“Though 24 some of the evidence relevant to the Monell claims was irrelevant to individual liability, the 25 district court’s many limiting instructions cured any possible prejudice.”
How later courts described this case
- “Though 24 some of the evidence relevant to the Monell claims was irrelevant to individual liability, the 25 district court’s many limiting instructions cured any possible prejudice.”
- finding “[t]he evidence admitted at trial 28 was legally sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find the City liable under [plaintiff’s] § 1983 1 Monell claim even though the jury found the individual defendants inflicted no constitutional 2 harm”
- noting that the party seeking bifurcation has the burden of 7 demonstrating “bifurcation will promote judicial economy and avoid inconvenience or prejudice 8 to the parties”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 JEFFREY COMER, No. 2:22-cv-00079-TLN-CSK
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 COUNTY OF SUTTER, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 This matter is before the Court on the County of Sutter, Sheriff Brandon Barnes, Mark
18 Hylen, Ernesto Chavez, Harrison Eide, and Michael Aguilar’s (collectively, “Defendants”)
19 Motion to Bifurcate. (ECF No. 35.) Plaintiff Jeffrey Comer (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition.
20 (ECF No. 36.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 38.) For the reasons set forth below,
21 Defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate is DENIED.
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1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
2 This case arises from an officer-involved shooting on October 9, 2020, in unincorporated
3 Sutter County near the Feather River. (ECF No. 36 at 3-4.) Sutter County Deputies shot Plaintiff
4 while he was being arrested on an outstanding warrant for attempted murder. (ECF No. 35 at 2.)
5 Plaintiff alleges he was unarmed and riding his bicycle away from the deputies at the time of the
6 shooting. (ECF No. 36 at 4.) Plaintiff further alleges he suffered injuries to his buttocks and
7 wrist. (Id.)
8 On January 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint, alleging four causes of action
9 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”): (1) excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
10 brought against the named deputies in their individual and official capacities; (2) Monell liability
11 based on a theory of failure to train; (3) Monell liability based on a theory of unconstitutional
12 custom or policy; and (4) Monell liability based on a theory of ratification. (ECF No. 1.) No
13 dispositive motions have been filed or heard in this case, and the parties are “in the early stages of
14 exchanging discovery.” (ECF No. 35 at 3.)
15 On May 22, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion to bifurcate discovery and trial of
16 the individual liability claim (Claim One) from the Monell liability claims (Claims Two through
17 Four). (ECF No. 35.) On June 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. (ECF No. 36.) On June 12,
18 2024, Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 38.)
19 II. STANDARD OF LAW
20 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 42(b), the district court may order
21 separate trials of one or more issues or claims “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to
22 expedite and economize.” “While separation of issues is not to be routinely ordered, it is
23 important that it be encouraged where experience has demonstrated its worth.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
24 42(b) Advisory Committee Notes (1966 Amend). The court has broad discretion in deciding
25 whether to bifurcate a trial. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002);
26 Hangarter v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004). Courts may
27 consider several factors in determining whether bifurcation is appropriate, including but not
28 limited to whether bifurcation would: (1) promote efficient judicial administration; (2) avoid
1 prejudice to the parties; (3) reduce the risk of jury confusion; or whether (4) the issues are clearly
2 separable. See Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1261 (9th Cir. 1982); Lam Research Corp. v.
3 Schunk Semiconductor, 65 F. Supp. 3d 863, 865 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
4 The party requesting bifurcation has the burden of proving that bifurcation is justified
5 given the particular circumstances. Spectra–Physics Lasers, Inc. v. Uniphase Corp., 144 F.R.D.
6 99, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (noting that the party seeking bifurcation has the burden of
7 demonstrating “bifurcation will promote judicial economy and avoid inconvenience or prejudice
8 to the parties”); Afshar v. City of Sacramento, No. CIV S–04–1088LKKJFB, 2007 WL 779748, at
9 *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2007) (“Defendant has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that
10 bifurcation is warranted.”).
11 III. ANALYSIS
12 The Court will address the parties’ arguments within the framework of the Rule 42(b)
13 factors as set forth in Hirst. 676 F.2d at 1261.
14 A. Judicial Economy
15 Defendants argue bifurcation of the instant case serves judicial economy because “a
16 constitutional finding is a threshold issue, before Monell even becomes relevant” and “without an
17 underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiff’s Monell theories are moot and not viable.” (ECF
18 No. 35 at 6.) Plaintiffs assert in opposition that bifurcating the Monell claims “could result in
19 repetition and redundancy, which would result in inefficiency, waste of judicial resources and
20 waste of jury time.” (ECF No. 36 at 3.)
