Holmes v. Reddoch

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MICHAEL R. HOLMES CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS No. 19-12749

CORBETT REDDOCH, ET AL. SECTION I

ORDER AND REASONS

Before this Court is plaintiff Michael R. Holmes’s (“Holmes”) motion1 for

attorney’s fees and expenses. Defendants Deputy Corbett Reddoch (“Reddoch”) and

Sheriff Gerald A. Turlich (“Turlich”) (collectively, “defendants”) filed a response2 in

opposition. Holmes filed a reply.3 As detailed herein, and for the reasons that follow,

the Court grants Holmes’s motion in part and denies it in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of an incident in which Holmes was stopped and arrested

at a church-school fair. Holmes, proceeding pro se, originally initiated this suit on

September 23, 2019, asserting multiple state and federal claims against six

defendants: Reddoch, Turlich, Ryan Hebert, Holly Hardin, Chris Lambert, and Paul

Durnin.4 Holmes proceeded in this lawsuit pro se for nearly a year before Harrece

Gassery (“Gassery”) enrolled as counsel for Holmes on September 21, 20205 and

1 R. Doc. No. 250.

2 R. Doc. No. 254.

3 R. Doc. No. 255.

4 R. Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 5–10, 47–50.

5 R. Doc. No. 50.

Kearney Loughlin (“Loughlin”) enrolled as additional counsel on September 25,

2020.6

On September 22, 2020, Holmes submitted a memorandum delineating his

claims, which included multiple claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of

his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.7 These included claims for

violations of the Fourth Amendment for unreasonable detention, unlawful arrest,

false imprisonment, excessive force, and an unreasonable search.8 Holmes likewise

alleged violations of his right to privacy, to be free from malicious prosecution, to due

process, and to free speech and expression pursuant to the First, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendments.9 Additionally, Holmes made several state-law claims such

as claims for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, trespass to chattel,

conversion, and negligent hiring.10 Holmes’s memorandum maintained claims

against all six of the defendants listed in Holmes’s original complaint.11

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.12 The Court granted the

motion, dismissing the federal claims based on its finding that Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994), barred Holmes’s Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest, false

imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and excessive force.13 The Court found that the

6 R. Doc. No. 55.

7 R. Doc. No. 52.

8 Id. at 3–6.

9 Id. at 6–9.

10 Id. at 9–13.

11 Id. at 1.

12 R. Doc. No. 68.

13 R. Doc. No. 97, at 18–24.

remainder of Holmes’s claims were either improperly pleaded or barred by qualified

immunity.14 And the Court dismissed Holmes’s state-law claims without prejudice to

their being raised in state court.15

Holmes filed an appeal,16 which was successful when the Fifth Circuit vacated

the Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.17 The Court concluded

that the Fifth Circuit’s decision vacated the Court’s judgment only as it pertained to

the claims that the Court had determined were barred by Heck, and it did not disturb

the Court’s holding with respect to the claims barred by qualified immunity.18

Shortly before trial, Holmes voluntarily dismissed all claims against Holly

Hardin, Christopher Lambert, and Paul Durnin.19 And during the trial, the Court

granted the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to

Holmes’s federal malicious prosecution claim, concluding that the claim was barred

by qualified immunity.20

On May 17, 2023, after a three-day trial, the jury found that Reddoch had (1)

unreasonably arrested Holmes in violation of the Fourth Amendment, (2) committed

the Louisiana state-law tort of battery upon Holmes, (3) committed the Louisiana

state-law tort of false arrest or imprisonment against Holmes, and (4) committed the

14 Id. at 26–38, 40.

15 Id. at 40.

16 R. Doc. No. 99.

17 R. Doc. No. 109.

18 R. Doc. No. 204.

19 R. Doc. No. 164.

20 R. Doc. No. 217, at 2.

Louisiana state-law tort of malicious prosecution against Holmes.21 The jury awarded

