People of Guam v. ELIGIO ADRIATICO

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM

THE PEOPLE OF GUAM,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ELIGIO ADRIATICO,

Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court Case No. CRA22-004

Superior Court Case Nos. CF0116-84; CF0085-83

OPINION

Cite as: 2024 Guam 7

Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam

Argued and submitted on February 28, 2024

Hagåtña, Guam

Appearing for Defendant-Appellant: Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee:

Stephen P. Hattori, Esq. Daniel G. Morris, Esq. (argued)

Public Defender Nathan M. Tennyson, Esq. (briefed)

Public Defender Service Corporation Marianne Woloschuk, Esq. (briefed)

779 Rte. 4 Office of the Attorney General

Sinajana, GU 96910 590 S. Marine Corps Dr., Ste. 901

Tamuning, GU 96913

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 2 of 38

BEFORE: ROBERT J. TORRES, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice;

and KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice.

TORRES, C.J.:

[1] Defendant-Appellant Eligio Adriatico appeals from the Superior Court’s denial of his post-

conviction motion for relief. Adriatico sought compassionate release because of the COVID-19

pandemic or, alternatively, the correction of illegal sentences. We affirm the trial court’s denial

of compassionate release. We also correct Adriatico’s life-without-parole (“LWOP”) sentences

for attempted aggravated murder. At the time of his sentencing, Guam law did not permit LWOP

for attempted aggravated murder.

[2] The merits of Adriatico’s cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim raise several important

Organic Act issues. Adriatico asks this court to find that mandatory LWOP for “youthful

offenders” is cruel and unusual punishment. We hold, like other jurisdictions in the United States,

that the federal Constitution acts as a floor in Guam and not a ceiling. The Organic Act Bill of

Rights serves as a second layer of protection that can be greater than the U.S. Constitution. We

find that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2002), is

unsupported by law, and we depart from it.

[3] The history of the Organic Act Bill of Rights does not support reading 48 U.S.C.A. §

1421b(h)’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments as coextensive with the Eighth

Amendment. Having concluded that we are not bound to interpret the Organic Act Bill of Rights

in lockstep with federal courts’ interpretation of the Constitution, we still find federal decisions

interpreting analogous provisions to be persuasive. Courts should depart from federal

jurisprudence only when adequate grounds exist for the departure. Here, Guam’s distinctive

characteristics support departure from federal Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 3 of 38

[4] We remand for further proceedings, with instructions to appoint counsel and hold an

evidentiary hearing on how evolving science on brain development applies to an emerging adult

and to Adriatico’s specific circumstances. After hearing, the trial court shall decide whether

imposition of mandatory LWOP sentences for youthful offenders violates Guam’s evolving

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.

[5] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

[6] Adriatico was born on December 1, 1962. This appeal deals with convictions from two

separate cases in the early 1980s. The first case stemmed from incidents that occurred between

September 28 and October 4, 1983. Adriatico was twenty years old when he and co-defendant

Romeo P. Marquez were convicted by a jury of several counts,1 including aggravated murder, after

engaging “in a crime spree that left seven people dead and ten seriously injured.” People v.

Marquez, DCA Crim. Nos. 84-00036A, 84-00037A, 1986 WL 68899, at *1 (D. Guam App. Div.

Oct. 24, 1986); Record on Appeal (“RA”) CF0085-83, tab 4 at 1–2 (Judgment, May 21, 1984).

For his two aggravated murder convictions, the Superior Court of Guam sentenced Adriatico to

the statutorily mandated life sentences without parole. That prosecution was captioned CF0085-

83. Less than three months later, Adriatico and Marquez were charged with shooting four inmates

at the Department of Corrections, leaving two dead and two permanently injured. Adriatico was

convicted of two counts of aggravated murder and two counts of attempted aggravated murder,

1

In this first case, Adriatico was convicted of two counts of Aggravated Murder, one count of Attempted

Aggravated Murder, five counts of Murder, one count of Aggravated Assault, two counts of Assault, one count of

Robbery in the Second Degree, and two counts of Possession and Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a

Felony. Record on Appeal CF0085-83 (“RA CF0085-83”), tab 4 at 1–2 (Judgment, May 21, 1984). On direct appeal,

the District Court of Guam Appellate Division reversed one deadly-weapon-special-allegation conviction while

affirming the remaining convictions. People v. Marquez, DCA Crim. Nos. 84-00036A, 84-00037A, 1986 WL 68899,

at *4–6 (D. Guam App. Div. Oct. 24, 1986).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 4 of 38

receiving four more LWOP sentences.2 Adriatico was twenty-one years old at the time of the

prison shooting. This prosecution was captioned CF0116-84.

[7] Adriatico was then transferred to a federal prison to serve his Guam sentence. He does not

dispute his legal culpability. See Appellant’s Pro Se Br. at 11 (Aug. 9, 2022) (“It is undisputed

that appellant committed the underlying crimes in his youthful years.”). Adriatico has been in

federal custody at USP Atwater, a high security U.S. Penitentiary in California, for nearly 40 years.

[8] Although Adriatico was sentenced for several convictions,3 most relevant to this appeal are

his six LWOP sentences: two for aggravated felony murder in the initial crime spree, two for

aggravated murder in the prison shooting, and two for attempted aggravated murder in the latter

shooting. Only the four LWOP sentences imposed for aggravated murder were mandatory under

9 GCA § 16.30(b).

[9] In 2021, Adriatico filed a motion in the Superior Court for compassionate release based on

the threat of COVID-19 and for sentence reduction on the theory that scientific developments

regarding brain development indicate LWOP sentences for youthful offenders are cruel and

unusual. Adriatico claimed that USP Atwater provided him with no access to Guam law materials

and asked the court to appoint him counsel. The Superior Court exercised jurisdiction over

2

Adriatico was also convicted of four counts of Possession and Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission

of a Felony.

3

In the initial prosecution, Adriatico received five additional life sentences for Murder, fifteen years for

Attempted Aggravated Murder, three years for Aggravated Assault, two years for Assault, ten years for Second Degree

Robbery, and twenty-five years (with three years of parole) for Possession and Use of a Deadly Weapon in the

Commission of a Felony. Cf. Marquez, 1986 WL 68899, at *6 (vacating Adriatico’s second deadly-weapon special

allegation). In the prison shooting case, he received four additional sentences of twenty-five years for Possession and

Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a felony. These sentences were ordered to run as follows: (1) twenty-

five years for use of a deadly weapon (which has now been served); (2) the nine other sentences for the initial crimes

(including two LWOP sentences and five life sentences) are then to be served, which run concurrently together; (3)

the four LWOP sentences from the prison shooting are to be served next, and they run concurrently together; (4)

finally, the four sentences of twenty-five years each for use of a deadly weapon, which run consecutive to each other.

Thus, considering the sentences that run concurrently, in the aggregate, Adriatico was sentenced to serve 125 years

plus two life sentences without parole.

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 5 of 38

Adriatico’s motion and held a hearing where Adriatico appeared telephonically from USP Atwater,

representing himself.

[10] While the motion was under advisement, Adriatico requested the court take judicial notice

of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 2017 Report on youthful offenders.4 Adriatico also mailed

a pro se supplemental brief to the Superior Court arguing that because the “[U.S.] Supreme Court

[has] accepted neurological evidence on adolescent brain development, the sentencing landscape

has changed significantly in both state and federal laws.” RA CF0085-83, tab 27 at 3–4 (Suppl.

Br., May 12, 2022) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.

460 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016)).

[11] The Superior Court denied Adriatico’s motion on the merits. The court concluded that

although Guam has no compassionate release statute, Adriatico did not meet “his burden of

showing that there are ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ to justify his immediate release,”

and that “[e]ven if the Court found an ‘extraordinary and compelling reason’ exists, it could still

deem compassionate release not warranted based on a review of the factors set forth in [18

U.S.C.A. §] 3553(a).” RA CF0085-83, tab 24 at 8–9 (Dec. & Order, May 5, 2022). The court

ultimately found that Adriatico had not shown that the “significant amount of time” he has spent

in prison was “sufficient given the seriousness of the offenses committed.” Id. at 9.

4

This is the term used in the federal sentencing guidelines and literature on the subject, which defines a

“youthful offender” as one aged 18-25. This generally coincides with Guam’s definition of a “youth offender,” with

the notable difference being Guam’s definition excludes offenders convicted of crimes punishable by life

imprisonment. 9 GCA § 83.15(d) (2005). Although Guam’s Youth Correction Act was enacted in 1965, it has never

been implemented. See People v. Chargualaf, Crim. No. 88-00068A, 1989 WL 265040, at *7 (D. Guam App. Div.

Sept. 26, 1989) (“The Act was created in 1965 by Public Law 8–49 but has never been implemented. Rules necessary

to carry out the intent of the Act and to enable the [Guam] Parole Board to exercise powers and duties under the Act

were never executed. Additionally, no Director of the Department of Corrections has ever certified that proper and

adequate treatment, facilities, and personnel have been provided under the Act.” (first citing 9 GCA Ch. 83, Refs. &

Annos.; then citing 9 GCA § 83.30; and then citing 9 GCA § 83.45)); Borja v. Bitanga, 1998 Guam 29 ¶ 21 (“[T]he

rehabilitation goals of the Act cannot be accomplished at this time because the Act has never been implemented.

Sentencing under the Act is an impossibility.”).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 6 of 38

[12] The court further found that because “Adriatico does not set forth that his sentences in

either CF0085-83 or CF0116-84 were illegal. . . . a reduction of sentence is inappropriate under [8

GCA §] 120.46.” Id. at 5. It concluded that “[a]lthough Adriatico sets forth that the Court should

consider more recent developments in scientific evidence and case law indicating leniency for

young offenders under the age of twenty-five, the Court does not find that such developments are

appropriate for consideration under compassionate release. Further, the sentencing of a defendant

under Guam law is not subject to federal sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 9.

[13] Adriatico timely appealed.

II. JURISDICTION

[14] This court has jurisdiction over appeals from the Superior Court of Guam under 48

U.S.C.A. § 1424-1(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 118-137 (2024)) and 7 GCA §§ 3107 and

3108(a) (2005). This court has appellate jurisdiction over a post-judgment order affecting a

defendant’s substantial rights. 8 GCA § 130.15(c) (2005); see also People v. McKinney, 2018

Guam 10 ¶ 8. This court previously found in a written order that it had jurisdiction over the merits

of this appeal. Order (Mar. 10, 2023). We concluded that the Superior Court can properly exercise

its general jurisdiction to consider post-conviction motions if they are not explicitly barred by

statute. Id. at 3 (citing People v. Habib, 2010 Guam 9 ¶ 8; Carter v. State, 2015 UT 38, ¶ 18, 345

P.3d 737; State v. Mundo-Parra, 462 P.3d 1211, 1213–14 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020); 24 C.J.S. Criminal

Procedure and Rights of Accused § 2097); see also Carter, 2015 UT 38, ¶ 19 n.4.

[15] We also concluded, “Under Guam law, an illegal sentence can be corrected by motion at

any time,” id. at 4 (citing 8 GCA § 120.46 (2005); People v. Mallo, 2008 Guam 23 ¶¶ 6, 9; Habib,

2010 Guam 9 ¶ 15), and “[a] sentence that violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel

and unusual punishment is quintessentially an illegal sentence,” id. (citing Montgomery, 577 U.S.

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 7 of 38

at 195). We will exercise jurisdiction over the merits of an appeal challenging the denial of a

motion to correct an illegal sentence when the defendant makes a colorable claim that the sentence

violates their constitutional rights. See McKinney, 2018 Guam 10 ¶ 10; cf. People v. Torres, 2008

Guam 26 ¶ 13; Northern Mariana Islands v. Delos Santos, 2020 MP 16 ¶ 6. After oral argument,

we requested supplemental briefing on whether the law at the time of Adriatico’s sentencing

authorized an LWOP sentence for Attempted Aggravated Murder and whether such a sentence

was mandatory, among other things. Order at 2 (Mar. 1, 2024).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[16] The legality of a sentence is reviewed de novo. McKinney, 2018 Guam 10 ¶ 9. This court

reviews constitutional and Organic Act issues de novo. People v. Guerrero, 2000 Guam 26 ¶ 5.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Adriatico’s Compassionate-Release Argument Has Been Abandoned on Appeal

[17] The People argue that although Adriatico requests that this court remand the matter with

instructions to treat the motion for compassionate release as a habeas petition, “he gives no

justification for doing so.” Appellee’s Br. at 10 (Aug. 18, 2023). The People continue, “This court

has already held that the lower court had jurisdiction to decide the defendant’s motion, and the

lower court exercised its jurisdiction and issued a decision on the motion.” Id. Adriatico did not

file a reply brief. At oral argument, Adriatico’s appellate counsel conceded that he was abandoning

the compassionate-release argument. Digital Recording at 10:07:32–10:08:18 (Oral Arg., Feb. 28,

2024). Because Adriatico has abandoned his compassionate-release argument, we affirm the trial

court’s denial of that part of his motion. See Kim v. Min Sun Cha, 2020 Guam 22 ¶ 20 (“We have

held in prior cases that a party may abandon an argument on appeal by explicitly conceding an

issue, or by failing to include any argument or discussion in his or her brief.” (citations omitted)).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 8 of 38

B. We Correct Adriatico’s LWOP Sentences for Attempted Aggravated Murder

[18] An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time. See 8 GCA § 120.46; McKinney, 2018

Guam 10 ¶ 10. Adriatico argues that mandatory LWOP sentences for youthful offenders constitute

cruel and unusual punishment. Appellant’s Br. at 2 (July 7, 2023). Adriatico also argues that the

law at the time of his sentencing did not authorize LWOP for attempted aggravated murder.

Appellant’s Suppl. Br. at 4 (Nov. 27, 2023) (arguing that at the time of his convictions, the

maximum sentence for a first-degree felony was 20 years).

[19] “An illegal sentence is ‘a sentence that is not authorized by the judgment of conviction or

that is greater or less than the permissible statutory penalty for the crime.’” McKinney, 2018 Guam

10 ¶ 10 (quoting Mallo, 2008 Guam 23 ¶ 13). “In determining the plain meaning of a statutory

provision, we look to the meaning of the entire statutory scheme containing the provision for

guidance.” Amerault v. Intelcom Supp. Servs., Inc., 2004 Guam 23 ¶ 14.

[20] Guam’s attempt statute, which has not been amended since its enactment in 1976, makes

attempted murder a first-degree felony. Compare Guam Crim. & Corr. Code § 13.60(b) (1977),

with 9 GCA § 13.60(b) (as recodified by Guam Pub. L. 15-104:8 (Mar. 5, 1980)). It does not

explicitly address attempted aggravated murder, but under subsection (a), “attempt . . . [is a]

crime[] of the same grade and degree as the most serious crime which is attempted.” Id. § 13.60(a).

Because aggravated murder is a felony of the first degree under 9 GCA § 16.30(b), attempted

aggravated murder is also a first-degree felony. At the time of Adriatico’s conviction, Guam law

provided that a person convicted of a first-degree felony could be sentenced to “not less than five

(5) years and not more than twenty (20) years.” 9 GCA § 80.30(a) (as recodified by P.L. 15-

104:8). But “[i]n the case of a felony of the first degree,” a felon could be sentenced to an extended

term of “life imprisonment” if the court found they were a repeat offender pursuant to 9 GCA §

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 9 of 38

80.38. 9 GCA § 80.32(a) (as recodified by P.L. 15-104:8); 9 GCA § 80.38 (as recodified by P.L.

15-104:8). At the time, no law expressly permitted a defendant to be sentenced to LWOP for

attempted aggravated murder. In 2003, we struck down section 80.38 as unconstitutional in People

v. Muritok, 2003 Guam 21 ¶ 47.

[21] Yet the People argue that “a discretionary sentence of life without parole may [have been]

entered subject to the fulfillment of necessary factors [of 9 GCA § 80.32].” Appellee’s Suppl. Br.

at 16 (Apr. 19, 2024). However, at the time of Adriatico’s conviction, the law provided that

“[u]nless otherwise provided by law, every person confined in a [Guam] penal or correctional

institution shall be eligible for release on parole . . . .” 9 GCA § 80.72(a) (as recodified by P.L.

15-104:8); see also People v. Moses, 2007 Guam 5 ¶ 47 (“Under Guam law, a sentence of

imprisonment always has a possibility of parole, unless the sentence specifically states that it is a

sentence without the possibility of parole.”). Additionally, where the Guam legislature has

authorized LWOP sentences, it has done so expressly. See, e.g., 9 GCA § 25.15(b)–(c) (as

amended by P.L. 36-101:3 (June 15, 2022)) (First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct); 9 GCA §

25.25(c) (as amended by P.L. 36-101:5) (Third Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct); 9 GCA §

67.401.4(b) (as amended by P.L. 35-005 (Apr. 4, 2019)) (Prison Terms for Drug Offenders, repeat

offenders); 9 GCA § 67.401.9(b)(2) (as amended by P.L. 32-163 (May 23, 2014)) (Importation

and Exportation Penalties, repeat offenders). Although section 80.32 allowed trial courts at the

time to impose a life sentence, it did not specifically state such sentences were without the

possibility of parole. Because the law at the time of Adriatico’s conviction did not expressly

provide for LWOP for attempted aggravated murder, we conclude that it was not “otherwise

provided by law.” See 9 GCA § 80.72(a).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 10 of 38

[22] Based on the plain language of the statutory sentencing scheme at the time of Adriatico’s

conviction, the maximum penalty allowed by statute for Adriatico’s commission of attempted

aggravated murder was a life sentence with the possibility of parole. In light of our decision in

Muritok that section 80.38 is unconstitutional, we hold that the maximum sentence that Adriatico

could have received for a conviction of attempted aggravated murder was 20 years of

imprisonment. Cf. People v. Tedtaotao, 2015 Guam 9 ¶¶ 9–26 (reaching this conclusion for

attempted murder), overruled in later appeal, 2015 Guam 31 ¶¶ 26–27, 57 (vacating Tedtaotao’s

attempted murder conviction on other grounds). We exercise our authority under 8 GCA § 120.46

to correct Adriatico’s LWOP sentences for the two counts of attempted aggravated murder in

CF0116-84 to 20 years of incarceration for each count, “to be served concurrently to each other

and consecutive to that sentence . . . being served by [Adriatico] in [CF0085-83] . . . .” See RA

CF0116-84, tab 1 at 2 (Judgment, Nov. 21, 1984).

C. This Court Can Interpret the Organic Act’s Bill of Rights to Provide Greater Protections

than Federal Interpretations of Analogous Language Found in the U.S. Constitution

[23] Although Eighth Amendment claims have been infrequently litigated, the former District

Court of Guam Appellate Division opined in People v. Sablan that a mandatory life sentence did

not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Crim. No. 76-05A, 1978 WL 13493, at *1 (D. Guam

App. Div. Mar. 3, 1978) (citing People v. Root, 524 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1975)).5 Whether a

sentence inflicts cruel and unusual punishment is an issue of first impression in this court.

[24] The Ninth Circuit case of Guam v. Guerrero looms over this issue. Guerrero stands for

the proposition that where the Organic Act Bill of Rights and U.S. Constitution have “substantively

5

The Appellate Division’s reliance on People v. Root seems to have been misplaced, as the Ninth Circuit

made no discussion of mandatory life sentences. See generally Root, 524 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1975) (discussing

the felony-murder rule). In addition to being decided more than thirty years before the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth

Amendment trilogy of Roper, Graham, and Miller, the Sablan decision is unpersuasive here because there is no

distinction between life sentences with or without parole.

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 11 of 38

identical language,” this court cannot interpret the Organic Act in a different manner from the U.S.

Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. People v. Moses, 2016 Guam 17 ¶¶ 20–21

(quoting Guerrero, 290 F.3d at 1217–18); see also United States v. Drake, 543 F.3d 1080, 1085

(9th Cir. 2008) (interpreting Speedy Trial Clause in the Organic Act as coterminous with federal

Constitution because “[t]he language of the Speedy Trial Clause in the Organic Act tracks its

federal counterpart almost exactly” (citing Guerrero, 290 F.3d at 1217–18)). If we are to reach

the merits of the mandatory LWOP for aggravated murder issue, we must address Guerrero—

either following it or departing from it because it is unsupported by law.

[25] We hold that Guerrero is unsupported by law, and this court has the authority to depart

from it. As the court of last resort for Guam, this court is empowered to independently and

definitively interpret provisions of the Organic Act Bill of Rights.

1. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Guerrero

[26] We have summarized the procedural history of Guerrero as follows:

Guerrero, a Rastafarian, was convicted of importing marijuana into Guam, which

he used in his religious practices. In considering this case on appeal, we had ruled

that the Free Exercise Clause in the Organic Act was more protective than the

federal version, safeguarding Guerrero’s religious practices. On appeal to the Ninth

Circuit, Guerrero maintained he was shielded by two layers of protection: the

Organic Act’s Bill of Rights, “subject to final construction by [this court], and a

federal Bill of Rights, subject to final construction by the U.S. Supreme Court.” He

argued that subsection (u) of the Mink Amendment is “a floor below which the

Guam legislature cannot dip,” whereas the standalone provision is analogous to a

state constitution, and should be interpreted more broadly.

Moses, 2016 Guam 17 ¶ 20 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).

[27] The Ninth Circuit in Guerrero made several contentions about Guam and the Organic Act

that merit discussion.6 The court determined that “Guam’s ‘Bill of Rights,’ . . . is a federal statute

6

The tone of the opinion departs from previous Ninth Circuit opinions about the territories. Compare

Guerrero, 290 F.3d at 1212-18, with Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The Bill of Rights

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 12 of 38

dealing with an issue of federal constitutional import, not a local law.” Guerrero, 290 F.3d at

1214 (emphasis added). It observed, “In response to renewed petitions of Guam’s inhabitants,

Congress enacted the Organic Act of 1950, 48 U.S.C. § 1421 et seq., which, inter alia, established

a ‘Bill of Rights’ modeled after the Bill of Rights in the federal Constitution, 48 U.S.C. § 1421b.”

Guerrero, 290 F.3d at 1214. It noted, however, that “Guam’s ‘Bill of Rights’ is patterned after,

but not identical to, the federal Bill of Rights.” Id. at 1214 n.6. The court recognized the general

was not intended to interfere with the performance of our international obligations. Nor was it intended to operate as

a genocide pact for diverse native cultures.”). Beyond the dismissive attitude towards Guam, the statements in

Guerrero that Guam has no inherent right to govern itself and enjoys only those rights conferred to it by Congress

largely miss the point. The Ninth Circuit wrote of Guam as an abstract area of land (“territory” not in the technical

legal sense, but the general one). See, e.g., Julian Aguon, On Loving the Maps Our Hands Cannot Hold: Self-

Determination of Colonized and Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 16 Asian Pac. Am. L.J. 47, 68 (2011)

(“[T]he people of Guam are, essentially, non-people. . . . Guam’s international personality as a non-self-governing

territory aside, Guam is, under U.S. domestic law, an unincorporated territory.”). But we cannot ignore the people

who actually live here. Id. at 65, 68 (“Compounding the interpretive violence done to the text of the U.S. Constitution

in the name of the colonial enterprise is the psychic violence inflicted on folks who must find our way in a country

that neither wants us nor wants to let us go. . . . So we are Americans in name, not right.”).

To whatever extent the conclusion that “Guam . . . enjoy[s] only those rights conferred to it by Congress,”

Guerrero, 290 F.3d at 1217, might be technically correct, it ignores the right of Guam’s people to self-government

that is enshrined in the text of America’s founding document, as the supreme law of the land, and in international law.

The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created

equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and

the pursuit of Happiness.”); U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. (providing treaties are supreme law of land); G.A. Res. 2625

(XXV), at 123 (Oct. 24, 1970) (“By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined

in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their

political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect

this right . . . .”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, para. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171

(“All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status

and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”). If the Ninth Circuit is to be taken at face value,

sovereignty is not derived from the people, but from how the area of land they inhabit is characterized by the federal

judiciary. The Tenth Circuit has the better view:

[A] basic principle of republican association [is] that “governments . . . deriv[e] their [] powers from

the consent of the governed. . . . Respect for this principle should be at its zenith in the case of

territories born from American imperial expansion, a project that was always in significant tension

with our aspirations toward representative democracy. “The fabric of American empire ought to

rest on the solid basis of the consent of the People.” We have sometimes failed to live up to

Hamilton’s admonition. It is for this reason “that sovereignty and membership need to be

reconceptualized in less rigid terms if we are to establish a political regime that overcomes historical

subordination and justly rules over the territory and inhabitants of the United States.”

Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862, 879 (10th Cir. 2021) (third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (emphasis

added) (citations omitted); see also Guam v. Olsen, 431 U.S. 195, 208 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[W]e should

not eviscerate the court system carefully devised by the people of Guam in the exercise of their right of self-

government.”).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 13 of 38

proposition established by the United States Supreme Court in the Insular Cases7 that “[w]ith the

exception of certain ‘fundamental rights,’ federal constitutional rights do not automatically apply

to unincorporated territories.” Id. at 1214 (citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13

(1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 147 (1904)). The court also acknowledged that “in

1968, Congress enacted 48 U.S.C. § 1421b(u), known as the Mink Amendment, which extended

certain constitutional rights to Guam ‘to the extent that they [had] not been previously extended’

and provided that those rights ‘shall have the same force and effect [in Guam] as in the United

States or in any State of the United States.’” Id. (alterations in original).

[28] As framed by the Guerrero court, the “thorny question” they were tasked with deciding

was “whether § 1421b(a) is analogous to the free exercise provisions found in many state

constitutions that state supreme courts are free to interpret as providing more protection than that

given by the federal constitution.” Id. at 1215. They reasoned the issue before them was “whether

the rights established in the federal Constitution are a ceiling beyond which the Supreme Court of

Guam cannot exceed when it is interpreting its ‘Bill of Rights.’” Id.

[29] As the court found the language of the Free Exercise Clause of the Organic Act “virtually

identical to its federal counterpart,” it observed that if the federal Constitution imposed a ceiling,

the Guam Supreme Court would be bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Employment

Division v. Smith. Id. at 1214–16 (citing Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)) (denying free

exercise protections to members of Native American Church). The Ninth Circuit rejected the

argument that § 1421b provided an additional layer of constitutional protection. Id. at 1216, 1218.

7

“Best known as the Supreme Court decisions that held that the Constitution did not ‘follow the flag’ to the

islands annexed by the United States after the Spanish-American War--the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam--the

Insular Cases famously gave judicial sanction to American imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century.” Christina

Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 797, 798–99

(2005).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 14 of 38

Consistent with this court’s holding, Guerrero had argued that the Mink Amendment extended the

federal Bill of Rights to Guam as a floor, whereas the other provisions of the Guam Bill of Rights

were analogous to provisions found in a state constitution. Id. at 1216. This would have meant

that although this court was bound by the interpretation the U.S. Supreme Court gives the

constitutional provisions extended to Guam by the Mink Amendment, it was free to interpret other

provisions of § 1421b more broadly to provide greater protections than the federal Constitution.

Id. The Ninth Circuit stated:

Of course, Guam is not a state, has no locally adopted constitution, and its

“Bill of Rights” was passed not by its citizens, but rather by Congress. While §

1421b might function as a constitution, it remains quite unlike a constitution of a

sovereign State. Guam is a federal instrumentality, enjoying only those rights

conferred to it by Congress, and its “Bill of Rights” is a federal statute. Not even a

sovereign State may interpret a federal statute or constitutional provision in a way

contrary to the interpretation given it by the U.S. Supreme Court. We are powerless

to delegate authority to the Supreme Court of Guam to interpret matters of federal

law in a manner other than that provided by the federal judiciary.

Id. at 1216–17 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Free Exercise Clause of

the First Amendment operated as a ceiling in Guam, and that this court’s interpretation of the Free

Exercise Clause in the Guam Organic Act was bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in

Smith. See id. at 1216–18.

[30] To justify its conclusion that the federal Constitution operated as a ceiling, the Ninth Circuit

cited cases it explicitly acknowledged treated the federal Constitution as a floor. Id. at 1217 (citing

Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 123–24 (1904); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349

(1910); United States v. Husband R. (Roach), 453 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1971); S. Porto Rico

Sugar Co. v. Buscaglia, 154 F.2d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 1946); Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians &

Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir. 1992)). The court admitted that all these

cases “involved situations where the local territorial court interpreted its statutory bill of rights to

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 15 of 38

provide less protection of individual rights than that found in the federal Constitution,” as opposed

to the Supreme Court of Guam which found “its ‘Bill of Rights’ to provide greater protection of

individual rights.” Id. at 1217. Undeterred by this clear distinction between the interpretation

offered by the Supreme Court of Guam and those rejected in the cited cases, the Ninth Circuit

inexplicably stated, “[W]e nevertheless find their principle controlling. These cases teach us that

a territorial court lacks the authority to interpret a federal statute or federal constitutional provision

contrary to the interpretation the U.S. Supreme Court has given it.”8 Id. at 1217–18.

[31] The court, in a footnote, dismissed the argument that its interpretation made parts of the

Mink Amendment redundant and superfluous. Guerrero had asked, “If subsection (u) was merely

extending rights that had not previously been extended, and subsection (a) already provided the

federal level of free exercise protection, why did Congress mention the First Amendment again in

subsection (u)?” Id. at 1218 n.11. Ignoring the Insular Cases and basic canons of construction,

the court offered a textualist justification that cannot be described as anything but mere ipse dixit:

“Had Congress wanted to add a separate layer of constitutional protections, simpler language

would have sufficed, for example, ‘in addition’ or ‘also.’ In any case, subsection (u) adds only

those provisions not already extended. Therefore, if a provision had been extended, like free

exercise of religion, it was not duplicated by subsection (u).” Id.

[32] The court held that it “was error for the Supreme Court of Guam to conclude that ‘[d]espite

the similarity of the two provisions, [the Guam Supreme Court] can reach its own conclusions on

the scope of the protections of section 1421b(a) and may provide broader rights than those which

8

Nowhere else in the United States where a constitutional provision applies does it operate this way. See,

e.g., Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard.”); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 13 (May 2024 Update);

see also In re Individuals in Custody of State, No. SCPW-XX-XXXXXXX, 2021 WL 4762901, at *16 n.13 (Haw. Oct. 12,

2021) (McKenna, J., dissenting) (“Even if our language was identical to the federal Constitution, we are able to provide

greater protection under the Hawai‘i constitution.” (citing State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889, 901 (Haw. 1995))).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 16 of 38

have been interpreted by federal courts under the United States Constitution.’” Id. at 1218 (first

alteration in original).

2. Why Guerrero is unsupported by law

[33] The Organic Act was amended in 2004 to end certiorari review of our decisions by the

Ninth Circuit, making this court equal to the other branches of government and courts of last resort

in almost every other U.S. jurisdiction. Act of Oct. 30, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-378, § 2, 118 Stat.

2206, 2208 (codified at 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-2). This court clarified in Underwood v. Guam

Election Commission that “[u]nder the principles of stare decisis as they exist in American

jurisprudence, we do not regard the termination of the Ninth Circuit review as a termination of the

precedential value of cases involving Organic Act issues that rose to the Ninth Circuit through . .

. the local court appellate process during the Ninth Circuit review period.” 2006 Guam 17 ¶ 35.

But this court emphasized:

[B]ecause the Supreme Court of Guam is now the final arbiter of questions arising

through the jurisdiction of the courts of Guam (short of final certiorari review by

the United States Supreme Court), we recognize our authority to depart from Ninth

Circuit cases interpreting the Organic Act of Guam only in the rare instance where

we believe that such cases are unsupported by law.

Id.

[34] The Ninth Circuit’s Guerrero decision has been harshly criticized, including by the

Supreme Court of the U.S. Virgin Islands (“USVI”), which observed that “the reasoning of

Guerrero was ‘based neither on text, nor on congressional intent, nor on precedent.’” See Balboni

v. Ranger Am. of the V.I., Inc., 70 V.I. 1048, 1065 n.16 (2019) (quoting Christopher Serkin &

Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 701, 736 (2016)). In Balboni, the

USVI Supreme Court held that it is “empowered to independently and definitively interpret the

Bill of Rights provisions of the Revised Organic Act as the court of last resort for the Virgin

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 17 of 38

Islands.” Id. at 1060. Although we do so on slightly different grounds,9 we agree with the USVI

Supreme Court’s conclusion that “[t]o the extent that the Guerrero decision is not inconsistent

with the United States Supreme Court’s later decision in Limtiaco v. Camacho, 549 U.S. 483, 491

(2007), it is not apposite.” Id. at 1065 n.16. A critical flaw in the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit’s

Guerrero opinion is that it rests on several false assumptions: that the similarity of a statute’s text

9

The USVI Supreme Court emphasized that the Ninth Circuit decided Guerrero “without any analysis of the

legislative history.” Balboni v. Ranger Am. of the V.I., Inc., 70 V.I. 1048, 1065 n.16 (2019). It found the legislative

history of the USVI Bill of Rights to be dispositive:

Congress did not model the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights after the Bill of Rights to the United States

Constitution. Rather, the legislative history reveals that Congress modelled the Virgin Islands Bill

of Rights after similar provisions found in state constitutions, which state courts of last resort have

virtually-uniformly interpreted as conferring greater rights than those in the Bill of Rights to the

United States Constitution. And while the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights was enacted by Congress,

it was not enacted pursuant to the general and enumerated powers vested in Congress in its capacity

as a national legislature through Article I of the United States Constitution. Instead, Congress

enacted the Revised Organic Act as the organic governing law or constitution for the Virgin Islands

through its power under the Territorial Clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution, which

effectively authorizes Congress to enact laws for a territory as if Congress were a state government.

Congress, having also directed that the relationship between the courts of the Virgin Islands and the

courts of the United States to mirror the one between state and federal courts, consequently intended

for this Court to exercise the power to interpret the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights in the same manner

that a state court of last resort may interpret the Bill of Rights to a state constitution.

Id. at 1061.

The dissent in Balboni criticized the majority for placing much emphasis on the statement of one senator in

the congressional record that the USVI Bill of Rights adopted “familiar provisions found in various organic acts and

in State constitutions in relation to the Bill of Rights.” Id. at 1116–17 (Cabret, J., dissenting). Neither party has

located any analogous statement in the legislative history of the Guam Organic Act. But although our decision can be

rooted on stronger bases, the history of the Guam Congress Walkout does suggest the people of Guam played a pivotal

role in the passage of the Organic Act, including shaping the legislation eventually passed by Congress. See, e.g., Leo

Babauta, Guam Congress Walkout, Guampedia, https://www.guampedia.com/guam-congress-walkout/ (last visited

Dec. 2, 2024); Anne Perez Hattori, Righting Civil Wrongs: The Guam Congress Walkout of 1949, 3 ISLA: A Journal

of Micronesian Studies 1, 19 (Rainy Season 1995) (“In passing their own version of an organic act for Guam, the

members of the Guam Congress sought to identify the walkout as a clear call for US citizenship and civil government

. . . .”). Specifically, this legislative history indicates the Organic Act Bill of Rights was meant to be an enaction of

the Bradley Bill of Rights, which was proposed by the Naval Governor in 1930. Penelope C. Bordallo, A Campaign

for Political Rights on Guam, Mariana Islands, 1899-1950 (Aug. 1982) (M.A. thesis, Univ. Hawai’i) (Scholar Space)

(discussing draft Organic Act passed by the Guam Congress that guaranteed the Bradley Bill of Rights); Bill of Rights

for Guam 1930, Guampedia, https://www.guampedia.com/bill-of-rights-for-guam-1930/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2024).

Although ultimately vetoed by the Secretary of the Navy, the Bradley Bill of Rights was intended as a law of purely

local concern. See Bill of Rights for Guam 1930, Guampedia (“[B]y virtue of the power and authority vested in me

as Governor of Guam, and in recognition of the loyalty and unswerving allegiance of the people of Guam to the

Government of the United States of America and to its ideals of freedom and democracy, I declare that the following

articles shall have full force and effect of law in the Island of Guam . . . .” (quoting Bradley Bill of Rights,

Proclamation)). Thus, our conclusion is also supported by the legislative history of the Guam Organic Act Bill of

Rights.

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 18 of 38

makes it automatically coextensive with the Constitution; that 48 U.S.C.A. § 1421b(a) and the

First Amendment are the same provision of law; and that the Mink Amendment was surplusage.

We address each of these flawed assumptions in turn.

a. Similarity of language does not render a statute automatically coextensive

with the Constitution

[35] First, the Guerrero court assumed that where a “federal statute” uses language that is

“virtually identical” to the federal Constitution, the statute must be coextensive with the

Constitution because it “deal[s] with an issue of federal constitutional import.” Guerrero, 290

F.3d at 1214. But this is simply not the case. This assumption is not based in precedent, as the

U.S. Supreme Court has outlined the analysis to determine whether a federal statute is coextensive

with a constitutional provision. In Kastigar v. United States, the Court outlined this analysis in

the context of whether a federal immunity statute was coextensive with the Fifth Amendment

privilege against self-incrimination: “The constitutional inquiry, rooted in logic and history, as

well as in the decisions of this Court, is whether the immunity granted under this statute is

coextensive with the scope of the privilege.” 406 U.S. 441, 449 (1972); see also Childs v. McCord,

420 F. Supp. 428, 431 (D. Md. 1976) (applying Kastigar, stating, “The legislative history of this

statute clearly reveals a congressional intent that a ‘statutory (claim of immunity) . . . be as broad

as, but no broader than, the privilege against self-incrimination.’”), aff’d sub nom. Childs v. Schlitz,

556 F.2d 1178 (4th Cir. 1977). A federal statute may be coextensive with a constitutional

amendment, but this is not automatic; rather, the congressional intent must be clear.

[36] The proper analysis does not end with the superficial similarity of language between the

statute and the Constitution, but also looks to the similarity of purpose between the constitutional

principle and the statute, along with the statute’s legislative history. The inquiry of the Guerrero

court was rooted in neither logic, history, nor precedent. Rather, it purported to create a new

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 19 of 38

category of federal statute that is automatically coextensive with the Constitution: a federal statute

that “deal[s] with an issue of federal constitutional import.” Guerrero, 290 F.3d at 1214. This

categorization had never been invoked by any other federal court before and has never been since.

b. The First Amendment and 48 U.S.C.A. § 1421b(a) are different provisions

of law

[37] Another issue that the Guerrero decision ignores is that 48 U.S.C.A. § 1421b(a) and the

First Amendment are different provisions of law. At the risk of stating the obvious, a federal

statute and a constitutional amendment are two different things. As the U.S. Supreme Court has

said, “[T]he Organic Act is a federal statute, which we are bound to construe according to its

terms.” Limtiaco, 549 U.S. at 492. But this is not mere pedantry; this is a distinction with a

difference—construing subsection (a) of the Organic Act Bill of Rights and construing the First

Amendment are two different things. Like any other court, this court is bound by the U.S. Supreme

Court’s interpretation of a federal law. But it does not follow that when the Court construes a

constitutional provision, it is cabining all federal statutes that deal with that “issue of federal

constitutional import.” Contra Guerrero, 290 F.3d at 1214.

[38] This distinction should have been obvious to the Guerrero court, because at issue there was

the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”)—a federal statute Congress explicitly

passed to provide greater religious protections than the Supreme Court recognized under the First

Amendment. See Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 424 (2022) (stating RFRA was passed in the

aftermath of Smith and aims to ensure greater protection for religious exercise than is available

under the First Amendment). Although RFRA has had a troubled history from its passage,10 it still

applies to the federal government. See, e.g., Ajaj v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 25 F.4th 805, 807–08

10

It was found unconstitutional as applied to the States. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see

also Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356–58 (2015) (summarizing RFRA’s history).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 20 of 38

(10th Cir. 2022) (“RFRA prohibits the federal government from substantially burdening an

individual’s exercise of religion unless the application of that burden is the least restrictive means

of furthering a compelling governmental interest.”). It would be nonsensical to state that any

decision of the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the Free Exercise Clause invalidates laws

explicitly passed by Congress to provide additional statutory protections of religious exercise. See,

e.g., United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1558–59 (9th Cir. 1996) (observing that “[t]he power

of Congress to provide federal protection in addition to that accorded by the great guarantees of

the Bill of Rights has been exerted in other contexts,” and collecting examples of federal statutes

passed by Congress to free religious orders from the impact of Supreme Court decisions). When

the Supreme Court issues a constitutional ruling, it does not invalidate every tangentially related

federal statute that provides greater protection than the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., In re Young, 141

F.3d 854, 860 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Congress has often provided statutory protection of individual

liberties that exceed the Supreme Court’s interpretation of constitutional protection. . . . Congress

need not agree with everything the Supreme Court does in order for its legislation to pass

constitutional muster . . . .”).

[39] The U.S. Supreme Court has stated it will “accord deference” to decisions of this court

“over matters of purely local concern.” Limtiaco, 549 U.S. at 491. If the U.S. Supreme Court

ultimately interprets a provision of 48 U.S.C.A. § 1421b(a)–(t) differently, we will be bound by

that interpretation—but the Court has yet to do so. See Underwood, 2006 Guam 17 ¶ 34 (observing

any split between this court and federal courts can be resolved by U.S. Supreme Court). The false

equivalency between a federal statute that “deal[s] with an issue of federal constitutional import”

and a constitutional provision works a sleight of hand. It turns the technically correct statement

that “[n]ot even a sovereign State may interpret a federal statute or constitutional provision in a

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 21 of 38

way contrary to the interpretation given it by the U.S. Supreme Court,” Guerrero, 290 F.3d at

1217, into the plainly incorrect holding that “[n]ot even a sovereign State may interpret a federal

statute [that deals with an issue of federal constitutional import] in a way contrary to the

interpretation given [the related constitutional provision] by the U.S. Supreme Court.”

[40] State courts routinely make independent determinations of federal statutes, see, e.g.,

Boucher v. All. Title Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 440, 443 (Ct. App. 2005) (“In the absence of controlling

United States Supreme Court decisional authority, we make an independent determination of

federal law.”); State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ohio 2001) (“[W]e are not bound by rulings

on federal statutory or constitutional law made by a federal court other than the United States

Supreme Court. We will, however, accord those decisions some persuasive weight.”), even when

they deal with an issue of “federal constitutional import,” see, e.g., Wendella Sightseeing Co. v.

City of Chicago Through Dep’t of Fin., 2023 IL App (1st) 211371, ¶ 52 (“Because our analysis

involves interpretation of the RHA, a federal statute, and tangentially, the tonnage clause as

contained within our federal constitution, we may look to ‘decisions of the United States Supreme

Court and federal circuit and district courts’ for guidance.”), appeal denied sub nom. Wendella

Sightseeing Co. v. City of Chicago, 221 N.E.3d 333 (Table) (Ill. 2023).

[41] Even when a federal statute is modeled after and shares similar language with a

constitutional provision, the Guerrero court was wrong to assume the statute must be interpreted

in lockstep with the Constitution. Nowhere is this highlighted more than in relation to the Indian

Bill of Rights, codified as part of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) at 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302. As

the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, ICRA “accorded a range of procedural safeguards to tribal-

court defendants ‘similar, but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 22 of 38

Fourteenth Amendment.’” United States v. Bryant, 579 U.S. 140, 149 (2016) (quoting Santa Clara

Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 57 (1978)).

[42] The contention by the Guerrero court that a sovereign cannot interpret a federal statute

differently from how the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the Constitution is demonstrably false;

courts of sovereign tribal nations routinely interpret ICRA differently than the U.S. Supreme Court

interprets analogous constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, 8 Nav. R.

604 (Navajo 2004) (“In giving meaning to the right against self-incrimination, this Court does not

have to directly apply federal interpretations of the Bill of Rights. In interpreting the Navajo Bill

of Rights and the Indian Civil Rights Act, as with other statutes that contain ambiguous language,

we first and foremost make sure that such interpretation is consistent with the Fundamental Laws

of the Din[é].”). Despite ICRA stating, “No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government

shall . . . deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law,” 25 U.S.C.A. §

1302(a)(8) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 118-107 (2024)), the Eighth Circuit has held that “the equal

protection clause of the ICRA is not coextensive with the equal protection clause of the

[F]ourteenth [A]mendment to the United States Constitution,” Wounded Head v. Tribal Council

of Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Rsrv., 507 F.2d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).

[43] Nearly 50 years ago, the Ninth Circuit recognized:

[T]he courts have been careful to construe the terms “due process” and “equal

protection” as used in the Indian Bill of Rights with due regard for the historical,

governmental and cultural values of an Indian tribe. As a result, these terms are not

always given the same meaning as they have come to represent under the United

States Constitution.

Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1104 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes

of Flathead Rsrv., 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976); McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974);

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 23 of 38

O’Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442

F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971)).

[44] Thus, while the Indian Bill of Rights is a federal statute—that was modeled on the U.S.

Constitution and shares similar language with it—courts are unanimous in holding that they are

not coextensive. The contention of the Guerrero court that a federal statute that deals with an issue

of federal constitutional import must be treated as coextensive with the analogous constitutional

provision is simply unmoored from settled law.

[45] Adriatico’s appeal centers on the Organic Act’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual

punishments,” 48 U.S.C.A. § 1421b(h), and it is not the case these words must be interpreted to be

coextensive with the Eighth Amendment. As for ICRA’s prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishment, courts have found that they “should not merely look at the construction of the Eighth

Amendment to the United States Constitution.” E.g., Ramos v. Pyramid Tribal Ct., Bureau of

Indian Affs., 621 F. Supp. 967, 970 (D. Nev. 1985); see also Swinomish Tribal Cmty. v. 2002

BMW, 17 Am. Tribal Law 235, 238 (Swinomish 2022) (stating that although persuasive, federal

Eighth Amendment jurisprudence not binding on Tribal Court).

c. The plain text of the Mink Amendment shows Congress contemplated a

two-tiered system of rights with the federal Constitution setting a floor

[46] The Ninth Circuit’s comments about the Mink Amendment are unmoored from the

statutory text, territorial jurisprudence, and canons of statutory interpretation. The Mink

Amendment extended to Guam, inter alia, the first nine amendments to the Constitution “to the

extent that they have not been previously extended to that territory.” 48 U.S.C.A. § 1421b(u). The

Guerrero court recognized it was reasonable to read this phrase as “provid[ing] Guam two layers

of religious protection, one federal and one subject to local interpretation that cannot fall beneath

the floor of federally protected rights.” Guerrero, 290 F.3d at 1218 n.11. Yet it rejected this

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 24 of 38

interpretation by assuming—without justification—the statutory language was a reference to the

Organic Act Bill of Rights and not the doctrine of territorial incorporation. See id. (“In any case,

subsection (u) adds only those provisions not already extended. Therefore, if a provision had been

extended [by the Organic Act], like free exercise of religion, it was not duplicated by subsection

(u).”).

[47] Whatever the virtue or vices of the Insular Cases, the Guerrero court cited them in its

decision and accurately characterized one of their central holdings to be: “With the exception of

certain ‘fundamental rights,’ federal constitutional rights do not automatically apply to

unincorporated territories.” 290 F.3d at 1214 (citing Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312–13; Dorr, 195 U.S.

at 147); see also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 249 (1901) (holding the revenue clauses of the

Constitution did not “extend of their own force to our newly acquired territories”); Pueblo v.

Casellas Toro, 2017 TSPR 63, 197 D.P.R. 1003, 97 P.R. Offic. Trans. 52 (“Through the so-called

Insular Cases, the federal Supreme Court held that only the rights classified as fundamental rights

under the Constitution of the United States extend of their own force to nonincorporated territories,

such as Puerto Rico.” (citing Downes, 182 U.S. 244)). The obvious implication is that, under

settled law when the Mink Amendment was passed, certain federal constitutional rights extended

of their own force to Guam. It is against this backdrop that the Mink Amendment’s extension of

certain federal constitutional provisions must be read; any jurist familiar with the Insular Cases

understands this.11

[48] The plain text of the Mink Amendment illustrates that the original provisions of the

Organic Act Bill of Rights restricted the civil government of Guam. See 48 U.S.C.A. § 1421b(u)

11

As has recently been written, “The Insular Cases impact the everyday lives of the peoples of the territories

in far-reaching ways--from the political to the economic, and the social to the cultural.” Susan K. Serrano & Ian

Falefuafua Tapu, Reparative Justice in the U.S. Territories: Reckoning with America’s Colonial Climate Crisis, 110

Cal. L. Rev. 1281, 1288 (2022).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 25 of 38

(“The following provisions of and amendments to the Constitution of the United States are hereby

extended to Guam to the extent that they have not been previously extended to that territory and

shall have the same force and effect there as in the United States or in any State of the United

States . . . .”). Although some federal constitutional provisions extended to Guam of their own

force because they were fundamental rights, certain “provisions of and amendments to the

Constitution of the United States” could only be extended to Guam by legislation. See id. The

phrase “to the extent that they have not been previously extended to that territory,” id., can be

interpreted only as a reference to the central holding of the Insular Cases—some fundamental

rights enshrined in the U.S. Constitution already applied in Guam by their own force. The

statement that the provisions extended to Guam “shall have the same force and effect there as in

the United States or in any State of the United States,” id., can only logically be interpreted to

mean Congress intended these constitutional provisions to operate in Guam like they do

everywhere else in the country—setting a floor below which the government (both local and

federal) could not go.

[49] “When Congress amends legislation, courts must presume it intends the change to have

real and substantial effect.” Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. 374, 393 (2021) (quoting Ross

v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 641–42 (2016)). Read against the background of law Congress was

legislating against, and presuming Congress intended the amendment to have real and substantial

effect, the plain text of the Mink Amendment contemplated a two-tiered system of rights—as exists

in nearly every other jurisdiction in the United States. A textualist reading of that amendment that

comes to any other conclusion is intellectually disingenuous. See Balboni, 70 V.I. at 1069 (“To

hold otherwise would render the 1968 amendment to the Revised Organic Act extending the

Fourteenth Amendment to the Virgin Islands completely superfluous.”); Guam v. Inglett, 417 F.2d

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 26 of 38

123, 124 (9th Cir. 1969) (“[A]ll of the statutory language may be given effect by interpreting

[subsection (u)] to mean that each of the constitutional provisions referred to in the section is to

have the same effect in Guam as it would have in a state of the United States. Thus, the first nine

amendments of the Constitution are made directly applicable to federal prosecutions in the

territory, but are made applicable to prosecutions by the territorial government only to the extent

that the rights guaranteed by these amendments are incorporated within the meaning of the [Due

Process Clause] of the Fourteenth Amendment.”), disapproved on other grounds by United States

v. Frame, 454 F.2d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1972); L. Offs. of Phillips & Bordallo, P.C. v. Leon

Guerrero, Civil Case No. 22-00020, 2023 WL 5075374, at *6 (D. Guam Aug. 9, 2023) (“If the

Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were already extended to Guam in

their entirety through subsection (e), Congress would have repeated itself by enacting subsection

(u). The canon against surplusage thus dictates that subsections (e) and (u) must constitute

different rights. . . . [T]he right found in subsection (e) must then be local. . . . [Section] 1421b(e)

only applies on Guam and is concerned with protecting persons against a local government . . . .”).

The Guerrero decision “undermines the central purpose of state constitutional adjudication:

preserving the independence of state law, consistent with federal ‘floors’ of civil rights.”

Developments in the Law – The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev.

1324, 1460 (1982); Hendrickson v. Reg O Co., 657 F.2d 9, 15 n.5 (3d Cir. 1981) (observing that

although “[i]t might be argued that since the Virgin Islands is not a state, but a territory, the notion

of interstate federalism is not a pertinent consideration,” where Congress provides by statute that

a territory should be treated as a state, this indicates the same principles should apply to it as they

would to a state).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 27 of 38

d. We hold that Guerrero is unsupported by law

[50] The Guerrero court was simply wrong. Chief Justice Siguenza was right when he wrote

for a majority of this court that “[d]espite the similarity of the two provisions, this court can reach

its own conclusions on the scope of the protections of [the Organic Act Bill of Rights] and may

provide broader rights than those which have been interpreted by federal courts under the United

States Constitution.” People v. Guerrero, 2000 Guam 26 ¶ 22.

D. Title 48 U.S.C.A. § 1421b(h)’s Prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punishments Should Not

Be Interpreted in Lockstep with the Eighth Amendment

1. The Eighth Amendment

[51] The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines

imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment ‘guarantees individuals the right not

to be subjected to excessive sanctions.’” Miller, 567 U.S. at 469 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543

U.S. 551, 560 (2005)). That right “flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for

crime should be graduated and proportioned’ to both the offender and the offense.” Id. (quoting

Roper, 543 U.S. at 560). “[T]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.”

Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 59). The concept of proportionality is viewed “less through a

historical prism than according to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a

maturing society.’” Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).

[52] The Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”) has

aptly summarized this jurisprudence:

To determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, we must look to “‘the

evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). We do

so because what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is not simply illustrative

but involves a “moral judgment.” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 28 of 38

“The standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic

mores of society change.” Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Furman v.

Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972)).

The Eighth Amendment, which includes the Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Clause, forbids the imposition of “inherently barbaric punishments.” Graham, 560

U.S. at 59. The Clause calls attention to the indispensable duty of the government

to respect human dignity even of those who are convicted with atrocious crimes.

Id. The greater part of American jurisprudence on the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause, however, does not involve punishments that are barbaric, but

rather those that are disproportionate to the crime. Id.

Justice requires that imposition of punishment be “graduated and

proportioned” to the crime. Weems, 217 U.S. at 367. Indeed the constitutional

protection of the Eighth Amendment does not necessitate strict proportionality

between crime and punishment, but “forbids only extreme sentences that are

‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001

(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting Solem

v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 303 (1983)).

Commonwealth v. Yu Qun, 2016 MP 19 ¶¶ 9–11.

[53] United States Supreme Court decisions provide two “strands” of precedent where

disproportionate sentences may violate the Eighth Amendment. “The first has adopted categorical

bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders

and the severity of a penalty.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 470 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Atkins v.

Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (imposing death penalty on defendant with severe intellectual

disability violates Eighth Amendment). The second line of precedents “have prohibited mandatory

imposition of capital punishment,” instead “requiring that sentencing authorities consider the

characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before sentencing him to death.” Miller,

567 U.S. at 470. As the Hawai‘i Intermediate Court of Appeals has explained:

Graham noted that life without parole and the death penalty share characteristics

that are shared by no other sentences and that life without parole is especially harsh

on juveniles who will almost inevitably spend more time in jail than adults. Miller,

567 U.S. at 474–75 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–70). The Court in death penalty

cases requires that “capital defendants have an opportunity to advance, and the

judge or jury a chance to assess, any mitigating factors, so that the death penalty is

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 29 of 38

reserved only for the most culpable defendants committing the most serious

offenses.” Id. at 475–76. The Court concluded that a similar rule, permitting the

sentencer to consider the mitigating factors associated with juvenile offenders who

have committed homicides, “should apply when a juvenile confronts a sentence of

life (and death) in prison.” Id. at 476–77.

