Hayes Jr. v. Acts 2:38 Faith Deliverance, Inc., Church Of Jesus Christ Of The Apostolic D/B/A Faith Deliverance Apostolic Church

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

EASTERN DIVISION

TYRONE HAYES JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

ACTS 2:38 FAITH DELIVERANCE, ) No. 1:23−cv−01116-STA-jay

INC., CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST )

OF THE APOSTOLIC d/b/a FAITH )

DELIVERANCE APOSTOLIC )

CHURCH; DENARD WILLIAMS; and )

RANDALL HOOKER, )

)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

AND

ORDER OF REFERENCE

Plaintiff Tyrone Hayes, Jr., filed this action against various church entities, Bishop Denard

Williams, and Randall Hooker for the alleged sexual abuse of Plaintiff by Defendant Hooker.

Plaintiff asserted claims of negligence, negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, negligence per

se, and breach of fiduciary duty against the church defendants and claims of battery, assault, false

imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy against

Defendant Hooker. Because he failed to file an answer or otherwise respond to the complaint,

default was entered by the Clerk of the Court against Defendant Hooker on October 30, 2023, and

a motion for default judgment was granted on December 19, 2023.1 The matter was referred to the

Magistrate Judge for a determination of Plaintiff’s damages. (ECF No. 21.)

1 The church entities and Bishop Williams have been dismissed from the action by stipulation of

On December 20, 2023, an evidentiary hearing on the issue of damages was set for

February 1, 2024. Defendant Hooker was notified by mail of the hearing. (ECF No. 22.) The

hearing was subsequently continued until February 28, 2024, upon motion of Plaintiff. (ECF No.

24.) Plaintiff was instructed to notify Defendant Hooker of the re-setting.

On January 31, 2024, an attorney filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Defendant (ECF

No. 25), a motion to continue the hearing (ECF No. 26), and a motion to set aside the default

judgment on the ground that Defendant believed that the attorney for the church entities and Bishop

Williams also represented him and that he was not aware of the default judgment until the setting

of the damages hearing. (ECF No. 27.) Plaintiff filed a response to the motion on February 13,

2024. (ECF No. 33.) The motion to set aside the default judgment was referred to the Magistrate

Judge on that same date. (ECF No. 34.)

A hearing before the Magistrate Judge was held on February 28, 2024, on both the issue of

damages and whether the default judgment should be set aside. Plaintiff testified and presented

two witnesses, and Defendant testified on his own behalf. The parties filed post-hearing briefs

(ECF Nos. 50-53) which the Magistrate Judge considered in making his recommendation, along

with the testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing.

The Magistrate Judge issued his report and recommendation on October 23, 2024. (ECF

No. 54.) He recommended granting the motion to set aside default judgment and, therefore, did

not make a recommendation as to damages. Plaintiff filed objections to the report. (ECF No. 55.)

Defendant Hooker did not respond to the objections.

If a party objects within the allotted time to a Report and Recommendation, as did Plaintiff,

the Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed

the parties. (ECF Nos. 16, 43.)

findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1); see also Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b). Parties must file specific objections. “[T]he filing of vague, general, or conclusory

objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to a complete

failure to object.” Cole v. Yukins, 2001 WL 303507 *1 (6th Cir. March 19, 2001) (citing Miller v.

Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995)).

The Magistrate Judge first set out the well-established standard for setting aside a default

judgment.

When an entry for default ripens into a default judgment, any subsequent motion to

set aside the default judgment will be considered under Rule 60(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Burrell v. Henderson, 434 F.3d 826, 832 (6th Cir. 2006).

United Coin Meter Co., Inc. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d 839, 845 (6th

Cir. 1983) is the seminal case in the Sixth Circuit and encourages courts to apply

Rule 60(b) “equitably and liberally.” United Coin Meter tasks courts with using the

same factors that are found in Rule 55(c), “(1) whether the opposing party would

be prejudiced; (2) whether the proponent had a meritorious claim or defense; and

(3) whether the proponent’s culpable conduct led to the default.” Id. This Court

must weigh the competing interests of “favoring the finality of judgments” and

construing “all ambiguous or disputed facts in the light most favorable to the

defendant.” Id. (citing Waifersong, Ltd. v. Classic Music Vending, 976 F.2d 290,

292 (6th Cir. 1992); INVST Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Chem–Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d

391, 398 (6th Cir.1987)). Ultimately, “any doubt should be resolved in favor of the

petition to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits.”

United Coin Meter, 705 F.2d, at 845 (quoting Rooks v. Am. Brass Co., 263 F.2d

166, 169 (6th Cir. 1959)).

Under Waifersong, the Rule 60 analysis begins, and often ends, under the

culpability analysis. 976 F.2d, at 292. Unlike Rule 55(c), a court must apply a

heightened standard under Rule 60, requiring a defendant to show that the

circumstances fall into the enumerated grounds for relief provided in Rule 60(b).

Burrell, 434 F.3d, at 832. Here, Hooker seeks relief under two enumerated grounds:

“(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (6) any other reason

justifying relief from the operation of judgment.” Only after the party makes a

showing that their culpable conduct led to the default “may the district court

proceed to consider the other United Coin Meter factors.” Weiss v. St. Paul Fire

and Marine Inc. Co., 283 F.3d 790, at 794 (6th Cir. 2002). As such, this Court

begins with the culpability analysis.

(Rep. & Rec. pp. 4-5 (record citation omitted)).

In looking at culpability, the Magistrate Judge considered Defendant’s assertions that he

mistakenly believed that he was represented by counsel and that he did not receive the request for

entry of default or motion for default judgment prior to the granting of default judgment.

In support of Defendant’s belief that he was represented by his co-Defendants’ attorney(s),

the Magistrate Judge looked at Defendant’s testimony that he contacted his co-Defendants’

counsel’s office on three occasions and was told that the office was busy and that they would get

back with him; he assumed that, because the attorneys were representing the church and Bishop

Williams they were also representing him; although he did not sign a retention agreement with the

firm, he was unaware that such an agreement is customary when preparing for a federal civil suit;

co-Defendants’ counsel requested a fifteen-day extension on Defendant’s behalf; and Defendant

never received any communication from co-Defendants’ counsel that he was not their client. The

Magistrate Judge noted that he must resolve any doubt in favor of Defendant’s testimony under

United Coin Meter and then determined that Defendant was “excusably mistaken about being

represented by his co-Defendants’ counsel.” (Id. at p. 6.)

In light of the preference for deciding cases on the merits, the Court finds that it must

reluctantly disagree with the Magistrate Judge’s decision. First, Defendant presented no outside

evidence, such as testimony from co-Defendants’ attorneys, that they had engaged in any

communication with him that would have led him to believe that they represented him. Defendant

testified that Bishop Williams told him who was representing him and the church and, from that

exchange, Defendant “assumed” that they would also represent him without any facts to back up

his assumption. Finally, Defendant testified that he did not speak with co-Defendants’ attorney(s);

instead, he contacted their office and was told that someone “would get back with him,” although

they never did. He was merely “under the impression that [he] was somehow being represented

as well.” “I thought that, you know, that I would somehow be part of, be represented as well….”

(TR. pp. 8-9, ECF No. 41.) He acknowledged that his belief that he was being represented was an

“assumption” on his part. He also admitted that he never signed a retention agreement with co-

Defendants’ counsel.

The Court finds that Defendant Hooker’s “assumption” was not reasonable and does not

constitute excusable neglect under Rule 60. Defendant has presented no evidence showing a

plausible basis for his assumption. At no time did his co-Defendants or their counsel tell him that

he was being represented or take any action to mislead him. “Neither carelessness nor ignorance

of the law on the part of the moving party will justify relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).”

Merriweather v. Wilkinson, 83 F. App’x 62, 63 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

As for the extension of time counsel sought on behalf of Defendant, Plaintiff’s motion for

default judgment states that:

On September 28, 2023, as a courtesy, counsel for Defendants Denard Williams

and Acts 2:38 Faith Deliverance, Inc., Church of Jesus Christ of the Apostolic

(hereinafter “Faith Deliverance”) communicated with Plaintiff’s counsel that

Defendant Hooker had not yet obtained counsel and requested an extension on his

behalf. Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to extend a fifteen-day extension for Defendant

Hooker to retain counsel and respond to the Complaint.

