to the

alleged constitutional violation. Thus, on this record, the FDOC Defendants

are entitled to summary judgment and the Motion is due to be granted as to

Ratley’s failure to protect claims against them.

B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

The material facts relating to the FDOC Defendants’ involvement in

Ratley’s medical care are undisputed. The parties agree that the FDOC

Defendants are not medical providers and that any claim against the FDOC

Defendants based on the lack of medical care he received following Burkett’s

September 19, 2019 attack is solely based on their status as supervisory

officials. But Ratley’s supervisory medical claim against the FDOC Defendants

hinges on a determination that at least one of the Medical Defendants actually

violated Ratley’s clearly established constitutional rights. See Rooney v.

Watson, 101 F.3d 1378, 1381 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding no supervisory liability

where there was no underlying violation of clearly established constitutional

rights); Knight ex rel. Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 821 (11th Cir.

2017) (“There can be no policy-based liability or supervisory liability when

there is no underlying constitutional violation.”). Because the Court has

already determined that the Medical Defendants did not act deliberately

indifferent to Ratley’s serious medical needs, see Order (Doc. 145), the FDOC

Defendants cannot be liable in their supervisory roles. As such, the FDOC

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment and the Motion is due to be

granted as to Ratley’s deliberate indifference to serious medical need claims

against them.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc 127) is

GRANTED.

2. The Clerk shall terminate Defendants Dixon, Palmer, Stewart,

and Young as parties.

3. By January 31, 2025, Defendant Burkett and Ratley shall confer

in good faith in an attempt to resolve the remaining claims. If they reach a

settlement, they shall promptly notify the Court. If they cannot settle the

claims privately, Defendant Burkett shall file a notice advising whether the

parties believe a settlement conference with the United States Magistrate

Judge will be beneficial.

4. To allow the parties sufficient time to confer regarding settlement,

the Clerk shall administratively close the case pending further order.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 13th day of

December, 2024.

United States District Judge

Jax-7

C: Michael Steven Ratley

Counsel of record

37