In Re: M/V Ram XVII

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:22-cv-0998

IN RE: M/V RAM XVII

JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE AYO

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Aries Marine

Corporation (“Aries Marine”). See Record Document 81. Specifically, Aries Marine argues

there is no genuine issue of material fact that Dylan Rose (“Rose”) is not a seaman but is

a maritime worker covered under the Longshore Harbor Workers Compensation Act

(“LHWCA”). See Record Document 81-1 at 8. Thus, Aries Marine submits it is entitled to

summary judgment in its favor dismissing Rose’s claim for unseaworthiness. See id. Rose

filed an opposition See Record Document 93. Aries Marine replied. See Record

Document 102. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Summary Judgment

(Record Document 81) is GRANTED. Rose’s claims against Aries Marine are hereby

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

In November of 2019, Lloyd Engineering, Inc. (“LEI”) contracted with Tolunay-

Wong Engineers, Inc. (“TWE”) to conduct geotechnical studies of soil core samples in the

Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Texas (“the LEI/TWE Contract”). See Record Document

55 at 2. In December of 2019, TWE subcontracted with Amdrill Inc. (“Amdrill”) to provide

the crew and equipment to drill for and obtain the soil core samples to be studied for the

LEI/TWE Contract (“the TWE/Amdrill Contract”). See id. In December of 2019, LEI

entered into a time charter agreement with Aries Marine to charter a liftboat, the M/V Ram

XVII, to provide transportation, a work platform, and living quarters for LEI, TWE, and

Amdrill personnel in support of the LEI/TWE and TWE/Amdrill Contracts (“the Charter

Agreement”). See id.

On December 2, 2019, Aries Marine and TWE entered into a contract titled

“Indemnity and Hold Harmless Agreement (Boarding Agreement) (“the Boarding

Agreement”), in which Aries Marine, as owner of the various vessels, and TWE agree to

allocate risks and liabilities arising out of TWE’s use of Aries Marine’s vessels. See id. at

3. Aries Marine required that TWE executed the Boarding Agreement before TWE and its

subcontractor’s personnel would be permitted to board the M/V Ram XVII to perform the

core sample work. See id. The Boarding Agreement bears the signatures of TWE’s

Executive Vice President, Arthur J. Stephens, P.E. and Aries Marine’s President and

CEO, Courtney B. Ramsay. See id.

At the time of his December 2019 accident, Rose was employed by TWE’s

subcontractor, Amdrill. See id. at 4. Rose asserted claims against Aries Marine arising

out of injuries sustained while working as a driller helper for Amdrill on the deck of the

M/V Ram XVII in performance of the TWE/Amdrill Contract. See id. Rose initially sued

Aries Marine and TWE in state court seeking recovery for personal injury damages. See

Record Document 78-1 at 1–2. He also named Amdrill as a defendant in that litigation;

however, Amdrill and the claims against it were later dismissed, as Rose settled all claims

against Amdrill. See id. at 3.

Subsequently, Aries Marine filed this limitation of liability action seeking

exoneration from or limitation of liability for the December 2019 accident, staying the state

court proceeding, and seeking defense and indemnity from the M/V Ram XVII’s time

charter, LEI, and TWE. See Record Document 81-1 at 2. Rose filed a claim in the

limitation proceeding asserting claims of unseaworthiness and negligence against TWE,

LEI, and Aries Marine. See id. TWE, LEI, and Aries Marine then filed a Third-Party

Complaint against Amdrill and its insurers based, in part, on Rose’s claim of Jones Act

seaman status. See id. Amdrill answered the Complaint, denying Rose is a Jones Act

seaman and asserting a crossclaim against Rose based on the LHWCA settlement. See

id. Aries Marine moves for summary judgment dismissing Rose’s claims because he is

covered by the provisions of the LHWCA, and his accident was caused by conditions over

which Aries Marine had no control or duty to remedy. See id.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Summary Judgment Standard.

