Smith v. Harris County Sheriff's Officer Reyes

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT November 26, 2024

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

SCOTT SMITH, §

SPN # 02448595, §

§

Plaintiff, §

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VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-1839

§

HARRIS COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICER §

REYES, §

§

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The plaintiff, Scott Smith, is an inmate in the Harris County Jail. Smith proceeds

pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights suit. Because this case is governed by the

Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the Court is required to screen the pleadings and

dismiss the complaint in whole or in part if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Having reviewed the pleadings, the applicable law, and all matters of record, the Court

concludes that this civil action should be conditionally dismissed for the reasons that

follow.

I. BACKGROUND

Smith names “Officer Reyes,” an officer with the Harris County Sheriff’s Office, as

the sole defendant in this case. He states that on April 5, 2024, Officer Reyes was on

security duty at Ben Taub Hospital. He alleges that Reyes “told 5 black people [Smith]

hate[s] black people” and then “put [Smith] in a holding cell with them” and left the

hospital. He also states that Reyes “admitted to his employer” that he had taken this action,

which “[e]ndangered [Smith’s] life” (Dkt. 1, at 3-4). He does not allege any physical

injury. As relief for his claims, he requests that the Court “compensate [him] for stress”

caused when his life was in danger (id. at 4).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Because the plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is

required by the PLRA to screen the case and dismiss the complaint at any time if it

determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A district court may dismiss a

claim as frivolous if it lacks any arguable basis in law or fact. Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d

674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law “if it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory.” Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir.

2013) (cleaned up). It lacks an arguable basis in fact “if, after providing the plaintiff the

opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly

baseless.” Id. (cleaned up).

A dismissal under § 1915A(b) or § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim is

governed by the same standard as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002). Under this

standard, a court “construes the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff,” “takes all facts

pleaded in the complaint as true,” and considers whether “with every doubt resolved on

[the plaintiff’s] behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief.” Harrington v. State

Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). A court may

dismiss a case sua sponte and without notice to the plaintiff if the plaintiff has pleaded his

best case or if the dismissal is without prejudice. Brown v. Taylor, 829 F.3d 365, 370 (5th

Cir. 2016); see Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a court

may sua sponte dismiss for failure to state a claim “as long as the procedure employed is

fair”) (cleaned up); Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that

where the pleadings, viewed under the individual circumstances of the case, “demonstrate

that the plaintiff has pleaded his best case,” dismissal on the pleadings is appropriate if the

pleadings do not adequately state a cause of action).

In reviewing the pleadings, the Court is mindful of the fact that the plaintiff

proceeds pro se. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a liberal construction

and, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (cleaned

up). Even under this lenient standard a pro se plaintiff must allege more than “‘labels and

conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)); see Patrick v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 681 F.3d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 2012). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Additionally, regardless of how well-pleaded the

factual allegations may be, they must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under

a valid legal theory. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Geiger v. Jowers,

404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).

III. ANALYSIS

Smith’s civil rights claim is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a

vehicle for a claim against a person acting under color of state law, such as a law

enforcement official, for a constitutional violation. Pratt v. Harris Cty., Tex., 822 F.3d

174, 180 (5th Cir. 2016). To the extent Smith raises a claim that Officer Reyes failed to

protect him, his claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hare v. City of

Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 638-39 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

Smith’s claim must be dismissed because federal statute prohibits the compensatory

damages he seeks. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), “No Federal civil action may be brought

by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional

injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the

commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18).” See Mayfield v. Texas

Dep't of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 605-06 (5th Cir. 2008). Smith brought this action

when confined in the Harris County Jail and alleges that he suffered stress when in custody,

in particular, when Officer Reyes confined him to a holding cell for two hours. He seeks

compensation for the stress allegedly caused by Officer Reyes, but alleges no physical

injury or sexual act. His claim must be dismissed under § 1997e(e) for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.

As an additional ground for dismissal, the Court notes that a failure-to-protect claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment requires a plaintiff to plead facts that could show that he

was incarcerated under conditions posing a “substantial risk of serious harm” and that the

defendant was “deliberately indifferent” to his need for protection. Hare, 74 F.3d at 648;

see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate indifference cannot be

inferred from a defendant’s negligence or gross negligence, but rather requires that the

official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Thompson v.

Upshur Cty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Hare, 74 F.3d at 645, 649)). In

order to prevail, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed and that

the defendant actually drew the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Here, Smith alleges

that Officer Reyes “told 5 black people [Smith] hate[s] black people” and then “put [Smith]

in a holding cell with them” (Dkt. 1, at 3-4). He does not plead facts that could show that

other people in the holding cell took any action based on Reyes’ alleged statement, that he

otherwise faced a substantial risk of serious harm, or that Ryes actually drew an inference

of a substantial risk to Smith. See Thompson, 245 F.3d at 459; Hare, 74 F.3d at 649.

Therefore, he fails to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Given Smith’s statements that his life was endangered during his two-hour stay in

the holding cell on April 5, 2024, and that he seeks compensation for “stress,” as well as

his failure to identify any physical injury or sexual act on the date in question, the Court is

satisfied that he has pleaded his best case. See Brown, 829 F.3d at 370; Bazrowx, 136 F.3d

at 1054; Jacquez, 801 F.2d at 793. Dismissal is warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

and § 1915A(b). However, because Smith is proceeding pro se, the Court will

conditionally dismiss the case and permit Smith an opportunity to cure the defects in his

pleading within 30 days.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court now ORDERS as follows:

1. This civil action is conditionally dismissed under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. Smith’s claims will be dismissed with prejudice without further order of

the Court unless, within 30 days of the date of this order, Smith files an amended complaint

that cures the defects identified in this opinion and states a claim against Officer Reyes

upon which relief can be granted.

2. All pending motions, if any, are DENIED as moot.

The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on November 26 , 2024.

— Cowra 0 HonQ1 _

GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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