Gerken v. Gordon

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

____________________________________________

DANIEL-LEE GERKEN,

Plaintiff,

vs. 1:24-CV-435

(MAD/CFH)

THOMAS GORDON, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

DANIEL-LEE GERKEN

West Sand Lake, New York

Plaintiff pro se

Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:

ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On March 28, 2024, Plaintiff Daniel-Lee Gerken commenced this action, pro se, against

Defendants Child Support Magistrate Thomas Gordon, Clerk of the Rensselaer County Family

Court Erin Scott, Rensselaer County, Jaqueline Devorak, the mother of Plaintiff's child, Attorney

for the Child Nancy Harding, and New York State Child Support Processing Center. See Dkt.

No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants are conspiring against him

to violate his constitutional rights by defrauding him and forcing him to pay child support. See id.

Plaintiff also submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). See Dkt. No. 2.

On October 29, 2024, Magistrate Judge Christian F. Hummel issued a Report-

Recommendation and Order granting Plaintiff's IFP motion. See Dkt. No. 5. Magistrate Judge

Hummel also recommended dismissing Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice and without leave

to amend. See id. On November 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed objections to the Report-

Recommendation and Order. See Dkt. Nos. 6, 7.

"Generally, when a specific objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-

recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to a de novo

review." Boice v. M+W U.S., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 3d 677, 683 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing FED. R.

CIV. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)). "To be 'specific,' the objection must, with

particularity, 'identify [1] the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to

which it has an objection and [2] the basis for the objection.'" Id. (quoting N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1(c))

(footnote omitted). "When only a general objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's

report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a

clear error review." Id. at 684 (citations omitted). "Similarly, when an objection merely

reiterates the same arguments made by the objecting party in its original papers submitted to the

magistrate judge, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation challenged by

those arguments to only a clear error review." Id. (footnote omitted). After the appropriate

review, "the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must review his complaint under a more

lenient standard. See Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). The Court

must "make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of

important rights because of their lack of legal training." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.

1983). Thus, "a document filed pro se is 'to be liberally construed,' and 'a pro se complaint,

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 106 (1976)). "Although the court has the duty to show liberality towards pro se litigants, . . .

there is a responsibility on the court to determine that a claim has some arguable basis in law

before permitting a plaintiff to proceed with an action in forma pauperis." Moreman v. Douglas,

848 F. Supp. 332, 333-34 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (internal citations omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and Abstention Doctrines

Magistrate Judge Hummel first discussed the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

Younger abstention, and domestic relations abstention to subject matter jurisdiction. See Dkt. No.

5 at 8-14. Magistrate Judge Hummel first noted that Plaintiff appears to be challenging a

Rensselaer County Family Court child support order, which cannot be challenged in this Court

pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. at 9. He next explained that if any state family

court proceedings are still ongoing, Younger abstention would require the Court to decline to

exercise subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 9-10. Finally, Magistrate Judge Hummel

commented that "courts in this circuit routinely dismiss actions for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, due to the domestic relations abstention doctrine, where the plaintiff is seeking

review of child support proceedings." Id. at 12 (quotation omitted).

In his objections, Plaintiff contends that Article 6, Section 2 of the United States

Constitution overrules the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Dkt. No. 6 at 7. Plaintiff does not

address Younger or domestic relations abstention.

The Court finds no clear error in Magistrate Judge Hummel's discussion and application of

the aforementioned doctrines. First, "[t]he Supreme Court has explained that Rooker-Feldman

bars 'a party losing in state court . . . from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of

the state judgment in a United States district court.'" Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th 62, 67 (2d

Cir. 2023) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)). "Rooker-Feldman 'is

confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-

court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district

court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.'" Id. at 67-68 (quotation omitted).

Next, Younger demands that

federal courts [] decline to exercise jurisdiction in three []

exceptional categories of cases: "First, Younger preclude[s] federal

intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. Second, certain

civil enforcement proceedings warrant[ ] abstention. Finally,

federal courts [must] refrain[ ] from interfering with pending civil

proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the

state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions."

Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d 631, 637 (2d Cir. 2019), aff'd and remanded, 591 U.S. 786 (2020)

(quoting Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013)). "Younger abstention is [] an

'exception to th[e] general rule' that 'a federal court's obligation to hear and decide a case is

virtually unflagging,' . . . and the doctrine is also subject to exceptions of its own in cases of bad

faith, harassment, or other 'extraordinary circumstances.'" Id. (quotations omitted). "[T]he

Younger doctrine is inappropriate where the litigant seeks money damages for an alleged violation

of § 1983." Rivers v. McLeod, 252 F.3d 99, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2001).

The Second Circuit, in American Airlines, Inc. v. Block, 905 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990),

explained that "[a]lthough matrimonial actions may ordinarily be instituted in federal court on

diversity grounds, the Supreme Court in Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. [582, 584] (1859), went so far

as to disclaim all federal subject matter jurisdiction for some classes of matrimonial actions." Id.

This is known as the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction, i.e., federal courts

should not exercise jurisdiction over matrimonial actions brought under diversity grounds.

"[H]owever, the scope of this matrimonial exception to federal jurisdiction is 'rather narrowly

confined,' . . . only 'where a federal court is asked to grant a divorce or annulment, determine

support payments, or award custody of a child' does it generally decline jurisdiction pursuant to

the matrimonial exception." Id. (quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Deem v.

DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618, 621 (2d Cir. 2019) ("Although the domestic relations 'exception' to

subject matter jurisdiction . . . does not apply in federal-question cases, the domestic relations

abstention doctrine articulated in American Airlines does"). The abstention doctrine has been

utilized across the country by federal courts removing themselves from considering a state court

domestic relations matter. See Deem, 941 F.3d at 623 (collecting cases) (citing, inter alia,

DeMauro v. DeMauro, 115 F.3d 94, 99 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[A]bstention by use of a stay may be

permissible where a RICO action is directed against concealment or transfer of property that is the

very subject of a pending divorce proceeding")).

Here, Younger prevents this Court from interfering in ongoing family court matters to the

extent that Plaintiff asks this Court to order the Rensselaer County Family Court and New York

State Child Support Processing Center to take certain actions. See Dkt. No. 1 at 5; see also

Skillings v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-3034, 2023 WL 8531493, *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2023);

Dudley v. Hochul, No. 5:24-CV-0048, 2024 WL 1906594, *5 (N.D.N.Y. May 1, 2024).

Additionally, as to Plaintiff's request for monetary damages, "the domestic relations exception

clearly does not apply to this case because it is 'before this Court on federal question jurisdiction,

not diversity.'" Deem, 941 F.3d at 623 (quoting Williams v. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1275 (2d Cir.

1995)) (emphasis added). However, abstention is appropriate because Plaintiffs' complaint

concerns family court disputes over child support payments. See Cora v. Wright, No. 1:24-CV-

0263, 2024 WL 450247, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2024).

The Court, therefore, adopts this portion of the Order and Report-Recommendation.

B. Sovereign Immunity

Plaintiff seeks to sue the New York State Child Support Processing Center. See Dkt. No.

1. Magistrate Judge Hummel concluded that Plaintiff cannot sue the entity because it is protected

by sovereign immunity as an arm of New York State. See Dkt. No. 5 at 14-17. Plaintiff argues in

his objections that sovereign immunity does not apply because the Child Support Processing

Center, along with the other Defendants, are attempting to cover up constitutional violations. See

Dkt. No. 6 at 8.

Plaintiff has not presented any legal authority that contradicts Magistrate Judge Hummel's

accurate analysis and conclusion concerning the application of sovereign immunity to the New

York State Child Support Processing Center. "[T]he Eleventh Amendment means that, 'as a

general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their

Eleventh Amendment immunity,' or unless Congress has 'abrogate[d] the states' Eleventh

Amendment immunity when acting pursuant to its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment.'" Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Woods v. Rondout

Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2006)). "[T]he United States

Supreme Court has held that the States, and their agencies, are not 'persons' within the meaning of

Section 1983." Aron v. Becker, 48 F. Supp. 3d 347, 366 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Will v.

Michigan Dep't. of the State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).

1 Plaintiff references Article 6, section 2 of the United States Constitution which affirms that the

Constitution is the supreme Law of the Land and Plaintiff contends that the Constitution makes

New York's common law child support scheme unconstitutional. See Dkt. No. 6 at 7. The Court

will not address the substance of Plaintiff's claims and arguments concerning the validity of the

state court child support orders for the reasons set forth in this decision.

Because New York has not waived its sovereign immunity, Magistrate Judge Hummel

correctly concluded that Plaintiff's complaint against the New York State Child Support

Processing Center, a state entity, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Grigoli v. 42 U.S.C.

§654(3) Child Support Enf't Div., No. 18-CV-3672, 2018 WL 2084172, *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 1,

2018); Skalaban v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 314 F. Supp. 2d 101, 106 (D. Conn. 2004). The

Court adopts this portion of Magistrate Judge Hummel's Report-Recommendation and Order.

C. Absolute Judicial Immunity

As to Plaintiff naming Support Magistrate Thomas Gordon as a Defendant, Magistrate

Judge Hummel concluded that the claims are barred by judicial immunity and sovereign

immunity. See Dkt. No. 5 at 17-22. Plaintiff argues in his objections that Defendant Gordon

"loses [his] judicial immunity" because he has committed treason. Dkt. No. 6 at 9. As to

sovereign immunity, Plaintiff contends that the acts underlying his complaint "are an attempt to

cover for government officials acting outside their scope of authority" such that sovereign

immunity does not apply. Id. at 7.

The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Hummel that judicial and sovereign immunity bar

Plaintiff's complaint against Defendant Gordon in his capacity as a Support Magistrate.

"Absolute immunity for judges is 'firmly established' for acts 'committed within their judicial

jurisdiction.'" Peoples v. Leon, 63 F.4th 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner,

474 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1985)). "Absolute immunity for a judge performing his or her judicial

functions is conferred in order to insure 'that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested

in him shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal

consequences to himself.'" Libertarian Party of Erie Cnty. v. Cuomo, 970 F.3d 106, 123 (2d Cir.

2020), abrogated on other grounds by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597

U.S. 1 (2022) (quoting Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009)). "Entitlement to

absolute immunity does not depend on the individual's title or on the office itself. . . ." Id. at 124

(citations omitted). "Judicial acts principally involve adjudication of particularized, existing

issues." Id. "Judicial immunity is overcome in only two circumstances: (1) 'a judge is not

immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial

capacity'; and (2) 'a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the

complete absence of all jurisdiction.'" McCluskey v. Roberts, No. 20-4018, 2022 WL 2046079,

*5 (2d Cir. June 7, 2022) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991)).

Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Gordon stem entirely from adjudication of

Plaintiff's child support case. See Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2; Dkt. No. 1-3 at 5. Although Plaintiff

disagrees with the Defendant Gordon's decisions, the actions are entirely within the scope of the

Support Magistrate's jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not presented more than conclusory allegations to

establish that Defendant Gordon was acting absent all jurisdiction. Defendant Gordon is,

therefore, entitled to absolute immunity. See, e.g., King v. New York State, No. 23-CV-3421,

2023 WL 5625440, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2023); Wilkins v. Soares, No. 8:20-CV-00116, 2020

WL 5238598, *4 (N.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020); Viola v. Bryant, No. 3:17-CV-00853, 2017 WL

2676407, *4 (D. Conn. June 21, 2017); Topolski v. Wrobleski, No. 5:13-CV-0872, 2014 WL

2215761, *5 (N.D.N.Y. May 29, 2014).

