George D. Metz, II v. D. Bridges

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11275

____________________

GEORGE D. METZ, II,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

D. BRIDGES,

officer,

J. DODSON,

officer,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11275

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00056-ECM-SMD

____________________

Before WILSON, BRASHER, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Officers Bridges and Dodson (collectively, the Officers) ap-

peal the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss based on

qualified immunity from George Metz’s claims of Fourth Amend-

ment unlawful search and seizure brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. On appeal, the Officers argue that: (1) the district court

erred in concluding that there was no arguable probable cause to

arrest Metz and that it was impermissible to perform a search inci-

dent to arrest under the circumstances; and (2) the district court

erred in concluding that the Officers’ actions violated clearly estab-

lished law. After careful review and with the benefit of oral argu-

ment, we reverse the district court’s decision denying the officers

qualified immunity.

I.

The relevant background—gleaned from the allegations in

the complaint and the video recordings relied on and undisputed

by Metz 1—is this. On June 4, 2020, Metz and a colleague he calls

1 At the motion to dismiss phase, the court may look beyond the pleadings and

consider documentary evidence, such as body camera footage, if: (1) the com-

plaint refers to the footage; (2) the footage is central to the plaintiff’s claim;

and (3) the authenticity of the footage is not challenged. See, e.g., Baker v. City

of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1276–78 (11th Cir. 2023); Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d

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23-11275 Opinion of the Court 3

“Bad Cop No Donut” went to the Houston County Department of

Human Resources (DHR) in Dothan, Alabama. 2 When Metz and

his colleague entered the lobby, a DHR security guard noticed that

they were recording a video. She told Metz and his colleague they

were not allowed to film in the building and asked them to leave.

They refused, claiming they were from “Bolt Action News Group”

and they had a First Amendment right to film in public spaces.

Metz’s video showed flyers posted in the DHR lobby about matters

including adult protective services, child abuse, and child support.

The security guard asked them to leave several times, and each

time they ignored her or refused. At one point, the security guard

asked a DHR employee to call 911 to inform the police dispatcher

that there were men “filming inside of a building they’re not sup-

posed to be in.”

Officer Bridges arrived first. Upon his arrival, a DHR em-

ployee pointed out the men and said, “These men are videoing

down here.” Officer Bridges asked Metz and his colleague to pro-

duce identification, but they refused. After asking six times, and

1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002). As Metz referred to the video by timestamp

throughout his complaint, the footage captures the events central to the com-

plaint, and Metz does not dispute its authenticity, the district court properly

considered the footage. In fact, Metz never challenged the district court’s de-

cision to consider the videos, nor has he claimed on appeal that we should not

consider them. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins., 739 F.3d 678, 681–82 (11th

Cir. 2014) (holding that issues not raised on appeal are deemed abandoned).

2 Alabama DHR offices administer “all forms of public assistance” Ala. Code

§ 38-2-6(1).

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being refused each time, Officer Bridges handcuffed them. When

Officer Dodson arrived, a DHR employee told him that the men

were refusing to leave after being asked to do so by the security

guard. Officer Dodson informed them that they were trespassing

and asked them to identify themselves. They did not comply, and

Officer Dodson searched them. Eventually, the Officers’ supervi-

sor arrived and, after some discussion, told Metz and his colleague

they were free to go. They left around an hour after first being

handcuffed.

Metz brought a § 1983 claim pro se against Officers Bridges

and Dodson for violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free

from unlawful searches and seizures. The Officers moved to dis-

miss for qualified immunity, and the district court denied the mo-

tion. The Officers timely appealed.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s denial of qualified im-

munity on a motion to dismiss. Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117,

1121 (11th Cir. 2001). We accept the factual allegations in the com-

plaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-mo-

vant’s favor. Id.; Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277 (explaining that we do the

same for ambiguities in video footage). But where video footage is

“clear and obviously contradicts the plaintiff’s alleged facts, we ac-

cept the video’s depiction instead of the complaint’s account and

view the facts in the light depicted by the video.” Baker, 67 F.4th at

1277–78 (citation omitted).

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Further, we are mindful of our obligation to construe filings

by pro se litigants liberally, no matter how “inartfully pleaded.” Er-

ickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotations omitted). But

we may not rewrite deficient pleadings, and pro se complaints that

fail to state a claim must be dismissed. See Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd.,

760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).

III.

Section 1983 provides private citizens a cause of action

against persons who violate their constitutional rights while acting

under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Government officials

performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified im-

munity unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quotation marks

omitted). “Qualified immunity is a defense not only from liability,

but also from suit.” Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 272 (11th Cir.

2013). Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” are

shielded from litigation. Jordan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th

Cir. 2007).

To prove he is entitled to qualified immunity, a public offi-

cial must show that he was acting within the scope of his discre-

tionary authority when the alleged misconduct took place. Hollo-

man ex. rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir.

2004). If proven, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show: (1) the

defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right was

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clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Gilmore,

738 F.3d at 272.

There are three recognized ways a plaintiff can show that a

law is clearly established. Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1310

(11th Cir. 2019). First, by pointing to a case with materially similar

facts decided by the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the

highest court of the relevant state. Id. Second, by showing “a

broader, clearly established principle should control the novel facts

in this situation.” Id. (quotations omitted). This principle must be

“specific enough to give the officers notice of the clearly estab-

lished right.” Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th

Cir. 2005). Finally, “the plaintiff can show that the conduct at issue

so obviously violated the Constitution that prior case law is unnec-

essary.” J.W. ex. rel. Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d

1248, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2018).

The Fourth Amendment, applied to the states by the Four-

teenth Amendment, protects people from unreasonable searches

and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

Courts have recognized three categories of police-citizen encoun-

ters, subject to different levels of Fourth Amendment scrutiny: (1)

police-citizen interactions involving no coercion or detention; (2)

brief seizures or investigatory detentions (known as Terry stops 3);

and (3) arrests. See Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir.

2006).

3 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

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A brief, investigatory Terry stop does not violate the Fourth

Amendment when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the

person has committed or is about to commit a crime. United States

v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011). “[I]f there are articu-

lable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that a person has com-

mitted a criminal offense, that person may be stopped in order to

identify him, to question him briefly, or to detain him briefly while

attempting to obtain additional information.” Hayes v. Florida, 470

U.S. 811, 816 (1985). Reasonable suspicion is “a less demanding

standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably

less than preponderance of the evidence.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528

U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Still, “[t]he officer must be able to articulate

more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of

criminal activity.” Id. at 123–24 (quotations omitted). When de-

termining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the courts must re-

view the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the

officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity

“may be afoot.” Miller, 458 F.3d at 1259 (quotation marks omitted).

Defensiveness toward police is a relevant factor. Jordan, 635 F.3d

at 1187.

Arrests, on the other hand, must be based on probable cause.

Miller, 458 F.3d at 1259. “Probable cause exists when the facts and

circumstances within the officers’ knowledge, of which he or she

has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent

person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect

has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Probable cause requires

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“only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.” Paez

v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks

omitted). It “does not require anything close to conclusive proof .

. . or even a finding made by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.

An officer need not “rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation for

suspicious facts” nor rule out every affirmative defense, so long as

it was reasonable to conclude from the totality of the circumstances

that there was a “substantial chance of criminal activity.” District

of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61 (2018); see also Paez, 915 F.3d

at 1286. Officers may search a subject incident to a lawful arrest.

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234–35 (1973).

When an officer asserts qualified immunity in the context of

an investigatory stop, “the issue is not whether reasonable suspi-

cion existed in fact, but whether the officer had ‘arguable’ reasona-

ble suspicion to support an investigatory stop.” Jackson v. Sauls, 206

F.3d 1156, 1166 (11th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, a “law enforcement

official who reasonably but mistakenly concludes that reasonable

suspicion is present is still entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at

1165–66. In the context of an allegedly unconstitutional arrest,

qualified immunity applies if, based on the totality of the circum-

stances, the officer had “arguable probable cause” to make the ar-

rest. Fish v. Brown, 838 F.3d 1153, 1167 (11th Cir. 2016). Arguable

probable cause is a lower standard than actual probable cause and

only requires that, “under all of the facts and circumstances, an of-

ficer reasonably could—not necessarily would—have believed that

probable cause was present.” Id. (quotation marks and emphasis

omitted). This inquiry includes “the collective knowledge of law

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enforcement officials derived from reasonably trustworthy infor-

mation.” Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 2023) (quo-

tation marks omitted).

