Nichols v. Bumgarner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

PATRICK NICHOLS,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. BAH-23-0014

N. BUMGARNER,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Patrick Nichols filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Montgomery County Police Officer N. Bumgarner on January 3, 2023. ECF 1. After briefing by

both parties, this Court granted Bumgarner’s motion to dismiss without prejudice and afforded

Nichols an opportunity to file an amended complaint. ECF 25. Nichols filed his amended

complaint on April 15, 2024, ECF 26, and Bumgarner has again moved for dismissal, ECF 27.

Nichols opposed the motion, ECF 29, and Bumgarner replied, ECF 31. The issues have been fully

briefed. The Court has reviewed the pleadings and finds a hearing unnecessary. See Loc. R. 105.6

(D. Md. 2023). For the reasons stated below, Officer Bumgarner’s motion shall be granted and

Nichols’ amended complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

For context, the Court provided the following background information in its April 1, 2024,

memorandum opinion:

Nichols’ complaint alleges that on March 24, 2022, Officer Bumgarner

slammed him on the ground during an arrest which “fractur[ed his] arm and

crack[ed his] bones.” ECF 1, at 6. Nichols was taken to a hospital where x-rays

confirmed that his arm was fractured. Id. Additionally, he states that during the

arrest “another officer had his knee on” Nichols’ throat and he “couldn’t

[breathe] for a second.” Id. He seeks four million dollars in damages. Id. at 5, 7.

Nichols includes a one-page attachment which largely reiterates what is stated

in his complaint. He adds in the attachment that he “did not do nothing” to

Officer Bumgarner. Id. No additional detail is provided.

On October 17, 2023, Officer Bumgarner moved to dismiss the complaint.

ECF 14. Specifically, he argues that Nichols’ complaint should be dismissed

because it does not comply with the general rules of pleading, nor does it state a

viable claim. ECF 14-1, at 3. More specifically, Officer Bumgarner argues that

there are insufficient facts put forth by Nichols to demonstrate that Bumgarner’s

actions were “unlawful in the context of the events leading to his arrest, his

behavior, or the arrest itself, or that Officer Bumgarner’s action was in any way

unjustified.” Id. at 4. Further, Officer Bumgarner argues that, if Nichols’

complaint is construed to advance an excessive force claim, Nichols has failed

to demonstrate that any force exerted was excessive. Id. at 4–5. Finally, Officer

Bumgarner argues he is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 5–6.

Nichols reiterates in his opposition response that Officer Bumgarner

violated his constitutional rights during the arrest. ECF 19, at 2. He specifies that

he is raising a claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. Id. He

further states he does not believe Officer Bumgarner is entitled to qualified

immunity. Id. at 1. He does not provide any additional factual details regarding

the incident.

Officer Bumgarner replied, again maintaining that Nichols has failed to

provide a factual predicate to support his assertion that any force used by Officer

Bumgarner was unlawful. ECF 22. Thus, Officer Bumgarner reiterates that

Nicholas has not stated a claim, nor has he pled facts to show he is entitled to

relief. Id. Further, he argues that Nichols has failed to overcome Officer

Bumgarner’s qualified immunity. Id. As such, he asks that this Court dismiss

Nichols’ complaint with prejudice. Id. at 3.

ECF 24, at 1–3. The Court found that Nichols did not put forth sufficient factual information to

state a claim for excessive force because, in both his complaint and his opposition, he put forth

almost no detail, and instead appeared to suggest that his fractured arm alone demonstrated that

any force utilized by Officer Bumgarner was excessive. Id. at 5. Further, he provided no

information about the circumstances of the arrest, the severity of the alleged crime, his actions, or

any potential threat which existed to himself, the officers, or bystanders. Id. Without such

information, the Court found that Nichols had not provided sufficient facts to establish the

elements of his claim, and conclusory statements that the force used was excessive were

insufficient. Id. Further, Officer Bumgarner could not properly respond to the claim that any force

utilized was excessive, nor could the Court determine whether any force utilized by Officer

Bumgarner was reasonable in light of the circumstances at issue. Id. Thus, the complaint was

subject to dismissal.

However, although Officer Bumgarner requested dismissal with prejudice, the request was

denied, and Nichols was given an opportunity to amend the complaint in order to correct the

identified deficiencies. Id. Nichols filed his amended complaint on April 15, 2024. This time, he

states the following:

On 3/24/21 PO3 N. Bumgarner life was in no danger or harm. PO3 N.

Bumgarner had stop me because they said I had a [warrant] and doing [sic] the

arrest and search P.O.3 N. Bumgarner had slamme [sic] me on the grounds and

use force for no reason and P.O.3 Schmidt had put his knee on my throat and I

couldn’t [breathe] for a second. And when P.O.3 N. Bumgarner had [slam] me

on the ground and broke my arm and crack two bones in my arms P.O.3 N

Bumgarner and P.O.3 Schmidt was wrongful for damaging my arm and putting

his knee on my throat and I couldn’t [breathe] for a second my life was in danger.

ECF 26, at 4–5. Officer Bumgarner again moves to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that

Nichols has failed to cure the identified deficiencies in his prior pleading and has failed to state a

claim. ECF 27-1, at 2. He also argues he is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 5.

Nichols responded in opposition. ECF 29. He reiterates his belief that Bumgarner acted

“unlawfully” and “illegally.” Id. at 2. He also reiterates that his arm was broken. Id. He states

that he has video of the arrest but fails to describe what the video shows. Id. He urges the Court

to find that his “case is not meritless,” and argues that he has “sufficient facts showing that Officer

Bumgarner was wrong by law.” Id. No additional factual details are provided.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Officer Bumgarner moves to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice for failing to

state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the factual allegations

of a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). “To satisfy this standard, a

plaintiff need not ‘forecast’ evidence sufficient to prove the elements of the claim. However, the

complaint must allege sufficient facts to establish those elements.” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d

435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

In reviewing the motion, the Court accepts the well-pleaded allegations as true and

construes them in the light most favorable to Nichols. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “However,

conclusory statements or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

[suffice].’” EEOC v. Performance Food Grp., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 3d 584, 588 (D. Md. 2014)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above a speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “‘[N]aked assertions’ of wrongdoing

necessitate some ‘factual enhancement’ within the complaint to cross ‘the line between possibility

and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Although pro se pleadings are construed generously to allow for the development of a

potentially meritorious case, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980), courts cannot ignore a clear

failure to allege facts setting forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d

387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude’ with which a district court should view

such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate. Only those questions which

are squarely presented to a court may properly be addressed.”) (internal citation omitted)). “[A]

court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because

they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

III. DISCUSSION

Once again, Nichols appears to advance a claim that Officer Bumgarner utilized excessive

force against him during his arrest, as evidenced by his fractured arm. Claims of excessive force

during an arrest or investigatory stop are examined under the Fourth Amendment’s objective

reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–97 (1989); see also Cty. of Los

Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 429 (2017) (“The framework for analyzing excessive force

claims is set out in Graham.”). Reasonableness is assessed by weighing “the nature and quality

of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the

governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” Mendez, 581 U.S. at 427 (quoting

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). The operative question is “whether the totality of the

circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of search or seizure.” Id. at 427–28 (quoting Garner,

471 U.S. at 8–9). Factors to be included in making this determination include the severity of the

crime at issue, whether there is an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and

whether the subject is resisting arrest or attempting to flee. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The

determination is to be made “‘from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene’ . . . ‘based

upon the information the officers had when the conduct occurred.’” Mendez, 581 U.S. at 428 (first

quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397; then quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207 (2001)). The

Constitution “does not require police to gamble with their lives in the face of a serious threat of

harm.” Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 479 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d

640, 641 (4th Cir. 1996)). Further, “the right to make an arrest necessarily carries with it the right

to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396;

see also Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 869 (4th Cir. 1988).

Here, despite being notified of the deficiencies in his original complaint and given an

opportunity to amend, Nichols still does not put forth sufficient factual information to state a claim

for excessive force. His amended complaint adds virtually no additional facts to those provided

in the original complaint. See generally ECF 26. Specifically, he has provided no information

about the circumstances of the arrest, the severity of the alleged crime at issue, his actions, or any

potential threat which existed to himself, the officers, or bystanders. Id. His conclusory statements

that Officer Bumgarner’s “life was in no danger or harm” are not supported by any factual details.

Id. These unsupported allegations are insufficient. Although a complaint need not contain detailed

allegations, the facts alleged must put forth “more than labels and conclusions,” as “‘courts are not

bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Without any additional information

having been provided in the amended complaint, the Court finds that Nichols has not plead

sufficient facts to establish the elements of his claim. As such, his amended complaint must be

dismissed. This time, with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Officer Bumgarner’s motion to dismiss, ECF 27, is GRANTED,

and Nichols’ complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

A separate implementing order follows.

Date: November 26, 2024 /s/

BRENDAN A. HURSON

United States District Judge