The opinion
Filed 11/26/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B332945
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA093728)
v.
FAHIM ANTHONY MULTANI,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ricardo R. Ocampo, Judge. Affirmed.
Alan Siraco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David E. Madeo, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Fahim Anthony Multani appeals the trial court’s denial of
his petition for compassionate release under Penal Code
section 1172.2.1 The California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) indicated Multani has “a serious and
advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory” within the
meaning of section 1172.2, subdivision (b)(1) and recommended
that his sentence be recalled. Multani was diagnosed with stage
IV lung cancer in 2014, while he was awaiting trial. By 2017, the
cancer had metastasized to his brain. However, his cancer is
caused by a specific gene mutation and has been successfully
treated with targeted medication for the past seven years.
Medical notes indicated there was no evidence of disease
progression or active disease. Multani’s doctor described the
cancer as “perfectly suppressed.” The trial court therefore
concluded Multani’s illness does not currently have an end-of-life
trajectory.
Multani contends the trial court’s interpretation of “end-of-
life trajectory” was too narrow and the term should be
interpreted as encompassing any serious and advanced illness for
which death would be predictable and foreseeable if intervention
were withdrawn. Multani also contends the express language of
the statute covers his disease and renders him presumptively
eligible for compassionate release. We reject these arguments.
Because “end-of-life trajectory” indicates that the illness must, at
the very least, be progressing toward death, we conclude the trial
court did not err in finding that the facts presented failed to
support the petition for Multani’s release.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A detailed recitation of the facts underlying Multani’s
convictions is unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. In
summary, in September and October 2012, Multani repeatedly
punched, slapped, and kicked his then-girlfriend and cohabitant,
Jennifer P. He also struck her with a belt and a plank of wood,
choked her until she was almost unconscious, stabbed her with
broom bristles, and used a knife to threaten her. (People v.
Multani (Mar. 8, 2018, B270411) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2015, a jury found Multani guilty of one count of torture
(§ 206), one count of corporal injury to a fellow parent (§ 273.5,
subd. (a)), and two counts of battery against a fellow parent
(§ 243, subd. (e)(1)). He was sentenced to life in prison with the
possibility of parole.
Prior to his conviction, in 2014, Multani was diagnosed
with stage IV lung cancer. He tested positive for ALK gene
rearrangement. Doctors therefore prescribed ALK mutation-
treating drugs. Multani initially had an “excellent response” to
the first of these drugs. However, by February 2017, it appeared
the cancer had metastasized to his brain. In March 2017, his
consulting physician, Dr. John R. Wilkinson, placed Multani on a
new ALK mutation-treating medication, to which he responded
well.2 There was no new or recurrent tumor growth between
December 2017 and April 2018, and, in November 2018,
Dr. Wilkinson noted there was “no sign of disease, still has stage
2 Dr. Wilkinson later testified that the first drug Multani
received “doesn’t penetrate or spread well into the brain” and it
was common for it to be effective elsewhere but ineffective in the
brain, “which is why it is now used less often,” and why Multani’s
current treatment is now “the preferred option.”
3
IV cancer, however excellent response to suppressive
chemotherapy.” Between February 2019 and November 2021,
MRI and PET CT scans continued to show no evidence of disease
progression or active disease. In November 2021, Dr. Wilkinson
observed that Multani’s cancer “appears well controlled.”
Sometime after November 2021, it appears Multani was
released, but he was subsequently rearrested and returned to
prison.3 In March 2023, Multani informed Dr. Wilkinson that he
was pursuing compassionate release after new changes in the
law. Dr. Wilkinson indicated he would support the request, as
Multani “has widespread metastatic cancer which is not curable
and is on extremely expensive treatment which requires frequent
imaging studies. This would be more convenient and less
expensive out of the custody setting.” MRI imaging of Multani’s
brain from March 2023 indicated that Multani’s lung cancer
remained stable and there was no sign of any new or enhancing
lesions on his brain.
In June 2023, Dr. Joseph Bick, Director of Health Care
Services for CDCR, recommended that Multani’s prison
commitment and sentence be recalled under section 1172.2 in
light of his metastatic lung cancer. The recommendation stated
that the radiation and chemotherapy treatments Multani
received could not cure his cancer; Multani’s illness caused
weakness and problems with balance and cognition that required
use of a wheelchair; and physicians, including a cancer specialist,
had determined that he had a serious and advanced illness with
3 The record provides few details regarding Multani’s release
and reincarceration. However, medical notes indicated: “Patient
pursuing compassionate release a second time after being
released and then reincarcerated.”
4
an end-of-life trajectory. Multani also filed a recall and
resentencing brief.
In August 2023, the court held a hearing to obtain
additional information about Multani’s medical condition. The
court heard testimony from Dr. Wilkinson and Dr. Michele
Ditomas, a doctor who supports the CDCR compassionate release
process.
Dr. Wilkinson is a board-certified oncologist and
hematologist. He testified that he had been treating Multani
since July 2016. Multani’s specific gene mutation was “incredibly
important,” because “it means that the targeted molecular
treatment or special designed chemical will modify or shut down
the cancer cells for the time you are taking the medication. [¶] It
is not a curative treatment but rather a suppressive treatment
and for ALK positive tumors it can in some people be
extraordinarily effective.” Multani’s current treatment regimen
consists of a medication he takes twice a day, PET CT scans
every four to six months, and MRI scans of his brain every four
months.
According to Dr. Wilkinson, although individuals with
widespread lung cancer that is not due to a targeted gene
mutation have a prognosis of nine to 18 months, Multani had
been diagnosed with stage IV cancer nine years earlier and had
responded “extraordinarily well” to treatment. His latest PET
CT scan showed “no evidence of any measurable lung cancer.”
Dr. Wilkinson described Multani’s cancer as “perfectly
suppressed,” and “by no means in remission,” but “completely
suppressed.” Dr. Wilkinson could not definitively predict how
Multani would continue to respond to his current course of
treatment, but he opined that “the best expectation is people tend
5
to continue doing how they’ve done in the past.” He observed
that there were several additional courses of treatment that had
been developed during the past 10 years and which may be
options for Multani if the current course of treatment ceased to be
effective.
When asked whether he believed Multani had less than six
months to live, Dr. Wilkinson stated: “I’d have to say my
professional opinion would be in terms of the lifespan of the
average patient with lung cancer he’s done much better than the
other patients, but I can’t construe that at any moment if he may
feel significant progression and may not respond to future
treatment. [¶] I would be comfortable saying his average
survival would be less than 6 months with the understanding
that it easily could be much longer.” However, Dr. Wilkinson
stated that Multani was “responding optimally, perfectly to the
current treatment which again is suppressive as opposed to
curative.” Dr. Wilkinson supported compassionate release,
explaining Multani “has clearly widespread uncurable lung
cancer which is thankfully currently being suppressed by an
expensive medication, but he is unncurable [sic].”
Dr. Ditomas had not met Multani, but she reviewed his
medical records and spoke with people involved in his care. She
testified that Multani’s medication “is currently controlling his
cancer” but he is not cured and “it’s hard to say exactly how long
it’s going to be effective.” It was her understanding that if
Multani’s medication stopped working “or he develops intolerable
side effects,” Multani would have “less than 6 to 10 months” to
live. She also observed that there were potentially lethal effects
to his medication and that if he developed one of these side
effects, he would be unable to continue taking the medication.
6
In his closing argument, Multani’s attorney conceded that
he did not believe “there is any clear answer” as to whether
Multani’s disease was on an end-of-life trajectory and that the
trial court was in “uncharted waters.” However, he argued that
Multani satisfied the requirement for compassionate release
because “clearly his life is much shorter than it would have been.”
Counsel for the People argued that the petition was premature,
as Multani’s cancer was suppressed and he was doing well.
The trial court noted there was no appellate guidance on
the meaning of “end-of-life trajectory” under section 1172.2. It
found the undisputed evidence established that Multani’s illness
was uncurable, but also observed: “[E]nd of life trajectory doesn’t
mean uncurable illness because if it’s just mere uncurable illness
the Legislature would have written that for us to follow.” The
court also suggested that an illness that merely shortens life is
not what the Legislature intended. Multani’s condition had not
deteriorated in the past years and, although it was unclear from
the record how long his illness would remain suppressed,
Dr. Wilkinson’s testimony indicated that Multani’s long positive
response to his medication meant he would continue to have a
positive response. The court therefore concluded that Multani’s
illness was not in the stage intended by the Legislature and
denied the request for compassionate release. The court
indicated the decision was without prejudice to another petition
“should the medication stop working tomorrow, next month, next
year, in 5 years . . . .”
Multani timely appealed.
7
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Concluding Multani
is Not Presently Eligible for Compassionate Release
Under Section 1172.2
A. Section 1172.2 and applicable legal principles
Assembly Bill No. 960 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which took
effect January 1, 2023, added section 1172.2 to the Penal Code to
reorganize and amend the procedures for compassionate release
requests from CDCR. (Stats. 2022, ch. 744, § 3.) Under the
amended law, if the statewide chief medical executive, in
consultation with other clinical executives, determines that the
requirements of section 1172.2, subdivision (b), are satisfied,
CDCR must recommend to the court that the incarcerated
person’s sentence be recalled. (§ 1172.2, subd. (a).)
Subdivision (b) creates “a presumption favoring recall and
resentencing” if the court finds an incarcerated person satisfies
one of two medical criteria: “(1) The incarcerated person has a
serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory.
Examples include, but are not limited to, metastatic solid-tumor
cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ
disease, and advanced end-stage dementia” (id., subd. (b)(1)); or
“(2) The incarcerated person is permanently medically
incapacitated with a medical condition or functional impairment
that renders them permanently unable to complete basic
activities of daily living . . . .” (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
This presumption “may only be overcome if a court finds
the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,
as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1170.18, based on the
incarcerated person’s current physical and mental condition.”
(§ 1172.2, subd. (b).) “Section 1170.18 defines unreasonable risk
8
as ‘an unreasonable risk that the [defendant] will commit a new
violent felony within the meaning of clause (iv) of subparagraph
(C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of [s]ection 667.’ [Citation.]
These felonies are called super strikes and include such felonies
as ‘murder, attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder,
assault with a machine gun on a police officer . . . or any sexually
violent offenses or sexual offense committed against minors
under the age of 14.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 363, 369–370 (Gonzalez).)
Resolving the question presented in this appeal requires us
to interpret section 1172.2. We therefore “apply the well-
established rules of statutory construction and seek to
‘ “ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the
purpose of the law.” ’ [Citations.] As always, we begin with the
words of a statute and give these words their ordinary meaning.
[Citation.] If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous,
then we need go no further. [Citation.] If, however, the language
is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, then
we look to ‘extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be
achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public
policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the
statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.’ [Citation.]”
(Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2001) 25 Cal.4th
508, 519.) We review questions of statutory interpretation de
novo. (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 (Prunty).)
However, we review the trial court’s factual findings with respect
to section 1172.2 for substantial evidence. (People v. Lewis (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 401, 409 (Lewis) [trial court abuses its discretion
when factual findings critical to decision find no support in the
evidence]; see also People v. Torres (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 550,
9
555 [upholding trial court’s factual findings under prior
compassionate release law where supported by substantial
evidence].)
As a preliminary matter, Multani contends that a
recommendation from the statewide chief medical executive
based on a diagnosis of one of the diseases listed in
section 1172.2, subdivision (b)(1), creates a presumption favoring
recall and resentencing which can only be overcome by a trial
court’s finding that the incarcerated person poses an
unreasonable risk to public safety. However, section 1172.2,
subdivision (b), provides that the presumption in favor of recall
and resentencing arises only if the court finds the facts described
in subdivision (b)(1) or (2). Here, the trial court found the facts
insufficient to conclude the subdivision (b)(1) criteria were met.
B. End-of-life trajectory
Multani makes two central arguments on appeal. First,
Multani contends that section 1172.2, subdivision (b)(1), only
requires “an illness that has a fatal prognosis and death is
predicted and foreseeable if intervention is withdrawn due to the
incurable disease.” (Italics added.) Second, he argues the court
lacked the discretion to find that he did not satisfy the
requirements of subdivision (b)(1) because the statute includes
“metastatic solid-tumor cancer” as an example of a serious and
advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory, and it is
undisputed that Multani has non-small cell cancer of the lung
that metastasized to his brain.
Turning to Multani’s first argument, it appears the parties
do not dispute that “widespread metastatic incurable lung
cancer” is a “serious and advanced illness,” and we assume the
same. We focus our analysis on the meaning of “with an end-of-
10
life trajectory.” The statute does not define “trajectory.” The
word is commonly understood as the figurative and transferred
use of its meaning in physics: “[t]he path of any body moving
under the action of given forces . . . .” (Oxford English Dict.
