The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
DEBORAH MANEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 3:24-cv-01162
v. )
) Judge Trauger
MENTAL HEALTH COOPERATIVE, ) Magistrate Judge Frensley
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Deborah Maney, a resident of Nashville, Tennessee, filed this complaint
against Mental Health Cooperative. (Doc. No. 1).
I. FILING FEE
Plaintiff submitted an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP
Application”). (Doc. No. 2). According to Plaintiff’s IFP Application, her monthly income totals
$923 from Supplemental Social Security payments, she has no assets of any kind, she has no
monthly expenses of any kind, and she does not expect any major changes to her monthly
income or expenses in the next 12 months (Id.) Plaintiff did not provide a residential address and
states in her complaint that she is homeless. (Doc. No. 1 at 2). Because her IFP Application
reflects that she lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the full filing fee without undue
hardship, the IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED. The Clerk therefore is DIRECTED
to file the complaint in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
II. INITIAL SCREENING STANDARD
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In
doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which requires
sua sponte dismissal of an action upon certain determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review her complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999). Under
§ 1915(e), the Court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and dismiss any
complaint, or any portion thereof, if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir.
2010).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain: (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the
relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although allegations in a pro se complaint are held to “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972), “liberal construction . . . has limits.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th
Cir. 2001) (citing Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985). And pro se litigants are not
exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brown v. Matauszak, 415
F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011).
III. ALLEGED FACTS
The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was discriminated against in housing matters by the
Mental Health Cooperative because no one would help Plaintiff secure housing or an
appointment to discuss housing; Plaintiff has been told that her housing applications were lost or
she did not qualify for housing; she should be “a top priority”; she was humiliated; and these
issues have been ongoing for 26 years. (Doc. No. 1 at 3-5).1
IV. SCREENING OF THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS COMPLAINT
After conducting the initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court finds
that Plaintiff’s complaint does not satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8 and cannot
survive screening under Section 1915(e)(2).
Plaintiff brings her complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a
cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under
Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused
by a person acting under color of state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549
(6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006));
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The only named Defendant to the complaint is the Mental Health Cooperative. According
to the website of Mental Health Cooperative, it is a nonprofit agency located in Nashville,
Tennessee. See https://www.mhc-tn.org/ (last visited November 21, 2024). As a private nonprofit
agency, Mental Health Cooperative is not a state actor subject to suit under Section 1983.
1 Plaintiff’s handwritten complaint is very difficult to read and, where legible, does not always make sense. (See e.g.,
Doc. No. 1 at 4, handwriting on left side of the page). The Court has made its best attempt to fairly evaluate
Plaintiff’s allegations.
Even if Plaintiff had named a state actor as a defendant, some or all of Plaintiff’s claims
would be subject to dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself does
not contain a statute of limitations. “The statute of limitations applicable to a [Section] 1983
action is the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions under the law of the
state in which the [Section] 1983 claim arises.” Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510
F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has specifically noted that the
applicable limitations period in Tennessee is one year, based on Tennessee Code Annotated §
28-3-104(a). Howell v. Farris, 655 F. App’x 349, 351 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Hughes v.
Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2000)). Accordingly, the statute of limitations for
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims is one year. Because the acts of which she complains have been
occurring for 26 years, at least some of those claims would fall outside the one-year statute of
limitations period.
Any remaining claims that possibly could fall within the limitations period would be
subject to dismissal. The allegations set forth in the complaint do not explain what type of
discriminatory conduct in which employees of the Mental Health Cooperative allegedly engaged.
Furthermore, a person’s inability to secure an appointment at a nonprofit agency does not rise to
the level of a constitutional injury.
V. CONCLUSION
As explained above, Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis complaint is subject to dismissal under
28 U.S.C. 1915(e) because she has not named a Defendant who can be sued under Section 1983.
Accordingly, this action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an
appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).
It is so ORDERED. Uy
Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge