Opinion

Bong v. Brown

Court
District Court, D. Oregon
Filed
Dec 13, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.3%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

JILL BONG, Case No. 6:23-cv-00417-MTK

Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

KATE BROWN; RACHAEL BANKS;

STEVE WOODS; REX FULLER; CLINT

THOMPSON; JOHN BOLING; CHARLIE

SAWYER; REBEKAH SAWYER; VALERIE

ANDERSON; HOLLY HILL; BOB

SCONCE; UNKNOWN LEGAL COUNSEL;

OREGON EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT;

and OREGON SCHOOL BOARDS

ASSOCIATION,

Defendants.

KASUBHAI, United States District Judge:

Self-represented Plaintiff Jill Bong filed this action against multiple Oregon state officials

and school district employees in their individual and official capacities alleging various state and

federal law claims, including alleged constitutional and civil rights violations. The majority of

Plaintiff’s claims arise from actions taken by Defendants in response to the COVID-19

pandemic. Plaintiff was employed as a math tutor for Defendant Douglas County School District

15 (“Defendant”) beginning in January 2016. 2d. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-48, ECF No. 199. Her

employment was terminated on October 19, 2021, for failure to comply with her employer’s

COVID-19 vaccination mandate, from which she had requested an exemption based on minority

religious beliefs. Id. at ¶¶ 352, 354. Before her termination, Plaintiff had expressed opinions

opposing the vaccination mandate, and alleges retaliation for sharing those views.

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction against Defendant

Douglas County School District 15 (ECF No. 235). Plaintiff seeks an order enjoining Defendant

from continuing hostility and discrimination against minority or non-Christian religious beliefs,

from taking retaliatory action against Plaintiff for protected speech, to put Plaintiff on equal

footing with other employees with respect to employment offers and conditions, and to reinstate

Plaintiff to her former position and pay rate. Pl. Mot. 14-15. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s

motion is denied.

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter

v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). A party seeking a preliminary injunction

must demonstrate: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction is in the

public interest. Id. at 20. The moving party “has the general burden of establishing the elements

necessary to obtain injunctive relief.” Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th

Cir. 2009). Moreover, when a plaintiff seeks “mandatory” relief rather than “prohibitory”

relief—as Plaintiff does here by requesting reinstatement—that relief “is particularly disfavored,

and should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.” Anderson v.

United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).

Applying the Winter factors, the Court’s analysis here begins and ends with Plaintiff’s

failure to demonstrate that she will face irreparable harm in the absence of the relief requested. It

is true that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,

unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).

However, a litigant seeking injunctive relief for such harm must still show that “First

Amendment interests were either threatened or in fact being impaired at the time relief was

sought.” Id. Injunctive relief is not warranted “absent a sufficient likelihood that [Plaintiff] will

again be wronged in a similar way.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). Here,

Plaintiff admits that she has “already suffered” the First Amendment harms of which she

complains, Mot. at 14, and she provides no showing that additional injury is being incurred or is

threatened. Indeed, Plaintiff has not been employed by Defendant since 2021.

In sum, Plaintiff has not shown that she will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

injunctive relief. Because this element is dispositive of Plaintiff’s motion, the Court does not

address the remaining Winter factors. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1174

(9th Cir. 2011).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 235) is

DENIED.

DATED this 13th day of December 2024.

s/ Mustafa T. Kasubhai

MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (He / Him)

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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