Olumakinde v. Officers of the Classification Department of BCDC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

FASHANU IREWOLE OLUMAKINDE,

Plaintiff,

Vv.

BALTIMORE COUNTY DETENTION Civil Action No. TDC-24-0943

CENTER,

OFFICERS OF THE CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF BCDC and

SERGEANT AROWOROWON, .

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Fashanu Irewole Olumakinde, a detainee previously confined at the Baltimore

County Detention Center (“BCDC”) in Towson, Maryland, has filed this civil action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (*’§ 1983”) in which he alleges that Defendants failed to protect him from gang

members while he was detained at BCDC. Defendants BCDC, “Officers of the Classification

Department of BCDC,” and Sergeant Aroworowon have filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended

Complaint. Olumakinde was notified of his right to file a memorandum in opposition to the

Motion, but he has not done so. Having reviewed the submitted materials, the Court finds that no

hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to

Dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

In the operative Amended Complaint, Olumakinde alleges that on December 22, 2023,

while he was incarcerated at BCDC, he was assaulted by three gang members in Housing Unit 3B

and sustained injuries to the left side of his face and to his eyes that required medical treatment.

Olumakinde reported the incident to BCDC correctional staff, and the gang members were

sanctioned to restrictive housing.

On February 1, 2024, one of these assailants was transferred into the same dormitory within

the same unit in which Olumakinde was located, Housing Unit “4T#3.” Am. Compl. at 4, ECF

No. 6. Olumakinde asserts that unnamed BCDC Classification Officers are responsible for his

housing assignment.

On February 23, 2024, Olumakinde was transferred back to Unit 3B where he had been

assaulted in December 2023. Before Olumakinde was reassigned to Unit 3B, he advised an

unidentified sergeant that he “had keep separates on 3B” and feared for his safety. Jd. at 5.

Olumakinde also specifically advised Sgt. Aroworowon that he would be in danger if he were

moved back to Unit 3B, but Sgt. Aroworowon threatened Olumakinde with lock-up if he did not

accept his housing assignment. Olumakinde asserts that when he was placed back in Unit 3B, he

suffered “severe mental breakdown and extreme panic attacks” and was subjected to humiliation

because several inmates on the tier called him a “snitch” and a “bitch.” /d. Some detainees entered

his cell and spat on him and slapped him. Olumakinde asserts that he “was brutalized, physically

abused, suffered severe mental and verbal abuse,” that he “was extorted, humiliated and harassed

on a daily basis,” and that he feared for his life. /d. at 7. He also alleges that although he needed

medical treatment for injuries sustained during this period, he was not provided with any treatment.

Ultimately, Olumakinde was removed from Unit 3B because the gang members and their

associates rioted and demanded that he be removed from the tier.

Olumakinde alleges that BCDC and unidentified Classification Officers at BCDC violated

his constitutional rights by failing to place him in a safe environment. He also asserts that “Sgt.

Aroworowon could have prevented this traumatic experience if he listened to me when I voiced □

my fears and concerns.” Jd. at 5. Based on his alleged “mental, verbal, emotional and physical

damage,” Olumakinde seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief. Jd. at 7.

DISCUSSION

In their Motion, Defendants seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Defendants argue that: (1) Olumakinde has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (2)

Olumakinde has failed to state a plausible claim for relief as to any claim; and (3) Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity.

I. Legal Standard

To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts

to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is

plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. Legal conclusions or conclusory statements

do not suffice. /d. A court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations

in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson

Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). A self-represented party’s complaint must be construed

liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, “liberal construction does not

mean overlooking the pleading requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Bing v.

Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020).

I. BCDC

Olumakinde names BCDC in this matter in name only and does not include any allegations

against the facility. Moreover, BCDC is not a governmental entity, so it is not a “person” subject

to suit under § 1983, which imposes liability upon a “person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person with the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws... .” 42

U.S.C. § 1983; see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 688, 690-92

& n.53 (1978) (noting that for purposes of § 1983, a “person” includes individuals and “bodies

politic and corporate”). A number of courts have held that a detention facility is not a “person”

subject to suit under § 1983. See Smith v. Montgomery Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. PWG-13-3177,

2014 WL 4094963, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 18, 2014) (holding that Montgomery County Correctional

Facility “is an inanimate object that cannot act under color of state law and therefore is not a

‘person’ subject to suit under Section 1983”); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F. Supp. 1294,

1301 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons’ and the jail is not a person

amenable to suit.”).

Even if Olumakinde amended the complaint to assert a claim against Baltimore County,

rather than BCDC, the claim would fail. Olumakinde makes no allegations, as required to state a

§ 1983 claim against a local government, that a Baltimore County official acted pursuant to a

governmental custom or policy violating his constitutional rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

Therefore, the claims against BCDC will be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (stating that a

court must screen a prisoner’s complaint against a governmental entity or employee and dismiss

any claims that fail to state a plausible claim for relief).

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants assert that Olumakinde’s claims should be dismissed because he has failed to

allege and establish that he exhausted available administrative remedies. Under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134 § 803, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), “[n]Jo

action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Inmates must

exhaust administrative remedies before they bring any “suits about prison life, whether they

involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or

some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

Defendants argue that dismissal is warranted based Olumakinde’s failure to comply with a

Maryland state statute that provides that “[w]hen a prisoner files a civil action, the prisoner shall

attach to the initial complaint proof that administrative remedies have been exhausted.” Md. Code

Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5—-1003(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2020). This provision further provides that

if a prisoner’s complaint does not include such proof, the court should dismiss the complaint. See

id. § 5—1003(b)(3).

