The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
REGINALD CRAIG LAWSON,
Plaintiff,
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-cv-00186
CITY OF ST. ALBANS, WV, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court has reviewed the Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (Document 1), the Defendant
Kanawha County’s Motion to Dismiss (Document 13) its Memorandum in Support of Defendant
Kanawha County’s Motion to Dismiss (Document 14), Defendant State of West Virginia’s Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Document 17) the Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant
State of West Virginia’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Document 18), Defendant City
of St. Albans’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Document 20) and the Memorandum of
Law in Support of Defendant City of St. Albans’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
(Document 20), collectively referred to herein as the Defendants’ Motions.
By Administrative Order (Document 7) entered on April 11, 2024, this action was referred
to the Honorable Omar J. Aboulhosn, United States Magistrate Judge, for submission to this Court
of proposed findings of fact and recommendation for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
On August 30, 2024, Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn submitted a Proposed Findings and
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Recommendation (PF&R) (Document 40), wherein it is recommended that this Court grant the
Defendants’ Motions, dismiss the Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice, and remove this matter
from the Court’s docket. The Plaintiff timely objected to the PF&R by filing his Objection to the
Recommendation to Dismiss (Document 41). For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that
the Plaintiff’s objections should be overruled.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn’s PF&R sets forth a detailed account of the relevant facts and
procedural history surrounding the Plaintiff’s claims. The Court now incorporates by reference
those facts and procedural history. In order to provide context for the ruling herein, the Court
provides the following summary.
The Plaintiff, Reginald Lawson, alleges that his brother, Tracy Lawson, provided the
Plaintiff’s name as his own when he was arrested for shoplifting by Patrolman L.A. Poe of the St.
Albans Police Department. Tracy Lawson did not have any identification on him, and the
Plaintiff’s name was printed instead in the arrest reports and criminal complaint made pursuant to
the shoplifting arrest. The Plaintiff states that Officer Poe failed to perform her official duties by
not collecting Tracy Lawson’s fingerprints for identification, and instead confirmed the false
identity through the Plaintiff’s DMV record from 1984. Tracy Lawson was then released on
personal recognizance by Magistrate Judge Shelton because of the Plaintiff’s lack of criminal
history.
When Tracy Lawson failed to appear at a later hearing, an arrest warrant containing the
Plaintiff’s name was issued. The Plaintiff was arrested, transported, and detained for seven (7)
days by the Morgantown Police Department. The shoplifting charge against the Plaintiff was
dismissed after it was determined that Tracy Lawson falsely provided the Plaintiff’s name. The
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Plaintiff now brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the City of St. Albans, Kanawha County,
and the State of West Virginia, wherein he asserts that his First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendment
rights were violated by these Defendants and their alleged agents.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
However, the Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or
legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the findings or recommendation
to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). In addition,
this Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party “makes general and conclusory
objections that do not direct the Court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and
recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). When reviewing
portions of the PF&R de novo, the Court will consider the fact that Petitioner is acting pro se, and
his pleadings will be accorded liberal construction. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976);
Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978).
APPLICABLE LAW
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint or
pleading. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521
F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Additionally, allegations “must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(d)(1). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual
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allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a complaint must contain more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, “a complaint [will not] suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid
of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). The Court must also “draw[ ] all reasonable factual
inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,
244 (4th Cir. 1999). However, statements of bare legal conclusions “are not entitled to the
assumption of truth” and are insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Furthermore,
the court need not “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or
arguments.” E. Shore Mkts., v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice . . . [because courts] ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In other words, this “plausibility standard requires a plaintiff
to demonstrate more than ‘a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’” Francis,
588 F.3d at 193 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A plaintiff must, using the complaint,
“articulate facts, when accepted as true, that ‘show’ that the plaintiff has stated a claim entitling
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him to relief.” Francis, 588 F.3d at 193 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Determining
whether a complaint states [on its face] a plausible claim for relief [which can survive a motion to
dismiss] will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
DISCUSSION
Judge Aboulhosn found that the Plaintiff failed to state a claim because his Section 1983
claims relied solely on conclusory allegations that did not involve any of the named Defendants.
Judge Aboulhosn also noted that the Plaintiff failed to respond to any of the Defendants’ arguments
for dismissal, specifically the arguments that the Plaintiff has failed to assert factual allegations
against the Defendants, that West Virginia is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, that West
Virginia is not liable under Section 1983 because it is not a “person” as required by the statute to
maintain suit, and that the Plaintiff has failed to set forth a municipal policy that caused his alleged
injuries as required to assert a Monell claim. Based on controlling case law, Judge Aboulhosn
concluded that the Plaintiff had conceded these arguments.
In his Objection filed on September 16, 2024, the Plaintiff restates the allegations contained
in the Complaint and lists statutes he argues Officer Poe and Magistrate Judge Shelton violated.
He contends that Officer Poe violated W. Va. Code § 61-5-28 (failure to perform official duties)
when she did not take Tracy Lawson’s fingerprints and submit them for identification. By failing
to take Tracy Lawson’s fingerprints, the Plaintiff alleges she also violated W. Va. Code § 15-2-24
(neglect to report fingerprints of an arrestee to the Criminal Identification Bureau). He further
alleges that Officer Poe aided Tracy Lawson in escaping by failing to perform her official duties
and is thus not entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, the Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge
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Shelton also failed to perform his official duties and violated W. Va. Code § 62-1C-1a by
improperly determining whether to release Tracy Lawson on his own recognizance.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.” A local government cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries
caused by its employees or agents unless it is “execution of a government’s policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy” that causes the injury. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
694 (1978). “[A] plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under [Section] 1983 [is
required] to identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff's injury.” Bd. of
Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (quoting Id.). “The plaintiff
must also demonstrate . . . a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of
federal rights.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 (emphasis added).1
Even accepting all of the factual allegations contained in the Plaintiff’s Complaint as true,
it is clear the Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In his Complaint,
the Plaintiff asserts nothing more than naked assertions that fail to implicate any of the named
Defendants, but instead implicate only Officer Poe and Magistrate Judge Shelton. The Plaintiff
1 The Plaintiff has not asserted a false arrest or malicious prosecution claim in his Complaint, but rather a claim that
Officer Poe’s and Magistrate Judge Shelton’s actions violated their obligation to perform their official duties. The
Plaintiff thus attempts to assert a Monell claim. As such, the Court will not determine whether the seizure of the
Plaintiff was supported by probable cause.
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has failed to cure these defects in subsequent briefing. Furthermore, the Plaintiff's motion 1s
devoid of any causal link between the actions of the Defendants and the deprivation of his federal
rights. Absent facts establishing how the Defendants are linked in any way to the asserted harms
the Plaintiff has suffered, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn’s assessment that the
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Section 1983.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, after thorough review and careful consideration, the Court ORDERS that
Plaintiff Objection to the Recommendation to Dismiss (Document 41) be OVERRULED, the
Magistrate Judge’s Proposed Findings and Recommendation (Document 40) be ADOPTED, the
Defendants’ Motions (Documents 13, 17, and 20) be GRANTED, the Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint
(Document 1) be DISMISSED with prejudice, and that this matter be removed from the Court’s
docket.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to Magistrate Judge
Aboulhosn, to counsel of record, and to any unrepresented party.
ENTER: November 25, 2024
Dire. Benger’
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA