Walker v. Butler

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JAMES E. WALKER, #R02343,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 19-CV-00445-SPM

KIMBERLY BUTLER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

McGLYNN, District Judge:

In September 2021, Plaintiff James Walker filed his Third Amended Complaint

(“Complaint”). (Doc. 103). Walker alleged that while incarcerated at Menard

Correctional Center (“Menard”), Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by

hindering his ability to file a habeas petition and denying him access to the law library

and legal materials to research. Defendants moved for summary judgment on

Walker’s complaint. (Doc. 172). Walker filed a response (Doc. 178), to which

Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. 180).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As this Court and others have recited, this case has a complicated history. See

Walker v. Thompson, No. 21-cv-001173-SPM, Doc. 17 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2021); Walker

v. Butler, No. 21-cv-1174-DWD, Doc. 15 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2022). This case commenced

with Plaintiff James Walker originally filing a lawsuit in this district on July 16, 2015.

See Walker v. Unknown, No. 15-cv-786-MAB (S.D. Ill.). In that case, the Court found

that Walker’s first three complaints violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20’s

joinder requirements. Unknown, Doc. 7, 11, 17. Finally, counsel was recruited to

represent Walker, and on February 26, 2016, recruited counsel filed an amended

complaint. Walker’s counsel in Case No. 15-cv-786-MAB also submitted three more

proposed complaints on February 26, 2016 via email to the presiding Judge, which

were to be severed into separate lawsuits. Unknown, Doc. 33. However, those proposed

complaints were overlooked at the time and not severed or filed of record. It was not

until April 23, 2019, that the Court severed the three proposed complaints into new

actions. Unknown, Doc. 126. One of those severed cases was designated as this case,

Walker v. Butler, No. 19-cv-00445-SPM.

On July 18, 2019, the Court dismissed the original Complaint for failure to state

a claim and granted Walker leave to amend. (Doc. 9). Walker then filed two amended

complaints, and, assuming that Walker wanted to proceed with the latest version, the

Court conducted a preliminary review of the Second Amended Complaint on October

2, 2019. (Docs. 16, 21, 22). On September 17, 2020, Walker sought leave to file his

Third Amended Complaint. (Docs. 76, 77, 103). Leave was granted, and the Court

conducted a merits review. (Doc. 102).

On December 7, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 125). The

Court granted the motion in part, leaving Count 1 against Defendants Bramlet and

Knust, Count 3 against Defendants Bramlet, Knust, and Ellis, and Count 4 against

Defendants Bramlet and Knust to proceed. (Doc. 140). Defendants moved for summary

judgment on Walker’s complaint. (Doc. 172). Walker filed a response (Doc. 178), to

which Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. 180).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In March 2013, Defendants Bramlet and Knust, in their roles as law library

paralegals at Menard, did not provide Plaintiff with a clear copy of his habeas corpus

petition and exhibits while the facility was on lockdown. (Doc. 103, p. 19.) Also in

March 2013, Defendants Bramlet and Knust did not inform Plaintiff (i) that his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus could be electronically filed; (ii) that he should

include an affidavit affirming his placement of the petition in the prison mail system

if he wanted to take advantage of the prison mailbox rule; and (iii) how to answer a

show-cause order demonstrating why his petition should not be dismissed as untimely.

(Id.) Defendants Bramlet and Knust did not notify Plaintiff that his habeas petition

had been dismissed in August 2014, allegedly preventing him from filing a timely

appeal. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he went to the law library on or about August 16, 2013 to

obtain copies, and while in the law library needed to use the restroom. (Doc. 173-2, p.

12, 31-32). Plaintiff was returned to his cell house by a corrections officer in order to

use the restroom. (Id., p. 13.) Plaintiff testified in his deposition that Defendant Ellis

was not involved in returning Plaintiff to his cell or back to the law library. (Id.)

Plaintiff further testified that he probably did receive the copies that he had requested

before being escorted back to the cell house. (Id., p. 32-33.)

The case for which Plaintiff was preparing on or about August 16, 2013 was

continued by the court until November 25, 2013. (Doc. 103, p. 20; Doc. 173-2, p. 11.).

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he did not receive another call pass to the law library

from Defendants Bramlet or Knust, and that Defendants Bramlet and Knust did not

permit Plaintiff to use the law library again until November 25, 2013, the day of his

court deadline. (Doc. 103, p. 20.) Plaintiff alleges that this resulted in a defendant

being dismissed from that case. (Id.). In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he was

not allowed to go to the law library on November 25, 2013. (Doc. 173-2, p. 8.) Records

of law library call passes granted to Plaintiff at Menard in 2013 reflect that he was

issued call passes ten times after August 16, 2013: on September 16, 23, and 30;

October 7, 21, and 28; November 25; December 2, 23, and 30. (Doc. 173-1, ¶ 5).

In January 2014, Defendants Bramlet and Knust did not provide Plaintiff with

pens, paper, or an envelope to enable him to write and mail a response to the court

while Menard was on lockdown, nor did they provide him with adequate access to the

law library to properly research a motion to dismiss and draft a response with

supporting legal authority. (Doc. 103, p. 21.). During his deposition, Plaintiff testified

that he received the monthly allocation of “10 sheets of paper…3 pens and some

envelopes” as long as he was indigent. (Doc. 173-2, p. 26-27). Plaintiff was also denied

access to the law library in January 2014. Records of law library call passes granted

to Plaintiff at Menard in 2014 reflect that he was issued call passes twice in January

2014, one of which was cancelled due to issues at Menard. (Doc. 173-1, ¶ 5). If a library

call pass was cancelled due to issues within the facility, access to law library services,

such as copies of case law and pleadings, notarization, and e-filing, was provided via

institutional mail and/or in-person law library staff tours of the cell houses. (Id.).

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is the moment in a lawsuit where a party lays its proverbial

cards on the table, showing what evidence it possesses to convince a trier of fact to

agree with its version of the events. Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (other

citations omitted)). Summary judgment is only appropriate if the movant “shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060

(7th Cir. 2014) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). That “burden on the moving party may

be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an

absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

In determining the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court

construes all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all

reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Intern.-Indiana, Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396

(7th Cir. 2000). While the Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the opposing party, “[i]nferences and opinions must be grounded

on more than flights of fancy, speculations, hunches, intuitions, or rumors[.]”

Bennington v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001); Rand v. CF

Industries, Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1146 (7th Cir. 1994); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element

of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex,

477 U.S. at 323. Furthermore, when opposing parties tell two different stories, one of

which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe

it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion

for summary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Henning v. O’Leary,

477 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2007).

ANALYSIS

I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on the basis that

Walker failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. However, Defendants moved to

withdraw their defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies (Doc. 70), which

was granted by this Court on September 21, 2020. (See Doc. 77). Defendants seek to

reassert the failure to exhaust defense in a memorandum of law in support of a motion

for summary judgment. While defendants first attempted to reassert this defense in

their amended answers (Doc. 126, Doc. 143), they failed to move for the Court to grant

them leave to reassert the defense in said answers. Defendants “make no effort to set

forth any good cause or excusable neglect to allow for consideration of the issue.”

Kruger v. Baldwin, No. 19-CV-268-RJD, 2023 WL 130422, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2023).

Moreover, parties cannot amend their pleadings through arguments raised in

motions for summary judgment or briefs opposing summary judgment. See Anderson

v. Donahoe, 669 F.3d 989, 997 (7th Cir. 2012). An affirmative defense must be raised

in the answer, not by motion. See Vasquez v. Indiana Univ. Health, Inc., 40 F.4th 582,

588 (7th Cir. 2022). As discussed above, Defendants should have moved for leave to

reassert the withdrawn defense, rather than simply reassert it in an amended answer

and in a brief supporting a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the

Defendants may not reassert this defense at the summary judgment stage. The motion

for summary judgment on this ground is denied.

II. Statute of Limitations

Defendants also move for summary judgment on the grounds that the statute

of limitations has run as to four of the allegations in Count 1 and all the allegations

in Count 4. Section 1983 does not contain an express statute of limitations, so federal

courts adopt the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Ashafa

v. City of Chicago, 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1998). In Illinois, the limitations period

for § 1983 cases is two years. Kalimara v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 879 F.2d 276,

277 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing 735 ILCS 5/13-202). However, a federal court relying on the

Illinois statute of limitations in a § 1983 case must toll the two-year limitations period

while a prisoner exhausts the administrative grievance process, as required under the

Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 2001).

