Opinion

Sheets v. Jimenez

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Dec 12, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.3%

because the officers did not commit a constitutional violation “they are entitled to qualified immunity, and we end our qualified immunity analysis”

How later courts described this case

  • because the officers did not commit a constitutional violation “they are entitled to qualified immunity, and we end our qualified immunity analysis”
  • “Prior restraints contrast with ‘subsequent punishments,’ which regulate a given type of speech by penalizing the speech only after it occurs.”
  • “In a limited public forum, as we have said, the government’s restrictions on speech must not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint and must be reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.” (citation omitted)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

ANDREW BRYANT SHEETS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 2:24-cv-704-SPC-KCD

KELVIN JIMENEZ, DYLAN J

RENZ and CITY OF PUNTA

GORDA,

Defendants.

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss—one filed by Officers

Kelvin Jimenez and Dylan Renz (Doc. 21) and one filed by the City of Punta

Gorda (Doc. 22). Plaintiff responded to each motion (Docs. 26, 27), so the

motions are ripe for review.

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violations of his First Amendment rights. (Doc. 18).1 On August 12, 2020,

Plaintiff entered the Punta Gorda Public Safety Complex to file a complaint.

All the while, he was video recording this experience with a body camera. The

problem is a city ordinance renders it unlawful “to record video and/or sound

1 The Court “accept[s] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[es] them in the

light most favorable to” Plaintiff. Belanger v. Salvation Army, 556 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir.

2009).

within City-owned, controlled, and leased property, without the consent of all

persons whose voice or image is being recorded.” Punta Gorda Code § 15-48(e).2

Because Plaintiff was actively violating this Ordinance when he entered the

Public Safety Complex, he was met by Officer Jimenez who asked Plaintiff to

step outside. Once outside, Officer Jimenez explained to Plaintiff that he

“cannot be inside while recording.” (Doc. 18 ¶ 19). Two months later, on

October 1, 2020, Plaintiff returned to the Public Safety Complex to conduct a

records request. This time though, he was trespassed from the building by

Officer Renz for again violating the Ordinance. (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 25-26).

Based on these confrontations, Plaintiff sues the Officers (in their

individual and official capacities) under various § 1983 theories. First, he

claims the Officers violated his First Amendment rights by engaging in

viewpoint discrimination (counts I and IV). He next argues their actions

amounted to a prior restraint, which also violated his First Amendment rights

(counts II and III). And he claims their conduct was retaliation for exercising

his First Amendment rights (counts V and VI). He also brings a Monell claim

against the City for failure to train (count VII). And in Count VIII, he brings

2 The Ordinance is not a complete bar to unconsented recording. It provides an exception for

recordings “within the City Council Chambers, conference rooms, and other locations in

which a public meeting is being conducted pursuant to a public notice” as well as “law

enforcement activities.” Punta Gorda Code § 15-48(e).

essentially the same claim again while also insisting the Ordinance is

“unconstitutional on its face.” (Doc. 18).

This is a familiar case. Back in 2019, Plaintiff brought a similar action—

Sheets v. City of Punta Gorda, 2:19-cv-484-SPC-MM. There, Plaintiff was cited

under the same Ordinance for unconsented video recording inside City Hall.

He asked the Court to enjoin the Ordinance as unconstitutional under the First

and Fourteenth Amendments. Like here, he claimed the Ordinance was

viewpoint discriminatory and constituted a prior restraint. In denying his

motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court made clear that “the Ordinance

is facially viewpoint neutral because it does not target any viewpoint, ideology,

or opinion.”3 Sheets v. City of Punta Gorda, Fla., 415 F. Supp. 3d 1115, 1124

(M.D. Fla. 2019). And it similarly found the Ordinance was not a prior

restraint. Id. at 1126. Plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed the case.