Likewise, sovereign immunity protects Defendant Gordon from suit brought against him

in his official capacity. The Second Circuit has recently reaffirmed the application of Eleventh

Amendment sovereign immunity to New York State judges. See Bythewood v. New York, No. 22-

CV-2542, 2023 WL 6152796, *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 2023) ("We agree with the district court that

[the] claims against the State of New York and the Judicial Defendants are barred by Eleventh

Amendment sovereign immunity")).

Therefore, the Court adopts this portion of the Report-Recommendation and Order.

D. Quasi-Judicial Immunity

Magistrate Judge Hummel next reviewed the application of quasi-judicial immunity to

Plaintiff's claims brought against Erin Scott, the Chief Clerk of the Rensselaer Family Court. See

Dkt. No. 5 at 22. The Court finds no clear error in Magistrate Judge Hummel's conclusion that

Defendant Scott is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because the allegations against him relate

solely to his function as an officer of the Rensselaer Family Court. See id. at 24; see also Jackson

v. Pfau, 523 Fed. Appx. 736, 737-38 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of Section 1983 claims

against judicial law clerk, the N.Y.S. Chief Administrative Judge, court attorneys, and the Chief

Clerks of several state courts, finding that the "defendants were entitled to judicial immunity[]

because [the] allegations against each of them concerned actions that were judicial in nature or

closely related to the judicial process"); Gollomp, 568 F.3d at 365; Fishman v. Off. of Ct. Admin.

New York State Cts., No. 18-CV-282, 2020 WL 1082560, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2020), aff'd, No.

20-1300, 2021 WL 4434698 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 2021).

Additionally, Defendant Nancy Harding, as the attorney for Plaintiff's child is entitled to

quasi-judicial immunity. "A private actor may be afforded the absolute immunity ordinarily

accorded judges acting within the scope of their jurisdictions if his role is 'functionally

comparable' to that of a judge, . . . or if the private actor's acts are integrally related to an ongoing

judicial proceeding." Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 172 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Butz v.

Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513, (1978); citing Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 111012 (2d Cir.

1998); Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 136-38 (2d Cir. 1987)) (additional quotation marks

omitted). The Second Circuit has affirmed application of quasi-judicial immunity to a "law

guardian and her director." Yapi v. Kondratyeva, 340 Fed. Appx. 683, 685 (2d Cir. 2009). This is

because law guardians or attorneys for children serve "serve[] as an 'arm of the court,' or act[] as

an 'integral part[ ] of the judicial process.'" Holland v. Morgenstern, 12-CV-4870, 2013 WL

2237550, *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013) (quoting Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir.

1998)). Because Defendant Harding was appointed by the court and performed court-related

functions, she is also afforded quasi-judicial immunity. See Cherner v. Westchester Jewish Cmty.

Servs., Inc., No. 20-CV-8331, 2022 WL 596074, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2022), aff'd, No. 22-642,

2022 WL 17817882 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2022); Wilson v. Wilson-Polson, No. 09-CV-9810, 2010

WL 3733935, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2010), aff'd, 446 Fed. Appx. 330 (2d Cir. 2011); Thomas v.

Martin-Gibbons, No. 19-CV-7695, 2020 WL 5026884, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2020). If

Defendant Harding is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, then as explained in the Report-

Recommendation and Order and below, she would not be considered a state actor and cannot be

sued under § 1983.

E. State Action

As to Ms. Harding and Jaquelin Devorak, the mother of Plaintiff's child, Magistrate Judge

Hummel determined that they could not be held liable under § 1983 because they are not state

actors. See Dkt. No. 5 at 25-28. In his objections, Plaintiff argues that he has sufficiently alleged

state action because Defendant Devorak "used the coercive power of the state to effectively put

Plaintiff in peonage in order to unjustly enrich herself in this case." Dkt. No. 6 at 9. He also

contends that Defendant Harding has used "the state to compel and coerce Plaintiff into a Title

VI-D consent contract with the private corporation known of State of New York Child Support."

Id. at 10. Plaintiff's objections are conclusory and the Court adopts this portion of Magistrate

Judge Hummel's Report-Recommendation and Order.

"'Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private

parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that

the challenged conduct constitutes state action.'" Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 206 (2d Cir.

2012) (quoting Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005)). "'A

plaintiff pressing a claim of violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983 is thus required to

show state action.'" Id. (quoting Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d Cir.

2003)). "'[S]tate action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation "caused by the exercise

of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a

person for whom the State is responsible," and that "the party charged with the deprivation must

be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor."'" Id. (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)) (additional quotation omitted).

"'To state a claim against a private entity on a section 1983 conspiracy theory, the

complaint must allege facts demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state

actor to commit an unconstitutional act.'" Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d

Cir. 2002) (quoting Spear v. Town of West Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1992)). "Put

differently, a private actor acts under color of state law when the private actor 'is a willful

participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.'" Id. (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,

398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)). "A merely conclusory allegation that a private entity acted in concert

with a state actor does not suffice to state a § 1983 claim against the private entity." Id.

As to Defendant Devorak, it is well-settled that "'[t]he fact that a private entity uses the

state courts does not transform the private party into a state actor.'" Rice v. City of New York, 275

F. Supp. 3d 395, 403-04 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Graham v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 156

F. Supp. 3d 491, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)); see also Malave-Sykes v. Endicott Police Dep't, No. 3:23-

CV-1215, 2023 WL 6847684, *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2023) (quotation omitted) ("[P]roviding

false information to the police does not make a private individual a state actor and liable under §

1983'"); Parent v. New York, 786 F. Supp. 2d 516, 538 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd, 485 Fed. Appx.

500 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[A]lthough appointed by the state, an attorney for the children or law

guardian is not a state actor because he or she must exercise independent professional judgment

on behalf of the clients they represent"); Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961, 962-64 (2d Cir.

2015) (affirming dismissal of claims against children's grandmother for initiating protective

services investigations because grandmother was not a state actor). Therefore, her use of the

judicial system to obtain child support payments does not make her a state actor.

Assuming Defendant Harding is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for the sake of this

analysis, she would not be considered a state actor insofar as the Second Circuit has explicitly

held "that law guardians who act as 'attorney[s] for the child' are not state actors for the purposes

of suits filed pursuant to § 1983." Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961, 964 (2d Cir. 2015); see

also Dickerson v. Siegal, No. 23-CV-3859, 2023 WL 6158833, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2023).

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds no clear error in this portion of Magistrate Judge

Hummel's Report-Recommendation and Order and adopts it, accordingly.

F. Municipal Liability

Magistrate Judge Hummel next recommended that Plaintiff's claims against Rensselaer

County be dismissed because Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege any underlying constitutional

violations, nor did he establish any policy or custom which caused a constitutional violation. See

Dkt. No. 5 at 28-32. Plaintiff argues that child support is a Rensselaer County official policy

which is being used to deprive Plaintiff of his rights. See Dkt. No. 6 at 10-11.

Magistrate Judge Hummel thoroughly set forth the legal background underlying municipal

liability, which Plaintiff does not challenge. See Dkt. No. 5 at 28-32; see also Dkt. No. 6. As to

the application of the legal framework, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Hummel that

Plaintiff has not alleged a surviving underlying constitutional claim nor a county policy or

custom.

The argument that child support is a municipal policy has been rejected by numerous

courts. See Sorenson v. Suffolk Cnty. Child Support Enf't Bureau, No. 07-CV-03755, 2009 WL

580426, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2009); Parent, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 536; Cannon v. NYS Comm'r of

Soc. Servs., No. 19-CV-6493, 2019 WL 3743975, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2019); Bowen v. Gordon,

No. 1:24-CV-114, 2024 WL 2053155, *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2024); Grigoli, 2018 WL 2084172,

at *5. Thus, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Hummel and dismisses the complaint as

against Rensselaer County.