This merely requires that the plaintiff pursue administrative remedies, not that he

exhaust them. See Dobbey v. Uptown People's L. Ctr., No. 23-1885, 2023 WL 8106978,

at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 22, 2023). The tolling ends when the grievance is denied. See

Bowers v. Dart, 1 F.4th 513, 518 (7th Cir. 2021).

Defendants contend that Walker failed to file grievances pertaining to all the

allegations in Counts 1 and 4, and for the denial of library call passes in Count 3. (Doc.

173, p. 8). Plaintiff contends that he filed several grievances covering the above

allegations. (Doc. 178, p. 13-20). A review of the evidence demonstrates that

Defendants are correct. The record shows that Walker filed three grievances. The first

was filed on September 12, 2013, in which he alleged the setup of the law library at

Menard prevented him from conducting legal research and that he was denied access

to the bathroom while doing his research. (Id., p. 87-88). The second was filed on

October 7, 2014, in which Walker similarly alleges he was prevented from using the

bathroom. (Id., p. 57-58). The third was filed on November 4, 2013, and alleges the

same. (Id., p. 78-79). Accordingly, Defendants are correct that Walker’s grievances

pertain only to the allegations in Count 3 that he was prevented from using the

bathroom while conducting legal research. Thus, only those allegations were

effectively tolled under the statute of limitations, which the Defendants do not contest.

As to Count 1, the four allegations from March 2013 would be barred by the

statute of limitations as of March 2015. These claims were included in Plaintiff’s

initial complaint, which was filed on February 26, 2016, nearly a year after the statute

of limitations expired, rendering each of these March 2013 claims time barred.

Walker’s final allegation occurred in August 2014, within the two-year statute of

limitations. Thus, only Walker’s fifth allegation of Count 1 is not time-barred. As to

Count 4, all allegations occurred in January 2014. As these claims must have been

brought by February 2016, they are time-barred by the statute of limitations. Thus,

only the final allegation of Count 1 and all the allegations of Count 3 are not time-

barred. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on statute of limitations

grounds for the first four allegations in Count 1 and the entirety of Count 4.

III. First Amendment: Denial of Access to Courts

Though the Court has granted summary judgment on statute of limitations

grounds for the majority of Count 1 and all of Count 4, it will conduct review of the

merits of all of Walker’s claims. In the context of an alleged First Amendment

violation, “persons in prison, like other individuals, have the right to petition the

government for redress of grievances.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972). The

Supreme Court has held that prisoners have the right to petition for redress of

grievances, which includes access to the courts for purposes of presenting their

complaints. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).

Specifically, prisoners must be given reasonable access to a law library or to persons

trained in the law. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.

817 (1977). Establishing a right of access to law materials, however, requires an

individualized demonstration of an inmate having been hindered in efforts to pursue

a legal claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). Mere delay or inconvenience is

not an unconstitutional detriment; on the contrary, the plaintiff must show that the

defendants took steps imposing a meaningful impediment to his underlying claims.

Jones v. Van Lanen, 27 F.4th 1280, 1288 (7th Cir. 2022). Specifically, a plaintiff must

connect the defendants’ conduct with his “inability to pursue a legitimate challenge to

a conviction, sentence, or prison conditions.” Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 671 (7th

Cir. 2009).