Holmes compensatory damages of $4,200.00 for past medical expenses; $50,000.00

for past and future pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and

disability; and $3,500.00 for expenses and costs arising from his legal defense in the

state criminal action filed against him for resisting arrest.22 The jury also awarded

Holmes $65,000.00 in punitive damages for Reddoch’s violation of Holmes’s Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable arrest.23

But the jury rejected several of Holmes’s federal claims. Against Reddoch, the

jury found that Holmes was unreasonably stopped but that Reddoch was entitled to

qualified immunity for that stop.24 And the jury rejected Holmes’s federal claims

against Reddoch for use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and

retaliation for protected speech in violation of the First Amendment.25 The jury

rejected all claims against Ryan Hebert.26

The Court then entered judgment against Reddoch and Turlich, including

$57,700.00 as compensatory damages for Reddoch’s violations of federal and

Louisiana law and $65,000.00 in punitive damages for Reddoch’s violation of federal

law, for a total of $122,700.00 in damages.27 However, the Court deferred the issue of

21 R. Doc. No. 219.

22 Id. at 11.

23 Id. at 13.

24 Id. at 2.

25 Id. at 3–4.

26 Id. at 7–8.

27 R. Doc. No. 230.

attorney’s fees and costs until a final judgment was issued in the case.28 Defendants

then filed a second appeal.29 On September 30, 2024, the Fifth Circuit entered final

judgment affirming the judgment of this Court.30

Holmes now seeks attorney’s fees totaling $304,647.12 and litigation-related

expenses totaling $2,512.40 as a prevailing party pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).31

Attorneys for Holmes support this request with detailed billing and expense records

throughout the more than four years in which they were involved in the case.32

Defendants argue that the Court should reduce the attorney’s fees to “reflect

the lack of damages received at trial and the dismissal of certain claims before trial”

and that the fees should “be reduced to the extent they are excessive and

duplicative.”33 Defendants do not argue that the hourly fees charged by Holmes’s

attorneys are unreasonable and do not point to any specific hours in the billing

records that should be discounted. Instead, defendants merely state that the

duplicative, excessive, and unnecessary fees in this case “are too many to mention,”

that “[t]here was no reason to have multiple attorneys participating” in many steps

of litigation, and that “Gassery did not participate meaningfully in trial or in the

litigation in general.” 34 Defendants do not make any argument regarding Holmes’s

request for expenses.

28 Id. at 2.

29 R. Doc. No. 231.

30 R. Doc. No. 249.

31 R. Doc. No. 250, at 1.

32 See R. Doc. Nos. 250-2, 250-3.

33 R. Doc. No. 254, at 1.

34 Id. at 10.

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides that in any action to enforce a provision of

§ 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable

attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” While the plain language of § 1988 grants courts

discretion to determine whether to award a prevailing party attorney’s fees, case law

has established that, “absent special circumstances, a prevailing plaintiff should be

awarded section 1988 fees as a matter of course.” Cruz v. Hauck, 762 F.2d 1230, 1233

(5th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, it is

well settled that, “under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a prevailing party may also recover ‘[a]ll

reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, including charges for photocopying, paralegal

assistance, travel, and telephone . . . because they are part of the costs normally

charged to a fee-paying client.’” DeLeon v. Abbott, 687 F. App’x 340, 342 (5th Cir.

2017) (quoting Associated Builders & Contractors of La., Inc. v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd.,

919 F.2d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1990)).

The Fifth Circuit has held that “where a plaintiff prevails on both a § 1983

claim and a [non-fee-supporting] claim that are based on a ‘common nucleus of

operative facts,’ the plaintiff may recover attorney’s fees for both claims.” Planned

Parenthood of Hous. and S.E. Tex. v. Sanchez, 480 F.3d 734, 739 (5th Cir. 2007).

