The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
BILLY MILES,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 23-cv-3572-NJR
DR. PERCY MYERS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Billy Miles, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who is
currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights while at Pinckneyville
Correctional Center. Miles’s Complaint alleged that Dr. Percy Myers was deliberately
indifferent in treating his chest pain (Docs. 1, 11).
This matter is currently before the Court on Dr. Percy Myers’s motion for
summary judgment for Miles’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies (Docs. 30,
31). Dr. Myers also filed a notice to Miles advising him that his failure to respond to the
pending motion could result in a judgment for Dr. Myers (Doc. 32). Prior to Miles’s
deadline to respond to the motion, on August 14, 2024, Miles filed a motion to stay the
case (Doc. 34). He asked to stay all of his pending cases before the Court because he was
in segregation (Id.). On August 15, 2024, the Court denied Miles’s motion but granted him
an extension of time to respond to Dr. Myers’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 35).
The Court found that Miles failed to demonstrate that he was unable to file pleadings
while housed in segregation and also found that he was capable of responding to the
pending dispositive motion. The deadline to file a responsive pleading was reset for
October 1, 2024 (Doc. 35). As of this date, Miles has failed to file a response.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 2, 2023, Miles filed his Complaint alleging deliberate indifference
to his chest pain while housed at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (Doc. 1). Miles alleged
that on December 14, 2021, he was placed in the prison’s healthcare unit for a clogged
artery in his left leg after complaining about chest pain (Doc. 11). While housed in the
healthcare unit, he spoke to Dr. Percy Myers on numerous occasions and complained of
chest pain. But Dr. Myers would simply reply “one thing at a time.” He directed Miles to
submit a sick call request for his chest pain after he was released from the healthcare unit
(Id.). Miles alleged that at the time he filed his Complaint he still had chest pain and
received no care for his pain.
After a review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Miles was allowed
to proceed on the following count:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Dr.
Myers for failing to treat Miles’s chest pain.
(Doc. 11, p. 4).
Although Dr. Myers points to four grievances that are potentially relevant to
Miles’s claim, the Court finds only two of those grievances sought to grieve the claim in
the Complaint.
January 30, 2022 Grievance (#425-02-22):
On January 30, 2022, Miles submitted an emergency grievance about chest
pain that he had been experiencing since December 14, 2021 (Doc. 31-1,
p. 20). Miles noted that he was placed in the healthcare unit on that date for
a clogged artery in his left leg (Id.). While in the healthcare unit, he
experienced chest pain. Although he thought the chest pain would stop,
Miles noted that the pain never stopped. On January 6, 2022, Miles
submitted a sick call request about the chest pain (Id. at p. 21). On January
8, 2022, the healthcare unit found nothing wrong with him but provided
him with an aspirin prescription for three days (Id.). On January 11, 2022,
Miles received a call pass to see Dr. Myers on January 12, 2022. But on the
scheduled date, Dr. Myers refused to see Miles. At the time of his grievance,
Miles noted that he was still experiencing chest pain both day and night
(Id.).
On February 3, 2022, the Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”) received
Miles’s grievance and marked it as an emergency to be expedited through
the grievance officer (Id. at p. 20). Although Dr. Myers fails to attach the
grievance officer’s response to his motion, Miles attached the grievance and
response to his Complaint (Doc. 1, pp. 11-15). On March 10, 2022, the
grievance officer reviewed Miles’s grievance. The grievance officer noted
that the healthcare unit responded to the grievance and denied that Miles
complained of chest pain while in the infirmary (Id. at p. 13). Per the
Healthcare Unit Administrator (“HCUA”), Miles was in the healthcare unit
for issues with his leg and never mentioned to the doctor that he had chest
pain (Id.). The HCUA also denied that Miles had been to the nurse sick call
line related to his complaints but noted that he was on the cardiac clinic
calendar to be seen in March (Id.). The HCUA directed Miles to either
submit a nurse sick call request or inform security if he felt his pain was an
emergency (Id.). In light of the HCUA’s response, the grievance officer
denied the grievance (Id.). On March 11, 2022, the CAO concurred with the
findings (Id.).
On April 10, 2022, Miles marked the grievance for an appeal to the
Administrative Review Board (“ARB”). The ARB received the grievance
eight days later. The ARB noted that the grievance was for medical
treatment, noted the date of December 14, 2021, and noted that Dr. Myers
refused to see Miles for chest pain (Doc. 31-1, p. 19). The ARB returned the
grievance, finding that it was untimely (Id.). The ARB noted that Miles did
not meet the 30-day timeframe for appealing the grievance after the
concurrence by the CAO.
