“[B]y adding subsection (b), a person who suffers injuries arising out of patient care would not be disadvantaged by a shortened limitations period simply because he or she happened to obtain treatment at a public facility rather than a private one.”
How later courts described this case
- “[B]y adding subsection (b), a person who suffers injuries arising out of patient care would not be disadvantaged by a shortened limitations period simply because he or she happened to obtain treatment at a public facility rather than a private one.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION
JOHN CRAMPTON, III, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:24-cv-04156-SLD
)
SAMUEL LITTLE, TOM WILEY, and )
ERIC DUSENBERRY, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Plaintiff John Crampton, III alleges that Defendants Samuel Little, Tom Wiley, and Eric
Dusenberry (“Defendants”)—police officers employed by the Village of Colona, Illinois—
violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they arrested him. See generally Compl., ECF No.
1. Plaintiff also alleges that Little and Dusenberry (“Battery Defendants”) battered him. Id. at
4–5.1 Pending before the Court is Battery Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff’s
Complaint and Memorandum of Law in Support, ECF No. 9. For the reasons that follow, the
motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND2
On June 21, 2023, Plaintiff patronized Grease Monkey Bar and Restaurant in Colona,
Illinois. He consumed alcoholic beverages and determined that it was unsafe to drive himself
home. Another patron, Steven Garland, offered to drive Plaintiff home in Plaintiff’s truck.
Plaintiff agreed—Garland got into the driver’s seat and Plaintiff got into the passenger’s seat. At
1 The paragraphs of Plaintiff’s Complaint are inconsistently numbered, so the Court cites to it using page numbers.
2 At the motion to dismiss stage, the court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint, and draw[s] all
reasonable inferences in [the nonmovant]’s favor.” Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc., 818 F.3d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 2016). Unless
otherwise noted, the factual background is drawn from Plaintiff’s Complaint.
this point, Defendants approached the truck and demanded that the truck’s occupants give them
their names. Plaintiff complied, informing the officers of his name, address, and plan to have
Garland drive him home in his truck. Plaintiff remained seated in the truck’s passenger seat.
Battery Defendants then grabbed Plaintiff’s right and left arms and reached into the truck,
unbuckling his seatbelt. They pulled him out of the truck and pinned him against the truck’s
side. Despite his statements and requests, they “yank[ed]” his arms behind him, lifting him up
and placing handcuffs on him. Compl. 2. He was transported to the Colona Police Department
and charged with “resisting arrest and obstructing police officers.” Id. at 3. The charges against
him were ultimately dismissed. As a result of Battery Defendants’ conduct, he sustained injuries
to his wrists, elbows, and shoulders, among other harms.
On August 21, 2024, Plaintiff sued Defendants in this Court, invoking the Court’s
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 to pursue his battery claim against Battery
Defendants as Count II. Id. at 5. Battery Defendants move under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Count II with prejudice, asserting that Plaintiff fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted because his Complaint pleads facts sufficient to establish
that the relevant statute of limitations had run before he filed his Complaint. See generally Mot.
Dismiss Count II. Plaintiff did not respond to Battery Defendants’ motion.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). At the motion to dismiss stage, the key
inquiry is whether the complaint is “sufficient to provide the defendant with ‘fair notice’ of the
plaintiff’s claim and its basis.” Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 934
(7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)). While “detailed factual
allegations are unnecessary, the complaint must have ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc., 818 F.3d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court must take “[t]he complaint’s well-
pleaded factual allegations, though not its legal conclusions, . . . [as] true,” Phillips v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 714 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 2013), and “draw all inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party,” Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2014).
II. Analysis
Plaintiff’s failure to respond means he has waived any arguments in opposition and the
Court may dismiss Count II so long as Battery Defendants’ provided basis for doing so is
plausible. See Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999);
Diggs v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., LLC, 21 C 4544, 2022 WL 3543496, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18,
2022) (collecting cases for the proposition that failing to respond to a plausible argument for
dismissal constitutes waiver). Battery Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion is premised upon the
expiration of a statute of limitations, which is an affirmative defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1).
“[A] plaintiff’s complaint need not anticipate or refute potential affirmative defenses.” Luna
Vanegas v. Signet Builders, Inc., 46 F.4th 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2022). However, some affirmative
defenses “may be raised in a motion to dismiss if the allegations of the complaint itself set forth
everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th
Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). “[D]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis of a
limitations defense may be appropriate when the plaintiff effectively pleads h[im]self out of
court by alleging facts that are sufficient to establish the defense.” Hollander v. Brown, 457 F.3d
688, 691 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006).