Additionally, where a plaintiff prevails against some parties but not others, “a fee

applicant may claim all hours reasonably necessary” if “claims against multiple

parties share a ‘common core of facts’ or ‘related legal theories.’” La. Power & Light

Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 327 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (quoting Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434–35 (1983)).

To calculate a reasonable attorney’s fee award, courts begin with the lodestar,

which is determined by taking the “reasonable number of hours expended on the

litigation and the reasonable hourly rates for the participating lawyers . . . [and]

multiply[ing] the reasonable hours by the reasonable hourly rates.” La. Power &

Light Co., 50 F.3d at 324 (citations omitted); see, e.g., In re Fender, 12 F.3d 480, 487

(5th Cir. 1994) (“The lodestar is computed by multiplying the number of hours

reasonably expended by the prevailing hourly rate in the community for similar

work.”).

“When moving for attorney’s fees, ‘the fee applicant bears the burden of

establishing entitlement to an award . . . .’” Petteway v. Henry, 738 F.3d 132, 137 (5th

Cir. 2013) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). What constitutes a reasonable hourly

rate is “computed according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant legal

market.” Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 281 (5th Cir. 2000). “Generally, the

reasonable hourly rate for a particular community is established through affidavits

of other attorneys practicing there.” Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 368 (5th

Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). If the nonmoving party does not oppose the hourly rate,

that rate is “prima facie reasonable.” Islamic Ctr. of Miss. v. City of Starkville, 876

F.2d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 1989).

Prevailing parties seeking attorneys’ fees are also “charged with the burden of

showing the reasonableness of the hours billed and . . . proving that they exercised

billing judgment.” Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prod. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir.

2006). “The party seeking attorneys’ fees must present adequately documented time

records to the court.” Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993). “Using this

time as a benchmark, the court should exclude all time that is excessive, duplicative,

or inadequately documented.” Id. “The proper remedy when there is no evidence of

billing judgment is to reduce the hours awarded by a percentage intended to

substitute for the exercise of billing judgment.” Walker v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. and

Urb. Dev., 99 F.3d 761, 770 (5th Cir. 1996).

There is a strong presumption that the lodestar amount is reasonable. Saizan,

448 F.3d at 800. However, once the lodestar is calculated, the court may adjust it

upward or downward based upon the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia

Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). Id. These factors are:

(1) the time and labor required to represent the client or clients; (2) the novelty

and difficulty of the issues in the case; (3) the skill required to perform the legal

services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney; (5)

the customary fee charged for those services in the relevant community; (6)

whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the

client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9)

the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability

of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the

client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

Saizan, 448 F.3d at 800. Id. at 800 n.18. An adjustment based on the Johnson factors

is appropriate where the lodestar “does not adequately take into account a factor that

may be properly considered in determining a reasonable fee.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex

rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 554 (2010).

However, “[t]he lodestar may not be adjusted due to a Johnson factor . . . if the

creation of the lodestar amount already took that factor into account; to do so would

be impermissible double counting.” Saizan, 448 F.3d at 800. For example, “[t]he first

factor already is included in the lodestar.” Walker, 99 F.3d at 771. “‘[N]ovelty [and]

complexity of the issues,’ ‘the special skill and experience of counsel,’ the ‘quality of

representation,’ and the ‘results obtained’ from the litigation are presumably fully

reflected in the lodestar amount, and thus cannot serve as independent bases for

increasing the basic fee award.” See Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for

Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898–900

(1984)). The Fifth Circuit has also stated that “the contingent nature of the case

cannot serve as a basis for enhancement of attorneys’ fees” and that the preclusion of

other employment, “will ordinarily be subsumed within the lodestar amount” because

it will be reflected in the number of hours billed. Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d

311, 321–23 (5th Cir. 1993).

However, of the Johnson factors that courts may consider in adjusting the

lodestar, “the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S.

at 436. When “a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the product of

hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly

rate may be an excessive amount.” Id. “This will be true even where the plaintiff’s

claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith.” Id. “The district

court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may

simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.” Id. at 436–37.

III. ANALYSIS

Holmes has two attorneys in this case now requesting attorneys’ fees. Each

submitted a log of their billing records. Gassery’s hourly rate over the course of

litigation ranges from $215 to $265.35 Many of Gassery’s hours were billed at a

discount from his ordinary rate.36 His log reflects 387.88 hours of work, costing

$91,431.70 in hourly fees.37 Loughlin billed his usual hourly rate in this matter,

which was $375 in 2020, $400 in 2021 and 2022, $425 in 2023, and $450 in 2024.38

His log reflects a total of 505.7 hours, amounting to $210,402.50 in hourly fees.39

Defendants do not challenge the hourly rates charged by Gassery or Loughlin, and

the Court thereby concludes that the rates requested are reasonable. See Islamic Ctr.

of Miss., 876 F.2d at 469.

With respect to the lodestar, defendants’ argument is that the attorney’s fees

must “be reduced to the extent they are excessive and duplicative.”40 Defendants

argue that “[t]here was no reason to have multiple attorneys participating in

depositions, discovery, and other steps in litigation” and that “Gassery did not

participate meaningfully in trial or in the litigation in general.”41 However,

defendants do not point to any specific hours that should be reduced for being

35 R. Doc. No. 250-2, at 1 (Declaration of Harrece Gassery).

36 See id. (“In 2020 my hourly fee was between $215.00 and $250.00. In 2022 and

2023, my attorney fee rate was $325.00 an hour. My billing rate is now $350.00

hour.”).

37 Id. at 140.

38 R. Doc. No. 250-3, at 1–2.

39 Id. at 32.

40 R. Doc. No. 254, at 3.

41 Id.

excessive or duplicative. Defendants merely state that “[t]he examples are too many

to mention.”42 “Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in the record.”

United States v. del Carpio Frescas, 932 F.3d 324, 331 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)

(quoting Albrechsten v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Sys., 309 F.3d 433, 436 (7th

Cir. 2002)).

After a review of Gassery’s extensive billing records, the Court cannot conclude

that Gassery failed to meaningfully participate in the litigation. Furthermore, while

the Court is obligated to reduce fees for work that is duplicitous, courts frequently

award fees for multiple attorneys at trial or other proceedings where there is a

legitimate need for more than one attorney and the additional attorneys play a

supporting rather than a merely passive role.43 Holmes’s attorneys specifically state

that Gassery was “listening to testimony, observing the demeanor of witnesses and

the jurors, considering objections and responses to objections, assisting in the

preparation of witnesses and formulation of arguments, communicating and advising

[his client], and otherwise engaging in the myriad activities required to try a case

from start to finish.”44 Indeed, while defendants complain of Holmes’s use of two

42 Id. at 10.

43 See, e.g., Midkiff v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 571 F. Supp. 3d 660, 669 (W.D. Tex.

2021) (“[H]ere [the plaintiff] has presented evidence that the additional attorney who

attended the mediation and trial participated ‘in a supporting role’ rather than

merely as a passive observer . . . . The undersigned thus also declines to reduce [the

plaintiff’s] proposed lodestar amount on this basis.”); Walker, 99 F.3d at 768 (finding

no clear error where the court awarded fees for multiple attorneys when the court

found that there was a reasonable need for more than one attorney in the

proceedings).

44 See R. Doc. No. 255, at 5 n.3.

attorneys at trial, defendants themselves found it reasonable to have three attorneys

present.45 And defendants point to no specific examples in the billing records where

Gassery or Loughlin billed for mere passive participation. The Court therefore

concludes, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that Gassery’s participation in

these proceedings was reasonable, and the Court declines to reduce the requested

lodestar on this basis.