G. Conspiracy

As to Plaintiff's conspiracy claim, Magistrate Judge Hummel also correctly concluded

that Plaintiff failed to state a claim. See Dkt. No. 5 at 33-34. Magistrate Judge Hummel

explained the requirements for stating a conspiracy claim and noted the high burden that pleading

such a claim demands. See id. The Court finds no clear error in the conclusion that Plaintiff's

complaint is too conclusory to support a conspiracy claim particularly where he has failed to

allege any underlying constitutional violation. This is because the only named Defendants are

immune from suit or are not liable under § 1983. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's

conspiracy claim. See Cruz v. New York, No. 5:17-CV-00510, 2017 WL 6021838, *20 (N.D.N.Y.

Oct. 27, 2017); Fariello v. Rodriguez, 148 F.R.D. 670, 685 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 22 F.3d 1090

(2d Cir. 1994); Young v. Suffolk Cnty., 705 F. Supp. 2d 183, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).

H. Leave to Amend

Magistrate Judge Hummel recommended denying Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint

because a better pleading cannot cure the deficiencies as outlined in the Report-Recommendation

and Order. See Dkt. No. 5 at 35.

"'Sua sponte dismissal of pro se [] petitions which contain non-frivolous claims without

requiring service upon respondents or granting leave to amend is disfavored by'" the Second

Circuit. Collymore v. Krystal Myers, RN, 74 F.4th 22, 27 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Moorish Sci.

Temple of Am., Inc. v. Smith, 693 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1982)). "In the § 1983 context, such

dismissals are 'inappropriate' – regardless of the merits – if the complaint alleges that '(1) the

defendant was a state actor . . . when he committed the violation and (2) the defendant deprived

the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.'" Id. (quoting Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961, 964 (2d Cir. 2015)). However, courts

often dismiss claims barred by immunity without leave to amend because better pleading cannot

cure the deficiency, i.e., amending a complaint does not eliminate a party's immunity. See Clay v.

Bishop, No. 1:22-CV-0983, 2023 WL 3352903, *7 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2023) (collecting cases);

Woods v. Vermont, No. 2:22-CV-00008, 2023 WL 2624352, *2 (D. Vt. Mar. 24, 2023); Burdick

v. Town of Schroeppel, No. 5:16-CV-01393, 2017 WL 5509355, *9 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2017),

aff'd, 717 Fed. Appx. 92, 93 (2d Cir. 2018). Likewise, a better pleading would not alter the

Court's decision as to application of the Rooker-Feldman, Younger, and domestic relations

doctrines because Plaintiff cannot amend his complaint to eliminate the fact that all of his claims

stem from past or present state family court matters. See Sochia v. Herkimer Cnty Child

Protective Servs., No. 6:24-CV-1068, 2024 WL 4802839, *11 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2024); Dean v.

Doberman, No. 21-CV-8320, 2023 WL 2480012, *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2023).

Therefore, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Hummel and denies Plaintiff leave to

amend his complaint.”

IV. CONCLUSION

After carefully the Plaintiff's submissions, Magistrate Judge Hummel's Report-

Recommendation and Order, and the applicable law, the Court hereby

ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Hummel’s Report-Recommendation and Order (Dkt. No.

5) is ADOPTED in its entirety for the reasons set forth herein; and the Court further

ORDERS that Plaintiffs' complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice and

without leave to amend; and the Court further

ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Order upon Plaintiff in

accordance with Local Rules.

IT ISSO ORDERED. ;

Dated: December 6, 2024 Jf 4 i. DP cal Z :

Albany, Noy York

U.S. District Judge

? Plaintiff provides the Court with a memorandum from the U.S. Department of Justice. See Dkt.

No. 7. Nothing in the memorandum alters the Court's conclusions as set forth in this decision.

15