21 The Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument that bifurcation of the individual
22 deputies’ liability claims and Monell liability claims serves the interest of judicial economy.
23 Defendants cite to City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) and a line of other
24 cases for the proposition that “there is no Monell case if there is no underlying constitutional
25 violation.” (ECF No. 35 at 6.) However, this expansive reading of Heller ignores the fact that an
26 exoneration of individual officers is not always dispositive to a plaintiff’s Monell claims. See
27 Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 917–18 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding “[t]he evidence admitted at trial
28 was legally sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find the City liable under [plaintiff’s] § 1983
1 Monell claim even though the jury found the individual defendants inflicted no constitutional
2 harm”); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2012) (adopting the rule in
3 Fairley — “[i]f a plaintiff establishes he suffered a constitutional injury by the City, the fact that
4 individual officers are exonerated is immaterial to liability under § 1983” — and stating that
5 exoneration of individual officers by qualified immunity is not automatically dispositive of
6 Monell claims (emphasis in original)); Est. of Alderman v. City of Bakersfield, No. 1:16-cv-
7 00994-DAD-JLT, 2018 WL 4156740, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2018) (finding that Monell
8 allegations relative to a city’s misconduct in investigating plaintiff’s death “may suffice as the
9 basis for an independent constitutional injury . . . [and] [t]his example alone warrants declining to
10 bifurcate the trial”); Est. of Matus by and through G.M. v. Cnty. of Riverside, No. 5:23-cv-00506-
11 MEMF-SP, 2024 WL 3758011, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2024) (declining to bifurcate Monell
12 claims because some claims were “not based upon the actions of individual officers” and because
13 “Monell claims are not precluded” if officers are exonerated under qualified immunity).
14 Defendants cannot guarantee that trial of the individual deputies’ liability claims would be
15 dispositive to Plaintiff’s Monell claims. First, an exoneration of the deputies by way of qualified
16 immunity would not automatically preclude the County’s liability under Plaintiff’s Monell
17 theories. See Fairley, 281 F.3d at 917. In that circumstance, Plaintiff may still succeed on
18 showing a constitutional deprivation for which the individual deputy Defendants are shielded by
19 qualified immunity — but not the municipality under Monell. Second, Defendants cannot show
20 with certainty that a single trial will dispose of this matter. Defendants may lose a trial of the
21 individual deputies’ liability claims and consequently the parties would require a second trial for
22 the bifurcated Monell claims. This scenario is contrary to Defendants’ assertion — without any
23 authority — that County indemnification of the deputies would end the litigation. (ECF No. 35 at
24 7 (“Plaintiff cannot recover additional damages for any Monell claim as Plaintiff’s damages are
25 what Plaintiff’s damages are for the claimed unlawful use of force . . . .”).) Either scenario
26 impedes judicial economy with duplicative proceedings. These reasons alone preclude
27 bifurcation, particularly at this early stage where Plaintiff’s allegations have not been tested by
28 dispositive motion practice.
1 Accordingly, Defendants do not meet their burden to show that bifurcation furthers
2 judicial economy in the instant case.
3 B. Prejudice
4 Defendants argue evidence supporting Monell liability “is likely to be prejudicial to the
5 individual [D]efendants.” (ECF No. 35 at 9.) Defendants further argue that by granting
6 bifurcation, the Court will avoid prejudice to the individual deputies because admitting evidence
7 related to the Monell claims could confuse the jury. (Id. at 10.) In opposition, Plaintiff states in a
8 conclusory fashion that Defendants have not shown bifurcation will avoid undue prejudice. (ECF
9 No. 36 at 7.)
10 Defendants cite to Atencio v. Arpaio, No. CIV. 12-2376-PHX-PGR, 2013 WL 5327382
11 (D. Ariz. Sept. 24, 2013) and Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 356, (9th Cir. 1996) to
12 bolster their claims that bifurcation is necessary to avoid prejudice. (ECF No. 35 at 9–10.)
13 Atencio cites to several cases in which trial was bifurcated to separate Monell claims based on
14 concerns about prejudice, but unlike the instant case, in Atencio “plaintiffs’ allegations in the
15 complaint include events that occurred more than 20 years ago, long before the individual
16 defendants were employed by Maricopa County.” 2013 WL 5327382, at *5 (internal quotations
17 and citation omitted). Further, the plaintiff’s strategy in Quintanilla was to introduce evidence of
18 other police dog attacks to convince the jury to award damages in his case. 84 F.3d at 355. No
19 evidence yet exists in the record to show that Plaintiff will employ a similar strategy in this case
20 — to say so at this early juncture is purely speculative.