Nonetheless, after combing through the billing records, the Court concludes

that there is evidence that, in some instances, Gassery did not exercise billing

judgment. For example, Gassery appears to make a six-minute entry for nearly every

email received from the Court regarding filings in this case.46 These include emails

notifying parties of Holmes’s own filings.47 At the time of this order, there are 258

entries in the record.48 The Court cannot conclude that billing six minutes for every

email from the Court notifying the parties of these entries is reasonable.

Furthermore, Gassery made duplicated entries for many of these emails from the

Court.49 These double counted entries are easily identified by reference to the

45 See R. Doc. No. 215, at 1.

46 See, e.g., R. Doc. No. 250-2, at 11 (“From USDC to HG re Efile Motion for Extension

of Time (#48) . . . From USDC to HG re Correction of Docket Entry by Clerk (#49) . . .

From USDC to HG re Order granting Motion to Enroll (#50)”).

47 See, e.g., id. at 13 (“From USDC to HG re Memorandum by All Plaintiffs filed (#52)

at 04:55 PM”).

48 See generally E.D. La. Case No. 19-12749 (docket sheet).

49 See, e.g., R. Doc. No. 250-2, at 51 (“From USDC re doc no 102”); cf. id at 49 (From

USDC to HG KL re Efile defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time (#102) at 10:45

PM”). See also, e.g., id. at 76–78 (showing listings for emails received from the Court

regarding record documents 120 through 130); cf. id. at 68–70 (showing listings for

emails received from the Court regarding record documents 120 through 130).

document number in the record with which the email is concerned. Gassery also

appears to have made duplicate entries to some other work in his logs.50 Given the

prevalence of this double counting, the Court cannot be confident that many of the

other extensive entries are not likewise duplicated.

Additionally, Gassery bills several hours for work on motions that appear to

never have been filed.51 The Court’s review is further complicated by the fact that

Gassery’s records are plagued by dates that do not match the dates in the record.52

The Court therefore cannot say that fees for these motions that appear to never have

been filed is reasonable. Given the evidence of a lack of billing judgment on Gassery’s

part, the Court opts to reduce his requested fees by 30 percent to account for the lack

50 See R. Doc. No. 250-2, at 14 (including an entry for four hours of “Memorandum

Drafting” on September 24, 2020). The Court notes that Holmes’s memorandum

delineating claims had already been submitted prior to this date. See R. Doc. No. 52.

Furthermore, Gassery’s log includes several hours billed for work in memorandum

drafting prior to the memorandum’s submission. See R. Doc. No. 250-2, at 9–10, 12

(including hours billed for memorandum drafting on 9/19/2020, 9/20/2020, 9/21/2020,

and 9/22/2020). Holmes did not file another memorandum in this case until December

28, 2020, when he filed a response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. R.

Doc. No. 72. Yet this entry cannot be related to work on Holmes’s response because

defendants filed their motion on December 16, 2020. R. Doc. No. 68. And the Court

did not grant defendants permission to file their motion until December 3, 2020. R.

Doc. No. 67.

51 See, e.g., R. Doc. No. 250-2, at 26 (listing work done on “MIL Prep,” research and

drafting for motions in limine, and for emails sent or received pertaining to a proposed

motion in limine between December 5, 2020 and December 8, 2020); cf. E.D. La. Case

No. 19-12749 (docket sheet) (showing no motions in limine filed by Holmes before

March 7, 2023).

52 See e.g., R. Doc. No. 250-2, at 62 (listing an entry on December 8, 2021 for an email

“From USDC to HG KL re Efile motion to lift stay (#116) at 06:24 PM”); cf. R. Doc.

No. 116 (showing the date that this document was filed into the record as August 23,

2022); see also R. Doc. No. 250-2, at 64 (showing a listing on January 1, 2022 for an

email “From MH to HG KL re Proposed COA draft response”); cf. 5th Cir. Case No.

21-30164, R. Doc. No. 58 (judgment entered on December 14, 2021).

of billing judgment. The Court therefore reduces the lodestar for Gassery’s requested

fees from $91,431.70 to $64,002.19. The Court finds no evidence that Loughlin failed

to exercise billing judgment with respect to his requested $210,402.50. Accordingly,

the Court calculates the lodestar for this case to be $274,404.69.