Despite the Court’s ruling, Plaintiff refused to back down. As discussed

above, he engaged in identical conduct in a different city building and now files

suit. This time though, he does not just attack the Ordinance directly. Instead,

3 In 2019, the Court determined that City Hall was a limited public forum. Thus, the

restriction on speech needed to be view-point neutral and reasonable. McDonough v. Garcia,

116 F.4th 1319 (11th Cir. 2024) (“In a limited public forum, as we have said, the government’s

restrictions on speech must not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint and

must be reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.” (citation omitted)). Here,

the parties agree the Public Safety Complex is a limited public forum, so the analysis is the

same.

he attacks the Officers who enforced it and the City for failing to train its

officers. Still, the substance of the attacks is the same.

Defendants move to dismiss the claims. The Officers argue that they

cannot be sued in their official capacity, that they are entitled to qualified

immunity, and that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel. (Doc.

21). The City argues Plaintiff fails to state a claim against it and that

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel. (Doc. 22).

With that background, the Court turns to the merits. First, the Court

addresses the collateral estoppel argument. “Collateral estoppel or issue

preclusion forecloses relitigation of an issue of fact or law that has been

litigated and decided in a prior suit.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Bhd. of Maint. of

Way Emps., 327 F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003). This doctrine applies when:

(1) the issues at stake are identical to the one involved in the prior litigation;

(2) the issues were actually litigated in the prior suit; (3) the determination of

the issues in the prior litigation was a critical and necessary part of the

judgment in that action; and (4) the party against whom the earlier decision is

asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the earlier

proceeding.” Id. Defendants have not shown this doctrine applies.4

4 Defendants incorrectly assert that Florida collateral estoppel applies. Because Defendants

argue a prior federal decision bars this action, federal preclusion principles apply. See CSX

Transp., 327 F.3d at 1316.

Defendants rely on this Court’s ruling from Plaintiff’s 2019 case. But

there, Plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of the Ordinance itself. Here,

Plaintiff argues the Officers’ enforcement of the Ordinance violated his First

Amendment rights, which is a distinct issue. The issues raised in his Monell

claim against the City—failure to train—are also new. That said, there is some

overlap between the issues in each case. But even so, the 2019 order denied

Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Given that posture, it is unclear

whether the previously addressed issues were “actually litigated” or necessary

for “judgment.” And Defendants present no authority on this point. So the

case may press forward.5

The case may not proceed, however, against the Officers in their official

capacity. Plaintiff brings his claims against the Officers in both their

individual and official capacities. The Officers argue Plaintiff cannot assert

claims against them in their official capacity while also maintaining a claim

against the City. This is true. “In contrast to individual capacity suits, when

an officer is sued under Section 1983 in his or her official capacity, the suit is

simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer

is an agent.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991).

“Such suits against municipal officers are therefore, in actuality, suits directly

5 That said, the Court is mindful of its previous rulings and, where appropriate, gives it

precedential effect.

against the city that the officer represents.” Id. Because the claims against

the Officers in their official capacity are duplicative of the claims against the

City, they must be dismissed. See Am. Humanist Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Ocala,

127 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2015).

Moving on to the claims against the Officers, beginning with viewpoint

discrimination (counts I and IV). According to Plaintiff, Officer Jimenez

required him to leave the Public Safety Complex for video recording, and

Officer Renz trespassed him for the same. However, just a few days before

Plaintiff first entered the Public Safety Complex, media crews were permitted

to set up cameras and record there. In Plaintiff’s view, this disparity in

treatment reveals the Officers’ actions against him were based on his

viewpoint. (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 56, 86). The Court construes this as a selective

enforcement claim. See Matacchiero v. McCormick, No. 3:24CV105-TKW-ZCB,

2024 WL 3629442, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2024) (“Plaintiff does not argue that

the public comment restrictions in the WCBCC meeting policies facially

discriminated against his viewpoint; he only argues that Defendant selectively

enforced the restrictions against him because of his viewpoint.”). But the

glaring problem is he does not allege any viewpoint that purportedly formed

the basis of his restriction.