A court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the pleadings, including

the opposing party’s affidavits, “show that there is no dispute as to any material fact and

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552–53. (1986). In

applying this standard, the Court should construe “all facts and inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party.” Deshotel v. Wal-Mart La., L.L.C., 850 F.3d 742, 745 (5th Cir. 2017);

see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“The evidence of the

non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”).

As such, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that

there is no genuine issue of material fact as to issues critical to trail that would result in

the movant’s entitlement to judgment in its favor, including identifying the relevant portions

of pleadings and discovery. See Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir.

1995). Courts must deny the moving party’s motion for summary judgment if the movant

fails to meet this burden. See id.

If the movant satisfies its burden, however, the nonmoving party must “designate

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323, 106 S. Ct. 2553). In evaluating motions for summary judgment, courts must view

all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). There is no

genuine issue for trial—and thus, a grant of summary judgment is warranted—when the

record as a whole “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the moving party….” Id.

II. Seaman Status, the Jones Act and the LHWCA.

“Depending on the status of an injured worker and the allegedly responsible party,

a maritime worker injured in the course and scope of his employment may bring an action

under the Jones Act, the LHWCA, the general maritime law, or state law.” Rutherford v.

Pontchartrain Materials Corp., LLC, No. 23-2570, 2024 WL 1966428, at *4 (E.D. La. May

3, 2024). “The Jones Act permits a ‘seaman injured in the course of employment…to bring

a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the employer.’” Id. (quoting 46

U.S.C. § 30104). Additionally, a Jones Act seaman can “bring a claim against his

employer for maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness.” Id. “The LHWCA is a workers’

compensation system and the exclusive remedy available to ‘a broad range of land-based

maritime workers’ who are injured in the course and scope of their employment but are

not seaman and thus not entitled to sue under the Jones Act.” Id. (quoting Chandris, Inc.

v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 355, 115 S. Ct. 2172 (1995) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G)). When

a court is “‘evaluating the employment-related connection of a maritime worker to a vessel

in navigation, [it] should not employ a “snapshot” test for seaman status, inspecting only

the situation as it exists at the instant of injury; a more enduring relationship is

contemplated in the jurisprudence.’” Id. (quoting Chandris, 515 U.S. at 363, 115 S. Ct.

2172 (quotation and citation omitted)).

Since the term “seaman” is not expressly defined in the Jones Act, the courts have

been tasked with defining the word “seaman.” Id. at 273. The Fifth Circuit has adopted

the two-part test established in Chandris to determine whether a maritime worker qualifies

as a seaman: “(1) ‘must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment

of its mission,’ and (2) ‘must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an

identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its

nature.’” Id. (quoting In re Endeavor Marine Inc., 234 F. 3d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing

Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368, 115 S. Ct. 2172 (1995)).

The first part of this test is considered a “threshold requirement,” making anyone

eligible for seaman status if they work at sea serving a ship. Id. The second part of the

test consists of two elements: “the worker’s connection must be ‘substantial in term of

both (1) its duration and (2) its nature.’” Id. “For the duration element, the ‘rule of thumb

for the ordinary case’ is that ‘[a] worker who spends less than about 30 percent of his time

in the service of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman.’” Id. In Sanchez

v. Smart Fabricators of Tex., L.L.C., the Court created four factors to consider “when

deciding whether a worker’s connection to a vessel is substantial in nature.” Id. The four

factors are as follows:

(1) the worker’s exposure to “perils of the sea,” meaning the

hazards of a maritime working environment; (2) whether “the

worker owe[s] his [or her] allegiance to the vessel, rather than

simply to a shoreside employer”; (3) if his or her work is “sea-

based or involve[s] seagoing activity”; and (4) whether “the

worker’s assignment to a vessel [is] limited to performance of

a discrete task after which the worker’s connection to the

vessel end[s],” or whether he or she stays with the vessel.

Id. (quoting Sanchez, 997 F. 3d 564, 574 (2021)).

As stated above, a worker may bring a claim under the LHWCA in the alternative.

Id. at 274. The LHWCA provides:

a cause of action to a person injured by “negligence of a

vessel,” with the caveat that “[i]f such person was employed

by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action

shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence

of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the

vessel.”