Generally, under Illinois law,3 personal injury claims like battery are subject to a two-
year statute of limitation. See, e.g., Thompson v. Village of Monee, No. 12 C 5020, 2013 WL
3337801, at *24 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2013) (citing 735 ILCS 5/13–202). However, the Illinois
Local Government Employees Tort Immunity Act shortens the statute of limitations for a claim
of personal injury, including battery, to just one year for certain claims asserted against local
governmental entities or employees thereof. See 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a).4 A plaintiff who asserts
that he was battered by a local governmental unit’s employee that was acting within the scope of
his employment must bring that claim within one year of its accrual. See Thompson, 2013 WL
3337801, at *24; see also Slabon v. Sanchez, No. 15-cv-8965, 2021 WL 4146909, at *20–21
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-2729, 2023 WL 3451274 (7th Cir. May 15, 2023);
Snyder v. Village of Midlothian, 302 F.R.D. 231, 233–34 (N.D. Ill. 2014). Under Illinois law, a
claim for battery “accrues on the day that the injury occurred.” Slabon, 2021 WL 4146909, at
*20 (collecting cases).
Battery Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim of battery is barred by the one-year statute
of limitations set forth in the Illinois Local Government Employees Tort Immunity Act because
Plaintiff alleges that he was battered by employees of the Village of Colona on June 21, 2023,
yet he waited until August 21, 2024 to file his lawsuit, which is “two months past the expiration
3 A court exercising supplemental jurisdiction over a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367—which grants jurisdiction
“over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within [the court’s] original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy”—may “simply apply the forum state’s substantive law” to that claim in
the absence of a dispute regarding choice of law. See, e.g., McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 760 F.3d 674, 684
(7th Cir. 2014). Battery Defendants assert that Count II is governed by Illinois law. Mot. Dismiss Count II 3–5.
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specify a particular body of law for Count II, see Compl. 4–5, and he did not respond
to Battery Defendants’ motion, so the Court applies the substantive law of the forum state, Illinois, see McCoy, 760
F.3d at 684.
4 Claims of injury stemming from medical malpractice are still subject to a two-year statute of limitation. 745 ILCS
10/8-101(b); see also Kaufmann v. Schroeder, 946 N.E.2d 345, 349 (Ill. 2011) (“[B]y adding subsection (b), a
person who suffers injuries arising out of patient care would not be disadvantaged by a shortened limitations period
simply because he or she happened to obtain treatment at a public facility rather than a private one.”).
of the statute of limitations.” Mot. Dismiss Count II 5. This case is materially indistinguishable
from Snyder, in which the court granted a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.
There, the plaintiff alleged that, on November 24, 2011, he was beaten with a baton without
provocation by a police officer who subsequently arrested him, that he was charged with
“aggravated assault and resisting a police officer,” and that the charges were subsequently
dropped. Snyder, 302 F.R.D. at 233. The court granted the police officer’s 12(b)(6) motion
because the plaintiff’s suit was not filed until November 20, 2013, which was outside the one-
year statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff’s claim of battery. See id. at 233–34. Here,
Plaintiff did not file suit until fourteen months after he was allegedly injured by police officers
while they arrested him—therefore, his claim is plainly barred. The Court finds that Battery
Defendants have provided a plausible basis to dismiss Count II and that Plaintiff has effectively
pleaded himself out of court because his claim of battery against Battery Defendants is barred by
the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a).
The only remaining issue is whether Plaintiff should be given leave to amend his claim.
Leave to amend should be “freely” given “when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2),
and a plaintiff ordinarily should be given a second chance to properly plead his claim, see
Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 519–20 (7th
Cir. 2015). However, “district courts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend . . . . where
the amendment would be futile.” Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008). Here,
amendment would be futile—no additional allegations can change Plaintiff’s injury date, Battery
Defendants’ employer, or Plaintiff’s Complaint’s filing date. Leave to amend is unwarranted.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendants Samuel Little and Eric Dusenberry’s, Motion to Dismiss Count
II of Plaintiff’s Complaint and Memorandum of Law in Support, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED.
Count II of Plaintiff John Crampton, III’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
Entered this 10th day of December, 2024.
s/ Sara Darrow
SARA DARROW
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE