The opinion
Filed 11/25/24 P. v. Sandoval CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B335241
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA082399)
v.
DANIEL SANDOVAL
NAVARRO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded with directions.
James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Stephanie A. Miyoshi,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
In 2012, defendant and appellant Daniel Sandoval Navarro
was found guilty of one count of murder and two counts of
attempted murder. His prison sentence included three 1-year
enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5,
subdivision (b), commonly referred to as prison priors. In 2023,
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation referred
defendant’s case to the trial court for possible recall and
resentencing in light of the passage of Senate Bill 483 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.), the enactment of section 1172.75 (former § 1171.1)
and the amendments made to section 667.5.
At the resentencing hearing in October 2023, the trial court
struck the three prison priors and reimposed the same
indeterminate terms on the murder and attempted murder
counts. Defendant appeals, contending the trial court failed to
take a valid waiver of his right to be present at the resentencing
hearing and also failed to recalculate his custody credits.
We vacate the order in part and remand for the limited
purpose of having the superior court recalculate the correct
number of custody credits to which defendant is entitled
pursuant to People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20
(Buckhalter). We otherwise affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We grant defendant’s request to take judicial notice of
our prior opinion from his direct appeal. (People v. Navarro
(July 19, 2013, B236494) [nonpub. opn.].)
On the evening of July 23, 2003, Alvaro S. was hanging out
in the courtyard of a Long Beach apartment building with his two
sons and four other men. A group of males entered the courtyard.
One of the intruding males asked who was “the one fucking with
[his] sister” and in short order, a “melee ensued.” (People v.
2
Navarro, supra, B236494.) More than one of the assailants yelled
out “This is BST,” referring to Barrio Small Town, a criminal
street gang. Defendant, his brother Francisco, Juan Manuel
Aguas and Juan Carlos Portillo were members of BST. Alvaro S.
was fatally stabbed during the attack, and two of the other men
who had been in the courtyard with him received nonfatal knife
wounds. (Ibid.) Witnesses saw and or heard two cars race from
the area. (Ibid.) One of those cars was registered to the mother
of Aguas. As it sped away, it crashed into a car and flipped over.
The occupants climbed from the wreck and fled. (Ibid.)
Defendant was identified in court by Javier S. as one of the
men involved in the attack. Javier thought defendant was one of
the attackers wielding a knife. Testimony from the investigating
officers and detectives confirmed that Javier had also identified
defendant in a photographic lineup as one of the attackers.
(People v. Navarro, supra, B236494.) Other evidence
demonstrated that Benjamin E. and John E. had identified
defendant in a photographic lineup. Benjamin wrote defendant
“ ‘might have been there that night’ ” and John wrote defendant
“ ‘was there that night.’ ” (Ibid.)
DNA testing performed on numerous broken bottles
recovered from an alley near the crime scene established that
biological material from one of the bottles matched defendant’s
DNA profile. (People v. Navarro, supra, B236494.)
Erick Moran, an accomplice who testified pursuant to an
immunity agreement, said that in July 2003, he was dating
Liliana, the sister of Aguas. Liliana told Moran that “some guys”
from the KA’s, a tagging crew from Long Beach, had harassed her
and pushed her against a wall. (People v. Navarro, supra,
B236494.) Moran went to Portillo’s house. Aguas and other BST
3
members were there. Moran told them what had happened to
Liliana. (Ibid.)
“Moran, Aguas, and Portillo got in a car to drive to Sixth
Street.” (People v. Navarro, supra, B236494.) People in one or
possibly two other cars followed them. They parked in an alley
near an apartment building. Aguas went into the courtyard first,
but “ ‘[e]verybody’ in the alley went into the courtyard.” (Ibid.)
Aguas “ ‘[s]ocked some guy,’ ” and then chased him when he ran.
(Ibid.) The intruders who went in the courtyard “ ‘were fighting
and some people were running out through the front.’ ” (Ibid.)
Moran saw Portillo and Aguas fighting. When asked initially if
he saw defendant or his brother go into the courtyard, Moran
said no. But on redirect, “he testified that he did remember
seeing them.” (Ibid.) Moran said he did not personally know
everyone who was involved. (Ibid.)
Moran said he and the others fled the scene in separate
cars. He “heard or saw one of the cars crash. The car ‘flipped,’
and two to four people got out and ran away.” (People v. Navarro,
supra, B236494.) The car belonged to Aguas’s mother. (Ibid.)
Jesus Prieto, another member of BST, testified and
confirmed that defendant, his brother Francisco, Aguas and
Portillo were all members of BST, as was Moran. Prieto told the
detectives about a night when he, defendant and his brother
Francisco, Aguas and Portillo were at Portillo’s house drinking.
“At some point, Prieto passed out. The next day or a couple of
days later, Portillo . . . made statements to the effect that ‘they
got in a fight’ or ‘got down with some gang,’ or ‘taggers.’ It was
the same night they ‘crashed the car.’ Portillo said ‘he fucked
some dudes up.’ ” (People v. Navarro, supra, B236494.)
4
Defendant, Francisco, Aguas and Portillo were charged
with one count of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1)
and two counts of attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664;
counts 2 & 3) arising from the attack. Gang allegations were
alleged as to all three counts. (People v. Navarro, supra,
B236494.)
The jury found defendant guilty on all three counts with
true findings the offenses were committed for the benefit of, at
the direction of or in association with a criminal street gang.
Defendant was sentenced to 55 years to life, plus three years,
calculated as follows: 25 years to life on count 1, plus consecutive
15 years to life terms on counts 2 and 3, plus three 1-year
enhancements for defendant’s three prison priors (Pen. Code,
§ 667.5). The court stayed a 10-year gang enhancement and
awarded defendant 733 actual days of presentence custody
credits.
In 2013, we affirmed defendant’s conviction. (People v.
Navarro, supra, B236494.)
After defendant’s judgment became final, the Legislature
passed Senate Bill 483, which, as relevant here, enacted Penal
Code section 1172.75. The new statute provides that “[a]ny
sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1,
2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (a).) The statute provides a procedural mechanism for
defendants to obtain a review of their sentences and possible
resentencing.
5
In March 2023, the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation referred defendant’s case to the trial court for
possible recall and resentencing.
The court set a hearing date pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.75 and the parties filed briefs. Defendant requested
a full resentencing, asking specifically that the court strike the
three 1-year prison priors, and run the terms on counts 2 and 3
concurrently instead of consecutively.
Counsel for the parties appeared on September 14, 2023.
Defendant was not present. Defense counsel, who appeared via
Webex, represented to the court that “[defendant] has indicated
to me he does not want to return from state prison for the
hearing.” The court advised counsel that it wanted both
attorneys to appear in person for argument and the resentencing
hearing was therefore continued to October 31, 2023.
On October 31, 2023, defendant’s appointed counsel and
the prosecutor appeared in person. Defendant was again not
present. Defense counsel told the court again, “My client is not
present. I have talked to him over the phone and he has
indicated to me that he does not want to be here.” The record
contains no further discussion of defendant’s absence and there is
no written waiver in the record before the court.
The People conceded that defendant’s three 1-year prison
priors should be stricken because they were not qualifying sexual
offenses, but otherwise opposed any other change to defendant’s
sentence.
The trial court recalled defendant’s sentence and
resentenced him as follows. The court struck the three prison
priors and declined to modify the balance of defendant’s sentence.
The court said the “interest of justice” warranted consecutive
6
sentencing on the three counts involving separate victims. The
gang enhancement was again stayed. The court said it based its
ruling on review of the court file, including the available
transcripts. The court also noted that defendant was 30 years old
at the time of the crimes with a “significant criminal record.”
Defendant’s total sentence was 55 years to life in prison. The
court’s minute order states that the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation shall recalculate total credits.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
1. Right To Be Present.
A defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all
critical stages of a criminal proceeding. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th
Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) The state constitutional right
to be present is generally deemed to be “coextensive with the
federal due process right.” (People v. Basler (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 46, 57.) Sentencing and resentencing hearings are
considered critical stages. (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th
404, 508 (Nieves); People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 453;
People v. Rouse (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 292, 300.)
A criminal defendant may waive his constitutional right to
be present at a critical stage in the proceeding “provided the
waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” (People v.
Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 633.) In addition, under
state statutory law, a defendant in a felony criminal case may
waive the right to be “physically or remotely present” but such
waiver must “be in writing and filed with the court or, with the
court’s consent, may be entered personally by the defendant or by
the defendant’s counsel of record.” (Pen. Code, § 977,
subd. (b)(2).) A waiver of the statutory right to be present made
7
by a defendant’s counsel is valid if counsel states “on the record
. . . that the defendant [was] advised of the right to be physically
or remotely present for the hearing at issue, [has waived that
right], and [has] agree[d] that notice to [counsel] that the
defendant’s physical or remote presence [is required] at a future
date” shall be notice to the defendant. (Id., subd. (b)(2)(A).)
Here, defense counsel twice represented to the court that he had
spoken with defendant about the hearing and that defendant had
stated he did not want to attend.
In deciding whether a defendant has knowingly and
voluntarily waived his constitutional right to be present, our
Supreme Court has said, that “[a]t a minimum, there must be
some evidence that the defendant understood the right he was
waiving and the consequences of doing so.” (People v. Davis
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 532 (Davis).) In Davis, the defendant’s
counsel made a representation to the court similar to the one
counsel made here, namely that he had discussed the hearing
with his client and he had decided to waive his presence. (Ibid.)
Davis found counsel’s representation inadequate, explaining
“There is no evidence that defense counsel informed defendant of
his right to attend the hearing; nor is there evidence that
defendant understood that by absenting himself from the hearing
he would be unable to contribute to the discussion of the contents
of the tape recording. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
presence at the hearing.” (Ibid.)
While defendant may have knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to appear during his discussions with his
counsel, the record fails to contain an adequate recitation of it.
8
Error by the trial court in failing to take a proper waiver of
the right to be present is subject to harmless error analysis.
(Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 532-533 [constitutional error
“pertaining to a defendant’s presence is evaluated under the
harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23”]; People v. Poore
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 266, 292 [distinguishing between constitutional
right to be present and state statutory right under Pen. Code,
§ 977 and holding that reversal for state statutory error “is
required ‘only if it is reasonably probable defendant would have
obtained a more favorable result absent the error’ ”].)
We conclude any error by the court in failing to take a
proper waiver of defendant’s right to be present at the
resentencing hearing was harmless by any standard. It was
defendant’s burden to establish his absence at the resentencing
hearing was prejudicial. (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th
769, 799.) Defendant has not done so.
Defendant argues the court may have been swayed by the
prosecutor’s argument that defendant had not wanted a new
probation report prepared for the hearing, suggesting that his
prison record would have shown negative behavior and no effort
at rehabilitation. He says Penal Code section 1172.75 allows the
court to consider postsentence factors in resentencing and that he
should have been present at the hearing to counter that
suggestion by the prosecutor. We are not persuaded by this
speculation. Nothing in the record indicates the court considered
postsentence factors relevant in making its resentencing choices.
Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th 404 is instructive. There, the
Supreme Court found a defendant’s absence without a valid
waiver at a restitution hearing was harmless beyond a
9
reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 509.) The court noted that defense
counsel had been aware of the proposed victim restitution
amount for some two months and had ample opportunity to
discuss it with the defendant. And, counsel had argued the
restitution issue thoroughly before the court. (Ibid.) Nieves
observed, “There is nothing in the record to indicate that [the]
defendant would have added any significant information about
her inability to pay beyond that presented by defense counsel.”
(Ibid.)
The same is true here. The trial court struck the
enhancements in accordance with the amended laws but
otherwise focused on the violent nature of the three charges
against separate victims and defendant’s past criminal history in
declining to run the counts concurrently instead of consecutively
as requested by defendant. There is nothing in the record that
supports the conclusion that defendant could have added any
information that would have been significant to the court’s
decision. Defendant’s absence was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
2. Custody Credits
The People concede defendant’s argument the superior
court was required to recalculate his custody credits in
accordance with Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th 20. Buckhalter
instructs that where, as here, “a prison term already in progress
is modified . . . , the sentencing court must recalculate and credit
against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has
already served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or
since he was originally committed and delivered to prison
custody.” (Id. at p. 29.) The trial court failed to do so, imposing
10
only the original 733 actual days of presentence custody credits
as calculated at the original sentencing in 2012.
We agree Buckhalter controls here. We remand for the
limited purpose of allowing the superior court to correctly
calculate defendant’s custody credits and to prepare a new
abstract of judgment.
DISPOSITION
The order is vacated only to the extent the superior court
failed to recalculate custody credits. The case is remanded to the
superior court for a recalculation of custody credits in accordance
with Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th 20. After recalculating
custody credits, the superior court is directed to prepare a new
abstract of judgment and transmit it to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
The order is affirmed in all other respects.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
11