Id. at 275 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 905(b)). There are three general duties shipowners owe

to longshoremen: (1) turnover duty, which “relates to the condition of the ship upon the

commencement of stevedoring operations; (2) “exercise reasonable care to prevent

injuries to longshoremen in areas that remain under the ‘active control of the vessel’” after

stevedoring operations have begun; and (3) duty to intervene, which “concerns the

vessel’s obligations with regard to cargo operations in areas under the principal control

of the independent stevedore.” Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., 512 U.S. 92, 98,

114 S. Ct. 2057, 2063 (1994) (quoting Scindia Steam Nav. Co. v. De los Santos, 451 U.S.

156, 167–78, 101 S. Ct. 1614, 1622–23 (1981)).

III. Analysis.

In its Motion, Aries Marine argues Rose is not a Jones Act seaman. See Record

Document 81-1 at 5. Aries Marine uses relevant testimony to support its argument. See

id. at 6. For example, Rose testifies he spent about 25 percent of his time working offshore

and 75 percent on land while working as a driller helper for Amdrill. See id. Other than the

two days leading up to and including the day of the incident, Aries Marine submits there

is no evidence that Rose worked on a vessel or an identifiable fleet of vessels under Aries

Marine’s ownership or control. See id.

Aries Marine argues Rose is covered as a maritime worker under the LHWCA

because he was injured on navigable waters. See id. Furthermore, Aries Marine contends

Rose’s negligence claim must be dismissed because Aries Marine did not breach its duty

under LHWCA § 905(b). See id. The Aries Marine crew did not see Rose place his foot

on the casing or have awareness of the chattering pipe. See id. at 7. Thus, Aries Marine

asserts it had no duty to intervene in the Amdrill crew’s operation. See id.

In his opposition, Rose asserts there are genuine issues of material fact as to

whether he is a Jones Act seaman and, regardless of the outcome on his seaman status,

there remain genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on whether

Aries Marine violated duties owed to Rose on its vessel. See Record Document 93 at 1.

Rose cites to cases in which courts left the issue of seaman status under the Jones Act

to the jury, except in exceptional circumstances. See id. at 8–9. Additionally, Rose argues

he qualifies under both parts of the Chandris test. See id. at 11. Under the second part

specifically, Rose submits if he had not been injured, he would have spent at least two or

three more months aboard the M/V Ram XVII. See id.

Alternatively, Rose contends that regardless of his seaman status, genuine issues

of material fact exist regarding Aries Marine’s liability. See id. at 12. Rose submits that

the Amdrill and TWE workers were allowed to work on board the ship without any basic

inspection, in which Rose avers violates the reasonable care required for persons on

board. See id. at 13. Rose cites to Aries Marine employees’ depositions, in which Rose

claims both men disavowed any oversight or control over the crew working on the vessel.

See id. Additionally, Rose argues there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether

Aries Marine knew of the hazards posed by both the chattering drill pipe, as well as the

condition of workers placing their feet alongside or on active drill equipment, and whether

its claim that, because its crew was not paying attention, it should not be held liable for a

violation of the turnover or intervention duties. See id. at 16.

Aries Marine replied, reiterating its Motion should be granted. See Record

Document 102 at 6. Aries Marine states Rose lacks the requisite substantial durational

connection to a vessel or fleet of vessels to qualify for seaman status. See id. Moreover,

Rose’s claims of negligence under § 905(b) should be dismissed. See id. Rose offers no

evidence that any dangerous condition existed at the time Aries Marine turned its deck

over to Rose and the Amdrill crew. See id. Aries Marine did not have a duty to intervene

with respect to the conditions which arose during the Amdrill operations, and which

related to the Amdrill equipment and operations. See id. Additionally, Aries Marine did not

have a duty to supervise, inspect, monitor, or otherwise discover the conditions or to

anticipate their danger. See id. The Court will first take up the issue of whether Rose

qualifies as a seaman under the Jones Act. Then, if the Court finds Rose does not qualify

as a seaman under the Jones Act, the Court will discuss Aries Marine’s duties to Rose

under the LHWCA.