Online (3d ed. 2024)
<https://www.oed.com/dictionary/trajectory_adj?tab=meaning_an
d_use#17904260> [as of Nov. 26, 2024], archived at
<https://perma.cc/MA55-YPJ8>; accord, Merriam-Webster’s
Unabridged Dict. (Online 2024) <https://unabridged.merriam-
webster.com/unabridged/trajectory> [as of Nov. 26, 2024],
archived at <https://perma.cc/4N2G-4ZLZ> [“a path, progression,
or line of development likened to a physical trajectory”].) Using
this plain meaning, the term the Legislature chose indicates that
section 1172.2, subdivision (b)(1), requires that the illness is
developing or moving the incarcerated person toward the end of
that person’s life.
Nothing in the plain language of the statute suggests the
Legislature intended the subdivision (b)(1) determination to be
based on what the trajectory of the illness would be if the
incarcerated person received no further medical treatment.
Neither subdivision (b)(1) nor any other part of section 1172.2
refers to treatment or medical intervention. If the Legislature
intended the compassionate release criteria to include serious
and advanced illnesses that progress to death only if left
untreated, it could have explicitly so stated. It did not.
Further, to the extent the plain meaning of “end-of-life
trajectory” is ambiguous, the legislative history does not
persuade us that the broader interpretation Multani advances is
consistent with the Legislature’s intent.
11
There were several versions of Assembly Bill No. 960 before
the final enactment. As originally proposed, the bill would have
amended the medical parole statute. When shifted to amend the
compassionate release provisions of the Penal Code instead, the
legislation proposed several changes that would, among other
things, codify specific timeframes for a decision on a
recommendation for release, authorize a facility’s chief medical
officer to determine whether an incarcerated person satisfies the
criteria for release instead of the CDCR Secretary, require CDCR
to recommend recall of a person’s sentence if that person
qualifies, and create the presumption favoring recall. (See Sen.
Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 960 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 16,
2022, pp. 4–5.) These modifications confirm that a legislative
purpose of Assembly Bill No. 960 was to make compassionate
release available to more incarcerated persons.
Most relevant here were the changes to the first set of
criteria for eligibility for release. An early proposal would have
replaced the then-existing requirement that the incarcerated
person be “terminally ill with an incurable condition caused by an
illness or disease that would produce death within 12 months”
with the requirement that the person have “an incurable disease
or medical condition with an end-of-life trajectory.” (Sen. Amend.
to Assem. Bill No. 960 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May
27, 2022, p. 10.) A subsequent amendment replaced “an
incurable disease or medical condition” with “a serious and
advanced illness,” and added the four specific examples. (Sen.
Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 960 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as
amended Aug. 16, 2022, pp. 2, 16.) A description of this version
of the bill in one Assembly Floor analysis noted that the new
12
“standard is more in alignment with federal compassionate
release guidelines where ‘[a] specific prognosis of life expectancy
(i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) is not
required.’ [Citation.] Instead, a defendant need only show that
they are ‘suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and
advanced illness with an end of life trajectory).’ [Citation.]”
(Assem. Conc. Sen. Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 960 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 16, 2022, p. 2.) And, indeed, the
language and examples in section 1172.2, subdivision (b)(1), are
identical to portions of the federal sentencing guidelines
regarding federal compassionate release.4 These changes, too,
suggest a legislative intent to broaden the eligibility criteria for
compassionate release and make it available to more incarcerated
persons.
4 Under federal law, a court may reduce a term of
imprisonment if it finds “extraordinary and compelling reasons
warrant such a reduction,” after considering specified additional
factors, and when the reduction is “consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
(18 U.S.C. §§ 3582(c)(1)(A), 3553(a).) Section 1B1.13(b)(1)(A) of
the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual
provides that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist when
“[t]he defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious
and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory). A specific
prognosis of life expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a
specific time period) is not required. Examples include
metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
(ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia.” (U.S.
Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (Nov. 2024) p. 48
<https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-
manual/2024/GLMFull.pdf> [as of Nov. 26, 2024], archived at
<https://perma.cc/SVQ4-7TZW>.)
13
Yet, while “terminally ill,” “incurable disease,” and “serious
and advanced illness” may all convey somewhat different
meanings, the progression of proposed amendments does not
suggest that the replacement of a specific time-defined prognosis
with “end-of-life trajectory” was intended to extend
compassionate release to those suffering from illnesses with an
end-of-life trajectory only if treatment is withdrawn.
Multani relies on a Senate Committee on Public Safety
analysis which included the statement of the author of the bill.