(Pl’s Mot. p. 2, ECF No. 20.) The certificate of service states that the motion was served on

Defendant by certified mail. (Id. at p. 4.) If Defendant Hooker received the motion, then he would

have known that co-Defendants’ counsel did not represent him. If he did not receive the motion,

then the request for an extension of time on his behalf could have played no role in his actions.

Moreover, Defendant was on notice from the date that he was served with the complaint

that he must file an answer within twenty-one days of September 7, 2023 (ECF No. 11), and yet

he ignored that directive. If nothing else, he could have submitted a pro se letter or motion to the

Court asking for additional time to confirm that he was represented.

Defendant testified that he did not receive the request for entry of default at all and did not

receive the motion for default judgment until January after the default judgment had been entered,

although Plaintiff avers that both were sent to Defendant’s home address by certified mail. After

the entry of default, service on a party in default is not required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2). See

Jack Tyler Eng’g Co. v. Colfax Corp., 2011 WL 1256610, at *5, n.25 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2011).

Although Defendant testified that he did not receive Plaintiff’s request for entry of default, there

is a rebuttable presumption that a party receives the regular mail sent to him. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)

& 77(d)(1) (serving notice of an order is made by “mailing it to the person's last known address—

in which event service is complete upon mailing); Rucker v. Potter, 215 F. App’x 406, 408 (6th

Cir. 2007)(“there is a rebuttable presumption that mail is received by the person to whom it is

addressed.”); see also In re Strauss Co., Inc., 2021 WL 4436159, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Sept.

27, 2021) (citing Ellis v. Warren, 2020 WL 364117, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2020) (“There is

a rebuttable presumption that an item properly mailed was received by the addressee. When there

is a certificate of service showing that the document was mailed to the intended recipient at his

home address, it is presumed that the document was received.2 After that, the mere denial of

receipt, without more, is insufficient to rebut the presumption.”) (internal quotation and editorial

marks and citations omitted), appeal dismissed, 2020 WL 5033293 (11th Cir. June 23, 2020);

Portley-El v. Milyard, 2006 WL 3371642, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 21, 2006) (finding that first-class

mail is presumed delivered if properly addressed) (citation omitted)). In this case, Defendant has

not rebutted the presumption that he received the documents. Therefore, this argument fails.

Because Defendant’s culpable behavior led to the entry of default and subsequent default

judgment, this factor weighs heavily against setting aside the default. As noted by Plaintiff,

2 Defendant has not denied that Plaintiff used his correct address when mailing documents.

multiple courts have held that the moving party cannot carry its burden without showing that his

culpable conduct did not lead to the default judgment. See, e.g., Manufacturers’ Indus. Relations

v. E. Akron Co., 58 F.3d 204, 209-210 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[A] thorough review of those cases

indicates that the result, as a practical matter, almost invariably depends on the culpability factor.”)

(emphasis in original); Weiss, 283 F.3d at 793 (“[A] party seeking to vacate a default judgment

under Rule 60(b)(1) must demonstrate first and foremost that the default did not result from his

culpable conduct.”). Accordingly, the Court could stop its analysis at this juncture since it finds

that Defendant was, in fact, culpable in failing to file an answer or timely defend against the

complaint filed against him. However, the Court will proceed with the other two steps to complete

the record.

Also weighing against setting aside the default is the lack of a meritorious defense.

Defendant has presented two possible defenses – statute of limitations and laches. The Magistrate

Judge explained that, under Rule 60, a defense is meritorious so long as “there is some possibility

that the outcome of the suit after a full trial will be contrary to the result achieved by the default.”

Williams v. Meyer, 346 F.3d 607, 613 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the party

seeking to set aside a default judgment is afforded great deference if the defense is “good at law,

regardless of the likelihood of success....” Burrell, 434 F.3d, at 834 (citation and quotation

omitted).

As stated by the Magistrate Judge, this Court has already rejected the statute of limitations

defense when it was raised by the church entities and Bishop Williams. (ECF No. 19.) Thus, there

is no possibility “that the outcome of the suit after a full trial will be contrary to the result achieved

by the default” based on this defense. Although the Magistrate Judge allowed for the possibility

of a meritorious laches defense, Defendant barely raised that defense, which is an affirmative

defense, and did not argue its applicability to his own case with any specificity.

“The defense of laches is based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel and is only applied

[when] the party invoking it has been prejudiced by the delay.” Brown v. Ogle, 46 S.W. 3d 721,

726 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Accordingly, the defense of laches is sustained only in “comparatively

rare cases.” Assocs. Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Blackburn, 2017 WL 1077060, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App.

Mar. 22, 2017) (citing S.M. Williamson & Co. v. Ragsdale, 170 Tenn. 439, 95 S.W.2d 922 (1936)).

When a defendant asserts an affirmative defense, such as laches, the defendant bears the burden

of alleging undisputed facts that show the existence of the affirmative defense. See Avery Place,

LLC v. Highways, Inc., 2015 WL 8161848, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2015) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff has thoroughly briefed the issue of whether laches may apply to action that has a

statute of limitations, as in this case, and correctly states that, when there is a governing statute of

limitations, the doctrine of laches may shorten that time period only when the plaintiff is guilty of

“gross laches.” Hampton v. Macon Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 2014 WL 107971, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App.

Jan. 10, 2014). Gross laches may be established when the plaintiff “unreasonably acquiesces in

adverse rights for a long duration of time,” and the defendant is prejudiced by the “unjustified

delay of the plaintiff.” Id. Here, there has been no such showing. As this Court stated in its order

denying co-Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF No. 19), “[b]ecause Plaintiff filed suit within

three years of receiving knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on notice that he had suffered an

injury as a result of the alleged childhood sexual abuse, his claim is timely….” Defendant has

presented no facts or law to convince the Court that its prior ruling was in error.

In examining the prejudice factor, the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that

Plaintiff’s assertion that he would be prejudiced by delay, standing alone, did not constitute

prejudice under the United Coin Meter factors. However, combined with Defendant’s culpability

and the lack of a meritorious defense, the delay to Plaintiff bolsters the Court’s decision to deny

setting aside the default judgment.

Because Defendant Hooker has not met the standard for setting aside a default judgment

under Rule 60, the Court must reject the report and recommendation and deny Defendant’s motion.

Plaintiff seems to suggest that he is entitled to a jury trial on the matter of damages.

However, as explained in 3M Co. v. Premium Contractor Sol., LLC, 2022 WL 1204865 (S.D. Ohio

Apr. 22, 2022),

Under Rule 55(b)(2), the Court may enter default judgment without a hearing, but

it also may conduct a hearing or make a referral when “it needs to ... determine the

amount of damages ... or ... investigate any other matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

55(b)(2)(B), (D). “‘Where damages are unliquidated a default admits only the

defaulting party’s liability and the amount of damages must be proved.’” Vesligaj

v. Peterson, 331 F. App’x 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Antoine v. Atlas Turner,

Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 110 (6th Cir. 1995)) (alteration adopted); see also Bell v. Zurich

Am. Ins. Co., 156 F. Supp. 3d 884, 889 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (“[w]hen the amount of

damages to be awarded pursuant to a default judgment is uncertain, the court must

make further inquiry”). “Even when a default judgment is warranted based on a

party’s failure to defend, the allegations in the complaint with respect to the amount

of the damages are not deemed true.” Vesligaj, 331 F. App’x at 355 (internal

quotation marks omitted). “The district court must instead conduct an inquiry in

order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). This inquiry may include an evidentiary hearing, as well

as consideration of affidavits or other documentary evidence in the record, to

determine the appropriate amount of damages to be awarded. Bell, 156 F. Supp. 3d

at 889 (a court may make further inquiry “through oral testimony at an evidentiary

hearing, or through the submission of affidavits and other materials”). “There is

no right to a jury trial on a request for a default judgment, or as a manner of

disputing damages following the entry of a default judgment.” Id.

3M Co., 2022 WL 1204865, at *1 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the issue of Plaintiff’s damages

will be returned to the Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation.

In summary, the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge to grant the motion

to set aside default judgment is REJECTED, the motion to set aside default judgment is DENIED,

and the issue of Plaintiff’s damages is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge for a report and

recommendation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ S. Thomas Anderson

S. THOMAS ANDERSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Date: December 5, 2024