Opinion

Junius J. Joyner, III v. Carrol A. Weimer, Jr.

Court
District Court, C.D. California
Filed
Nov 25, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.1%

“The policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.”

How later courts described this case

  • “The policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.”
  • “Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”
  • “[A]bsent a waiver by the state or a valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a state in federal court.”
  • holding that Virginia Attorney General was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and the exception announced in Ex parte Young did not apply

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-10021-JFW-AJR Date: November 25, 2024

Page 1 of 10

Title: Junius J. Joyner, III v. Carrol A. Weimer, Jr., et al.

DOCKET ENTRY: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS ACTION SHOULD

NOT BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OR

TRANSFERRED TO THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

PRESENT:

HONORABLE A. JOEL RICHLIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

_Claudia Garcia-Marquez_ _______None_______ __None__

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter/Recorder Tape No.

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR

PLAINTIFF: DEFENDANT:

None Present None Present

PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS)

On November 17, 2024, pro se Plaintiff Junius J. Joyner, III (“Plaintiff”), filed a

Complaint alleging violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the

“Complaint”) against: (1) Carrol A. Weimer, Jr., individually and in his official capacity

as a Prince William County Circuit Court Judge; (2) Clifford Lynwood Athey, Jr.,

individually and in his official capacity as a Court of Appeals of Virginia Judge; (3)

Richard Y. Atlee, Jr., individually and in his official capacity as a Court of Appeals of

Virginia Judge; (4) Randolph Beales, individually and in his official capacity as a Court of

Appeals of Virginia Judge; (5) Dominique Callins, individually and in her official capacity

as a Court of Appeals of Virginia Judge; (6) Doris Henderson Causey, individually and in

her official capacity as a Court of Appeals of Virginia Judge; (7) Vernida Chaney,

individually and in her official capacity as a Court of Appeals of Virginia Judge; (8) Marla

Graff Decker, individually and in her official capacity as a Court of Appeals of Virginia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-10021-JFW-AJR Date: November 25, 2024

Page 2 of 10

Title: Junius J. Joyner, III v. Carrol A. Weimer, Jr., et al.

Judge; (9) Frank Friedman, individually and in his official capacity as a Court of Appeals

of Virginia Judge; (10) Steven C. Frucci, individually and in his official capacity as a

Court of Appeals of Virginia Judge; (11) Junius P. Fulton, III, individually and in his

official capacity as a Court of Appeals of Virginia Judge; (12) Glen Huff, individually and

in his official capacity as a Court of Appeals of Virginia Judge; (13) Lisa Lorish,

individually and in her official capacity as a Court of Appeals of Virginia Judge; (14)

Mary B. Malveaux, individually and in her official capacity as a Court of Appeals of

Virginia Judge; (15) Mary Grace O’Brien, individually and in her official capacity as a

Court of Appeals of Virginia Judge; (16) Daniel E. Ortiz, individually and in his official

capacity as a Court of Appeals of Virginia Judge; (17) Stuart Raphael, individually and in

his official capacity as a Court of Appeals of Virginia Judge; (18) Kimberley Slayton

Shite, individually and in her official capacity as a Court of Appeals of Virginia Judge;

(19) James Williams, individually and in his official capacity as Virginia Department of

Social Services Commissioner; (20) Craig Burshem, individually and in his official

capacity as Virginia Department of Social Services Deputy Commissioner for State

Programs; and (21) Thomas Stanford, individually and in his official capacity as Office of

the Attorney General for the State of Virginia, Deputy Attorney General of the Civil

Division (collectively, the “Defendants”). (Dkt. 1 at 1-7.)

The allegations in the Complaint stem from a child custody dispute. (Id. at 7-8.)

As alleged in the Complaint, the Prince William County Circuit Court of Virginia

conducted a trial on November 8, 2021 to consider modifying a child custody agreement

between Plaintiff and his ex-wife, Emily Redman. (Id. at 7.) Judge Weimer ultimately

issued an order awarding sole custody of Plaintiff’s children to Ms. Redman. (Id. at 8.)

Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order to the Virginia Court of Appeals. (Id.) After a

dismissal and then reinstatement by the Supreme Court of Virginia, Plaintiff’s appeal is

currently still pending before the Virginia Court of Appeals. (Id. at 8-9.)

On May 25, 2022, Judge Weimer conducted a child custody modification hearing.

(Id. at 9.) Plaintiff alleges that Judge Weimer grossly overstated Plaintiff’s income in the

ultimate finding modifying Plaintiff’s child support obligation. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that

on January 12, 2023, he received an email from the Commonwealth of Virginia

Department of Social Services Division of Child Support Enforcement informing him that

he was $22,000 in arrears on his child support obligations. (Id.) On January 8, 2024,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-10021-JFW-AJR Date: November 25, 2024

Page 3 of 10

Title: Junius J. Joyner, III v. Carrol A. Weimer, Jr., et al.