The author’s statement indicated the bill was necessary because
prior law governing compassionate release was “too narrow and
the process too cumbersome for a population that poses the
lowest risk to public safety. As a result, very few people are
granted relief and, consequently, many die while awaiting a
referral to the court.” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 960 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 27,
2022, p. 5.) This resulted in the State “spending more money to
cover costly health care services for a population that is nearing
death or requiring thoughtful medical attention.” (Ibid.; Assem.
Conc. Sen. Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 960, supra, as amended
Aug. 16, 2022, p. 3.) Multani contends this demonstrates the bill
was intended to also extend compassionate release eligibility to
incarcerated persons based on the consideration that their
illnesses, like Multani’s, are expensive to treat.
Initially, we note that the statement Multani relies on,
while presented to and presumably considered by the Legislature
as a whole, reflected the view of only one legislator. It is
therefore not an indication that “ ‘those who supported his
proposal shared his view of its compass.’ [Citation.]” (California
Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28
14
Cal.3d 692, 700; People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 394
[California Supreme Court has frequently observed that “the
expressions of individual legislators generally are an improper
basis upon which to discern the intent of the entire
Legislature.”].)5
We acknowledge, however, that saving on health care costs
in prisons was a legislative purpose of the statute enacting the
original compassionate release provisions in 1997, and of a 2007
amendment that extended eligibility to medically incapacitated
prisoners. (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1160
[“[m]otivated in part by the Legislature’s desire to save the prison
system money,” former section 1170, subdivision (e), set forth
procedures for Secretary of CDCR or Board of Parole Hearings to
recommend sentence recall].) In Martinez v. Board of Parole
Hearings (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 578, the court detailed the
legislative history of the 1997 law, noting the purpose of
Assembly Bill No. 29 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.), “was not just
compassion; it was to save the state money.” (Martinez, at
p. 590.) Relevant legislative reports detailed the costs of
incarcerating terminally ill prisoners, the effect on the CDCR
budget, and the anticipated cost savings should the
5 Multani also cites portions of a legislative report that
appeared to quote or paraphrase the statement of a criminal
justice advocacy organization in support of the bill. As with the
statements of individual legislators, we cannot presume that the
entire Legislature agreed with this statement. Nor does the
portion Multani cites—that “ ‘California’s prisons were not
designed to serve as hospice centers and nursing homes’ ”—
clearly support his argument that the statute was amended to
include illnesses that would only have an end-of-life trajectory if
treatment is withdrawn.
15
compassionate release law go into effect. (Id. at pp. 590–591.)
The court further described the legislative history of the 2007 bill
amending the law, Assembly Bill No. 1539 (2007–2008 Reg.
Sess.), referred to in at least one legislative analysis as the
“ ‘Medical Release and Fiscal Savings Bill,’ ” again explaining
that the history “reflects that the purpose of the provision is not
just compassion; it is to save the state money.” (Id. at p. 591.)
The legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 960 does not so
emphatically indicate that a predominant purpose of eliminating
a specific prognosis of life expectancy and aligning the eligibility
criteria with federal guidelines was to increase fiscal savings.
But even assuming cost-savings was one purpose of the bill,
nothing in the legislative history indicates that the fiscal
rationale was at any point disconnected from the concept that the
release provisions would apply to incarcerated persons who are
currently approaching death or are severely incapacitated, and
are therefore less likely to pose a safety risk to the public. (See,
e.g., Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 370 [“Section 1172.2
thus presumes a terminally ill inmate is a low risk to be released
from custody because of their diagnosis, even if not fully
rehabilitated.”].)
Multani contends the end-of-life-trajectory qualification, in
replacing the former “less-than-a-year-to-live standard,” “conveys
that the ‘serious and advanced’ illness is in a final stage, and that
the disease will kill the incarcerated person expeditiously if
intervention fails or is withdrawn.” Yet, under the former
standard, the required prognosis was not that the person had less
than 12 months to live if treatment was withdrawn. Neither the
legislative history nor the text of the statute suggests that in
eliminating the specific time-estimated end-of-life requirement,
16
the Legislature intended to not only make individuals eligible if
they are in the final stages of an illness but might be expected to
live more than 12 months, but also to include those who are not
actively progressing toward death due to their illness if they
continue to receive available medical treatment.
C. Metastatic solid-tumor cancer
We further disagree that the trial court was required to
find Multani met the section 1172.2, subdivision (b)(1) criteria
because the Legislature has already determined that any form of
“metastatic solid-tumor cancer” is “a serious and advanced illness
with an end-of-life trajectory.” Essentially, Multani contends
that once it was established that he has a metastatic solid-tumor
cancer, the trial court had no legal basis to further evaluate
whether his particular illness currently has an end-of-life
trajectory.
If we considered the first part of subdivision (b)(1)—ending
with the term “metastatic solid-tumor cancer”—in isolation, we
might agree with Multani’s argument. Subdivision (b)(1)
identifies “metastatic solid-tumor cancer” as an example of an
eligible condition, without any express qualification. Yet, “[w]e
must also construe the words of the statute in context and give
meaning to every word and phrase.” (People v. Molina (2004) 120
Cal.App.4th 507, 514 (Molina).) In the unusual, but possible,
circumstance that an incarcerated person has metastatic solid-
tumor cancer that is effectively treatable, Multani’s
interpretation of the statute would render it necessary to ignore
the subdivision’s requirement that the condition be one with an
“end-of-life trajectory.” In contrast, reading “metastatic solid-
tumor cancer” as including only those forms of the disease that
17
have an end-of-life trajectory allows meaning and effect to be
given to both terms.
Two additional canons of statutory interpretation are
relevant. “ ‘Noscitur a sociis (“it is known by its associates”) is
the principle that “ ‘ “the meaning of a word may be enlarged or
restrained by reference to the object of the whole clause in which
it is used.” ’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] In other words, ‘a word
takes meaning from the company it keeps.’ [Citation.] ‘ “In
accordance with this principle of construction, a court will adopt a
restrictive meaning of a listed item if acceptance of a more
expansive meaning would make other items in the list
unnecessary or redundant, or would otherwise make the item
markedly dissimilar to the other items in the list.” [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (Kaatz v. City of Seaside (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 13,
40.) The canon of ejusdem generis “explains that, when a
particular class of things modifies general words, those general
words are construed as applying only to things of the same
nature or class as those enumerated.” (People v. Arias (2008) 45
Cal.4th 169, 180.) “[W]hen a statute contains a list or catalogue
of items, a court should determine the meaning of each by
reference to the others, giving preference to an interpretation
that uniformly treats items similar in nature and scope.” (Moore
v. California State Bd. of Accountancy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 999,
1011–1012.)
Here, the statute provides a non-exclusive list of examples
of serious and advanced illnesses with an end-of-life trajectory.
In addition to metastatic solid-tumor cancer, the examples are
ALS, end-stage organ disease, and advanced end-stage dementia.
Without qualification, the terms organ disease and dementia
might encompass conditions with a wide range of prognoses and
18
levels of impairment. However, the addition of “end-stage” and
“advanced end-stage,” limits eligibility to those forms of the
diseases that remain in the broader category of “serious and
advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory.” We note that in
adopting language from the federal guidelines, the Legislature
added “end-stage” to the example of “advanced dementia,”
further highlighting that the condition presently must have an
end-of-life trajectory.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ALS as “[a] rare
degenerative motor neurone disease which results in progressive
muscular atrophy, [usually] beginning in the hands, and
spasticity in the limbs.” (Oxford English Dict. Online (3d ed.
2024) <https://www.oed.com/dictionary/amyotrophic-lateral-
sclerosis_n?tab=meaning_and_use> [as of Nov. 26, 2024],
archived at <https://perma.cc/ZU5D-VRPK>.) Similarly,
Stedman’s Medical Dictionary defines ALS as “a fatal
degenerative disease involving the corticobulbar, corticospinal,
and spinal motor neurons, manifested by progressive weakness
and wasting of muscles innervated by the affected neurons;
fasciculations and cramps commonly occur. The disorder is 90–
95% sporadic in nature (although a number of cases are
inherited . . .), affects adults (typically, older adults), and usually
is fatal within 2–5 years of onset.” (Stedman’s Medical Dict.
(online ed. 2014).) By definition alone, ALS is typically an illness
with an end-of-life trajectory: it is progressive, degenerative, and
usually fatal.
An interpretation of “metastatic solid-tumor cancer” that
treats all of the listed conditions in section 1172.2,
subdivision (b)(1), similarly would thus incorporate the
restriction that the cancer be progressing inexorably toward
19
death, or, in other words, currently on an end-of-life trajectory.