Plaintiff fails to show he was targeted for any viewpoint. “A restriction

on speech constitutes viewpoint discrimination ‘when the specific motivating

ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the

restriction.’” Jackson v. McCurry, 762 F. App’x 919, 930 (11th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Vir., 515 U.S. 819, 829

(1995)). Although Plaintiff alleges others were permitted to record in the

Public Safety Complex without repercussion, he does not claim his restriction

was based on a held ideology, opinion, or perspective. So he fails to allege

viewpoint discrimination, and counts I and IV are dismissed.6

In counts II and III, Plaintiff contends that the Officers’ actions

amounted to an unlawful prior restraint. The Officers invoke qualified

immunity. “A motion to dismiss a complaint on qualified immunity grounds

will be granted if the complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly

established constitutional right.” Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189,

1199 (11th Cir. 2007). To establish qualified immunity, the Officers must show

the allegedly unconstitutional conduct occurred while they were acting within

the scope of their discretionary authority. Id. This point is not disputed. See

also Patrick v. McGuire, No. 8:24-CV-999-MSS-NHA, 2024 WL 4803217, at *4

(M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2024) (officer acted within discretionary authority when

she told plaintiff to leave the government office pursuant to the office’s policy

against video recording). So the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show: (1) the

6 Because Plaintiff will be permitted leave to amend these claims, the Court does not reach

the qualified immunity analysis.

Officers violated a constitutional right, and then (2) that the violation was

clearly established. Griffin, 496 F.3d at 1199. If Plaintiff cannot establish the

Officers violated a constitutional right, the qualified immunity inquiry ends.

Id. at 1200; see also Swinford v. Santos, 121 F.4th 179, 191 (11th Cir. 2024)

(because the officers did not commit a constitutional violation “they are entitled

to qualified immunity, and we end our qualified immunity analysis”).

The Officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s prior

restraint claims. To begin, his Complaint includes only conclusory assertions

that the Officers’ conduct constituted an unlawful prior restraint. And his

Response to the Officers’ motion to dismiss offers nothing of substance. Given

that it is his burden to show the Officers’ conduct was unlawful, he falls well

short. Putting aside this deficiency, he cannot show a constitutional violation

because the Officers’ enforcement of the Ordinance was not a prior restraint.

“A prior restraint on expression exists when the government can deny

access to a forum for expression before the expression occurs.” United States

v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

Conversely, if the government penalizes expression after it occurs, then there

is no prior restraint. See Barrett v. Walker Cnty. Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 1209,

1223 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Prior restraints contrast with ‘subsequent

punishments,’ which regulate a given type of speech by penalizing the speech

only after it occurs.”). Such is the case here.

A good place to start this analysis is with the Ordinance itself. It

provides that “if anyone is observed to be recording video and/or sound within

City-owned, controlled or leased property, without the consent of all persons

whose voice or image is being recorded, and such person refuses to cease

activity after being advised that such activity is prohibited under this

Ordinance, such refusal shall be considered to be a disruption to the work of

City government.” Punta Gorda Code § 15-48(e). At that point, the violator

can be asked to “immediately leave the premises.” Id. And if the violator

refuses to do so, he “shall be considered a trespasser” and law enforcement

“may issue a trespass warning notice for this conduct.” Id. Because a violator

of the Ordinance is penalized only after he records in a City building without

consent and subsequently refuses to cease the unconsented recording, the

Ordinance is not a prior restraint. Indeed, the Court explained this to Plaintiff

back in 2019 when it rejected the same argument. See Sheets, 415 F. Supp. 3d

at 1126 (explaining the Ordinance is not a prior restraint because it “does not

penalize unconsented recording. Instead, it penalizes the subsequent refusals

to stop recording without consent or leave City Hall because they disrupt the

purpose of the forum.”).

Having established the Ordinance is not a prior restraint, the rest is

easy. Because the Ordinance is not a prior restraint (and there is no suggestion

the Officers failed to comply with the Ordinance), it follows then that the

Officers’ enforcement of the Ordinance is not either. See Patrick, 2024 WL

4803217, at *6 (concluding that because the county policy withstood

constitutional scrutiny, “Defendants’ actions taken to enforce the policy did not

violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights”). Plaintiff’s own allegations confirm

this. He alleges that he was already video recording when he entered the

Public Safety Complex on August 12, 2020. (Doc. 18 ¶ 14). He was then

approached by Officer Jimenez who asked him to step outside because he

cannot record inside the building. (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 15-16). Then when Plaintiff

returned two months later, camera rolling,7 Officer Renz issued him a trespass

citation. (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 22-26). Because it was not until after Plaintiff began

recording inside the city building that the Officers stepped in, their actions

were not a prior restraint. And with no violation of Plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity on counts

II and III.

Next up are Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against the Officers.

“Retaliation against the exercise of First Amendment rights is a well-

established basis for section 1983 liability.” O’Boyle v. Sweetapple, 187 F.

Supp. 3d 1365, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (citing Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247,

1255–56 (11th Cir.2005)). “The elements of a First Amendment retaliation

7 The still image from Plaintiff’s body camera of Officer Renz addressing Plaintiff inside the

Public Safety Complex further establishes this point. (Doc. 18 ¶ 23).

claim are (1) the plaintiff engaged in speech or an act that was constitutionally

protected, (2) the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely affected the

protected speech or act, and (3) there is a causal connection between the

retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on the constitutionally-protected

speech or act.” Id. Under this rubric, Plaintiff’s claims fail.

Plaintiff asserts that, by precluding him from recording in the Public

Safety Complex, the Officers “sought to punish Plaintiff for exercising his first

amendment rights[.]” (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 98, 108). But as this Court previously

concluded, the Ordinance that makes unconsented recording in City buildings

unlawful is both reasonable and view-point neutral and, thus, constitutional.

Sheets, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 1124. See also Patrick, 2024 WL 4803217, at *4

(finding the Pasco County Tax Collector’s Office’s policy against video

recording without prior approval was viewpoint neutral and reasonable). It

follows then that Plaintiff was not engaged in an act that was constitutionally

protected. So he cannot state a retaliation claim, the Officers are entitled to

qualified immunity, and counts V and VI are dismissed with prejudice. See

Kushner v. Buhta, No. 16-cv-2646 (SRN/SER), 2018 WL 1866033, at *13 (D.

Minn. Apr. 18, 2018) aff’d, 771 F. App’x 714 (8th Cir. 2019) (finding officials

entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim

because the court already determined he did not have a First Amendment right

to video record).

Finally, we turn to the claims against the City. In Count VII, Plaintiff

brings a Monell claim, asserting that City employees have repeatedly and

unlawful violated his rights, demonstrating “a deliberate indifference and a

failure to train its employees properly on a viewpoint discrimination.” (Doc. 18

¶ 119). “To impose Monell liability, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his

constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or

policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and

(3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” Underwood v. City of

Bessemer, 11 F.4th 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “In limited

circumstances, a local government’s decision not to train certain employees to

avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an official government

policy for purposes of § 1983.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792

F.3d 1313, 1328 (11th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up and citation omitted). “A pattern

of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily

necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to

train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). And beyond that, a

plaintiff “must present some evidence that the municipality knew of a need to

train and/or supervise in a particular area and the municipality made a

deliberate choice not to take any action.” Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, Fla.,

561 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s claim falls short of these

standards.

As has been explained, Plaintiff fails to show his constitutional rights

were violated. So, his Monell claim falters from the start. Nor does he allege

the City was on notice of its employees’ viewpoint discrimination and

deliberately chose not to take action. And his attempt to establish a pattern of

constitutional violations falls short. He lists four instances in which he

believes City employees improperly discriminated based on his viewpoint. But

two of them are the actions by Officers Jimenez and Renz which won’t work

because, as discussed above, Plaintiff has not shown the Officers violated his

constitutional rights. He also points to a time he was trespassed from a

farmer’s market for recording without any suggestion he was trespassed based

on a held viewpoint. Lastly, he alleges he received a ticket for wearing an anti-

police shirt.8 Even assuming this was improper, this isolated incident does not

establish a pattern, nor is it similar enough to the alleged violation here—video

recording in a government building—to have put the City on notice of a need

to train. See Connick, 563 U.S. 51 at 62-63 (noting that previous Brady

violations by prosecutors were insufficient to put the district attorney’s office

on notice of the need to train because “those incidents [were] not similar to the

violation at issue”); Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1329 n.21. So Count VII is dismissed.