State v. Dat Minh Tran, 378 P.3d 1014, 1019 (Haw. Ct. App. 2016). Thus, in Miller, the U.S.

Supreme Court held that mandatory LWOP for juveniles sat at “the confluence of these two lines

of precedent,” which required “individualized consideration before sentencing a juvenile to life

imprisonment without possibility of parole.” 567 U.S. at 470, 480.

[54] The U.S. Supreme Court conducts its “evolving standards of decency” analysis by

surveying American society; it “compares each state’s most reliable ‘objective indicia’ of societal

values, which is usually comprised of state legislative and state jury sentencing data, to determine

whether a national consensus opposes the application of a specific punishment upon a particular

class of defendants.” Cristina M. Quiñones-Betancourt, When Standards Collide: How the

Federal Death Penalty Fails the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment “Evolving Standards of

Decency” Test When Applied to Puerto Rican Federal Capital Defendants, 23 Cornell J.L. & Pub.

Pol’y 157, 161 (2013) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 567).

2. Federal precedent is highly persuasive, but we can depart from federal

constitutional principles for compelling reasons

[55] In their initial brief, the People argued that “[s]ince the U.S. constitution does not prohibit

mandatory LWOP sentences for 20- or 21-year-olds, neither does the Organic Act.” Appellee’s

Br. at 14. The People attempted to distinguish Adriatico’s reliance on the Washington Supreme

Court’s decision in In re Monschke, 482 P.3d 276, 283 (Wash. 2021) (en banc), by arguing that

that court “was free to interpret the state constitution to allow young adult defendants originally

sentenced to LWOP to have an opportunity to be resentenced. Federal precedent, in contrast,

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 30 of 38

restrains Guam courts in this regard.” Appellee’s Br. at 14. Yet after being asked to brief whether

the Ninth Circuit’s Guerrero decision was supported by law, the People now argue:

The Organic Act of Guam creates two methods for analysis of “cruel and

unusual punishment”. The first is under 48 U.S.C. § 1421b(h) . . . . The second is

under 48 U.S.C. § 1421b(u), which extends the provisions of the Eighth

Amendment to Guam such that it shall have the same force and effect as in the

United States or in any State of the United States.

Appellee’s Suppl. Br. at 11.

[56] We are not constrained by federal precedent in interpreting subsection (h). Having found

that the rights established in the federal Constitution are not a ceiling beyond which we cannot

exceed when interpreting the Organic Act Bill of Rights, we must still determine whether to

interpret subsection (h) differently than the Eighth Amendment. Even before Guerrero, this court

reached decisions where analysis of an alleged violation of a defendant’s rights had a single

inquiry. See People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 ¶¶ 12–27 (relying on federal precedent to find

no violation of Fourth Amendment); People v. San Nicolas, 2001 Guam 4 ¶¶ 8–28 (relying on

federal caselaw to find no double jeopardy violation). But several of our decisions illustrate a

sentiment that both litigants and this court felt constrained by Guerrero. Moses, 2016 Guam 17 ¶

22 (“Moses’s call to use the Organic Act as a more protective local constitution is potentially

viable. However, the Guerrero ruling narrows the availability of such remedy, making it only

plausible if the language in the Organic Act and Federal Constitution were substantively

different.”); see also Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Constitutions in the United States Federal System, 77

Ohio St. L.J. 195, 201 (2016) (observing that the phenomenon of “lockstepping” occurs because

(1) federal law often is more developed; (2) lawyers too rarely argue their cases based on the text

and history of the state constitutions; and (3) some local laws require lockstepping).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 31 of 38

[57] We hold that courts should “ask[] first whether the right being asserted is protected under

the federal constitution. If it is, then the [Organic Act] claim is not reached. If it is not, then the

[Organic Act] is examined.”12 State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 6–7 (N.M. 1997) (rejecting prior

precedent where state and federal constitution were interpreted in lockstep and if “the federal

constitution did not provide . . . protection, we would follow that precedent without interpreting

independently the parallel provision of the New Mexico Constitution”). Scholars have called this

the “interstitial approach” to state constitutional analysis, which we now adopt. As explained in a

leading article on state constitutional law:

The interstitial model proposes three questions that the state court should

address sequentially when presented with a state constitutional issue. First, do

established principles of federal law dictate a result; that is, does the alleged

unconstitutional action fall below a federal floor? If so, the case can be decided

without the elaboration of state constitutional doctrine. If not, the second question

asks what factors, if any, warrant a divergence from federal doctrine. If the court

identifies reasons to diverge, the final question is how to proceed in elaborating the

contours of the state constitutional doctrine; specifically, should the court employ

a reactive approach, simply tinkering with the available federal doctrine, or should

it employ a more self-reliant approach, building state constitutional doctrine for this

area independently, without close reference to the federal doctrine? The answers

to these three questions should structure the process by which state courts decide

when and how to develop state constitutional law.

Developments in the Law – The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, supra, at 1358–59

(footnotes omitted).

[58] Here, the established principles of federal law dictate a result—the alleged unconstitutional

action does not fall below a federal floor. The People are correct that “[e]very Circuit to consider

this issue has refused to extend Miller to defendants who were eighteen or older at the time of their

12

In cases where a statute provides a third layer of protection in addition to the Organic Act Bill of Rights

and federal Constitution, courts should begin with the statute. See Hammonds by Lizama v. Boonprakong, Civ. Nos.

81-003A, 81-00048A, 1983 WL 30221, at *4 (D. Guam App. Div. Apr. 4, 1983) (“If a case may be resolved on either

constitutional or statutory grounds, a court should avoid the constitutional issue if a statutory disposition is possible.”

(citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 306–07 (1980); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)

(Brandeis, J., concurring))), aff’d sub nom. Awa v. Guam Mem’l Hosp. Auth., 726 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1984).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 32 of 38

offenses.” Cruz v. United States, 826 F. App’x 49, 52 n.1 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing Wright v. United

States, 902 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2018); In re Frank, 690 F. App’x 146 (5th Cir. 2017) (per

curiam); Melton v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 778 F.3d 1234, 1235, 1237 (11th Cir. 2015); United

States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Dock, 541 F. App’x 242,

245 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)).

[59] We must decide what factors, if any, warrant a divergence from federal doctrine. The New

Mexico Supreme Court has found that three grounds may justify departing from federal

jurisprudence: “(1) the federal analysis is flawed or undeveloped; (2) structural differences exist

between federal and state government; or (3) distinctive state characteristics exist that would

support the departure.” State v. Crane, 2014-NMSC-026, ¶ 15, 329 P.3d 689. We find these

grounds persuasive but not necessarily exhaustive. “Because some of these factors will be present

in virtually every case . . . [this Court] weigh[s] the relevant considerations in the case at hand to

determine whether they favor elaboration of state constitutional doctrine and to identify the factors

deserving the greatest attention in that elaboration.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting

Developments in the Law – The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, supra, at 1359).

[60] We conclude certain distinct characteristics of Guam to be adequate grounds upon which

to depart from federal jurisprudence and elaborate on our cruel-and-unusual-punishments

jurisprudence regarding mandatory LWOP sentences. In their supplemental brief, the People

argue that “the Guam Bill of Rights [could] be interpreted under the unique legal tradition of

Guam, which was greatly influenced by Spanish Civil Law, and later modified by its adoption of

local codes modelled on the California codes [which were also greatly influenced by Spanish Civil

Law].” Appellee’s Suppl. Br. at 10. We do not disagree that Guam has a unique legal tradition,

but across the territory acquired by the United States after the Spanish-American War, references

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 33 of 38

to “Spanish Civil Law” served as a pretext to avoid trial by jury. Katherine Unterman, Trial

Without Jury in Guam, USA, 38 Law & Hist. Rev. 811, 819–21 (2020) (“[J]ustifying the lack of

jury trials by pointing to Guam’s Spanish heritage was disingenuous, as in many other ways the

American colonial administration was trying to erase the island’s cultural traditions. . . . Dislike

of juries, racism against local populations, and the desire for centralized governance all pointed in

the same direction, each reinforcing the other.”); Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., The Law of United States

Territories and Affiliated Jurisdictions 126 (1995) (“To the extent that the jury system is designed

to interpose community sentiment between government and citizenry, it would have been

unthinkable . . . to allow members of the indigenous territorial population to serve as jurors or

grand jurors.”). Thus, “United States colonial officials’ ostensible respect for Guam’s heritage

actually undermined locals’ self-determination and agency.” Unterman, supra, at 819.

[61] We conclude that the Guam Bill of Rights should be interpreted under the unique legal

tradition of Guam, but rather than focusing on the “Spanish Civil Law” that was a pretext for the

“the racialization of Chamorus,” id. at 812, the focus should be placed on the people of Guam, and

that “[f]rom the very start of American [naval] occupation, . . . the people of Guam pressed for

greater rights and self-determination,” id. at 822.13 The Organic Act Bill of Rights was sought by

the people of Guam because “[t]hey wanted local agency, rather than governance by naval officers

and faraway Washington bureaucrats.” Id. at 827.