The Officers argued that when they arrived on scene, they

believed Metz was committing the crime of trespass. Under Ala-

bama law, “[a] person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third de-

gree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon

premises.” Ala. Code § 13A-7-4(a). Alabama also has a “stop and

identify” statute, which provides:

A . . . policeman of any incorporated city . . . within

the limits of the county . . . may stop any person

abroad in a public place whom he reasonably suspects

is committing, has committed or is about to commit

a . . . public offense and may demand of him his

name, address, and an explanation of his actions.

Ala. Code § 15-5-30. Dothan City Code § 1-5 makes it a crime for a

person to “fail, neglect or refuse to comply with any lawful order

of any lawful officer of the city made in pursuance of and under his

authority as such officer.”

IV.

In this case, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

We begin by noting that Metz did not dispute that the Officers

were acting within their discretionary authority, which meant that

the burden shifted to him to show both that the Officers violated

one of his constitutional rights and that the right was clearly estab-

lished at the time of the alleged misconduct. Holloman, 370 F.3d at

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1264; Williams, 904 F.3d at 1258. However, Metz has not shown

that the Officers violated his constitutional rights, nor that any vi-

olation was clearly established.

First, Metz cannot show that Officer Bridges violated his

rights because Officer Bridges had at least arguable reasonable sus-

picion to stop Metz under the circumstances, as well as arguable

probable cause to arrest. For starters, even drawing all reasonable

inferences from the complaint and video evidence in Metz’s favor,

Chesser, 248 F.3d at 1121; Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277, Officer Bridges

had arguable reasonable suspicion that Metz was trespassing, justi-

fying a Terry stop. As the complaint and undisputed video evidence

demonstrate, Officer Bridges was responding to a 911 call made by

a DHR employee about men “filming inside of a building they’re

not supposed to be in.” When Officer Bridges arrived, two men

were walking around the lobby filming, and a few DHR employees

were standing by looking concerned. As soon as Officer Bridges

stepped into the lobby, one DHR employee pointed out Metz and

his colleague and said, “These men are videoing down here.”

On this record, Officer Bridges could have reasonably sus-

pected that the DHR employees had asked the men to leave and

that the men had refused, and, thus, that they were trespassing un-

der Alabama law. See Ala. Code § 13A-7-4(a). This justified a Terry

stop. See Ala. Code § 15-5-30; Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186.

Once Officer Bridges validly had stopped Metz, he was al-

lowed to ask Metz for identification, and to arrest him when he

refused. “The principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect

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to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop.” Hiibel v. Sixth

Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 187 (2004). Alabama’s stop-and-

identify statute imposes this requirement. See Ala. Code § 15-5-30.

This meant that Metz’s refusal to identify himself during a valid

Terry stop violated Alabama’s stop-and-identify statute and gave

Officer Bridges probable cause to arrest him. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at

180, 189 (suspect’s refusal to provide identity, in violation of state

stop-and-identify statute, gave officers probable cause to arrest

him); see also Ala. Code § 15-5-30; Dothan City Code § 1-5.

As for Officer Dodson, Metz cannot show that he violated a

clearly established right. Because Metz was in handcuffs, it was rea-

sonable for an officer in Officer Dodson’s position to believe that

Metz was arrested, and that Officer Dodson could therefore con-

duct a search incident to arrest. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234–35.

V.

In short, Metz has not established a violation of his constitu-

tional rights—let alone a clearly established right. See Sebastian, 918

F.3d at 1310. He does not cite binding caselaw which clearly estab-

lishes that either officer’s conduct was unlawful, nor do the broader

Fourth Amendment principles on which he relies proscribe the Of-

ficers’ conduct. Finally, he has not shown that the Officers’ con-

duct was so obviously violative of the Constitution that prior case

law is unnecessary. Thus, we conclude that the district court erred

in denying the Officers qualified immunity.

REVERSED.