Plaintiff sent Office of the Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Thomas Sanford

an email seeking to resolve the allegedly egregious errors in the child custody support

obligation imposed by Judge Weimer. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff alleges that as of today, he has

not received any response to this email. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that on October 14,

2024, he filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the Supreme Court of Virginia seeking

an order directing Judge Weimer to adjust the child support obligation. (Id. at 12.)

Plaintiff does not appear to have received a ruling on his Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

(Id. at 13.)

Plaintiff alleges that he has registered to take the California Bar Exam on February

25, 2025, but that the Committee of Bar Examiners and the State Bar of California

prohibit anyone with outstanding child support obligations from sitting for the exam. (Id.

at 12.) Plaintiff alleges that he has been contacted by several legal recruiters for senior

counsel positions with prestigious law firms located in California, but that the recruiters

are unable to move forward with the positions until Plaintiff is licensed as an attorney in

the State of California. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that relief from this Court is necessary

because he does not have a reasonable expectation that he will receive a fair and unbiased

review of his claims in the pending proceedings in Virginia. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff seeks

injunctive relief, declaratory relief, compensatory damages, non-compensatory damages,

and punitive damages. (Id. at 21.)

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff previously filed a lawsuit in

the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Case No. CV 22-725-PTG-

JFA, against the following defendants: (1) the Prince William County Circuit Court; (2)

Judge Weimer; (3) Angela Horan, a Prince William County Circuit Court Judge who

presided over certain custody matters related to Plaintiff’s children; and (4) Kimberly A.

Irving, Chief Judge of the Prince William County Circuit Court who also presided over

certain custody matters related to Plaintiff’s children.1 In this prior lawsuit, Plaintiff

alleged violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on various

court rulings related to child custody matters. (Dkt. 1 at 24-28, E.D. Va. Case No. CV 22-

725-PTG-JFA.) The prior action was ultimately dismissed and the district court’s

1 This Court “may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record.”

Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-10021-JFW-AJR Date: November 25, 2024

Page 4 of 10

Title: Junius J. Joyner, III v. Carrol A. Weimer, Jr., et al.

judgment was affirmed on appeal by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Dkts. 56, 65,

75, 76, 77, E.D. Va. Case No. CV 22-725-PTG-JFA.) As relevant to the instant lawsuit,

the Eastern District of Virginia held that the Prince William County Circuit Court was

entitled to sovereign immunity and all judicial defendants were entitled to judicial

immunity, and therefore dismissed all claims against these defendants with prejudice.

(Dkt. 50, E.D. Va. Case No. CV 22-725-PTG-JFA.) The Eastern District of Virginia also

found that Plaintiff had filed multiple vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits against

Ms. Redman, and therefore imposed a pre-filing injunction against Plaintiff for any new

action against Ms. Redman arising out of or relating to their family court matters in Prince

William County Circuit Court. (Dkt. 65, E.D. Va. Case No. CV 22-725-PTG-JFA.)

“Federal courts are always under an independent obligation to examine their own

jurisdiction, and a federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no

jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An initial review of the Complaint strongly

suggests that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the action and the Defendants for the reasons

outlined below.

I. DISCUSSION

A. The Entire Action Is Subject To Dismissal Based on Younger

Abstention.

Plaintiff unequivocally asks this Court to interfere with ongoing state proceedings

in the State of Virginia. (Dkt. 1 at 13.) Indeed, Plaintiff specifically alleges that relief

from this Court is necessary because he cannot reasonably expect to receive fair and

unbiased treatment from the ongoing proceeding in Virginia. (Id.) As set forth above,

Plaintiff has several ongoing appeals and other challenges to the child support and custody

orders issued by the Prince William County Circuit Court. (Id. at 8-9, 12-13.)

However, a federal court will not intervene in a pending state proceeding absent

extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable harm is both great and

immediate. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1971); World Famous Drinking

Emporium, Inc. v. Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1987) (“In Younger v. Harris,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-10021-JFW-AJR Date: November 25, 2024

Page 5 of 10

Title: Junius J. Joyner, III v. Carrol A. Weimer, Jr., et al.

the Supreme Court held that federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal

proceedings except under extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss

is both great and immediate.”); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar.

Ass’n., 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (“The policies underlying Younger are fully applicable

to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.”).