[62] We hold that courts should construe the term “cruel and unusual punishments” as used in

the Guam Bill of Rights with due regard for the historical, governmental, and cultural values of

13

As early as 1901, citizens of Guam petitioned the United States Congress, stating that “fewer permanent

guarantees of liberty and property rights exist now than when under Spanish dominion. . . . We believe ourselves

fully justified in asking relief from a system of government that subjects a thoroughly loyal people to the absolute rule

of a single person.” Katherine Unterman, Trial Without Jury in Guam, USA, 38 Law & Hist. Rev. 811, 822 (2020)

(footnote omitted). In 1937, Baltasar J. (B. J.) Bordallo testified before Congress that “we are only concerned to the

extent that our people be granted citizenship rights as have the people of Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin

Islands.” Id. at 823–24 (quoting Testimony of Bordallo, Citizenship for Residents of Guam, 8).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 34 of 38

Guam. See Tom, 533 F.2d at 1104 n.5. This term should not always be given the same meaning

as it represents under the U.S. Constitution. As noted by Cristina M. Quiñones-Betancourt, writing

on the constitutionality of the federal death penalty as applied to Puerto Rican defendants:

Although members of the [U.S. Supreme] Court have considered data from

Washington D.C. when conducting their evolving standards of decency analyses,

no member of the Court has ever included objective indicia from Puerto Rico

despite the fact that Congress and the American courts treat Puerto Rico as a state

when it is convenient.

Quiñones-Betancourt, supra, at 170 (citations omitted). She argues persuasively that where a

territory’s objective indicia are omitted from the Supreme Court’s evolving standards of decency

test, an American national consensus should not be imposed on the territory:

The omission of Puerto Rico’s objective indicia from the application of the

Supreme Court’s evolving standards of decency test implies that Puerto Rico is so

fundamentally different from the states that its objective indicia cannot be used to

determine the American national consensus. Therefore, objective indicia gathered

from the states cannot be used to determine a national consensus that reflects a

Puerto Rican consensus because a Puerto Rican consensus can only be derived from

residents of Puerto Rico.

Id. at 171; cf. Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th at 880 (“I agree with the representatives of the American Samoan

government that ‘an extension of birthright citizenship without the will of the governed is in

essence a form of “autocratic subjugation” of the American Samoan people.’ While I am

sympathetic to Plaintiffs’ desire for citizenship, to accept their position would be to impose

citizenship over the expressed preferences of the American Samoan people. Such a result would

be anomalous to our history and our understanding of the Constitution.” (emphasis added)

(footnote omitted)); Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1461 (9th Cir. 1990) (“We conclude that

Wabol has carried its burden of demonstrating that this particular constitutional guarantee would

be impractical and anomalous in the Commonwealth and therefore should not be imposed.”

(emphasis added)).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 35 of 38

[63] Given that no federal decision has considered Guam when evaluating whether mandatory

LWOP for youthful offenders violates society’s evolving standards of decency, we find Guam’s

distinctive characteristics support departure from that federal precedent.

[64] Having identified a reason to diverge, we must now decide the contours of the Organic Act

doctrine—should we simply tinker with the available federal doctrine, or should we build an

Organic Act doctrine for cruel and unusual punishments independently? We do not find the

motivating ideas behind the federal “evolving standards of decency test” to be inherently flawed.

But to determine whether Guam’s imposition of mandatory LWOP violates the “basic mores of

society,” see Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419, logically, “society” must be defined to include Guam.

[65] We hold that the proper legal standard to be applied is to determine whether mandatory

LWOP for youthful offenders violates “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress

of a maturing society.” See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (citations omitted). This is done by surveying

objective indicia of societal values to determine whether a consensus opposes the application of a

specific punishment upon a particular class of defendants. See Quiñones-Betancourt, supra, at

161. Remand is appropriate for the trial court to survey the “objective indicia” of societal values.14

On the record before us now, we express no opinion on how to properly define the boundaries of

society, other than it must include Guam.15

14

A good starting point would be the definition of “Youth offender” found at 9 GCA § 83.15(d), which both

parties argue represents objective indicia of Guam’s societal values.

15

We do note, however, that “[t]wenty-two States and the District of Columbia do not mandate life without

parole in any circumstance. Of the remaining twenty-eight States, only twelve . . . mandate life without

parole.” Commonwealth v. Mattis, 224 N.E.3d 410, 426–27 (Mass. 2024) (footnotes omitted). The statutes in at least

two of those States that mandate LWOP for youthful offenders, including Hawai‘i, provide an opportunity to avoid

the mandatory nature of the sentence. Id. at 427 n.27. Of those twelve states that have statutes authorizing mandatory

LWOP for youthful offenders, the courts of at least three states have found those statutes unconstitutional to some

extent. Id. at 428; In re Monschke, 482 P.3d 276, 287 (Wash. 2021) (en banc); People v. Parks, 987 N.W.2d 161, 182

(Mich. 2022). Additionally, it appears that neither CNMI, Marshall Islands, Palau, nor the Federated States of

Micronesia mandate an LWOP sentence for any type of murder conviction. See 6 N. Mar. I. Code § 1101 (2024); 31

MIRC §§ 6.04, 6.13 (Marsh. Is.); 17 PNCA §§ 1702, 1209 (Palau); 11 F.S.M.C. §§ 606, 1204 (Micr.).

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 36 of 38

E. We Remand for Further Proceedings, with Instructions to Appoint Counsel and Hold an

Evidentiary Hearing on How Evolving Science on Brain Development Applies to an

Emerging Adult and to Adriatico’s Specific Circumstances

[66] Adriatico asks for a determination that the Constitution and Organic Act require “that the

trial court consider his status as a youthful offender along with evidence regarding his immaturity

at the time of the offense, subjection to negative peer pressure and impaired decision making

ability.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. He maintains that the trial court did not entertain his arguments

about cruel and unusual punishment, “finding that they are not appropriate for consideration.” Id.

He requests a remand to the trial court to argue that mandatory LWOP for youthful offenders is

unconstitutional, inorganic, or both. Id. We agree with Adriatico that the trial court failed to

entertain his cruel-and-unusual-punishment claims, and that remand for consideration under the

legal standards articulated in this opinion is appropriate.

[67] Due process provides for a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings when

“fundamental fairness necessitates the assistance of a trained advocate.” United States v. Palomo,

80 F.3d 138, 141 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). If a Guam prisoner is housed in a federal

penitentiary with allegedly no access to Guam law materials, and the court determines the claims

raised are meritorious enough to hold a hearing, fundamental fairness demands the assistance of a

trained advocate. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not articulated the source of the rule, the

Constitution requires “meaningful access to the courts,” such as by “providing prisoners with

adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 346, 351 (1996) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)). Adriatico

seems to have received neither, likely violating his right to due process. Generally, the remedy for

denial of counsel in such a case is remand for further proceedings, including appointment of post-

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 37 of 38

conviction counsel, allowing post-conviction counsel to supplement Adriatico’s pro se motion,

and conducting a hearing. See, e.g., People v. Chalchi-Sevilla, 2019 COA 75, ¶ 27.

[68] We remand with instructions “for further postconviction proceedings to give [Appellant]

the opportunity to consult with counsel about his constitutional claims and to develop and present

evidence to the trial court, with assistance of counsel, demonstrating how the evolving science on

juvenile maturity and brain development applies to an emerging adult and to the [Appellant’s]

specific circumstances.” See People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 22. After conducting an

evidentiary hearing, the trial court is tasked with deciding whether imposition of mandatory LWOP

sentences for youthful offenders violates Guam’s evolving standards of decency that mark the

progress of a maturing society. In deciding this issue, it is within the trial court’s discretion to

order briefing from the parties or hold a hearing to establish the ‘objective indicia’ of societal

values. Should the trial court decide mandatory LWOP sentences for youthful offenders are

inorganic because they violate Guam’s evolving standards of decency, the court shall exercise its

power under 8 GCA § 120.46 to correct illegal sentences. In such a scenario, the trial court must

follow the mandate that “a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth

and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” Cf. Miller, 567 U.S. at 483

(applying this standard to juveniles).

V. CONCLUSION

[69] Adriatico has abandoned appellate review of his motion for compassionate release on

COVID-19 grounds. We correct Adriatico’s two LWOP sentences for attempted aggravated

murder as they were illegal under the law at the time of his conviction. We VACATE in part the

judgment in CF0116-84. On remand, the Superior Court shall enter a new judgment correcting

these sentences as discussed above.

People v. Adriatico, 2024 Guam 7, Opinion Page 38 of 38

[70] We hold that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Guam v. Guerrero was unsupported by law,

and we can interpret the Organic Act to provide more protection than the Eighth Amendment. We

also hold that § 1421b(h) of the Organic Act Bill of Rights should not be interpreted in lockstep

with the Eighth Amendment. The proper legal standard to apply to the claim that a mandatory

LWOP sentence is inorganic is to apply a modified version of the “evolving standards of decency”

test that includes objective indicia of societal values from Guam.

[71] We remand with instructions that Adriatico be appointed counsel. He should be able to

consult counsel about his Organic Act claims and to develop and present evidence to the trial court,

with assistance of counsel, demonstrating how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain

development applies to an emerging adult and to Adriatico’s specific circumstances. After

hearing, the trial court shall decide whether a societal consensus opposes the application of this

specific punishment upon this class of defendants.

[72] We AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND to the Superior Court for further

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

/s/ /s/

F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO KATHERINE A. MARAMAN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

/s/

ROBERT J. TORRES

Chief Justice