(A) Seaman Status under the Jones Act.

When deciding whether Rose qualifies as a seaman under the Jones Act, “all

relevant circumstances of [Rose’s] situation must be considered.” Phillips v. Javeler

Marine Servs., LLC, No. 22-907, 2024 WL 2834460, at *3 (M.D. La. June 4, 2024). “[T]he

presence of a ‘vessel in navigation’ is central to both prongs of the Chandris test.” Id.

Rose worked aboard the M/V Ram XVII, which was stationed off the coast of Texas. See

Record Document 108 at 17. With no contrary argument from Aries Marine, the Court

finds, for the purposes of summary judgment, the M/V Ram XVII was a vessel. See

Phillips, 2024 WL 2834460, at *3.

Under the first prong of the Chandris test, Rose must put on evidence that he works

at sea in the service of the M/V Ram XVII. Amdrill hired Rose as a driller helper. See

Record Document 108 at 15. “A worker does not need to aid in the navigation of the

vessel in order to be a seaman.” Phillips, 2024 WL 2834460, at 3. While aboard the

vessel, his duties consisted of loading material, making sure everything is clean, and

supporting the driller with the trip pipe. See Record Document 108 at 15. The driller helper

puts pipe on, takes pipe off, and makes sure it’s clean. See id. at 15–16. Aries Marine

does not contest the first prong of the Chandris test. Thus, the Court finds Rose has put

on sufficient evidence to satisfy prong one. There is enough evidence showing Rose’s

duties contributed to the accomplishment of the M/V Ram XVII’s mission.

The second prong of the Chandris test is contested. The first element under this

prong is substantiality in duration. The Court is deciding whether Rose “‘is a member of

the [M/V Ram XVII’s] crew or simply a land-based employee who happens to be working

on the vessel at a given time.’” Phillips, 2024 WL 2834460, at *4. The Fifth Circuit has

held “that ‘[w]here the worker divides his time between vessel and land, an employee can

only establish the requisite connection to a vessel—and thus qualify as a seaman—if he

spends a substantial portion of his time in service of the vessel.’” Id. In Chandris, the

Court “adopted the Fifth Circuit’s 30% rule of thumb: Where a worker divides his time

between land-based and vessel-related service, ‘[a] worker who spends less than 30% of

his time in the service of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the

Jones Act.’” Id. Until the incident, Rose claims he spent about 75 percent working onshore

and 25 percent offshore. See Record Document 108 at 18. Rose had been on the job two

days when the incident happened. See id. at 23. Two days does not add up to 30 percent.

Like the plaintiff in Patterson v. Gulf Inland Contractors, Inc., Rose’s “only additional

support for his argument that the duration of his work on a vessel is in dispute is his own

conclusory declaration of the same….” 682 F. Supp. 3d 641, 652 (E.D. La. 2023). Rose

“provides no time sheets, hours log, employment records, or other evidence to bolster his

own conclusory statements.” Id. These conclusory statements do not create a genuine

issue of material fact to overcome summary judgment.

The second element of prong two requires substantiality in nature. Rose must put

on evidence that he has “a sufficiently substantial connection to [the M/V Ram XVII] to

qualify him as a Jones Act seaman.” Crochet v. Morton Salt, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 977,

987 (W.D. La. 2020). Like the plaintiff in Crochet, Rose did not work exclusively on Aries

Marine’s vessels or sail with the M/V Ram XVII once the drilling was finished. Id. Rather,

Rose works exclusively for drilling companies, like Amdrill, who board vessels to conduct

their operations. In Crochet, the district court found the plaintiff did not qualify as a seaman

under the Jones Act because he only went out on vessels occasionally and was an

employee of a land-based entity rather than the owner of the vessel. Id. The same can

be said for Rose; therefore, he fails to meet prong two of the Chandris test. The Court

finds that Rose does not qualify as a Jones Act seaman. There are no genuine issues of

material fact to the contrary. Thus, the Court will proceed to its analysis of whether Aries

Marine owed or breached any of the three Scindia duties under the LHWCA.

