Baker v. Mitchell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CLFFORD W. BAKER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-01739-GCS

)

PERCY MYERS, )

CHRISTINE BROWN, )

and )

CHRISTEL CROW, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Clifford Baker, an inmate with the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”), who is currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, brings

this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His

original Complaint alleging deliberate indifference in the treatment of his broken finger

was dismissed for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff was granted leave to

amend his pleading. On September 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint.

(Doc. 12). Baker alleges that defendants acted with deliberate indifference in treating his

broken finger, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

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On February 15, 2024, the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, conducted a

review of the Amended Complaint and allowed Plaintiff to proceed on an Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Christine Brown, Christel Crow, and

Percy Myers for delaying treatment for his broken finger. (Doc. 13). As to his allegations

regarding Defendants Brown and Crow, Plaintiff alleges that he spoke to Defendant

Crow on April 6, 2023, and he wrote a letter to Defendant Brown on March 22, 2023,

requesting care for his injured finger; they both failed to respond to his requests. (Doc.

12, p. 4). As to his allegations regarding Defendant Myers, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia,

that he was directed to follow-up with Defendant Myers after his February 9, 2023, visit

to the emergency room, but Defendant Myers failed to examine him after his return.

Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment on the issue of

exhaustion of administrative remedies filed by Defendants Brown and Crow. (Doc. 39).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he

failed to pursue his allegations against them through the prison’s grievance process

prior to filing this lawsuit.1 Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion. (Doc. 45). As the

motion is ripe, the Court turns to address the merits of the motion.

FACTS

The parties agree that grievance # 451-02-23 is the relevant grievance to the

1 On April 9, 2024, the Court granted Defendant Myers’s motion to withdraw the

affirmative defense of exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Doc. 37).

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issues in this case.2

On February 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed emergency grievance # 451-02-23,

concerning the allegations relating to medical treatment. (Doc. 39-2, p. 3; Doc. 45, p. 6).

Plaintiff states that he injured his hand the morning of February 9, 2023, while playing

basketball, and nurses and a doctor at the facility provided him with inadequate

treatment immediately following his injury. Plaintiff requested the following relief: “[t]o

have camera footage preserved in all areas mentioned in body of grievance gym/HCU

at time mentioned; to be seen immediately by the orthopedic doctor as ordered by PNK

ER Staff. To have finger fixed immediately. To alleviate pain. To be compensated both

monetary and compensatory damages.” Id. Plaintiff did not name Defendants Brown

and Crow.

On February 14, 2023, the Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”) expedited the

emergency grievance. The grievance officer’s report dated February 21, 2023, notes that:

“PER HCUA: Individual in custody is scheduled to see ortho.” (Doc. 39-2, p. 1, 2; Doc.

45, p. 4). The grievance officer recommended that the grievance be denied. The next

day, the CAO concurred with the grievance officer’s decision. (Doc. 39-2, p. 1; Doc. 45,

p. 4). On April 19, 2023, Debbie Knauer of the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”)

denied the grievance finding that the issue was appropriately addressed by the facility.

(Doc. 39-2, p. 8; Doc. 45, p. 8). Latoya Hughes, Acting Director, concurred with this

2 The record reflects that Plaintiff, during his incarceration, filed many grievances through

the prison’s grievance process.

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finding. Id.

Plaintiff filed suit on May 24, 2023. (Doc. 1). He filed his Amended Complaint on

September 19, 2023. (Doc. 12).

LEGAL STANDARDS

“Summary Judgment is proper if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures

and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [Defendants are]

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467

(7th Cir. 2010). Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). That statute states, in

pertinent part, that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under

section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available

are exhausted.” Id. (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to

the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir.

2006) (noting that “[t]his circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion.”).

Exhaustion must occur before the suit is filed. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th

Cir. 2004). A plaintiff cannot file suit and then exhaust his administrative remedies

while the suit is pending. Id.

Moreover, “[t]o exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals

in the place, and at the time, the prison administrative rules require.” Pozo v.

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McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to use a

prison’s grievance process, “the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the

case, and the prisoner’s claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.

The purpose of exhaustion is to give prison officials an opportunity to address the

inmate’s claims internally, prior to federal litigation. See Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684

(7th Cir. 2006)

Under Pavey, the Seventh Circuit held that “debatable factual issues relating to

the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies” are not required to be

decided by a jury but are to be determined by the judge. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739,

740-741 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, where failure to exhaust administrative remedies is raised

as an affirmative defense, the Court set forth the following procedures:

The sequence to be followed in a case in which exhaustion is contested is

therefore as follows: (1) The district judge conducts a hearing on exhaustion

and permits whatever discovery relating to exhaustion he deems

appropriate. (2) If the judge determines that the prisoner did not exhaust his

administrative remedies, the judge will then determine whether (a) the

plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and so he must go

back and exhaust; (b) or, although he has no unexhausted administrative

remedies, the failure to exhaust was innocent (as where prison officials

prevent a prisoner from exhausting his remedies), and so he must be given

another chance to exhaust (provided that there exist remedies that he will be

permitted by the prison authorities to exhaust, so that he’s not just being

given a runaround); or (c) the failure to exhaust was the prisoner’s fault, in

which event the case is over. (3) If and when the judge determines that the

prisoner has properly exhausted his administrative remedies, the case will

proceed to pretrial discovery, and if necessary a trial, on the merits; and if

there is a jury trial, the jury will make all necessary findings of fact without

being bound by (or even informed of) any of the findings made by the

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district judge in determining that the prisoner had exhausted his

administrative remedies.

Id. at 742.

As an inmate confined within the Illinois Department of Corrections, Plaintiff

was required to follow the regulations contained in the Illinois Department of

Correction’s Grievance Procedures for Offenders (“grievance procedures”) to exhaust

his claims. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. The grievance procedures first

require inmates to file their grievance with the counselor within 60 days of the

discovery of an incident. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). The grievance form must:

contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,

including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is

the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This provision

does not preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the names of

individuals are not known, but the offender must include as much

descriptive information about the individual as possible.

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). Grievances that are unable to be resolved through

routine channels are then sent to the grievance officer. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE

§ 504.820(a). The Grievance Officer will review the grievance and provide a written

response to the inmate. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(a). “The Grievance Officer

shall consider the grievance and report his or her findings and recommendations in

writing to the Chief Administrative Officer within two months after receipt of the

grievance, when reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE §

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504.830(e). “The Chief Administrative Officer shall review the findings and

recommendation and advise the offender of his or her decision in writing. Id.

If the inmate is not satisfied with the Chief Administrative Officer’s response, he

or she can file an appeal with the Director through the ARB. The grievance procedures

specifically state, “[i]f, after receiving the response of the Chief Administrative Officer,

the offender still believes that the problem, complaint[,] or grievance has not been

resolved to his or her satisfaction, he or she may appeal in writing to the Director. The

appeal must be received by the Administrative Review Board within 30 days after the

date of the decision.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). The inmate shall attach copies of

the Grievance Officer’s report and the Chief Administrative Officer’s decision to his

appeal. Id. “The Administrative Review Board shall submit to the Director a written

report of its findings and recommendations.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d). “The

Director shall review the findings and recommendations of the Board and make a final

determination of the grievance within 6 months after receipt of the appealed grievance,

when reasonably feasible under the circumstances. The offender shall be sent a copy of

the Director’s decision.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(e).

The grievance procedures allow for an inmate to file an emergency grievance. To

file an emergency grievance, the inmate must forward the grievance directly to the

CAO who may “[determine] that there is a substantial risk of imminent personal injury

or other serious or irreparable harm to the offender” and thus the grievance should be

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handled on an emergency basis. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(a). If the CAO

determines the grievance should be handled on an emergency basis, then the CAO

“shall expedite processing of the grievance and respond to the offender” indicating to

him what action shall be taken. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(b). If the CAO determines

the grievances “should not be handled on an emergency basis, the offender shall be

notified in writing that he or she may resubmit the grievance as non-emergent, in

accordance with the standard grievance process.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(c).

When an inmate appeals a grievance deemed by the CAO to be an emergency, “the

Administrative Review Board shall expedite processing of the grievance.” 20 ILL.

ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(f).

DISCUSSION

Because there are no disputes of material facts, the Court finds it unnecessary to

hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pavey.

Defendants maintain that Plaintiff’s grievance dated February 10, 2023, does not

specifically reference any action or inaction by them or that Defendants knew of, and

disregarded Plaintiff’s need for healthcare to treat his finger. Further, Defendants

maintain that the allegations in the Amended Complaint against them stem from

separate conduct and circumstances occurring after the grievance was filed. Thus,

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against them. Plaintiff counters

that his grievance was pending with the ARB when he made Defendants aware of his

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issue, and he believes the grievance dated February 10, 2023, was sufficient to meet the

exhaustion requirement.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense in an action

against prison officials, and the burden of proof is on the officials. Here, the

undersigned finds that Defendants have not met their burden and that Plaintiff did

exhaust his administrative remedies. The grievance procedures require that an inmate

name the individuals involved in the complaint, or, if their names are not known, an

inmate, must at the very least, “include as much descriptive information about the

individual as possible.” 20 ILL. ADMIN CODE § 504.810(a)(b). See also Ambrose v. Godinez,

No. 11-3068, 510 Fed. Appx. 470, 472 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2013); but see Jackson v. Shepherd,

No. 13-2651, 552 Fed. Appx. 591, 593 n.1 (7th Cir. Feb. 6, 2014). Further, the Seventh

Circuit has held that an inmate is required to provide enough information to serve a

grievance’s function of giving “prison officials a fair opportunity to address [an

inmate’s] complaints.” Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011). This fits with

the purpose of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, which was designed to afford

correctional officials a chance to address inmate complaints internally, prior to resorting

to federal litigation. See, e.g., Kaba, 458 F.3d at 684 (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93

(2006)). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has consistently reminded district courts that “all

the PLRA requires” is that a grievance “alert the prison to the nature of the wrong for

which redress is sought[.]” Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 580 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing

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Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002)). An inmate is not required to provide

personal notice of suit to an individual defendant through his grievance. See Maddox,

655 F.3d at 722 (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007)).

Here, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff through the above grievance provided

enough information to put the prison officials on notice of the nature of his claim

against Defendants Brown and Crow. While Defendants are not specifically named,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Brown was the Healthcare Unit Administrator and

Defendant Crow was the Warden during the relevant period. Thus, the possibility exists

that Defendants Brown and Crow had knowledge of the lack of medical treatment and

contributed to the delay in medical treatment. The simple fact that Plaintiff mentions he

was receiving no treatment is sufficient to satisfy the purpose of exhaustion, which is to

put the jail on notice of problems within the facility to allow the jail the opportunity to

address the problem before a lawsuit is filed. Moreover, the HCU was mentioned in

Plaintiff’s grievance as well as by the grievance officer in her report, thus indicating

Defendant Brown’s potential responsibility and involvement for the lack of treatment.

Furthermore, Defendant Crow, as CAO, was involved in the grievance process when

she deemed Plaintiff’s grievance emergent, thus placing her on notice of Plaintiff’s

issue. See, e.g., Maddox, 655 F.3d at 722 (“[w]here prison officials address an inmate’s

grievance on the merits without rejecting it on procedural grounds, the grievance has

served its function of alerting the state and inviting corrective action.”).

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In this instance, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that he was not required to file

multiple, successive grievances regarding the same issues. See Turley v. Rednour, 729

F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013). In Turley, the Seventh Circuit found that the inmate’s

grievance “centered around continuing prison policies, including allegedly illegal

lockdowns, and one occurrence of notice from [the prisoner] was sufficient to give the

prison a chance to correct the problems.” Id. But the Seventh Circuit noted that an

inmate is required to file a separate grievance “if the underlying facts or the complaints

are different.” Id. For instance, in Bowers v. Dart, 1 F.4th 513 (7th Cir. 2021), the Seventh

Circuit found that a grievance complaining about officers’ failure to respond during an

attack did not serve to exhaust the claim that officers failed to protect the plaintiff before

the attack. The Seventh Circuit noted that claims in the grievance were “substantively

distinct from the allegations in [the plaintiff’s] federal complaint.” Id. at 517. More

recently, the Seventh Circuit found that a grievance about the lack of water in an

observation cell did not serve to exhaust claims about other issues with the same cell,

including the presence of feces and chemical agents, because those claims were

substantively distinct from the claims in the grievance. See Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948,

959-961 (7th Cir 2024).

While Plaintiff’s specific allegations against these Defendants occurred after he

filed the grievance, these allegations are like the ones contained in the grievance in that

Plaintiff complains he was delayed medical treatment for his broken finger. Coupled

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with the fact that the CAO found Plaintiff's grievance to be emergent, that Plaintiff

referenced the HCU in the grievance, and that the grievance officer in her report noted a

response from the HCU, the Court finds that Plaintiff was not required to file an

additional grievance as to these two Defendants. Construing the evidence in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Defendants have not carried their

burden regarding exhaustion and that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies

as to his claim against Defendants Brown and Crow.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on the issue of exhaustion (Doc. 39).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 4, 2024. G | b ert C piaitaly sjaned by

Sison —i1608-0600"

GILBERTC.SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

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