(See 290 Division (EAT), LLC v. City and County of San
Francisco (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 439, 457–458 [despite plain
meaning of phrase, construing it consistent with other examples
in the statute implied a specifically limited meaning]; see also
Prunty, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 73 [concluding that use of “group”
in statute in conjunction with “organization” and “association”
suggested a meaning no broader than those terms; supporting
this conclusion by reference to noscitur a sociis canon]; Wendz v.
California Dept. of Education (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 607, 651–652
[applying noscitur a sociis principle to narrowly construe
“empirical” as referring to a specific type of research study].)
We must also “construe the statute in light of the
legislative purpose.” (Molina, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 514.)
We can discern no legislative purpose for limiting compassionate
release to individuals suffering from an illness with an “end-of-
life trajectory,” only to define that term to encompass conditions
that have been successfully treated and whose progression has
been halted indefinitely. Further, as explained above, even if
reducing health care spending in prisons was one purpose of
Assembly Bill No. 960, there is no indication that the Legislature
intended cost-savings to be an independent factor in the
determination of which incarcerated persons would be eligible for
compassionate release. Had that been the Legislature’s intent, it
could have said so expressly, or provided examples of other
conditions that are expensive to treat but, with treatment, do not
have an end-of-life trajectory. Construing the reference to
metastatic solid-tumor cancers as including only those that
currently have an end-of-life trajectory is consistent with the
clear legislative purpose of allowing individuals who are
20
medically incapacitated or dying to spend their remaining time
outside of the carceral system.
D. Substantial evidence supported the trial court
ruling
With the understanding that “end-of-life trajectory”
requires, at a minimum, an illness that is progressing toward
death at the time the petition is filed, and that the trial court
properly considered whether Multani’s metastatic solid-tumor
cancer currently has an end-of-life trajectory, we conclude
substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the
facts CDCR and Multani presented were insufficient to satisfy
section 1172.2, subdivision (b)(1).
Although Multani’s cancer is incurable, there is no
indication in the record that his illness has progressed since he
started his current course of treatment in 2017. Dr. Wilkinson
described it as “perfectly suppressed.” Medical records reported
no evidence of “disease progression” or “active disease.” We do
not discount that Multani’s condition could deteriorate if his
current treatment ceases to work and other treatment options
now available prove ineffective, or if he begins to suffer adverse
side effects from his current or future methods of treatment.
However, at the time of the hearing, these were mere
possibilities. When asked how Multani might be expected to
respond to his treatment in the future, Dr. Wilkinson testified
that “the best expectation is people tend to continue doing how
they’ve done in the past.” The expectation set by the past seven
years is that Multani will continue to respond well to treatment
and his cancer, though incurable, will remain suppressed. That
an illness that is neither progressing nor detectable in active
form on medical scans will likely shorten an incarcerated person’s
21
overall life expectancy does not indicate the illness currently has
an end-of-life trajectory, as the statute requires.
Multani contends that the few published decisions
interpreting section 1172.2 support the conclusion that his illness
has an “end-of-life trajectory.” However, as he concedes, it was
undisputed that the incarcerated persons in those decisions were
medically incapacitated or terminally ill under section 1172.2,
subdivision (b)(1) or (2). In each, the incarcerated person had a
life expectancy of one year or less, including with treatment. (See
Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 367 [“defendant was
diagnosed with metastatic rectal cancer ‘with a clear end of life
trajectory and one year expected survival’ ”]; Lewis, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at pp. 404, 405 [incarcerated person “was diagnosed
with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), which was rapidly
progressing” and “had a life expectancy of less than six months”];
Nijmeddin v. Superior Court (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 77, 80
[incarcerated person had “advanced incurable pancreatic cancer,
biliary adenocarcinoma, and other comorbid medical conditions”
with “a life expectancy of less than one year, even with
chemotherapy treatment, which he has decided to forgo”].)
Multani contends his circumstances are comparable because
“Dr. Wilkinson estimated Mr. Multani will have less than six
months to live once the effectiveness of his [current treatment]
begins to fail or it is discontinued due to increasingly problematic
side effects.” However, as discussed, neither circumstance had
come to pass at the time of the hearing. Multani is plainly
differently situated from the defendants in the cases on which he
relies.
22
Nothing in the trial court’s ruling, or in this opinion,
forecloses the possibility that Multani may obtain compassionate
release in the future if his circumstances change.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition is affirmed.
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
23