(B) The Three Scindia Duties under the LHWCA.

Under the LHWCA, Rose claims Aries Marine violated all three of its Scindia

duties: turnover duty, active control duty, and duty to intervene. See Record Document

93 at 14. Rose asserts that as a vessel owner, Aries Marine owed a duty to Rose to

provide a safe workplace. See id. at 15. Rose alleges the condition of the increasing

chattering with the pipe and slip ring was known to everyone on the deck of the M/V Ram

XVII. See id. Additionally, Rose contends Aries Marine cannot claim that its workers were

not aware of the risks associated with the work. See id. at 16. He supports his contentions

with the fact that the Aries Marine crew led safety meetings with everyone on the vessel.

See id.

The Court will analyze each Scindia duty. The turnover duty consists of two

different but related obligations. Hamilton v. Targa Transp. LLC, No. 16-2614, 2018 WL

2010294, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2018). “First, the owner owes a duty to exercise

ordinary care under the circumstances to turn over the ship and its equipment in such

condition that an expert and experienced stevedore can carry on stevedoring operations

with reasonable safety.” Id. The second obligation provides, “the owner owes a duty to

warn the stevedore of latent or hidden dangers that are known to the vessel owner or

should have been known to it.” Id. However, this obligation “does not include dangers

which are either: (1) open and obvious or (2) dangers a reasonably competent stevedore

should anticipate encountering.” Id.

The active control duty requires the vessel owner to “‘exercise due care to avoid

exposing longshoremen to harm from hazards that they may encounter in areas, or from

equipment, under the active control of the vessel during the stevedoring operation.’” Id.

at *7 (quoting Manson Gulf, L.L.C. v. Modern Am. Recycling Serv., Inc., 878 F. 3d 130,

134 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167; Howlett, 512 U.S. at 98)). The main

question “‘is whether the work area in question has been “turned over” to the contractor.’”

Id. (quoting Romero v. Cajun Stabilizing Boats Inc., 307 Fed. Appx. 849, 851 (5th Cir.

2009)).

The duty to intervene imposes liability on the vessel owner if it does not intervene

when it has actual knowledge of the hazards and “‘“that the stevedore, in the exercise of

obviously improvident judgment means to work on in the face of its and therefore cannot

be relied on to remedy it.”’” Id. at *8 (quoting Manson Gulf, 878 F. 3d at 134 (quoting

Burchett v. Cargill, Inc., 48 F. 3d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

After analyzing the summary judgment record, the Court finds there are no genuine

issues of material fact on this issue, and Aries Marine did not breach any of its Scindia

duties owed to Rose. Chris Osborne (“Osborne”), Joshua Phillips (“Phillips”), Rose, and

Kendall Jones (“Jones”) provide deposition testimony supporting the Court’s finding for

summary judgment.

Osborne, the Amdrill employee operating as a driller aboard the M/V Ram XVII,

provides testimony aiding in the Court’s determination. See Record Document 108 at 21;

see also Record Document 81-6. Osborne states he has no “reason to believe anyone

from Aries [Marine] knew there was chatter from the casing” because there were not in a

position to observe the casing. See Record Document 81-6 at 9. Osborne also provides

that Aries Marine would not have known about Rose putting his foot on the casing head

or been in a position to observe it. See id. at 9–10. At the time of Rose’s incident, no Aries

Marine crewmen were on the deck. See id. at 8. Osborne confirms it was his deck, he

handled the drilling, and he expected everyone to steer clear of the equipment. See id.

Aries Marine did not participate “in any kind of supervisory role with…how the drilling crew

did their job.” See id. at 8–9.