April 4, 2022 Grievance (#977-04-22)
On April 4, 2022, Miles submitted another grievance regarding his chest
pain. In this grievance, Miles alleged that on March 8, 2022, Dr. Myers
refused to provide medical care for his neck and chest pain (Doc. 31-1, p. 7).
Miles alleged that he had neck and chest pain daily, but Dr. Myers only
offered an EKG for his symptoms. Miles noted that he did not want an EKG
because he had already received one (Id.). Miles complained that Dr. Myers
did not know what he was doing, that he was incapable of providing
appropriate care, and he continued to deny Miles a referral to a neck and
chest specialist (Id. at pp. 7-8). Miles noted that he believed Dr. Myers was
retaliating against him because Miles refused the EKG test (Id. at p. 8). Miles
believed the test was a waste of time and noted that he had the right to
refuse a specific medical test, but he alleged Dr. Myers continued to retaliate
against him (Id.).
Miles complained that he previously had an issue with an artery and now
he was complaining of neck and chest pain, but Dr. Myers refused to do
anything about his pain despite his knowledge of Miles’s problems with his
arteries (Id.). Miles noted that on December 15, 2021, he told Dr. Myers
about his neck and chest pain, but Dr. Myers refused to give him any
medical care (Id.). He noted that from December 14, 2021, until January 5,
2022, he was in the healthcare unit and told Dr. Myers about the pain in his
chest. But Dr. Myers told him to focus on one condition at a time (Id.). Miles
asked a nurse how he could obtain care for his chest pain, and she told him
he would have to submit another sick call request once he was back in
general population (Id.). Miles noted that Dr. Myers would not provide him
with any care for his chest pain during Miles’s entire stay in the healthcare
unit (Id.).
Miles’s grievance was deemed an emergency by the CAO and reviewed by
the grievance officer. Per the HCUA’s response, Miles’s labs were normal,
and he was scheduled for the hypertension clinic. On April 5, 2022, he also
saw Dr. Myers, who instructed Miles on the importance of taking his blood
thinner medications in a consistent fashion (Id.). The response noted that
Dr. Myers did not believe that an outside referral was medically indicated,
but he did provide Miles with compression stockings for circulation (Id.).
The grievance was denied by the grievance officer. On April 15, 2022, the
CAO concurred with the decision.
Miles also appealed this grievance to the ARB. On May 10, 2022, the ARB
received the grievance. The ARB reviewed the grievance on the merits but
ultimately denied the grievance because Miles was receiving medical care
and specific treatments were at the discretion of the medical provider (Id.
at p. 5).
Although Dr. Myers identified two additional grievances in Miles’s grievance file,
the Court does not find those grievances relevant for the purpose of Miles’s claim. Miles’s
February 14, 2022 grievance (#590-02-22) alleged that Dr. Myers refused to provide Miles
with a lower bunk, lower deck permit for his clogged artery in his leg, despite his leg still
being swollen (Doc. 31-1, pp. 16-17). Although the grievance noted that Miles was
released from the healthcare unit on January 5, 2022, he only complained of his need for
permits for his leg (Id.). Miles’s February 16, 2022 grievance (#620-02-22) complained that
a nurse failed to refill his ant-fungal cream (Id. at pp. 11-12).
LEGAL STANDARDS
“Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures,
and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [the defendant] is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467
(7th Cir. 2010). Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). That statute states, in pertinent part,
that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
Id. The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.
Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]his circuit has taken a
strict compliance approach to exhaustion”). Exhaustion must occur before the suit is filed.
Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff cannot file suit and then
exhaust his administrative remedies while the suit is pending. Id. Moreover, “[t]o exhaust
remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the
prison administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.
2005). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to properly utilize a prison’s grievance process,
“the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner’s claim
can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.
Under Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-41(7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit held
that “debatable factual issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies” are not required to be decided by a jury but are to be determined by the judge.
Thus, where failure to exhaust administrative remedies is raised as an affirmative
defense, the Seventh Circuit set forth the following recommendations:
The sequence to be followed in a case in which exhaustion is contested is
therefore as follows: (1) The district judge conducts a hearing on exhaustion
and permits whatever discovery relating to exhaustion he deems
appropriate. (2) If the judge determines that the prisoner did not exhaust
his administrative remedies, the judge will then determine whether (a) the
plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and so he must
go back and exhaust; (b) or, although he has no unexhausted administrative
remedies, the failure to exhaust was innocent (as where prison officials
prevent a prisoner from exhausting his remedies), and so he must be given
another chance to exhaust (provided that there exist remedies that he will
be permitted by the prison authorities to exhaust, so that he’s not just being
given a runaround); or (c) the failure to exhaust was the prisoner’s fault, in
which event the case is over. (3) If and when the judge determines that the
prisoner has properly exhausted his administrative remedies, the case will
proceed to pretrial discovery, and if necessary a trial, on the merits; and if
there is a jury trial, the jury will make all necessary findings of fact without
being bound by (or even informed of) any of the findings made by the
district judge in determining that the prisoner had exhausted his
administrative remedies.
Id. at 742.
A. Illinois Exhaustion Requirements
As an IDOC inmate, Miles was required to follow the regulations contained in
IDOC’s Grievance Procedures for Offenders (“grievance procedures”) to properly
exhaust his claim. 20 Ill. Administrative Code §504.800 et seq. The grievance procedures
first require inmates to file their grievance with the counselor within 60 days of the
discovery of an incident. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.810(a). The grievance form must:
contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,
including what happened, when, where and the name of each person who
is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This
provision does not preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the
names of individuals are not known, but the offender must include as much
descriptive information about the individual as possible.
20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.810(c). Grievances that are unable to be resolved through
routine channels are then sent to the grievance officer. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.820(a).
The Grievance Officer will review the grievance and provide a written response to the
inmate. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.830(a). “The Grievance Officer shall consider the
grievance and report his or her findings and recommendations in writing to the Chief
Administrative Officer within two months after receipt of the grievance, when reasonably
feasible under the circumstances.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.830(e). “The Chief
Administrative Officer shall review the findings and recommendation and advise the
offender of his or her decision in writing.” Id.
If the inmate is not satisfied with the CAO’s response, he or she can file an appeal
with the Director through the ARB. The grievance procedures specifically state, “[i]f, after
receiving the response of the Chief Administrative Officer, the offender still believes that
the problem, complaint or grievance has not been resolved to his or her satisfaction, he
or she may appeal in writing to the Director. The appeal must be received by the
Administrative Review Board within 30 days after the date of the decision.” 20 Ill. Admin.
Code §504.850(a). The inmate shall attach copies of the Grievance Officer’s report and the
CAO’s decision to his appeal. Id. “The Administrative Review Board shall submit to the
Director a written report of its findings and recommendations.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code
§504.850(d). “The Director shall review the findings and recommendations of the Board
and make a final determination of the grievance within six months after receipt of the
appealed grievance, when reasonably feasible under the circumstances. The offender
shall be sent a copy of the Director’s decision.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(e).
The grievance procedures allow for an inmate to file an emergency grievance. In
order to file an emergency grievance, the inmate must forward the grievance directly to
the CAO who may “[determine] that there is a substantial risk of imminent personal
injury or other serious or irreparable harm to the offender” and thus the grievance should
be handled on an emergency basis. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.840(a). If the CAO
determines the grievance should be handled on an emergency basis, then the CAO “shall
expedite processing of the grievance and respond to the offender” indicating to him what
action shall be taken. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.840(b). If the CAO determines the
grievances “should not be handled on an emergency basis, the offender shall be notified
in writing that he or she may resubmit the grievance as non-emergent, in accordance with
the standard grievance process.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.840(c). When an inmate
appeals a grievance deemed by the CAO to be an emergency, “the Administrative Review
Board shall expedite processing of the grievance.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(f).
ANALYSIS
Miles was provided with notice of Dr. Myers’s summary judgment motion and
informed of the consequences of failing to respond to the motion (Doc. 32). Miles was
informed that his failure to respond would amount to an admission of the facts of Dr.
Myers’s motion (Doc. 32, p. 2). Prior to Miles’s deadline to file a response, he filed a
motion seeking a stay in several of his pending cases (Doc. 34). He noted that he was in
segregation and requested that all of his cases be put on “hold” (Id. at p. 2). The Court
denied Miles’s motion, finding that he failed to demonstrate that he was unable to
respond to the pending motion for summary judgment while in segregation (Doc. 35).
Miles’s deadline to file a response was extended to October 1, 2024. As of this date,
however, Miles has failed to file a response.
Pursuant to SDIL Local Rule 56.1(g) “all material facts…shall be deemed admitted
for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically disputed.” Because Miles failed to
respond to Dr. Myers’s statement of facts, the Court accepts Dr. Myers’s statement of facts
as true. Parra v. Neal, 614 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Cracco v. Vitran Exp. Inc., 559
F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003)).
The admission of the material facts, however, does not automatically grant Dr.
Myers’s motion for summary judgment; he must still demonstrate that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). And Dr.
Myers falls short of demonstrating that Miles failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies against him.
Dr. Myers makes much of the fact that Miles’s January 30, 2022 grievance does not
specifically mention Miles talking to Dr. Myers during Miles’s stint in the healthcare unit.
Dr. Myers’s parses out the portion of the grievance that mentions Dr. Myers, arguing that
Dr. Myers is only mentioned in Miles’s claim that he refused to see Miles in January after
his release from the healthcare unit (Doc. 31-1, p. 20). But Miles’s grievance does mention
his placement in the healthcare unit from December to January and notes that he had
chest pain. Although he did not specifically mention speaking to Dr. Myers while in the
healthcare unit, he did provide enough information to put grievance officials on notice
that he was complaining about Dr. Myers.
Exhaustion is not intended to provide individual notice to each prison official who
might later be sued; it is designed to provide the prison with notice of the problem and
give them an opportunity to fix it. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007)); Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).
As such, an inmate must provide enough information to serve the grievance’s function
of giving “prison officials a fair opportunity to address [an inmate’s] complaints.”
Maddox, 655 F.3d at 722. Although Dr. Myers argues that Miles failed to provide enough
information to put officials on notice that he was complaining about Dr. Myers’s
treatment during Miles’s stay in the healthcare unit, the grievance response clearly shows
that officials were aware of the nature of Miles’s complaint. The grievance officer’s
response (Doc. 1, p. 13) indicates that the grievance officer spoke to the HCUA, who
stated that Miles never “mentioned to the MD or nurse his chest hurt.” (Id.). Clearly, the
grievance official investigated whether Dr. Myers was aware of Miles’s chest pain during
his time in the healthcare unit. Further, the ARB’s return of grievance form notes that
Miles’s grievance was about his medical treatment on December 14, 2021, when he
entered the healthcare unit, and Dr. Myers’s refusal to treat his chest pain (Doc. 31-1,
p. 19). Although Miles did not specifically state that he complained to Dr. Myers while in
the healthcare unit, as he did in his Complaint, he provided enough information for
grievance officials to investigate whether Miles received care from Dr. Myers for his chest
pain during that time period. Thus, the grievance served its purpose in notifying officials
of Miles’s issues with Dr. Myers.1
Miles’s April 4, 2022 grievance also exhausted his claim against Dr. Myers. This
grievance specifically mentions Miles’s stay in the healthcare unit and his complaints to
Dr. Myers regarding his chest pain (Doc. 31-1, pp. 7-8). In fact, a portion of his grievance
tracks identically with Miles’s Complaint. His grievance alleges that he complained about
chest pain to Dr. Myers while in the healthcare unit for his clogged artery and Dr. Myers
kept telling him “one thing at a time” (Id. at p. 8). Although Dr. Myers argues that Miles
was merely providing “background for [his] true complaint” (Doc. 31, p. 7), arguing that
1 Miles’s January 30, 2022 grievance was returned to him by the ARB as untimely. The CAO signed
his concurrence on March 16, 2022 and Miles signed his appeal on April 10, 2022. The ARB
received the grievance on April 18, 2022 and rejected it as untimely. But Dr. Myers concedes that
the grievance could be considered timely (Doc. 31, p. 3 n. 3). He does not dispute that the
grievance was fully exhausted and only challenges whether the substance of the motion
exhausted Miles’s claim against him (Id.). The Court finds that the grievance did exhaust the claim
against Dr. Myers.
the nature of the grievance was only Dr. Myer’s conduct on March 8, 2022, there is simply
nothing in the record that supports this contention. Miles’s grievance clearly grieved Dr.
Myers’s treatment of Miles during his time in the healthcare unit. Dr. Myers also argues
that the grievance was untimely as to Miles’s claim for medical treatment in December
and January because it was submitted over 60 days after Miles’s stay in the healthcare
unit. But at no point in the grievance process did any grievance official reject the
grievance as untimely. “A procedural shortcoming like failing to follow the prison’s time
deadlines amount to a failure to exhaust only if prison administrators explicitly relied on
the shortcoming.” See Maddox, 655 F.3d at 722. Both the prison grievance officials and the
ARB ruled on the merits of Miles’s grievance. The grievance was never rejected on
procedural grounds. Thus, the grievance exhausted the possible claims against Dr.
Myers, including his treatment in December 2021.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Dr. Myers’s motion for summary judgment
(Docs. 30, 31) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 26, 2024 Tl
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge
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