A. Count 1

Plaintiff makes three allegations against Defendants Bramlet and Knust in

Count 1. The first is that they did not provide him with a clear copy of his habeas

corpus petition and exhibits while Menard was on lockdown. The Court determines

that Bramlet and Knust did not hinder Walker’s ability to file a habeas petition at all,

let alone meaningfully. Walker does not connect the defendants’ conduct to his alleged

injury: he does not explain how the failure of Bramlet and Knust to present him with

a clear copy of his petition led to its eventual denial, and “[s]peculative prejudice is

not enough for an ‘actual injury’”. Hertel v. Miller-Lewis, 695 F. App'x 957, 961 (7th

Cir. 2017) (quoting Rossi v. City of Chi., 790 F.3d 729, 736 (7th Cir. 2015)). At most,

Walker alleges that this led “to an unnecessary back and forth and the court

repeatedly receiving Plaintiff petition incomplete.” (Doc. 178, p. 21). He does not allege

that this failure led to the denial of his petition, merely that it caused him to

inconveniently have to resubmit his petition. Furthermore, in similar scenarios, the

Seventh Circuit has held that an inmate's right to access the courts is not violated

when prison officials fail to provide him with his requested records, “[b]ecause he did

not need his records to start his lawsuit[.]” Jackson v. Lemmon, 737 Fed. Appx. 795,

797 (7th Cir. 2018).

The second allegation is that Bramlet and Knust did not provide him with

timely notification regarding the dismissal of his habeas petition. However, Walker

himself testified that his failure to file a timely appeal was due to the number of

lockdowns at Menard, not due to any inadequacies with the legal assistance at

Menard. (Doc. 173-2, p. 8). As to these two allegations, the Court rules that as a matter

of law, Bramlet and Knust’s actions did not meaningfully impede Walker’s access to

the courts.

Third, he alleges that Defendants Bramlet and Knust did not give him various

pieces of legal advice, specifically: (i) to e-file his petition, (ii) to include an affidavit so

that he could rely on the prison mailbox rule, and (iii) how to respond to a show-cause

order. (Doc. 103, p. 19). However, the First Amendment does not entitle individuals in

custody to free legal advice. In rejecting the notion that the Constitution requires the

state to enable prisoners to litigate effectively once in court, the Court in Lewis noted

that, “[to] demand the conferral of such sophisticated legal capabilities upon a mostly

uneducated and indeed largely illiterate prison population is effectively to demand

permanent provision of counsel, which we do not believe the Constitution requires.”

518 U.S. at 354. Accordingly, Walker cannot allege that a failure to provide legal

advice constitutes a deprivation of access to the courts, as this would be akin to

requiring state prison officials to help prisoners effectively litigate their cases.

Therefore, Bramlet and Knust did not meaningfully impede Walker’s access to courts

by refusing to offer him legal advice.

Even if these allegations did meaningfully impede Walker’s access to courts,

pursuant to Lewis, a delay in receiving legal materials or legal assistance is not

actionable if the delay is the “product of prison regulations reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests.” 518 U.S. at 362. In circumstances similar to the

instant case, the plaintiffs in Lewis had protested the fact that there were delays in

accessing the law library when the prison was on lockdown. Id. But the Supreme Court

held that such delays were not of a constitutional significance, particularly due to the

fact that the institution in question housed “the most dangerous and violent prisoners

in the Arizona prison system.” Id. Menard also houses inmates that present “special

disciplinary and security concerns,” and Walker has not presented any evidence that

the lockdowns were not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See

Butler v. Bramlet, No. 314CV00537JPGPMF, 2016 WL 11464687, at *5 (S.D. Ill. May

2, 2016).

B. Count 3

In Count 3, Walker alleges that, after leaving the law library in August 2013 to

use the restroom in his cell house, he was denied the ability to return to the law library

until November 25, 2013. (Doc. 103, p. 20.) Specifically, Defendants Bramlet and

Knust allegedly denied the call passes needed for Plaintiff to be able to return to the

law library between August and late November, and Defendant Ellis allegedly forced

Plaintiff to leave the law library when he needed to use the restroom. (Doc. 173-2, p.

12). In the second half of 2013, the law library restroom was undergoing renovation.

(Doc. 173-1, ¶ 4).

First, examining the facts, Walker’s claim that he was subsequently denied call

passes to the law library is contradicted by both the records from Menard and his own

testimony. Walker was granted six additional call passes to the law library before the

month of November, and a seventh during the month of November, and admitted

during his deposition that he did go to the law library in September, October, and

November. (Doc. 173-1, ¶ 5). Moreover, when call passes to the law library were issued

to individuals in custody during this renovation, they were clearly imprinted with a

notice that the restroom in the law library was not accessible, and that individuals in

custody should use the facilities before leaving their cell house. (Id., ¶ 4). Walker was

therefore informed, in advance of arriving at the law library, that he would not be able

to use the restroom during his visit and his decision to leave the law library to use the

restroom in his cell house was, therefore, his alone. (Id.). When opposing parties tell

two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no

reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

380 (2007); Henning v. O’Leary, 477 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2007). As Walker’s claim

is blatantly contradicted by the record, this Court adopts Defendants’ version of the

facts. Walker does not demonstrate how being given seven visits to the law library

over a three-month period impeded his ability file a legal claim, and accordingly,

Defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law for these allegations.

However, even if the Court were to adopt Walker’s version of the facts, his claim

would still fail on two legal grounds. First, Walker does not allege how this regulation

at Menard impeded his ability to file his claims. Second, even if he had, prisoners may

routinely experience delays resulting from prison regulations in receiving legal

materials or legal assistance, as long as those regulations are reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests, even where they result in actual injury. Lewis, 518

U.S. at 362. Here, Menard’s restroom regulation was directly related to the renovation

of the prison, which is more than enough to satisfy the threshold of reasonable

relation. Accordingly, even had Walker suffered prejudice, Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment as to Count 3.

C. Count 4

Finally, in January 2014, Bramlet and Knust allegedly did not provide Walker

with pens, paper, or an envelope to enable him to write and mail a response to the

court while Menard was on lockdown, nor did they provide him with adequate access

to the law library to properly research a motion to dismiss and draft a response with

supporting legal authority. (Doc. 103, p. 21.) Walker alleges that this led to dismissal

of his FOIA case. (Id.)

First, Walker alleges that the materials provided to him to write and mail a

response was insufficient. “It is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided

at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents with notarial services to

authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them. Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 564

(7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 52 L.

Ed. 2d 72 (1977)). However, it is up to prison officials to determine the manner in

which they provide meaningful access. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825. In order to

facilitate their legal needs, individuals in custody at Menard who are deemed to be

indigent are provided with an “indigent package” consisting of one pen, paper, and two

envelopes during each month that they qualify as indigent. (Doc. 178-1, ¶ 6). During

his deposition, Walker testified that he received the monthly allocation of “10 sheets

of paper…3 pens and some envelopes” as long as he was indigent. (Doc. 178-2, p. 26-

27.). Walker does not identify “any specific negative consequences” of receiving only

the indigent package entitled to him. Owens, 878 F.3d at 565. In other words, he fails

to demonstrate how the allocation granted to him meaningfully interfered with his

ability to pursue a legal claim. Thus, based on the undisputed facts, Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment.

However, even if this Court were to adopt Walker’s view or treat the facts as

disputed, Defendants would still be entitled to summary judgment. The injury that

Plaintiff claims arose from these alleged denials was the dismissal of a defendant from

a FOIA case. (Doc. 103, p. 21.) As set forth in Lewis, the Constitution does not

guarantee inmates access in order to file any and every form of lawsuit they may wish

to file. 518 U.S. at 355. Rather, it guarantees the right to challenge sentences and

conditions of confinement, neither of which take the form of a FOIA case. See Marshall

v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006).

Second, Walker alleges that he was denied access to the law library in January

of 2014. However, this allegation is contradicted by the record. As reflected in the

records of library call passes from Menard, Walker was granted two call passes to the

law library in January 2014, one of which was cancelled due to issues at Menard. (Doc.

173-1, ¶ 5). Plaintiff attended the law library on at least one occasion during the month

of January 2014, and law library services would have been available to him for any

time that a call pass was cancelled due to issues at the facility. (Id.).

Regardless of whether Walker was denied writing and mailing materials or law

library visits in January 2014, he has not stated an injury that is recognized as the

basis of an access-to-courts claim, and thus Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment.

IV. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity, but because

the Court grants summary judgment on the merits it need not address the qualified

immunity arguments.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary

Judgment filed by Defendants Bramlet, Knust, and Ellis. (Doc. 172). Accordingly, this

case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court

to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff Walker and to close the

case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 12, 2024

s/ Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. McGLYNN

U.S. District Judge