Younger abstention is required in favor of a state proceeding if three criteria are met: (1)

the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests;

and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to litigate the plaintiff’s

federal constitutional claims. Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432; accord

Commc’ns Telesystems Int’l v. Cal. Pub. Util., 196 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, the proceedings before the Virginia courts are ongoing. (Dkt. 1 at 8-9, 12-

13.) Further, the proceedings implicate important state interests. See Gordon v. Koppel,

203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding important state interests were implicated,

and Younger abstention appropriate, where child custody proceedings were ongoing).

Finally, Plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to present his federal constitutional claims in

the state proceedings, including by appealing the orders of the Prince William County

Circuit Court, which he has done. (Dkt. 1 at 8-9, 12-13.) Accordingly, it appears that this

Court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.

B. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Various Judges Are Subject To Dismissal

Based On Judicial Immunity.

As set forth above, the Eastern District of Virginia has already issued a final order

determining that Judge Weimer is entitled to judicial immunity and therefore all claims

against Judge Weimer were dismissed with prejudice. (Dkt. 50, E.D. Va. Case No. CV

22-725-PTG-JFA.) Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Weimer in the Complaint are

barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See, e.g., Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan,

Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713-14 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion,

bars litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were raised or could have been

raised in the prior action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Regardless, this Court

agrees that the judicial defendants named in the Complaint are likely entitled to judicial

immunity. Indeed, judges are immune from civil suit for actions taken in their judicial

capacity, unless “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-10021-JFW-AJR Date: November 25, 2024

Page 6 of 10

Title: Junius J. Joyner, III v. Carrol A. Weimer, Jr., et al.

U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Plaintiff’s claims in the Complaint are very clearly based on the

actions of various judicial defendants taken in their role as judges. (Dkt. 1 at 4-12.) Thus,

all of the judicial defendants appear to be entitled to judicial immunity.

C. Plaintiff’s Official Capacity Claims For Monetary Damages Against

Virginia State Government Officials Are Barred By The Eleventh

Amendment.

In addition to the many defendants who are judges of the State of Virginia, Plaintiff

also names as defendants James Williams, individually and in his official capacity as

Virginia Department of Social Services Commissioner, Craig Burshem, individually and

in his official capacity as Virginia Department of Social Services Deputy Commissioner

for State Programs, and Thomas Stanford, individually and in his official capacity as

Office of the Attorney General for the State of Virginia, Deputy Attorney General of the

Civil Division. (Dkt. 1 at 3-7.) However, Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against

these state government officials in their official capacity appear to be barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution sets out the

principle of state sovereign immunity, providing as follows:

“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to

any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United

States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign

State.”

U.S. Const. amend. XI.

In other words, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing

suits brought against an unconsenting state.” Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co-

op., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 160 (1985)

(“[A]bsent a waiver by the state or a valid congressional override, the Eleventh

Amendment bars a damages action against a state in federal court.”). “[A] suit against a

state official in his or her official capacity . . . is no different from a suit against the State

itself.” Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991) (“State officers sued for damages

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-10021-JFW-AJR Date: November 25, 2024

Page 7 of 10

Title: Junius J. Joyner, III v. Carrol A. Weimer, Jr., et al.

in their official capacity are not ‘persons’ for purposes of the suit because they assume the

identity of the government that employs them.”). State agencies such as the Virginia

Department of Social Services and the Office of the Attorney General of the State of

Virginia are state agencies entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Bockes

v. Fields, 999 F.2d 788, 790-91 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that a Virginia county

Department of Social Services is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); McBurney

v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 402 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that Virginia Attorney General

was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and the exception announced in Ex

parte Young did not apply). Thus, it appears that Plaintiff’s official capacity claims

seeking monetary damages against Commissioner Williams, Deputy Commissioner

Burshem, and Deputy Attorney General Stanford are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

D. Plaintiff’s Individual Capacity Claims Against Virginia State

Government Officials Are Subject To Dismissal For Failure To State A

Claim.

To establish a civil rights violation, a plaintiff must show either the defendant’s

direct, personal participation in the constitutional violation, or some sufficient causal

connection between the defendant’s conduct and the alleged violation. See Starr v. Baca,

652 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, Plaintiff has failed to make any specific

allegation concerning the role of Commissioner Williams, Deputy Commissioner

Burshem, and Deputy Attorney General Stanford. To the contrary, with regard to the

Virginia Department of Social Services, the Complaint generally alleges that the denial of

Plaintiff’s administrative appeal violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and that the

“Social Services Defendants[’] malicious, willful, and artful delay terminating [Plaintiff’s]

request to remand to the Circuit Court violate[d] [Plaintiff’s] substantive due process

rights.” (Dkt. 1 at 18.)

With regard to the Office of the Attorney General, the Complaint merely alleges

that Plaintiff sent Deputy Attorney General Stanford an email on January 8, 2024, but that

Plaintiff has not received a response to the email. (Id. at 11.) The Complaint contains a

claim against Deputy Attorney General Stanford for conspiracy based on the allegation

that his failure to respond to the email “show[s] circumstantial evidence of an implied

agreement to deprive [Plaintiff] of 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution due

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-10021-JFW-AJR Date: November 25, 2024

Page 8 of 10

Title: Junius J. Joyner, III v. Carrol A. Weimer, Jr., et al.

process protections.” (Id. at 20.) However, the mere fact that Deputy Attorney General

Stanford did not respond to a single unsolicited email cannot plausibly support the

inference that he has agreed to participate in a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his

constitutional rights. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.

2001) (“Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory,

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”); Denton v. Hernandez, 504

U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (“[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts

alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are

judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

individual capacity claims against Commissioner Williams, Deputy Commissioner

Burshem, and Deputy Attorney General Stanford are subject to dismissal for failure to

state a claim.

E. This Court Also Notes That It Does Not Appear To Have Personal

Jurisdiction Over Defendants.

“In most circumstances, a defect in personal jurisdiction is a defense that may be

asserted or waived by a party.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, the

Court will not sua sponte dismiss the action based on the apparent lack of personal

jurisdiction. However, the Court notes for Plaintiff that the allegations in the Complaint

do not appear to support personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants.

Personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant may exist if the defendant has

either a continuous and systematic presence in the state (general jurisdiction), or sufficient

minimum contacts with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction will not

“offend traditional notions of fair play and justice” (specific jurisdiction). Int’l Shoe Co.

v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). For a court to exercise specific jurisdiction, the

nonresident defendant must undertake an act or transaction by which he purposefully

avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, the claim must arise

out of the non-resident defendant’s forum-related activities, and the exercise of

jurisdiction over the defendant must be reasonable. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453

F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal

jurisdiction. See Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d

1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2003).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-10021-JFW-AJR Date: November 25, 2024

Page 9 of 10

Title: Junius J. Joyner, III v. Carrol A. Weimer, Jr., et al.

The Complaint does not allege any purposeful availment of the State of California

by the Defendants. At best, the Complaint alleges that the Prince William County Circuit

Court mailed Plaintiff a USB drive containing records for the ongoing child custody

matters to Plaintiff’s California address. (Dkt. 1 at 7 n.1.) Thus, the Court notes for

Plaintiff that even if the Court did not lack jurisdiction for all the other reasons mentioned

above, the Court does not appear to have personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants.

F. This Action Also Appears Subject To Transfer For Improper Venue.

The federal venue statute requires that a civil action, other than one based on

diversity jurisdiction, be brought only in “(1) a judicial district where any defendant

resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located, (2) a

judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the

claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is

situated, or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as

provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the

court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Here, the Complaint alleges that venue is proper in this district because a

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred within

the jurisdiction of the Central District of California. (Dkt. 1 at 7.) However, this is

demonstrably false because the Complaint very clearly alleges that the events or omissions

giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Virginia. The only connections to California

are that Plaintiff relocated to the Central District of California on April 18, 2022, the

Prince William County Circuit Court mailed Plaintiff a USB drive to his California

address, and wages continue to be garnished from Plaintiff’s employers located in the

State of California. (Dkt. 1 at 7, 8, 10.) However, the wage garnishment that Plaintiff

complains of is based on a court order issued by the Prince William County Circuit Court

located within the Eastern District of Virginia. See 28 U.S.C. § 127(a).

Thus, it appears that venue lies in the Eastern District of Virginia, not the Central

District of California. It further appears that Plaintiff has filed the Complaint in this

district to try to avoid the prior adverse rulings of the Eastern District of Virginia in Case

No. CV 22-725-PTG-JFA. In the interest of justice, a federal court may transfer a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-10021-JFW-AJR Date: November 25, 2024

Page 10 of 10

Title: Junius J. Joyner, III v. Carrol A. Weimer, Jr., et al.

complaint filed in the wrong judicial district to the correct judicial district. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1406(a); Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, even if this

action were not subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, the action also appears to be

subject to transfer for improper venue.

II. DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why this

action should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or transferred for improper

venue. On or before December 24, 2024, Plaintiff must file a response to this Order

explaining how this Court has jurisdiction over the action and how this judicial district is a

proper venue. If Plaintiff fails to timely respond to this Order, this action may be

dismissed for failure to obey court orders and/or failure to prosecute. If Plaintiff no longer

wishes to pursue this action, he may voluntarily dismiss the action by filing a Notice of

Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). A form Notice of

Dismissal is attached for convenience.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Attachment:

CV-09, Notice of Dismissal Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a) or (c).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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