21 While Defendants are correct there is a risk of prejudice to the deputies in jointly trying
22 individual and Monell claims, that prejudice may be mitigated by a curative instruction to the
23 jury. See Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 806–07 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Though
24 some of the evidence relevant to the Monell claims was irrelevant to individual liability, the
25 district court’s many limiting instructions cured any possible prejudice.”); Est. of Alderman, 2018
26 WL 4156740, at *2 (same). Further, Defendants seem to argue the Monell claims would be moot
27 if the individuals are found liable at trial because the County would be liable for damages
28 awarded against its employees. However, such an argument negates the independent
1 constitutional injuries that Plaintiff allegedly suffered at the hands of the municipality and ignores
2 the “validity and import of non-economic objectives a plaintiff may have for their litigation.”
3 Trexler v. City of Belvidere, No. 20 CV 50113, 2021 WL 493039, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2021).
4 Accordingly, Defendants fail to show the risk of prejudice justifies bifurcation of the
5 instant case.
6 C. Confusion
7 Defendants argue “admitting evidence related to the Monell claim could confuse the jury,”
8 as “potential evidence” of other use of force incidents “could influence the jury’s consideration of
9 the individual excessive force claim against the deputies.” (ECF No. 35 at 10.) Plaintiff counters
10 by arguing that bifurcation could increase “the risk of jury misunderstanding due to the
11 complexity of issues.” (ECF No. 36 at 6–7.)
12 Neither party cites any case law for their vague assertions. The Court finds that any
13 possible juror confusion can be remedied with a limiting jury instruction. Indeed, “there are less
14 burdensome ways to deal with potentially prejudicial and confusing evidence than bifurcating the
15 trial.” Afshar, 2007 WL 779748, at *2.
16 Accordingly, Defendants’ fail to establish that any potential confusion justifies bifurcation
17 in this case.
18 D. Separable Issues
19 Defendants argue “Plaintiff’s individual liability claim . . . is an entirely separate issue
20 from his Monell claims against the County.” (ECF No. 35 at 11.) Defendants assert that
21 evidence anticipated to establish individual deputies’ liability “would not overlap much, if at all,
22 with evidence required to establish this single use of force incident was part of a pattern and
23 practice of similar violations.” (Id.) Plaintiff states in opposition, without advancing any
24 substantive argument, that the “Monell claims are tied inextricably with the individual Fourth
25 Amendment claims.” (ECF No. 36 at 6–7.)
26 Courts often bifurcate cases when they find “the evidence relevant to the claims against
27 the individual officers does not overlap in any meaningful way with the evidence relevant to the
28 claims against the [municipality].” Boyd v. City and County of San Francisco, No. C-04-5459
1 | MMC, 2006 WL 680556, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2006); see also Estate of Lopez v. Suhr, No.
2 | 15-cv-01846-HSG, 2016 WL 1639547, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2016) (“Plaintiffs’ claims
3 | against Chief Suhr are conceptually distinct from their claims against the Officers: their
4 | ratification theory involves only post-shooting facts, while their failure to train theory involves
5 | pre-shooting facts that do not directly relate to Perez Lopez’s case.”); cf. McCoy v. City of
6 | Vallejo, No. 2:19-cv-001191-JAM-CKD, 2021 WL 492535, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2021)
7 | (denying bifurcation because “[m]uch of the evidence that will be presented to establish that the
8 | five officers are individually liable overlaps with the evidence required to establish that
9 | [plaintiff's] death was part of a pattern and practice of similar violations”).
10 In the instant case, all of Plaintiff's Monell claims are premised on the alleged Fourth
11 | Amendment violation by the individual deputy Defendants. (See ECF No. 1 at 8-15.) To prove
12 | Plaintiffs Monell theories of pattern, practice, ratification, or failure to train at a bifurcated trial
13 || would necessarily require evidence of the underlying individual constitutional violation as a
14 | touchstone for each theory. This is exactly the type of evidence that meaningfully overlaps
15 | between individual officer liability and Monell liability.
16 Accordingly, Defendants have not met their burden to show that the issues do not overlap
17 | in any meaningful way to justify bifurcation.
18 IV. CONCLUSION
19 Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate is hereby DENIED. (ECF No.
20 | 35.)
21 IT IS SO ORDERED.
22 | DATE: December 5, 2024
23
TROY L. NUNLEY
26 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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