8 It is unclear if he is alleging the shirt formed the basis of the citation or if he believes he

was issued a ticket for some other violation but was targeted because of his shirt.

Count VIII is a mess. Plaintiff titles it as a First Amendment Free Press

and Monell violation and alleges that the City “through its procedures, policies,

practices, and customs engaged in conduct intentionally, knowingly, willfully,

wantonly, maliciously, and in reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights.” (Doc. 18 ¶ 129-30). This sounds a lot like the last claim. But he also

“facially challenges” the Ordinance “as unconstitutional under both state and

federal law.” (Doc. 18 ¶ 124). So it is difficult to unpack what relief Plaintiff

pursues.

To the extent that Plaintiff intends to bring a Monell claim, it is

dismissed as duplicative of count VII. See Appleby v. Knauf Gips KG, No. 22-

CIV-61411-RAR, 2023 WL 3844770, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2023) (“To promote

judicial economy, a court should dismiss claims that are duplicative of other

claims.”). As for a facial challenge to the Ordinance, he has already tried and

failed at challenging its constitutionality. This Court already determined the

Ordinance is both viewpoint neutral and reasonable. See Sheets, 415 F. Supp.

3d at 1124. To be sure, another similar county policy—precluding video

recording in the tax collector’s office without prior approval—was recently

found constitutional. See Patrick, 2024 WL 4803217, at *4. So the Court will

not entertain the argument any further. However, the Court briefly addresses

Plaintiff’s attempt to strike down the Ordinance as a violation of Florida law.

Plaintiff never specifies what Florida constitutional provision or statute

he believes the Ordinance violates. But he asserts Florida law requires that

“public business is to be conducted in sunshine.” (Doc. 18 ¶ 127). The Court

construes this as a violation of Florida’s Sunshine Law claim. Florida’s

Sunshine Law requires that all government meetings at which official acts are

to be taken must be open to the public at all times and reasonably noticed. Fla.

Stat. § 286.011(1). Its purpose is to protect the public from “closed door”

politics. Sarasota Citizens For Responsible Gov’t v. City of Sarasota, 48 So. 3d

755, 762 (Fla. 2010). Restricting nondisruptive video recording at public

meetings “violates the statute’s spirit, intent, and purpose.” Pinellas Cnty.

Sch. Bd. v. Suncam, Inc., 829 So. 2d 989, 991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). All

the same, the Ordinance explicitly permits unconsented recordings “within the

City Council Chambers, conference rooms, and other locations in which a

public meeting is being conducted pursuant to a public notice[.]” Punta Gorda

Code § 15-48(e). So the Ordinance does not violate Florida’s Sunshine Law or

federal law, and Count VIII is dismissed with prejudice.

This case sure seems like a repackaged version of Plaintiff’s case from

2019. While the Court finds it unlikely an amended complaint will bring him

any greater success, it will allow Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint

only as to counts I, IV, and VII. The other claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 21, 22) are GRANTED.

2. Counts II, ITI, V, VI, and VIII are DISMISSED with prejudice.

3. Counts I, IV, and VII are DISMISSED without prejudice.

4, Counts I-VI are DISMISSED with prejudice against Officers

Jimenez and Renz in their official capacity.

4. On or before December 31, 2024, Plaintiff may file a second

amended complaint as to counts I, IV, and VII only. Failure to do

so will cause the Court to dismiss this case without further notice.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on December 12, 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICTJUDGE

Copies: All Parties of Record

16

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