Defendants’ argument misapprehends the relevant legal standard. The cited Maryland state

statute is not applicable to complaints filed in federal court. In federal court, exhaustion of

administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, such that a prisoner plaintiff has no obligation

to plead facts or attach to a complaint specific proof of such exhaustion. See Jones v. Bock, 549

U.S. 199, 215-216 (2007). Rather, a defendant invoking this affirmative defense must identify or

provide evidence establishing the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See id.; Custis v.

Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 2017). Under this standard, defendants seeking dismissal based~

on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies ordinarily file a motion for summary judgment and

attach proof of such a failure, which may include, as applicable, a copy of the relevant

administrative grievance policy, relevant prison records of any grievances filed by the prisoner

relating to the claim in the complaint, and an affidavit or declaration from a prison official attesting

to the fact that the official reviewed the relevant files and found that there was no record that the

prisoner had filed an administrative grievance or completed all levels of appeal. Here, however,

Defendants have provided no such evidence. Accordingly, the Motion will be denied without

prejudice as to the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If warranted, Defendants may

file a motion for summary judgment on this issue and submit appropriate evidence.

IV. Failure to State A Claim

Defendants also assert that this case should be dismissed because Olumakinde has failed

to allege a plausible claim for relief. Although Defendants rely in part on an incident report

attached to the Motion, the Court may not consider such an exhibit because it is not integral to the

complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); Sec 'y of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d

700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). The Court therefore considers only the Amended Complaint itself.

Olumakinde brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which a

plaintiff must establish: (1) a deprivation of “a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the

United States”; and (2) that the act or omission causing the deprivation was committed by a person

acting under color of law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Generally Olumakinde alleges

that Defendants failed to protect him from harm caused by gang members at BCDC, in violation

of his constitutional rights. Where it appears that Olumakinde was a pretrial detainee at the time

of the relevant events, his claim is properly construed as an alleged violation of the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). For a

Fourteenth Amendment claim based on a failure to protect a pretrial detainee from a serious risk

of harm, a plaintiff need only allege that “on [a] purely objective basis . . . the “governmental

action’ they challenge is not ‘rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose’

or is ‘excessive in relation to that purpose.’” Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023)

(quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)). Pretrial detainees need not

demonstrate that prison officials possessed any subjective deliberate indifference to the risk of

harm but instead need only allege sufficient facts to show that the defendant's action or inaction

was “objectively unreasonable” in that “the defendant acted or failed to act ‘in the face of an

unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.”” □□□ at

611 (citations omitted). Nevertheless, negligence or “accidentally fail[ing] to do right by the

detainee” is insufficient to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation. /d. at 611-12.

In the Amended Complaint, Olumakinde asserts that after he had been previously assaulted

by gang members in Unit 3B in December 2023, he was returned to that unit in late February 2024,

where he was “brutalized, physically abused, suffered severe mental and verbal abuse,” and “was

extorted, humiliated, and harassed on a daily basis.” Am. Compl. at 6-7. He specifically alleges

that before the move, he told Sgt. Aroworowon, as well as another unidentified sergeant, that he

had orders in place to be kept separate from these gang members, and that he feared for his safety

if he was moved back to Unit 3B, but Sgt. Aroworowon “blatantly ignored me and threatened me

with restricted housing.” Jd. at 5. Construing the allegations in the light most favorable to

Olumakinde, he has plausibly alleged a Fourteenth Amendment claim for a failure to protect him

from a threat to his safety because he has alleged that Defendants were aware of an unjustifiably

high risk that he would be assaulted again if he were returned to Unit 3B but nevertheless returned

him to be harmed again by the gang members. The Motion will be denied because the Court finds

that the Amended Complaint has sufficiently stated a Fourteenth Amendment claim.

V. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Under this doctrine,

“§ 1983 actions against government officials in their individual capacities” are barred “unless (1)

they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct

was Clearly established at the time.’” Barrett v. PAE Gov't Servs., Inc., 975 F.3d 416, 428 (4th

Cir. 2020) (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018)). In arguing for

qualified immunity, Defendants make no claim that, pursuant to the second prong, it was not

clearly established at the time of these events that the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a

correctional officer fails to protect a pretrial detainee from a known risk of serious harm by placing

him in the same housing unit as other inmates known to pose a threat to his physical safety, such

as gang members who have previously assaulted him. Rather, Defendants argue only that,

pursuant to the first prong, Olumakinde has not sufficiently alleged a Fourteenth Amendment

violation because Defendants “had no knowledge of a specific threat posted to Plaintiff.” Mot.

Dismiss at 5, ECF No. 13-1. Where, as discussed above, the Court has found that Olumakinde has

stated a viable Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, and the issue of knowledge of a

threat is a factual dispute not properly resolved at this early stage, the Motion will be denied as to

the qualified immunity argument.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART in that the claims against BCDC will be dismissed, and the Motion will

be otherwise denied. A separate Order shall issue.

Date: December 6, 2024 :

THEODORE D. CHUANG

United States District Judge