The Court now looks to the Johnson factors and whether the award should be

further adjusted. Defendants’ argument here is that Holmes’s “fees should be reduced

to reflect the lack of damages recovered at trial and the dismissal of certain claims

before trial.”53

Holmes initially brought this lawsuit against six defendants,54 asserting at

least nine federal claims.55 However, he voluntarily dismissed his claims against

three of the defendants entirely.56 Just two of the defendants and five federal claims

went to the jury.57 After trial, the jury concluded that Reddoch was liable for

unreasonably arresting Holmes in violation of the Fourth Amendment.58 The jury

also found Reddoch liable for three of Holmes’s five state-law claims: battery, false

arrest or imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.59 But the jury concluded that

Reddoch was not liable for Holmes’s First Amendment claim, his Fourth Amendment

excessive force claim, or his Fourth Amendment claim that he was unreasonably

53 R. Doc. No. 254, at 3.

54 R. Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 5–10.

55 See R. Doc. No. 52 (memorandum delineating claims).

56 R. Doc. No. 164.

57 See R. Doc. No. 219.

58 Id. at 2–3.

59 Id. at 5–6.

stopped.60 Holmes was unsuccessful on all of his claims brought against Ryan

Hebert.61

While Holmes was not successful on all of his federal claims or against all

defendants, he prevailed on a substantial federal issue when the jury concluded that

he was unreasonably arrested pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. And the Court

was unable to identify any specific hours billed that related only to Holmes’s

unsuccessful claims. Holmes likewise succeeded on several state-law pendant claims

and may receive attorney’s fees for efforts related to those claims because they arose

out of a “common nucleus of operative facts.” See Planned Parenthood of Houston and

S.E. Texas, 480 F.3d at 739. Because a common core of facts related to all of Holmes’s

claims, Holmes may likewise recover all reasonable attorney fees for his successful

claims despite his lack of success against all defendants. See La. Power & Light Co.,

50 F.3d at 327. The Court therefore declines to deduct any specific hours from the

requested attorney’s fee on this basis.

However, in light of the Johnson factors, the Court concludes that the lodestar

is not proportional to the degree of success obtained in the lawsuit and must be

reduced. At trial, Holmes was awarded $57,700 for only one federal theory of recovery

along with his successful state-law claims, and he was awarded $65,000 in punitive

damages.62 Holmes’s recovery and success were certainly significant, and the high

fees in proportion to the jury award are at least partially justified by the two appeals

60 Id. at 2–4.

61 Id. at 7–8.

62 R. Doc. No. 230.

filed in this case, both of which were won by Holmes. However, given the initial scope

of the lawsuit and Holmes’s relatively limited recovery, it would be fundamentally

unfair to award the full fee as requested.

After carefully considering the record in this case and the partial success that

Holmes obtained, the Court determines that a reduction of 15 percent to the lodestar

constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee. Having considered the other Johnson factors,

the Court concludes that the other factors are either subsumed within the Court’s

lodestar calculation or do not warrant an adjustment of the lodestar. The Court will

therefore further reduce Gassery’s fee from $64,002.19 to $54,401.86, and the Court

will reduce Loughlin’s fee from$210,402.50 to $178,842.13. The Court will award a

total of $233,243.99 in attorney’s fees.

Defendants make no argument why Holmes’s requested expenses should either

not be paid or should be reduced. The Court therefore awards Holmes the requested

$2,512.40 for litigation-related expenses.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above,

IT IS ORDERED that Holmes’s motion is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART. Defendants Turlich and Reddoch are liable to Holmes for

$235,756.39 in reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses.

New Orleans, Louisiana, December 4, 2024.

LANCE M. AFRICK

UNITED STAVES DISTRICT JUDGE

17