Joshua Phillips’s (“Phillips”), the Amdrill employee operating as the other driller

helper aboard the M/V Ram XVII, provides deposition testimony that supports the Court’s

finding for summary judgment. See Record Document 108 at 22; see also Record

Document 81-8. Phillips testifies that the M/V Ram XVII was in a safe condition allowing

him to perform his job safely; there was nothing in his way on the vessel. See Record

Document 81-8 at 6. Furthermore, Phillips states that “nothing having to do with the vessel

or its equipment had anything to do with the accident in his opinion.” See id. Like Osborne,

Phillips testifies that no one “from the Aries Marine crew [could] have seen [Rose] put his

foot on [the] casing.” See id. at 7. In fact, the Aries Marine crew “was instructed to stay

clear of [Amdrill’s] equipment when [Amdrill was] operating.” See id. at 6. Aries Marine

did not play an active role in the drilling operations, nor did it supervise the Amdrill crew.

See id. at 7.

Rose’s deposition testimony also supports summary judgment. See Record

Document 108. Rose testifies there were no problems before the incident occurred. See

id. at 31. In fact, Amdrill owned the drilling equipment that was being used by Rose,

Phillips, and Osborne. See id. Amdrill employees maintained the equipment every day.

See id. at 31–32. Kendall Jones (“Jones”), an Amdrill employee a part of the drilling crew,

was the person in charge of supervising the drilling crews. See id. at 16–17. Rose

confirms that besides the weather, the Aries Marine crew was not “aware of anything

occurring leading up to the accident that would cause them to need to stop the operation.”

See id. at 41–42. In fact, Rose agrees that if someone from Aries Marine had been on

the deck at the time of the incident, the only thing they could have done to prevent the

incident was stop because the weather was deteriorating. See id. at 79. However, Rose

is unsure whether anyone informed the Aries Marine crew that the weather was affecting

the drilling. See id. at 42.

When asked where the Aries Marine crew was during the time of the incident, Rose

states that “the captain was probably wherever the captain sits upstairs, and [] Josh Long

was just somewhere on the deck.” See id. at 30. Rose cannot recall what Josh Long’s

(“Long”) purpose was on deck or specify his location on deck. See id. There is no other

testimony or evidence stating Long was on deck during the time of Rose’s incident. These

Aries Marine crew members did not play a role in Amdrill’s operations with the drilling

crew. See id. While Rose believes “Aries Marine had the authority to stop the job if they

felt it was unsafe,” he does not specify what Aries Marine could have done differently.

See id. at 41. No one from the Aries Marine crew participated in the drilling operations.

Amdrill appears to be solely in control of these operations. Thus, Rose’s speculative

conclusory statements about what Aries Marine should have done is insufficient to

overcome summary judgment.

Additionally, Jones, an Amdrill employee working as part of the drilling crew aboard

the M/V Ram XVII, provides relevant testimony. See Record Document 108 at 17; see

also Record Document 81-4. Jones confirms Osborne made decisions on operations as

the foreman of the night crew, but Jones oversaw everything as the field supervisor. See

Record Document 81-4 at 5. While the captain of the M/V Ram XVII, Octave Parfait

(“Parfait”), mostly stays up by his wheelhouse and can “see everything three-quarters

time what’s going on [on the deck],” there is no evidence Parfait oversaw the drilling

operations. See Record Document 81-5 at 2. The summary judgment evidence illustrates

that Jones was the main person supervising the Amdrill crew, which includes Rose.

From the above testimony, the Court finds Aries Marine did not breach any duties

owed to Rose. There is no summary judgment evidence showing that Aries Marine did

not exercise ordinary care when it turned over the M/V Ram XVII to Amdrill. Amdrill used

its own equipment; the only thing Aries Marine supplied was the vessel. Additionally, there

is no evidence Aries Marine knew of a hidden danger or the problems with the casing.

Aries Marine did not have notice or knowledge of the danger which caused the incident.

In fact, there is no sufficient evidence to demonstrate any Aries Marine crew member was

present on the deck at the time of Rose’s incident. Furthermore, no testimony can clearly

point to what caused Rose’s incident with the casing. The Court finds there are no genuine

issues of material fact as to whether Aries Marine breached the duties under the LHWCA.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above,

IT IS ORDERED that Aries Marine’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Record

Document 81) is GRANTED. Therefore, Rose’s claims asserted against Aries Marine are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

An Order consistent with this Memorandum Ruling shall issue herewith.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 11th day of December,

2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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