The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Brent Nix, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
No. 7:17-CV-00189-D
The Chemours Company FC, LLC, et
al.
Defendants.
Roger Morton, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. No. 7:17-CV-00197-D
The Chemours Company, et al.
Defendants.
Victoria Carey, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
No. 7:17-CV-00201-D
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and
Company, et al.
Defendants.
Order on Motion to Seal
Before the court is the Defendants’ Motion to Seal. D.E. 509. They request part of a
deposition transcript be maintained under seal on the docket, with a redacted version accessible,
because it contains information about sensitive business information. (D.E. 507, 507–1). There is
no opposition to the Motion to Seal.1 The court will grant the motion.
As with all aspects of the federal government, the federal courts belong to the People of
the United States. And, as a result, the public has “a general right to inspect and copy . . . judicial
records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). Allowing
public access to judicial records advances the public’s “interest in ensuring basic fairness and
deterring official misconduct not only in the outcome of certain proceedings, but also in the very
proceedings themselves.” United States ex rel. Oberg v. Nelnet, Inc., 105 F.4th 161, 172–73 (5th
Cir. 2024).
But the public’s “right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute.” Nixon, 435
U.S. at 598. “Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files, and” can deny the
public access to those records and files when they may be used “for improper purposes.” Id.
Parties regularly ask courts to shield judicial documents from the public eye. So to ensure
that the public’s right to access judicial records is not unduly limited, courts in the Fourth Circuit
“must comply with certain substantive and procedural requirements” before granting a motion to
seal. Va. Dep’t of State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 576 (4th Cir. 2004). At the outset, “the
district court . . . must determine the source of the right of access with respect to each document,
because only then can it accurately weigh the competing interests at stake.” Id. (internal citation
omitted). That source could be either the common law or the First Amendment. Id. at 575.
1 The motion notes that Plaintiffs oppose sealing of the materials. Mem. in Supp. at 7, D.E. 510. But they have filed
no pleading challenging the Motion to Seal.
2
Determining the appropriate source of the right of access is important because “the common law
‘does not afford as much substantive protection to the interests of the press and the public as does
the First Amendment.’” Id. (quoting Rushford v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th
Cir. 1988)).
The court must also give the public notice and a reasonable chance to challenge the request
to seal. Id. And it must “consider less drastic alternatives to sealing[.]” Id. Then, if it decides to
seal documents, the court must make specific findings and state the reasons for its decision to seal
over the alternatives. Id.
With these requirements in mind, the court turns to Defendants’ motion to seal.
The Defendants maintain the public’s right of access here stems from the common law, not
the First Amendment. Mem. in Supp. at 5, D.E. 510. The court assumes this to be correct.
While the common law provides less protection to the public’s right of access than the First
Amendment, it still provides a presumption of public access to judicial documents. Rushford, 846
F.2d at 253. Yet a party can overcome that presumption if it can show that “countervailing interests
heavily outweigh the public interests in access.” Id. The factors the court considers in making this
determination include “whether the records are sought for improper purposes, such as promoting
public scandals or unfairly gaining a business advantage; whether release would enhance the
public’s understanding of an important historical event; and whether the public has already had
access to the information contained in the records.” In re Knight Publ’g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235
(4th Cir. 1984).
After considering the Motion to Seal and the related filings, the court finds that it should
grant the Motion because each of the factors set out in In re Knight Publ’g Co. is satisfied. The
proposed sealed documents contain sensitive business information including strategic initiatives,
3
financial incentives, performance assessments, and non-public discussions by executives and
board members of Chemours. Some aspects of the matters discussed in the deposition may be
publicly available, but the specific information for which sealing is sought is not. Mem in Supp.
at 6. The Defendants contend it is unlikely that the materials at issue here will play a role in
adjudicating the matter. /d. And courts have concluded that it is appropriate to seal such sensitive
business information. See Nallapaty v. Nallapati, No. 5:20-CV-470-BO, 2022 WL 16984479, at
*5 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 15, 2022) (remarking that “[c]lonfidential business records have often been
recognized as sufficient to outweigh the right to public access.”).
Balancing all interests, release of these materials has little bearing on public matters but
could harm the Defendants’ interests. Based on this showing, the court finds that the circumstances
presented by this motion overcomes the common law presumption of access.
Additionally, although the public has had notice of the request to seal and a reasonable
opportunity to oppose the motion, no objections have been filed.
Finally, the court has considered less dramatic alternatives to sealing and finds that they
would be inadequate to preserve the confidentiality of business, financial, and other sensitive
information in the documents.
The court grants the Motion to Seal (D.E. 509). The Clerk shall maintain D.E. 507 and
507-1 under seal. And the Clerk shall docket the redacted versions of those materials, attached to
the Motion to Seal at Exhibit A (D.E. 509-1).
Dated: November 25, 2024 5.
Keotet 7 Alembea
Robert T. Numbers, II
United States Magistrate Judge